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Nuclear warfare is often posited as essentially different from conventional warfare. Certainly they are conceived of as so, since dominating the cultural imagination in the Second World War (Gamson, 1989, 2). Dozens of films have been made depicting disasters caused by nuclear war in the past few decades, especially when the threat was most imminent during the cold war, and these films generally depict nuclear weapons as distinct from other violent weapons of war (Perrine viii, 1998). This differentiation is further mirrored in fiction which heavily suggests that psychologically, nuclear weapons are perceived as different and unique. But does this psychological classification reflect real differences, or are nuclear weapons simply the most dangerous weapon of war on a continuum of deadly weapons? Examining the history and the policy trends since the first use of the weapons, I argue that nuclear warfare is different not because the weapons themselves are deadlier, but because their damage is inflicted on all participants in the war; as a result, nuclear states pursue a policy of deterrence through mutually assured destruction (MAD).

To evaluate nuclear war and weapons in comparison with conventional war and weapons and determine their difference, if any does exist, I will use two main criteria. First, I will examine the violent capabilities of nuclear weapons compared to war fought with conventional weapons and second, I will examine how these weapons are interpreted and used in international relations. I conclude that the difference between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare is not the weapons themselves, as the damage in terms of destruction of lives, infrastructure, and landscape can be matched by other forms of violence; however, the way in which nuclear weapons perform this violence causes them to be interrupted differently, and this different interpretation means that the way political entities view and use them is also different.

Nuclear weapons are understood to be distinct from conventional weapons precisely because of their increased destructive capacity, a capacity which negates the goal of warfare. Here, war is seen as a tactic used for the purpose of gaining power in a struggle between organised political groups. As such, it is a political instrument, “the resort to force to advance political purposes and to settle political conflicts between sovereign communities” (Cohen and Lee, 1986, 9). In a rational political system, in order to go to war, the party waging it must believe that the end result will be conditions so preferable to the pre-war ones that they justify both the risk and the cost of war. In short, “the object of war is to attain a better peace. Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, for one’s people, is better after the war than before” (Hart 1974, 353). If nothing can be gained by war, then it is illogical to wage.

Because nuclear warfare has the distinct possibility of destroying whole continents, it can be said it is distinct from conventional war. Moreover, the threat of its use can be utilised as an effective diplomatic tool in a way that conventional war cannot really match. This notion provides the foundations behind the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which assumes that the threat of global devastation is sufficient to deter states from conflict (Sokolski 2004, v). MAD also supports the notion that the possession or development of these weapons gives a state power, however it would be illogical for such a state to utilise them. For example, India views its official defence policy as “a doctrine which expressly calls for deterrence by threat of putative retaliation” via their nuclear force (Sokolski 2004, 293). If India were to be attacked by nuclear weapons, so long as India still retained the possibility of striking back with its own weapons – a distinct possibility as the technology stands today – then its counter-attack would be destructive enough to the aggressor as to nullify the original aims. In short, to a rational actor, nuclear warfare would never be worth the risk, and therefore, it can be suggested that possessing destructive weapons is the key to peace.

Unfortunately, the counter to this theory argues that nuclear weapons are not a special kind of weapon, and simply function as a deterrent today because they are the latest weapon. Indeed, there is a history of other weapons which have also been seen as destructive enough to destroy the aims of war. In the escalation of violence during World War II for example, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only marginally more horrific in terms of destruction of life and property than the firebombing of Tokyo and Dresden which were conducted through the use of so-called conventional weapons (Leviton 1991, 252). Moreover, the holocaust of Nanking by Japan early in the war certainly wrought similar levels devastation though it took the matter of days rather than seconds (Chang 2012, 15). Looking further back into history, civilisation-ending destruction has always been a consequence of war. When the Golden Horde of the Mongols attacked the northern Chinese Jin, the most advanced and populated cities in the world at the time, the death toll was in the millions as the Mongols ground the cities into dust. Moreover, at the time, it also appeared that death on that scale was both unprecedented and unlikely to occur again. The scale of this attack is demonstrated by this account from Arab historian Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233) “a tremendous disaster such as [this] had never happened before…It may well be that the world from now until its end…will not experience the like of it again” (Burgan 2009, 27). Looking back even earlier to the Punic Wars, Carthage was destroyed with the Roman equivalent of weapons of mass destruction: salt sewn into the ground to prevent life from ever emerging again (Cornell, 2012, 443). Biological and chemical pathogens are newer, but equally deadly and fast-acting: mustard gas, for example, became taboo after its effective use for mass-slaughter by the Germans in World War I (Price 1997, 61).

This historical overview shows that the deadliness of nuclear weapons in terms of capacities to destroy civilisations and their civilian populations is not unique. While the decades of research and development since Hiroshima and Nagasaki have certainly amplified the deadliness of the weapons, their capability to kill is not unique. What has changed from the days of Carthage, though, is the speed at which this destruction is done. This is because a state, once the victim of a nuclear attack, can possibility still retain the ability to launch a nuclear retaliation, and in so doing, create enough to do mass destruction to the victor. Complete destruction has always been a possible outcome in warfare, but the ability to win a war and still be destroyed to the point that life is no longer sustainable is unique to modernity. As nuclear scholar Cohen writes, “a state in a post-nuclear war would not be which political system would survive, but whether any would” (Cohen 1986, 9).

This categorical difference of MAD makes nuclear warfare an irrational act, waged only by a nihilist system unconcerned with its own existence. However, these weapons obviously play a role in the international system. There are two reasons for this. First, the weapons are not ubiquitous; only a few developed countries have the weapons, giving them a clear military advantage over non-nuclear states. So long as this advantage remains, deterrence via mutually assured destruction is not possible. This is one of the reasons which nuclear countries refuse to completely destroy their arsenals; moreover, it becomes a reason for non-nuclear states to pursue such weapons. “States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat that cannot be met through alternative means” (Sagan 2007, 54). Put simply, if two states are in conflict, and neither possess a weapon which will cause mutually assured destruction, the weaker state will seek such a weapon as an insurance policy. At the same time, third party states both with and without such weapons will oppose the acquisition, as expanding the nuclear club is only an advantage to the state seeking admittance.

Because having nuclear weapons is so important for deterrence, states in possession cannot abandon them nor publically claim that they will not use these weapons. This how the paradox of nuclear deterrence is reached. States seeking to avoid nuclear warfare must therefore make a credible commitment to use them; if such a commitment cannot be made, then other states will not be afraid of attacking. As Cohen summarizes: “threatening to do what would serve no political purpose [launch a war of mutually assured destruction] is the only way to avoid nuclear war” (Cohen 1986, 10).

This principle of nuclear deterrence leads to brinksmanship behaviour, where nuclear powers continually assert their readiness to use the weapons. Such behaviour can be observed especially during the Cold War, where the USSR and the USA both threatened nuclear war precisely because they did not wish it to occur. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, both states demonstrated their willingness to use weapons; it was because their wiliness was so well demonstrated that neither side felt free to use them (Trachtenberg 1985, 142). Had either power capitulated early, the other would have felt free to attack.

Since the end of the Cold War, brinkmanship behaviour exists only between actively hostile states. The USA, not having a serious rival in the unipolar international system, no longer needs to demonstrate its wiliness to use its arsenal. Where brinksmanship is seen is between states such as India and Pakistan, where both states have reason to engage in conflict and both possess nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2013, 147).

Adding to MAD, there are two other factors which determine nuclear behaviour: psychological categorisation of nuclear weapons as worse and more inhumane than other weapons, and the existence of non-rational actors with the possibility of becoming nuclear powers. The psychologically distinct category of nuclear weapons arose in part due to the significant pushback against the weapons after the Second World War. While the violence and destruction caused by the bombs was not significantly worse, as I earlier argued, the newness and manner of destruction caused them to be singled out for condemnation (Tannenwald 2007, 74). As a result, political leaders have come to see them as taboo – that using them or even advocating using them is a breach of ethnics, and that discussing using them in a democratic setting will prohibit election (Wittner 2009, 49).

Unfortunately, the existence of a nuclear taboo creates a problem for democratic politicians who must, by the principles of MAD, continue to pursue brinkmanship behaviour. As a result, a type of doublespeak emerges from nuclear powers. In order to maintain the image that they are humanitarian and with the added purposes of maintaining relative military power by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, they must condemn nuclear force. At the same time, however, these leaders must continually suggest that they are willing to use the weapons if necessary (Bundy 1988, 536).

Finally, in the post-September 11th world, nuclear powers have become increasingly concerned with the actions of non-rational or non-state actors who might use not operate by the principles of MAD. Because non-rational or non-state actors have nothing to lose, they therefore have no reason to prevent them from using such a weapon. As a result, nuclear policy of the twenty-first century has focused on containing weapons of mass destruction (Cirincion 2014, 293). This focus on containing non-state actors is because, should MAD be properly used against other rational states with comparative military power, these actors represent the greatest threat to the nuclear state.

In sum, nuclear warfare compared to conventional warfare is not different in terms of the scale of possible destruction inflicted on the losing state. However, because the destruction occurs much faster and the losing state is capable of inflicting such a serious blow to the victorious state that negates the entire purpose of war, nuclear warfare is unique. As a result, the weapons have taken on a psychological taboo as well as a commitment by rational actors not to use them, precisely by threatening to use them. These powers are also eager to see that nuclear weapons do not spread to new states or non-state actors. It is this paradox that has defined military strategy since the Second World War.

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Introduction

This discussion examines the increasing influence of NGOs in global politics and focuses specifically on the role of development NGOs and the way in which they have challenged traditional understandings of state sovereignty. The discussion focuses on development NGOs in order to understand how many such organisations have taken on roles which were traditionally seen as the preserve of the nation state, being directly involved in healthcare provision, infrastructure development and educational provision. The discussion begins with a look at the increasing importance of NGOs in international development before highlighting how this has then led to them challenging state providers in terms of influence. The final two sections of the discussion cast a critical eye on the issue and examine the extent to which these developments have directly challenged state sovereignty and also the extent to which this should be seen as a problem.

The increased role of NGOs in development

The increasing influence of NGOs in global politics is something which has taken off in the post-war years (Weber 2010). Increasingly, the trend has reached such significant proportions that international relations theorists have argued that many traditional theories of international relations such as realism are now no longer relevant in light of these increasingly important global institutions (Weber 2010). As globalisation has gathered pace, and media coverage has become ever more comprehensive the number of NGOs which now have a truly global reach has grown dramatically (Green 2008). Organisations such as Oxfam now have a comprehensive global reach and an institutional and logistical capability which makes them one of the best equipped organisations in the world (Green 2008). Both Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that this professionalisation of what were once small charities run largely by well-meaning volunteers (or frequently religious organisations), has fundamentally changed the capabilities of what these organisations are able to achieve. By logical extension, this enhanced capability therefore, gives such organisations a much greater scope and power which inevitably results in enhanced political power and relevance. A key positive is that such organisations are now able to achieve far more than was ever thought possible less than a century ago. However, the downside for some is that this power is frequently not coupled with democratic accountability and responsibility.

Large scale development NGOs and state sovereignty

The controversial element of large scale development NGOs in relation to state sovereignty comes on those occasions in which NGOs provide services which are traditionally seen as the role of the state. In some cases this is not controversial, for example in developing countries which have experienced a major natural disaster where immediate relief is urgently needed. However, in other cases where NGOs are involved in more long term provision of services, their impact on state sovereignty can be seen as being problematic. Perhaps the main reason for this is that they undermine the relationship between state and citizen and frequently undermine the sovereignty of political institutions (Riddel 2014). Whilst this is done with the best of immediate intentions writers such as Riddel (2014) and Houtzager (2006) have argued that the long term impact of this can be damaging both to the actual conditions in the particular country, but also to the political strength and accountability of the state. The argument goes that by taking over services which the state could provide, NGOs undermine the longer term planning and development of the state and effectively make it reliant on NGOs for service provision. Academics such as Houtzager (2006) argue that the only long term method for sustainable development, revolves around a strong and accountable state with genuine political power, and therefore NGOs which undermine this are in his view damaging to the longer term prospects for developing states.

A further area in which NGOs are able to undermine state sovereignty, relates to the way in which NGOs are able to undermine the diplomatic positions of sovereign states by addressing problems or issues directly at source (Thakur 2006). For example, a nation state may invoke economic sanctions on a particular state in order to create diplomatic pressure but NGOs are able to bypass this to a certain extent by taking funds direct from citizens and using them in the way they best see fit. By remaining unaccountable to direct state power they are able to challenge the power of the state in numerous ways.

Overall, it can therefore be seen that, in the vast majority of cases NGOs have never directly challenged state sovereignty but by virtue of their contribution towards a variety of issues, they have gradually eroded the role of the state in many areas. Also in some cases it can be seen that large scale NGOs have at times directly challenged the power of the state through the provision of certain services and their sheer size and capability. Broadly speaking however there is no major evidence put forward by any of the writers examined which would suggest that NGOs have directly challenged or undermined state sovereignty. Rather, the picture which emerges points to one in which state sovereignty and power is undermined by global governance institutions and large corporations, and then the gaps are plugged (or attempts are made to plug them) by myriad forms of NGO. This point is also supported by Eimer (2009).

Critical Reflection

The relationship between the modern political and international landscape and state sovereignty is particularly problematic. The role of supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the EU frequently make the news because of what is seen as their lack of true democratic accountability. However, the arguments made above show how NGOs are also contributing to this challenge on state sovereignty. The extent to which one sees this as a problem, is largely driven by the perspective one takes on the importance of the state as a provider of security and long term support. A key threat of such significant NGO involvement is that in huge numbers of cases the NGO in question is based in a different country to that country which it is attempting to help. This therefore, makes longer term security much harder to obtain from such involvement.

However, in contrast to this view it must also be noted that the vast majority of major NGOs work closely with many governments in attempting to support and develop infrastructures and key provisions (for example health provision) and that the idea that they undermine sovereignty in the state is questionable. This point is highlighted by Eimer (2009) in relation to China with Eimer (2009) highlighting the fact that the Chinese government has actively encouraged growth in the voluntary and NGO sector within China and has even encouraged foreign NGOs to become involved. Eimer (2009 p.1) points out that;

Officials are now actively talking up the role of charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as they hope to harness the newfound enthusiasm amongst the Chinese for giving to charity and volunteering that has appeared since the Sichuan earthquake. Because it has little experience of its own of working with such groups, China plans to use some of Britain’s most famous charities as role models for their own voluntary sector.

For a country with such a strong government as China to actively introduce NGOs and third sector involvement in the country shows that they do not perceive NGOs to represent a threat to sovereignty. Eimer (2009 p.1) highlights points made by Dr. Wang (the Minister in charge of NGOs in China) as directly looking towards major existing NGOs as examples of what can be achieved, arguing that;

Dr. Wang is looking to Britain and charities like Save the Children, which works extensively in China, for examples of how best to boost China’s charity sector. “The way Save the Children operates is a good example for us,” said Dr Wang. “I think we can learn a lot from the UK. For example, the laws relating to charities, the institutions that govern charities and the way they are managed, both large charities and grassroots ones. In the past, charities played a very important role in transforming the UK into a modern society.

However, it must also be acknowledged here that the Chinese government has such a strong power base that there are virtually no institutions on the planet which could challenge them. That said, it does provide some evidence that NGOs do not necessarily undermine sovereignty even where they have major involvement. Indeed, many such as Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that even with well-functioning democratic governments in wealthy states there are still areas in which NGOs can improve life for the majority of people without remotely undermining state sovereignty.

It is certainly important to acknowledged that the way in which globalisation has changed the world is unlikely to be reversed any time soon, and there is therefore an important question to be asked as to whether NGOs themselves are to blame for declining state power, or whether or not forces such as large corporations, supranational institutions and other similar entities are more to blame. Certainly NGOs have increased their role whilst state sovereignty has undoubtedly declined but this relationship could very well be as much coincidental as it is a correlation. Given the evidence examined above, it would therefore, seem much more plausible to argue that NGOs have not caused a trend of declining state sovereignty but that their increased involvement in plugging important provisions gaps within many countries has undoubtedly contributed or cemented this trend in place. Fundamentally however, it can be argued that this does not represent a significant issue for the majority of states.

It can therefore be argued, that the rise of NGOs has gone hand in hand with a decline in state sovereignty, particularly in some of the world’s poorest countries but that this decline in state power is unlikely to have been driven by NGOs and is much more likely to have been driven by other international forces. In many ways, the most likely outcome here is that NGOs have stepped in to fill in the gaps in provision, which have been left by the decline of state sovereignty caused by the increased power of institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major global corporations. This is certainly the view of a number of thinkers including Peet (2003) and Stiglitz (2002).

It can therefore be seen, that the evidence and arguments examined above point more to a situation in which NGOs are not directly responsible for the erosion of state sovereignty in many cases but that they have probably indirectly contributed towards it. There is certainly a problematic relationship between many NGOs and many poorer states in the sense that many NGOs have now become so powerful that they are able to support large parts of state infrastructure in many countries (Green 2008). In addition there is strong evidence that many NGOs have intervened in states and have contradicted the power of the state by introducing policies such as supporting women into jobs (unpopular in some countries) and encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour in many other states through the use of microfinance (Smith 2013).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can therefore be argued, that the rise in power of NGOs has certainly coincided with declining sovereignty in many of the world’s poorest countries and indeed in some of the wealthiest as well. However, the arguments examined above show that to solely blame NGOs for this decline in sovereignty is likely to be wrong. Indeed, much of the evidence suggests that the decline in sovereignty has been pushed much more by organisations such as global corporations and particularly global governance institutions which have comprehensively challenged state power in many institutions. That said, it must also be acknowledged that many of the larger NGOs have evolved into very powerful institutions which have directly challenged state power. To the extent that this trend is likely to continue, it must therefore be acknowledged, that NGOs have contributed to a decline in state sovereignty but also that they are certainly not the root cause of this decline.

References

Chang, H-J. (2003). Rethinking Development Economics. London: Anthem Press.

Eimer, D. (2009). China turns to British charities to plug gaps left by communist party. London: The Telegraph. [available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4526715/China-turns-to-British-charities-to-plug-gaps-left-by-communist-party.html ] (accessed 21/10/2015)

Green, D. (2008). From Poverty to Power. London: Oxfam.

Houtzager, P (2006). Changing Paths: International Development And The New Politics Of Inclusion. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Krasner, S. (2001). Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Peet, R. (2003). Unholy trinity. Zed Books

Riddel, R. (2014). Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment. Crawford School of Public Policy: Development Policy Centre.

Smith, B. (2013). Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalisation and its discontents. London: W.W.Norton.

Thakur, R. (2006). The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, C. (2010). International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge.

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International co-operation in Kyoto Protocol.

The environment started to be seen as a serious issue for some during the 1970’s. Many politicians at that point in time did not regard the environment as being an important issue, although the oil crisis of 1973 did make people think about pollution and resources. Concern for the environment was manly confined to ecologists and a few fringe environmental groups such as FOTE. However, greater scientific evidence of environmental damage that could seriously damage the future of the planet placed the environment firmly on the global political agenda (Evans& Newnham, 1998, p.149). Although the environment got onto the political agenda it has not proved straightforward to gain full international co-operation over taking meaningful measures to reverse or at least halt environmental damage. Effective co-operation has been delayed by the reluctance of some countries to reduce their pollution levels, as it would mean lowering their prosperity like the United States. Also there is resentment from third world countries being told they should stop their economic development because the West have already used most of the global resources. There are issues concerning who owns the remaining natural resources and who pays for the pollution that that they cause (Bannock, Baxter & Davis, 2003, p.120).

Ecological movements are not new to the late 20th century and the early 21st century yet the amount of influence that environmentalists have is greater than ever. There were people and movements opposed to industrialisation due to its social as well at its environmental impact (Eatwell & Wright, 2003, p.231).Ecological movements would usually have far more expansive plans for reversing environmental damage and would not be popular with political leaders, consumers and voters. Politicians rather than ecological movements almost always determine the pace and direction of international co-operation on the environment. The ecological movements have won a partial victory in that the environment looks set to remain on the agenda indefinitely. The difficult part is to make sure that agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol are truly co-operative and effective rather than just meaningless gimmicks by all governments that signed up to it (Eatwell & Wright, 2003, p.250).

It was probably no coincidence that modern ecological movements emerged in the West during the 1960s when growing affluence amongst the young middle classes allowed them the chance to think about the global economy and the impact that it had upon the global environment. In the 1960s many people if they thought about the environment at all assumed it meant nothing more or less than making the air and water clean (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 262). The main political and economic to capitalism, communism may have had different aims to its capitalist rivals yet it still aimed at rapid economic growth. Neither capitalism nor communism were or are intended to be guardians of the environment. However growing knowledge of the damage being caused to the environment would force countries to co-operate with each other especially after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (Brown, 2002, p. 240). In the ever increasing consumption of natural resources and increasing levels of pollution arguably intensified the Global Warming problem and would mean that co-operation over the environment would become a major area of contention. For the instance the United States consumption of oil increased by 300 per cent between 1950 and the start of the oil crisis in 1973. The highly ineffective factories of the Soviet Union produced almost as much as the United States for the production of far fewer goods (Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 252-253).

Complacency about the environment started to be lifted during the 1970s eventually leading to international protocols to reduce pollution. The oil crisis of 1973 led to some attempts to find alternatives to fossil fuels although it did nothing in the long term to reduce oil consumption even if it did hurt the pockets of Western motorists and Third World governments. As the human population continues to grow upwards of 6 billion plus beyond the use of resources and resulting pollution will grow (Nicholson, 1998, p.157). Environmental and ecological movements started to make headway in Western Europe and North America with concerns about acid rain, the emission of CFC’s reducing the ozone layer and most significantly global warming (Brown, 2001, p.252).

Global warming is now a concern of most governments although they do not have an equal say as to the policies that should be pursued to stop or reverse the process. Rising sea levels are more of a threat to the Netherlands, parts of Britain or Bangladesh than they are to the United States, Russia and China. The relative wealth of the Netherlands and Britain make their co-operation with the Kyoto Protocol than that of Bangladesh. The exclusion of the United States, Russia and China plus India would seriously damage the co-operation needed to make the Kyoto Protocol near being effective (Nicholson, 1998, p.165).

It has been encouraging that has been co-operation between governments over the environment. However, that co-operation has to be bought about by a process of negotiations and compromises with little to force countries, especially more powerful ones such as the United States, Russia and China into agreeing to effective measures to protect the environment. Aside from appealing to sense and reason there is little way of enforcing measures agreed at the Kyoto Protocol or any other environmental summit. The Kyoto Protocol, like its predecessor the Rio Earth summit, was the result of long drawn out talks similar in complexity to the GATT rounds or EU treaties or summits. Co-operation over the environment is often to the minimum restrictions and measures that can be agreed rather than the maximum. The agreements over reducing CFC (chloroflurocarbons) emissions can be regarded as starting the process on international co-operation to slow down environmental damage although it amply demonstrated that politicians are only willing to take action once there is enough scientific of environmental damage. By that time much damage has already been done (Brown, 2002, p. 240).

The Rio Earth Summit was intended to introduce measures and co-operation to tackle global warming on a greater scale. To a certain extent it succeeded in producing co-operation even if it was hampered by the unwillingness of the Bush senior administration to agree to the most stringent measures that could have been agreed. The United States remains the world’s largest individual polluting country yet its governments are generally unwilling to jeopardise American living standards to save the planet. The Bush senior administration did not however block the agreement at R as it could have done. The United States government came under pressure from other governments to take greater action yet did yield to it (Brown, 2002, p. 243).

Third World and developing countries were not happy and remain unhappy that the United States does not do more to protect the environment as it gained most from the way that the global environment operates (Nicholson, 1998, p.173). Other countries mainly in the EU and Scandinavia have been more active in seeing the environment as being of vital importance and wished to go further that the agreements reached at Rio. The EU can play its part in protecting the environment as it can pass legislation and regulations that its member states have to conform to (McCormick, 2002, p.128).

EU states plus Australia and New Zealand played their part in the Kyoto Protocol. Once again the United States proved reluctant to adopt tough measures. That reluctance was despite President Bill Clinton being keen on environmental issues. He was unwilling to cut American living standards and also realised that tough restriction were unlikely to get through a Republican controlled Congress (Crystal, 2003, p.513).

European countries such as Britain, France and Germany were unhappy about the lack of United States support for the Kyoto Protocol. Tony Blair was especially disappointed as he expected Bill Clinton to have been more supportive of the Kyoto Protocol and protecting the environment (Young, 2003, p.150). George W Bush was even less willing for the United States to be constrained by any parts of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed prior to the 9/11 attacks the bush administration seemed cool to the idea of government co-operation most issues. Since 9/11 the United States government has been more interested in pursuing the war on terrorism rather than co-operation to uphold the Kyoto Protocol or protecting the environment. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have done harm to the environment. The soaring oil prices seen after the invasion of Iraq may however boost the moves towards finding alternative fuels as much as any of the target son reducing emissions agreed within the Kyoto Protocol would have done on their own. OPEC countries seem far happier to cut oil production to maintain high prices, as it is not in their economic interests to co-operate with other countries to reduce oil production. Such is the demand for oil that the consumption does not decline even when prices are at record levels. Western governments when talking with OPEC countries would rather get the oil production quotas raised than discuss co-operation towards reduced consumption (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 397).

The need for global co-operation to achieve the 5 per cent emission targets set out with the Kyoto Protocol would seem to gathering with global warming seeming to contribute to climate changes that are increasingly costly and dangerous(Crystal, 2003, p. 513). Climate changes have and will make floods and droughts more common whilst lack of adequate food and water supplies will contribute to greater instances of famine and severe poverty. Whilst countries can take steps to avoid economic problems there is little they can do to stop a hurricane or tsunami. The costs of reducing pollution or improving irrigation and building up flood protection with no certainty that they will be successful (Eatwell and Wright, 2003, p. 251). There was large-scale international co-operation to help the Asian countries devastated by the tsunami of December 2004. Countries can only hope that such disasters are confined to unpopulated or lightly populated areas to keep death and destruction to a minimum. Aside from such hopes countries can increase their levels of co-operation by encouraging recycling, energy and water conservation schemes to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.

Therefore although the Kyoto Protocol was a sign of global co-operation to start reducing pollution and trying to make the global environment safer it has had its limitations. The failure of the United States to co-operate with the process means that the world’s greatest polluter is not taking active steps to help protect the environment. Perhaps that might change depending on who succeeds George W Bush to the presidency. Not every country has signed up to the Kyoto Protocol and of those that did not all have ratified it. Should the current high oil prices continue there maybe co-operation to find alternative fuels that are cheaper and possibly cause less pollution? Some countries are more committed to co-operation in order to protect the environment. The member states of the EU are formerly aiming towards sustainable development and the mission reductions agreed to as part of the Kyoto Protocols.

The selfishness of the United States and other countries that fail to co-operate to reduce environmental damage will come back to haunt us all and leave a terrible legacy to our descendants to deal with its full consequences. However the Rio Earth Summit and the Kyoto Protocols have provided a framework for global co-operation that needs to be built upon. Perhaps global co-operation could be increased through the auspices of the United Nations and aided by scientific evidence of the urgent need to act now. People should also consider acting on an individual and community basis to conserve and protect the environment as best they could by recycling and conserving water and energy.

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In his 1946 Iron Curtain speech, Winston Churchill (2015, n. pag.) stated that “[n]either the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the [UK] and the United States.” The end of World War II did indeed mark the start of a special relationship between the two nations and it has been characterised by political, diplomatic, economic and military relations as well as shared values and strategic objectives in the intervening years (Wallace & Phillips, 2009). However, there has been significant coverage and analysis of the special relationship since the 2008 election of Barack Obama as US President, with many political commentators, academics and journalists alike speculating as to how relevant such a relationship may now be as a result of changing strategy on the part of both nations. This essay will establish the state of the special relationship between the UK and the United States prior to the election of Barack Obama before exploring the political, economic and social changes that occurred in the wake of his inauguration. This will be done with a view to concluding that 2008 was a watershed for the special relationship as a result of changing US and UK priorities, transitional leadership and the global financial crisis. However, despite the evolution of the special relationship as a result of a shifting global political and economic climate, it is still a key strategic alliance that is relevant to the security of both states and the international community as a whole today.

Prior to 2008, the special relationship between the UK and US had the purpose of forming close cooperation between the two in terms of nuclear weapons technology, economic activity, trade and military planning and execution, amongst other areas (Wither, 2006). In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it forged a mutual recovery and support in the rebuilding of states that had been damaged by the war with the added point of America becoming the global leader (Arnold, 2014; Friedman, 2007). Lee (2010) argues that the UK was the weaker partner throughout the second half of the 20th century was a result of the fact that the defence cooperation between the two was dominated by the US, who had larger strategic forces and often demanded UK cooperation in initiatives during the Cold War. Wright (2002) supplements this perspective and notes that this imbalance persisted into the 21st century as a result of the UK’s backing of George W. Bush’s actions in the wake of 9/11 in exchange for maintaining British influence internationally. The British support for US foreign and security policy in the aftermath of 9/11, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq, suggested that the special relationship remained strong despite the fact that it did not have popular support in Britain and raised significant questions as to whether it was in the best interests of the UK to follow American international strategy (Dumbrell, 2009). However, regardless of the controversy that surrounded the actions of both nations, there can be little doubt that there were strong political, strategic and military links in place prior to the election of Obama in 2008.

Following Obama’s election in 2008, the special relationship has been called into question as a direct result of the ideological disparities between the new President and his predecessor. Obama’s diplomatic objectives and strategic goals departed significantly from the approach taken towards alliances and security by George W. Bush. For example, Dumbrell (2009) notes that Obama had an ambivalence towards the protectionist strategy that had previously been employed and those applying pressure on the president to continue to pursue it as well as committing to diplomacy with other European states to encourage engagement in Afghanistan. As such, the foundation of the special relationship had become distorted as a direct result of the fact that Obama did not wish to prioritise relations with Britain in order to secure an ally in the international community based on a traditional mutual need. Indeed, both Gordon Brown and Barack Obama sought to address global issues like climate change (Dumbrell, 2013) and the restructuring of international institutions to create an effective and efficient global society (Dumbrell, 2008). These issues were not prioritised on Bush’s agenda and the cooperation between the US and UK on them provides evidence of a shift in focus. However, the fact that both pledged to cooperate on matters of international rather than domestic importance does underscore the fact that diplomatic and political relations were still in place despite Obama’s determination to redefine US foreign policy. As such, the special relationship did change in the field of diplomacy but remained resolutely in place.

In highlighting Obama’s tentative departure from the traditional American protectionist stance, Dumbrell (2009) also drew attention to the fact that Obama sought to build military alliances to strengthen his position in Afghanistan and this also impacted upon that particular aspect of the special relationship. For example, Self (2010) states that Obama exerted pressure on the British government into committing more troops to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. This was done via coercive rhetoric in a bid to overcome policy differences that were geared towards protecting the British national interest in a time of economic crisis. As such, there was significant conflict in the area of military cooperation because of the circumstances that had changed the priorities of both nations. The military element of the special relationship also evolved after the inauguration of Obama in other ways that were directly linked to the shift in American strategic priorities (Wither, 2006). For example, Wither (2006, p. 47) argues that:

…the longstanding defence partnership is threatened by a number of factors, including interoperability problems, the UK’s national and defence spending priorities, the likely impact of a decision to replace Trident and the decline in the importance of the transatlantic strategic partnership in NATO.

This identifies several areas where US priorities were distinctly different to those of the UK and therefore marks a major disjunction between the policies of both. This had not existed before as the UK had actively supported the US in its global endeavours, often without question (Dumbrell, 2009). There can be no doubt that the UK was not able to do so to the same extent after 2008. British military capabilities were significantly reduced in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, which raised significant questions about the UK’s ability to contribute to global security as well as compromising any future usefulness in collaborative overseas operations (Wither, 2006). This was also paired with a reluctance to aid Obama via bilateral agreements to take action overseas, with a prime example being parliament’s rejection of Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposal to ally with Obama and commit to air strikes in Syria in 2013 and the resultant strained relationship between the two leaders (Rothkopf, 2014). As a consequence, the special relationship had fundamentally changed in numerous ways based upon the reluctance of the UK to tow the American line and the frustration that manifested in the military relationship between the two, at least on a governmental level if not on the ground where cooperation did occur.

Although cooperation may not have been as forthcoming in a military context as it had been prior to 2008, there are areas of policy and the special relationship in which new forms of cooperation flourished. For example, according to Wallace and Phillips (2009, p, 263), the “…US-UK special relationship today has a political and ideological superstructure and an embedded military and intelligence substructure.” This suggests that there is active cooperation between the two in the intelligence sphere and that is reinforced by the creation of a National Security Strategy Board, which was designed to provide a clear line of communication between officials in the UK and the US to discuss security and strategy as and when necessary (Watt, 2011). In addition, there are ongoing intelligence operations that require cooperation between the two, most notably the running of CIA networks within British communities in conjunction with MI5 in order to prevent terrorist attacks (Svendson, 2010). In effect, stronger links have developed in this particular area of the relationship and illuminate how it has changed based upon need.

The economic aspect of the special relationship also demands scrutiny. Despite the global economic crisis that damaged both the US and UK economies significantly there is extensive economic activity that ties them together, including trade and investment that renders each the largest investor in the other (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010). This irrevocably bound the nations together and provided a point of cooperation that was seemingly unaffected by global goals as it benefitted both nations. Indeed, Stacey et al (2015, n. pag.) note that Obama perceived the US and UK economies as the two that were “standing out at a time when a lot of other countries are having problems” at the beginning of 2015, thus ostensibly reaffirming the special relationship publically. The implication here is that the strength of both economies reinforced the relationship as a result of the ongoing benefits that both nations were able to reap from the situation. It should be noted that there were points of disagreement, such as the fact that Obama sought to insert clauses into World Trade Organisation UK stimulus packages that were designed to protect American industry and jobs. However, these did not actively impact upon the economic support or cooperation that one provided the other. In effect, this particular area of the special relationship changed very little despite the global economic climate and the uncertainty it introduced impacting upon other areas.

However, despite the changes to the special relationship illustrated above, there are certain elements of it that have altered little since 2008. For example, despite the fact that Obama has favoured a partnership with the collective of European states rather than one nation, the UK is still the weaker partner in the relationship: “…relief that [Obama’s] first phone call to a European leader was to Gordon Brown, indicates how dependent Britain’s claim to global status is on Washington’s approval” (Wallace & Phillips, 2009, p. 283). Although the UK is no longer a bridge to Europe as a result of Obama’s desire to establish relationships with the European Union and its individual states (Cameron, 2007), it still maintains the closest relationship of all European states to the US and continues to be its closest ally. This is important in determining how far the special relationship had changed and denotes the presence of common ground that has endured from the end of World War II and is still in place.

In conclusion, the analysis in this essay points to the special relationship between the UK and United States undergoing a fundamental change in the wake of the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. Although the channels of communication remained open and were consolidated as a result of cooperation in the field of intelligence and via the new National Security Strategy Board, the strategic goals of both nations were undoubtedly impacted by economic crisis, involvement on a changing international stage and the need to develop enhanced relations with other European nations. There is also evidence of friction between the two nations and this manifests in an unwillingness to support the other unless initiatives and policies were also in the national interest. These points outline how the special relationship changed on an ideological and a practical level. However, the economic element of the special relationship remained intact, in spite of the attempts by the US government to insert clauses into stimulus agreements to aid the American economy, and this underlined the remaining importance of each power to the other. As such, the analysis reinforces the idea that 2008 was a watershed for the US-UK special relationship as a result of the impact that changing priorities, transitional leadership and the global financial crisis had on both nations. There has certainly been a need for the evolution of the special relationship as a result of a shifting global political and economic climate but the relations between the US and UK still facilitate the maintenance of a key strategic alliance that is relevant to the security of both states and responds to the demand for global leadership by the international community today.

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Feminism is a political movement that seeks to overturn gender inequalities between men and women (Blunt and Wills, 2000: p. 90). It is concerned with the power relations that influence not only how individuals relate to each other, but how spheres of life are gendered in particular ways. Feminism is therefore, inherently linked to international law and is one of the ways in which it can be theorised. While the international legal system may be broadening in scope, it remains narrow in perspective. In particular, the boundaries and limits of international law can be seen from a critical and feminist perspective. Feminist legal theory is comprised of two broad strands. The first is to analyse and critically interrogate the implicit and masculinist assumptions of international law in theory and in practice. The second is to reform international law such that it might better serve the interests of women across the world. It has been argued that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’ (Hunter-Williams, 2009). However, despite this criticism, feminist theories have much to contribute to the study of international law. The importance of feminist theories in international law can be seen through the inadequacies of traditional theories of law and also in the application of feminist theories in areas such as human trafficking and refugee law. The absence of women in international law has distorted the discipline’s boundaries and “produced a narrow and inadequate jurisprudence that has, among other things, legitimised the unequal position of women around the world rather than challenged it” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.1). Feminist theory acts to challenge this situation and thus offers a significant contribution to the study of international law.

Traditional theories of international law have seriously failed to address the situation of women worldwide (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.25). Feminist theories, however, contribute to our understanding of international law and the global inequality of women. As such, the remainder of this essay will refute the claim that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’. It should be stressed that there is no single school of feminist jurisprudence and the categories do overlap in some respects.

Liberal feminists typically accept the language and aims of the existing domestic legal order. Charlesworth and Chinkin explain how liberal feminists “insist that the law fulfil its promise of objective regulation upon which principled decision-making is based” (2000: p.39). Their primary goal is to achieve equality of treatment between women and men in public areas, such as political participation and representation, and equal access to and equality within paid employment, market services and education (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.39). Liberal feminism therefore, has something to add to international law in that it seeks to achieve equality between men and women.

Charlesworth and Chinkin define cultural feminism to be “concerned with the identification and rehabilitation of qualities and perspectives identified as particular to women” (2000: p.40). Epistemologically, it is a standpoint theory in that it emphasises the importance of knowledge based upon experience and asserts that women’s subjugated position allows them to formulate more complete and accurate accounts of nature and social life (Harding, 1986: pp.24-29). In this area, the work of Carol Gilligan is particularly relevant. Gilligan investigates whether there is a distinctively feminine way of thinking or solving problems (Gilligan, 1982). She identifies a ‘different’ voice which bases decisions on the values of caring and connection in contrast to a style of decision-making based on abstract logic (Gilligan, 1982: p.24). The former is associated with women and the later with men (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.40). Gilligan’s work has been useful to the critical analysis of legal reasoning, which lays claim to abstract, objective decision making. Accordingly, “if legal reasoning simply reproduces a masculine type of reasoning, its objectivity and authority are reduced” (Charlesworth, et al., 1991: p.615). This illustrates the contribution of cultural feminism to international legal theory.

Radical feminism explains women’s inequality as the product of domination of women by men. Catherine Mackinnon has been a consistent exponent of this view. Her view is that the law keeps women ‘out and down’ (Mackinnon, 1987: p.205) by preserving a hierarchical system based on gender and sex. Radical feminism has paid attention to the public/private dichotomies that also feature in liberal thought. The public realm of the workplace, the law, economics, politics and intellectual and cultural life is regarded as the natural province of men; while the private world of the home, the hearth and children is seen as the appropriate domain of women (Charlesworth et al., 1991: p.626). This dichotomy has led to a debate amongst feminist scholars over whether this distinction often operates to obscure or legitimate men’s domination of women. This dispute could be seen to weaken radical feminist theory. However, the awareness it raises of the domination of women by men and particularly the hierarchical system of international law outweighs its flaws.

Feminist campaigns have not only been restricted to women from the Global North. The term ‘third world feminisms’ refers to approaches developed by women from the Global South and women of colour in the Global North. These approaches explore the differences among, as well as between, men and women. For instance, Alice Walker coined the term ‘womanism’ (1984, quoted in Blunt and Wills, 2000: p. 114) because many black feminists prefer the term ‘womanism’ to ‘feminism’, as the later has been largely white and largely uncritical of its whiteness. Charlesworth et al. assess third world feminisms in terms of the notion of a ‘different voice’ (1991: p.615) in international law. The authors argue that third world states have challenged international law as either disadvantageous to them or inadequate to their needs (Charlesworth et al.: p.616). However, they also suggest that although the challenge of the ‘different voice’ of the developing nations to international law has been fundamental, it has focused on disparities in economic position and has not questioned the silence of half the world’s population in the creation of international law, or the unequal impact of rules of international law on women (1991: p. 618). Despite the limitations of third world feminisms, it still provides an important contribution to international law in that it highlights the application of Western feminist theories to third world communities and societies (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.46).

The importance of the contribution of feminist theories to international law can be seen in practice in relation to human trafficking. In December 2000, over 80 countries signed the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol), (Doezema, 2002: p.20). The Trafficking Protocol works to conceptualise an international problem; it established the first definition of trafficking in international law and put in place a set of measures for international co-operation to address this problem (Sullivan, 2003: p.68). The Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion” (United Nations, 2003: p.2). Trafficking in women for the sex industry is highly profitable for those running the trade. The UN estimated that 4 million people were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of USD 7 billion for criminal groups (Sassen, 2002). Feminists and feminist organisations were particularly involved in discussions about the text of the Trafficking Protocol (Sullivan, 2003: pp.67-68). Feminist lobbying regarding the Protocol was split into two ‘camps’ espousing differing views on prostitution. One group, the Human Rights Caucus, viewed prostitution as legitimate labour. The other, represented by the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), considered all forms of prostitution to be a violation of women’s human rights.

Differences about the possibilities of distinguishing between free and forced prostitution divided feminists. Consequently, the definition of trafficking incorporated in the Protocol has some important weaknesses. Furthermore, the debate amongst feminists on this topic has fuelled claims that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’ (Hunter-Williams, 2009). However, the Protocol does have its strengths. The Trafficking Protocol has had significant worldwide impact on the status of women. As such feminist theory should be seen as making an important contribution to the study of international law.

A further area in which feminist theories are viewed as important in international law is that of refugee law. Carving out territory for refugee women within mainstream legal realms has been one way that feminists have successfully redressed their invisibility within refugee discourse (Oswin, 2001). Efforts have largely focused on eliminating the male bias within the legal definition of ‘refugee’ in order to incorporate the experiences of refugee women into refugee status determination processes. Emphasis has also been placed upon the recognition of violence against women as a ground of persecution. Those feminists who have sought to incorporate women’s experiences into refugee law can claim success on a variety fronts. For instance, the UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, adopted in 1991, emphasises the fact that gender-based persecution exists and should be recognised by ‘refugee-receiving’ states as a basis for asylum (Oswin, 2001: p.350). In this way, feminist efforts have been instrumental in putting refugee women’s experiences on the agenda of international refugee law. However, it could be proposed that feminist theories have not had a substantial involvement in refugee law as feminists “have only been granted a small portion of what is already extremely finite territory” (Oswin, 2001: p.347).

A final example of the significant impact that feminist theory has had on the study of international law is that of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. SC1325 is an eighteen-point resolution that develops an agenda for women, peace and security. It calls for the prosecution of crimes against women, increased protection of women and girls during war, the appointment of more women to the UN peacekeeping operations and field missions and an increase in women’s participation in decision making processes at the regional, national and international level (Cohn, et al., 2004: p.130). The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 31 October 2000. SC1325 is highly significant because it is the first time the Security Council has devoted an entire session to debating women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations. The resolution was influenced by feminist campaigners and the case highlights the growing influence of feminist theories on international law.

Women are on the margins of the international legal system (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.48). Charlesworth and Chinkin comment that: “Women form over half the world’s population, but their voices, in all their variety, have been thoroughly obscured by and within the international legal order” (2000: p.1). Feminist excursions into international law have been reproved for criticising the male-centredness of international law while at the same time invoking the international legal order to improve the situation for women (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.59). The implication of this is that “feminists forfeit the right to invoke international law if they point out its biases” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.59). Such claims have led to assertions that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’. However, the development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a “rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory” (Charlesworth, et al., 1991: p.613). This is highlighted by the inadequacies of traditional theories of international law, and the important contribution of feminist ideas both in theory and in practice, such as in the Trafficking Protocol and refugee law. Consequently, feminist theory can be used to “reshape the way women’s lives are understood in an international context, thus altering the boundaries of international law” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.337).

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Oswin, N. (2001) ‘Right Spaces’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3(3), pp.347-364.

Sassen, S. (2002) ‘Women’s Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Survival’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 71, pp.255-274.

Sullivan, B. (2003) ‘Trafficking in Women’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(1), pp.67-91.

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What are the main differences between ‘classical realism’ and ‘neo-realism’?
Introduction

Realism has become a foremost theory within international relations over six decades. Its contemporary construction is attributed to Hans Morgenthau and his work in the late 1940s. Morgenthau utilised previous works from scholars and strategists, which include, Ancient Greek scholar Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and his notions of the anarchic state, and the 1939 work of E.H Carr. Realism became the primary theory as the discipline of International Relations blossomed, forming political hypothesis based on its philosophies, such as Real Politik. As International Relations expanded as a discipline with Realism at its centre the theory become reformed. Kenneth Waltz succeeded in becoming the father of Neo-Realism in the same way Morgenthau had done with Realism thirty years prior. This resulted in a schism in the Realist theory between classic Realism and structural (neo) Realism.

The purpose of this essay is to investigate this split and to distinguish the major differences of the two Realist strands. These theories are vast volumes of work that have been considered by the brightest minds of discipline for several decades, the salient features of the two theories discussed in this text will offer just a glimpse into their philosophies. Investigation to compare the differences of the two shall be split into two parts, firstly examining the theoretical base and highlighting the noticeable distinctions. The second part will conceptualise these points in a practical sense, attaching them to historical events predominantly from the twentieth century.

Theoretical

Morgenthau’s key principles of Realism consider states as individuals, a ‘unified actor.’ One state represents itself, and these states are primary in international relations. Internal politics and contradictions are irrelevant as states pursue interests defined by power. Power, is a further key proponent of Morgenthau’s paradigm, he believed it central to human nature and therefore state actors. Morgenthau considered human nature as corrupt, dictated by selfishness and ego, resulting in a dangerous world constructed by egotistical greedy actors. Thus Realism possesses at its core a very pessimistic outlook of constant threat and danger, logically therefore Realism submits as one of its fundamental considerations that state actors are driven by survival and the need for greater dominance and power to create a favourable balance of power and decreasing the actors potential to diminish. (Gellman, 1988). Realists consider these attitudes to consume national interest, trumping any other concern. Self-help becomes a necessity. Reliance or trust of other actors is foolish as Machiavelli describes – “today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy” (Morgenthau, 1948).

Realisms success and prominence in international relations naturally exposed it to a series of critiques. Authors and scholars disagreed with its ideological theory and often advocated alternative theories. These included a Liberalist outlook that promotes the importance of democracy and free trade, while Marxists believe international affairs could be understood as a class struggle between capital and labour. Other theories derided the lack of morality, collectivism and simplicity in Realism. Despite it retaining several of the basic features of classical Realism, including the notions that states are primary unitary actors and power is dominant. Neo-Realism provided criticism of the classic paradigm. Structural Realism directed attention to the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than to its components (Evans and Newham, 1998). Kenneth Waltz detaches from Morgenthau’s classic Realism suggesting it to be too ‘reductionist’. He argues that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure, Realism in his view, is unable to conceptualise the international system in this way due to its varying limitation, essentially due to its behavioural methodology. (Waltz, 1979) Neo-Realism considers the traditional strand as being incapable of explaining behaviour at a level above a nation state. Waltz is described as offering defensive version of Realism, while John Mearsheimer promotes an offensive consideration of Realism, suggesting Waltz’s analysis fails to chart the aggression that exists in international relations, however they are often considered as one through neo or structural Realism. (Mearsheimer, 2013)

The idea, that international politics can be understood as a system, with an exact construct and separate structure, is both the starting point for international theory and point of departure from the traditional Realism. The fundamental concern for Neo-Realists is why do states exhibit similar foreign policy behaviour regardless of their opposing political systems and contrasting ideologies. The Cold War brought two opposing superpowers that although were socially and politically opposite behaved in a similar manner and weren’t separate in their pursuit of military power and influence. Realism in Waltz’s view was severely limited, as where other classic disciplines of international relations. Neo-Realism is designed as re-examination, a second tier explanation that fills in the gaps classic theories neglected. For example, traditional Realists remain adamant that actors are individuals in international affairs, referencing the Hobbesian notion that two entities are unable to enjoy the same thing equally and are consequently destined to become enemies. Whilst, Neo-Realists consider that relative and absolute gains are important and they may be attained by collusion through international institutions. (Waltz, 1979)

Practical

The salient theoretical differences exhibited in the first section will be strengthened in this second section by applying the theory to practical situations in order to enhance the understanding and the degree of separation. As one has discussed, traditional Realists consider that the foundation of international affairs is war, perpetrated by states. A Realist doctrine is exhibited by the actions and musings of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, during their time together during Nixon’s presidency and with Kissinger’s influence on Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. While in the theatre of the Cold War, they attempted to maximise American power in order to safeguard American security against fellow actors. Incursions in Vietnam and Korea were designed at a basic level to keep their ideology as the primary superpower and increase American dominance. Nixon’s presidency was associated also with his administrations dialogue with China, and their keenness to exploit the Sino-Soviet split in order to tip the balance of power in America’s favour, all illustrating a class Realist mentality of international relations, that it is constructed entirely between state interactions and a grasp for power. (Nye, 2007)

Another example that depicts this mentality is Thucydides work concerning The Peloponnesian War, an often-utilised example used by traditional Realists; Thucydides in his works expresses an unrelenting Athenian desire to pursue self-interest, and achieved this through the use of force and hard power. He famously wrote, “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides, 1972, p402). Thucydides sentiments illustrate the Realist notion of human nature being motivated primarily by power, and it is similar to subsequent wars throughout human history. Colin Gray a modern scholar concurs with the Realist outlook suggesting an inherent human characteristic that still drives states in the same way it did in 400 B.C (Gray,2009).

Neo-Realists tend to distance themselves from this notion of a corruptible human nature. They blame the starting of the Second World War, not on innate human corruptibility, but on the failure to achieve a recognised international system. They disagree with Realist logic that the primary reason for the Second World War was Hitler’s lust to institute his power and influence across Europe. In their estimations the disorder provided by the Treaty of Versailles was principal in throwing the world back into war. Its adoption on the behest of French, British and American states provided the opportunity and the catalyst for the Nazi Party to flourish. Resentment in Germany of the allied powers, coupled with a weak nation unable to recover because of this ‘dictate’ rendered the German economy and military perpetually weak, all contributing to Hitler’s ability to snatch power and consequently produce the elements to start a world war. The world was failed in Neo-Realist estimations by a lack of substantial system (Jervis, 1994).

The response classic Realists provide to Neo-Realists is that their re-worked form of the theory is simply presented in a way that is more structural and scientific but with the core maintaining the original doctrines offered by traditional Realism. Although Neo-Realists do not deny that their ideology is extremely similarIt is an improvement on the original theory offering a more structured and formulated paradigm., but Realists argue those alterations, which include these structural formations is what inhibits the new theory. Richard Ashley is one author that concurs with these sentiments stating traditional Realism, provides an advanced concept of analysis (Ashley, 1984). For example, even if the Treaty of Versailles did create bleak conditions on Germany that incited the Nazi’s upsurge, the fundamental lust for power Hitler exhibited in the extreme was still predominant for starting World War Two regardless of structural factors. This analysis echoes Colin Gray’s opinions regarding the characteristics exhibited from the Peloponnesian War still being relevant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and illustrates Realism relevance.

A further crucial difference between the two strands is the role of political belief or governance. Classic Realism has always established this consideration. Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Hirohito all had what was classed as un-democratic governances. Stalin, with a similar totalitarian system had initially signed a pact with Hitler, it was only the latter’s covetousness for supremacy that scuppered that particular alliance, illustrating the pessimistic nature of traditional Realism, not being able to trust other actors. Conversely, Neo-Realists, led by Waltz concluded that there is no “differentiation of function between different units, i.e. all states perform roughly the same role” (Halliday, 1994). Neo-Realism came at a time where the system had altered from what classic Realism was founded upon, a pre-war world of several great powers. The Cold War heralded a bi-polar system, dominant on nuclear weapons rendering the differing ideologies and political regimes irrelevant, it was the system that prevailed. Furthermore, America propped up highly undemocratic regimes throughout the Cold War in Asia, South America and the Middle East. Suggesting classic Realist arguments of governance systems is incomplete (Merhasimer, 2013).

Traditional Realism witnessed a degree of a resurgence post-9/11, the event itself and the subsequent fallout was deemed textbook of classic Realism. Actors had to employ self-help and act unilaterally to stop attacks and an assault on the states survival. 9/11 produced a real illustration to the strength non-state actors can have on the international relations. Although Neo-Realism maintains the classic theory consideration of state primacy, it does reference non-state actors as relevant in the international system. Additional actors however must adapt to the actions of states Waltz suggests, “When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.” (Waltz, 1979, p94) Furthermore, America’s democratic crusade dubbed ‘the war on terror’ was viewed as traditional Realism in action, inferring Morgenthau’s consideration of autocracy vs. democracy. However, Neo Realists will reference American support for very non-democratic states, such as its unwavering support for Saudi Arabia as the system still triumphing over the state and its form of governance. The actions of the US tie in with Mearsheimer’s offensive Realist outlook to seek hegemony, “great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.” (Merhasimer, 2001)

Conclusion

In conclusion whilst both strands of Realism remain constant in key areas such as the anarchic state, unitary actors and the importance of Power. Neo-Realism presents a shift away from the traditional theories offering a tangible alternative to the corruptible human nature consideration being the root of the cause conflict, as exemplified aptly by the debate on the outbreak of World War Two. However, the crucial point of departure that Neo-Realism provides is the importance given to the international system over the state, claiming that traditional Realism is inhibited by its methodology, failing to explain behaviour of an entity above the nation state. Neo-Realism allows for co-operation among states at a higher level than Realism permits, this provides an opportunity to succeed in achieving absolute and relative gains. The concept flourished during the Cold War, rejecting Morgenthau’s system of governance analysis, suggesting that states behave the same regardless whether it’s democratic or not. Neo-Realists still maintain this is relevant. Classic Realists disagree using the events of this century to prove that its methodology was always correct.

In Sum, the two differ fundamentally on approach, Neo-Realism seeks to offer a systematic and scientific approach that they believe is lacking in traditional Realism; according to its proponents it complements the original theory by correcting its fallacies, building on classic Realism emphasis on self-interest, power and the state, challenging the human nature concept and behaviour above state level.

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Recent years have seen an increase in military force being used as a tool for increasing the scope for humanitarian values within conflict zones. This paper assesses this trend, and uses a number of conflict case studies as a vehicle for evaluating this premise. In doing so, this paper considers that the Libyan intervention in 2011 offers a case study which argues that state led humanitarian intervention is borne out of a political, as opposed to a humanitarian, need. This undermines the promotion of humanitarian values.

The concept of military led humanitarian intervention can be found within a highly subjective area of academic and political thought. With regards to this, there are some commentator’s, such as Waxman (2013: n.p.) who consider that military led humanitarian intervention consists of “the use of military force to protect foreign populations from mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses” whilst others, including Marjanovic (2012: n.p.) see this particular course of action as being “a state using military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed”. With regards to this subjectivity there is a series of overlapping concepts that help to further the debate in this area. These overlapping areas can be found within a number of conceptual areas including war and conflict within which humanitarian values are negatively impacted by activities which impact upon non-combatants, these include human rights abuses. Where humanitarian values are considered, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2013) holds a perspective which suggests that these comprise of aspiration in relation to humanity, neutrality, independence, and impartiality. In this regard, therefore, one can suggest that where military forces are deployed in order to promote or support humanitarian operations it is necessary that these forces act accordingly within the boundaries of these guiding principles. In their totality, therefore, it is arguable that there exists a number of factors which need to be present where a situation occurs that requires military led humanitarian assistance.

With regards to any underpinning intervention that relates to issues covered within humanitarian interventions, Weiss (2012: 1) believes that it is possible that an underlying notion of a “responsibility to protect” is a dominating factor in contemporary geo-political thinking, however instead of this doctrinal approach being used across the globe Weiss (2012) believes that the global community tends to cherry-pick the various conflicts that it intervenes in, this is discussed elsewhere in this paper. That said, Minear & Weiss (1995) had previously indicated that any military intervention that seeks to promote humanitarian values should incorporate a post war recovery planning and redevelopment programme. However recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has seen an increase in the numbers of military led humanitarian interventions that are related to “activities undertaken to improve the human condition” (Weiss, 2012: 1). This latter issue, concerning the human condition, suggests that there has been a genuine shift in the contemporary conflict environment. This shift is primarily based on the progression from conventional warfare to of asymmetric warfare which involves a number of non-state actors and combatants. This is a factor that has not been ignored by Weiss (2012). Here the suggestion that, today, only state led military interventions can promote humanitarian values has been promoted because non-state actors are not bound by regulations and international protocols regarding the dynamics and conduct of war. Indeed this particular perspective gains an increased level of support where the current post Cold War conflict environment is considered.

For Pattison (2010) the years following the end of the Cold War have resulted in a vastly increased number of military operations that have been designed to support humanitarian values through intervention. These interventions have occurred in a plethora of collapsed or failed states and include, but are not limited to. post Gulf War (1991–2003) Iraq, Bosnia – Serbia (1995), The Balkans and Kosovo (1992-1999), East Timor (1999) Somalia (2002), Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011). These interventions, for some, also include the post 9-11 era’s intervention in to Afghanistan and latterly in Iraq (2003-2010) (Pattison, 2010). In this regards, Weiss (2012) believes that the underlying concept of humanitarian intervention has helped to increase the potential for international interventions into other states because of a need to increase the level of protection offered to non-combatants from conflict. However, the earlier indication of cherry picking conflicts offers for a greater insight into the nature of political discourses which take place at the United Nations (UN) Security Council with regards to these conflicts and where state led political aspirations are an overbearing factor in the intervention tools and choices made by states. Indeed one can argue that the current and ongoing conflict in Syria offers as a casing point particularly since all state actors which have intervened possess their own aspirations in shaping the future of that particular country (Haaretz, 2014; Press TV, 2013; Ruthven, 2014; Time, 2015). In some respects, therefore, the issue of humanitarian intervention and its related values base is being abused in order that these political aspirations can be furthered (Dagher, 2014). This aspect, however, is a perpetual factor in the international arena, particularly where realist agendas are taken into consideration (Bayliss & Smith, 2001). One area where international intervention has been encouraged is in relation to ethnic conflict.

Kaldor (1998) recognises that the end of the Cold War resulted in an increase in the frequency of ethnically charged conflicts and that these types of conflict have been offered as a rationale for international humanitarian based interventions In respect of this, Kaldor (1998) argues that the changes that have taken place within conflict dynamics that has resulted in belligerent forces not being constrained by international regulations, including the Geneva Convention protocols, Laws of Armed Conflict or relevant United Nations Charters (Kaldor, 1998) has led to humanitarian values being used as an excuse to further the political aspirations of a number of states. The result of this changed dynamic has perpetuated and has spread to a number of conflict zones around the world. However, it has led to an increase in the reliance upon conventional forces whose role has been to offer peace keeping and security services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in support of their own operations. In this respect it is noted that Christoplos, Longley, and Slaymaker (2004) consider that the intervention strategies have also altered in recent years. Here, they note that the underpinning intervention programmes now seek to promote humanitarian values and that this is evidenced by the creation of a tripartite doctrinal system which now utilises areas of national and personal rehabilitation; added to this are post war recovery programmes that are intended to help redevelop both the state and social infrastructures; finally there is the central issue of relief programmes that seek to maintain the fabric of civil society during crisis periods. For Seybolt (2007) this perspective adds weight to any argument that promotes the possibility that military humanitarian interventions can assist NGOs in their duties via the provision of security provisions. However, it is also recognised that adding external military forces into a combat zone has can lead to further complications primarily because military operations possess a potential for using force when necessary (Davidson, 2012; Ministry of Defence, 2011).

In promotion of a perspective which says that deployed military forces can utilise force is well grounded in military doctrines. For example the UK Ministry of Defence promotes a policy whereby “The peacekeeper fulfils a mandate with the strategic consent of the main warring parties, allowing a degree of freedom to fulfil its task in an impartial manner, while a sustainable peace settlement is pursued.” (Ministry of Defence, 2011: 1.1). This perspective suggests that it is possible for military personnel whose primary function is to assist NGOs as part of the promotion of humanitarian values is in fact a secondary consideration. Ultimately the use of military force within humanitarian interventions is a purely political choice that is intended to help reshape the political landscape of the affected region or state in the post conflict environment. With regards to the current Syrian conflict, one can argue that the divergent and conflicting political perspectives and aspirations is a factor which will undermine the potential for any real focus upon the promotion of humanitarian values. Indeed, it is also recognised that this eventuality does little to promote the principles of humanitarianism as argued by the likes of the ICRC (2013). In effect the possibility that military forces can conduct purely military operations, or war phase fighting, during a humanitarian intervention undermines any utilitarian or altruistic claims made by the respective political powers. In its totality this suggests that the aforementioned issue of political realism is both present and ongoing. Indeed such an argument can be backed up by a policy review of the recent and ongoing Afghan conflict.

A review of UK doctrinal papers promotes this paper’s preference that military operations incorporate the possibility that war fighting, as well as security duties, is a contingent factor in the preparations for any military force. Stabilisation programmes in the Afghanistan intervention occurred in an environment where the UK’s military “had the consent of the host nation government but no other warring party (Afghanistan: Taliban 2001 – present)……..A military force may decide in such situations that the defeat of a specific enemy is essential to the success of the operation.” (Ministry of Defence, 2011: 1.1). Essentially, therefore, in political terms it is feasible that political intentions can undermine any altruistic argument in relation to the deployment of military forces to carry out humanitarian operations. For some the recent ‘humanitarian’ intervention into Libya is an example of this outcome.

The recent UN backed military intervention in Libya was mandated via humanitarian intervention that was intended to provide relief and assistance (United Nations, 2011). The promotion of this intervention was supposed to further the seven values of humanitarian intervention, as promoted by the ICRC (2013) however one can argue that the resultant intervention was mainly politically motivated because there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Gaddafi’s regime had been a long time foe of those states which executed the intervention (USA, UK & France) (Boulton, 2008). In promotion of their intervention, the USA UK, and France had argued that a failure to intervene would result in a humanitarian crisis caused by the perpetuation of conflict. However, Kuperman (2011) argues that the resultant UN Resolution 1973 (United Nations, 2011) created conditions where the intervening military forces could operate beyond the realms of Resolution 1973. These included, for example, allowing the USA, UK, and France to conduct stabilisation operations so that the authority of the Gaddafi regime could be undermined, thereby helping to bring this conflict to a swift conclusion. In layman terms this meant military intervention via war fighting. With regards to this, Kuperman (2011) also argues that Libyan state functions were impacted, including the freezing of its financial and economic assets. It was also argued that the intervening forces of the USA, France and the UK oversaw the deployment of private military contractors whose role was to undertake anti Gaddafi operations thereby seeking to overthrow his regime (RT News, 2012). In effect, the usage of humanitarian justifications for military intervention in conflict can be defined in terms of the actions and justification of the states whose forces have been committed to operate in those areas and regions.

In its totality, therefore, the usage of military force as an effective instrument for the promotion of humanitarian values is limited. These limitations can be found within the underlying political rationales that exist within states that are prepared to commit forces for these operations, particularly where these states have an interest in the realisation of a particular outcome. Whilst humanitarian led interventions have become a mainstay of the post Cold War climate, one can argue that the promotion of the seven humanitarian values that are promoted by the ICRC (2013) are undermined by the intervening forces because of their ability to both flout their mandate, as well as their ability to conduct war fighting operations under the guise of humanitarianism. In essence, therefore, one can argue that there are genuine limits to the ability of military forces to promote humanitarian values however these limitations are not factors which states consider when seeking to intervene in any conflict.

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With reference to London, Manchester and Glasgow in the UK
Introduction

Debates on poverty and inequality have been always heated and topical. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the dogma of austerity, poverty and inequality received a newfound attention from academic and policy circles alike. What is especially interesting, for the purposes of this essay, is to look at the bare version of austerity politics and how they have fed into existing socioeconomic privation and how they are aligned with more deep seated politics dating back to Thatcherite economics and Voodoo economics (Harvey, 2005).

This essay will look at the UK and specifically London, Manchester and Glasgow, and tease out themes around poverty and inequality and how they have been animated as a direct result of policy as well as decision-making at Westminster. By and large, poverty and inequality are multifaceted concepts and should not be seen as purely economic. They intersect with legacies and collective memories and the relationship between cities and inequality is therefore going to be dynamic and complicated.

This essay first turns to delineating what cities, poverty and inequality are taken to mean and locate this discussion within a larger theoretical current and critique. The argument that will be proposed is that poverty and inequality are, put simply, manifested in their fullest extent in global cities, as they are the immediate receptors of government policy and dialogue. Although regional cities and towns are also affected, the ‘contagion’ of policy is a lot weaker and their relationship obscure. To provide evidence for this argument, this essay will examine three different socioeconomic phenomena that have stark implications for poverty and inequality, namely neoliberal austerity politics, a protracted housing crisis, and finally, deindustrialization and a one-sided focus on the City. The essay concludes with a couple of policy recommendations as to how to curtail the rise of inequality in cities.

Why global cities?

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, this essay identifies and looks into global cities as opposed to a nation as a whole. This is because the latter is more abstract and generalized, and relies on more macroeconomic assumptions. In contrast, the former is the ‘playground’ of policy and dialogue, being their proximate receptor and their locus (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2013). That is to say, global cities, in a way, symbolize what policy underlies and is about. The direct consequences that accrue allow an observer to make more credible and robust points about its relationship to inequality and poverty (Sassen, 2011). For example, if this essay were to take up national inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, the concepts would become harder to discern and the implications unclear. Much of the theoretical literature has homed in on the root causes of inequality and how this deleterious phenomenon has come about (see Atkinson, 2015). Although this essay will later touch on and attempt to trace why inequality exists and is magnified in cities, it is noteworthy that most of the research into inequality shies away from looking at the direct results it has on life in global cities.

How do we explain poverty and inequality?

Next, this essay turns to defining poverty and inequality. There is a presumption in favour of conflating these two to purely economic phenomena to be addressed by economic solutions. However, as will be examined, the case study of Glasgow is a powerful rejoinder to this conflation. Namely, it is a city that has competitive economic infrastructure and results, and yet lags behind in other crucial holistic social measurements. More broadly, poverty and inequality, as stated are complex and multifaceted. That is why it is suggested that the Gini coefficient is a fundamentally limited and misguided measurement to marshal in this essay. Instead, what would be more relevant would be more relevant is to look at the likes of Amartya Sen (2005) and his work on human capabilities and how potential can be frustrated in myriad non-economic ways. For this reason, this essay cannot properly infer from London’s high economic performance that it adequately caters to the problems of inequality and poverty. Put simply, that a global city grows does not mean that the least well off are benefiting as well. By taking this comprehensive approach, this essay will discuss how complex policy has complex consequences on people’s lives and general levels of contentedness.

The trajectory of inequality

Inequality is, by no means, novel. This discussion is embedded in a global debate about what gives rise and momentum to inequality, especially following the global financial crisis of 2008. In the core of the Western world, inequality has run amok in the past few decades, despite the fact that they have rendered modest economic growth in general (Piketty, 2014). This puzzling reality has been the subject of a lot of academic debate and contributions; some scholars have suggested that inequality is not inevitable but, in fact, beneficial, as it makes people more driven and aspirational, and more likely to celebrate and mimic such role models as Mark Zuckerberg and Warren Buffet (Lippman et al., 2005). According to this line of arguing, inequality is seen to be a by-product of entrepreneurial ability and prowess.

However, it is unlikely that this line of thought captures the deep and perplexing character of inequality. To rebut the claim that inequality is a fair reflection of talent and ability, this essay makes a contention that it is rather the result of collective deliberate decision-making (Stieglitz, 2012). This becomes particularly evident in global cities where the contradictions therein highlight that it must be more than just a lack of talent or luck that is holding people back on such a large scale. London, for example, boasts the City which is undeniably the globe’s foremost financial center and also the silicon roundabout, a very promising and booming hub of entrepreneurs. Yet, it also has areas like Peckham. Inquiring into the latter’s residents’ attitudes, it becomes plain that they feel disillusioned and failed by the capital of the United Kingdom (Glaeser et al., 2009). This area offers another side to London’s ‘success story’, as it tends to be hosts of endemic crime, destitution, childhood obesity and other negative manifestations. Therefore, to say that inequality is down to the genes you are endowed and the aspirations you form is too simplistic a story for global cities.

Another instance in which it is seen that people are adversely affected by phenomena outside of their control is that of the prolonged housing crisis that London is witnessing (Harford, 2014). Due to unprecedented demand and people looking to move in, house prices have been on a perpetual rise. What has enabled this rise has been the power that landlords have in that they can charge disproportionate amounts to tenants but they can also fund their own mortgage by letting out properties (Harford, 2014). This translates very negatively for people from lower socioeconomic strata, as they lack comparable access to credit to begin with. That is why they turn to the state and council houses which cater to that. However, the latter have also been penetrated by private landlords leading to the perverse situation whereby council housing is owned privately and can also be overcharged. This is down to political choices regarding allowing the right to buy these kinds of properties, but also creating a generally more permissive framework to buy and let property. At the same time, those at the top end of the economic spectrum have benefitted from more generous inheritance and high property tax offering a glimpse into how glaring inequality can become in global cities. To contrast that, note that Berlin has recently introduced rent controls to avoid a similar scenario (Vasagar, 2015).

It is therefore clear that people living in London have vastly different and unequal access to the most important asset of their consumption lives, namely their house, which has bad implications for their psychological wellbeing and the extent to which they can provide for their families sustainably. Big cities cannot afford to have these kinds of contradictions run within them, whereby lower strata segregate from the mainstream in the own communities and refuse to engage with political-decision making and active citizenship (Wheeler, 2005). This, in turn, exacerbates the already unsteady relationship between cities and inequality, as these groups lose morale and incentive to engage with common goals and agendas.

Neoliberalism

The global financial crisis has made a case that the United Kingdom’s government has heated and that is in favour of austerity politics. The government has engaged in discretionary benefit cuts and also has increased tuition for tertiary education, both of which disproportionally hurt the poor and therefore augment inequality. In seeing benefits reduced, a person in a big city faces profound adversity. Compounded by the housing crisis and general inflation, this person is likely to have his livelihood eroded. Their children will also have to take bloated student loans, and that is if they can afford to hold off working immediately after school. Recently, the UK government has engaged in a bait-and-switch policy whereby benefits to the poor were cut yet that was supposedly counteracted by the introduction of a ‘living’ wage (O’Connor and Gordon, 2015). Again, this example demonstrates that inequality is not an inevitable result of human nature and a random distribution of talent, but created and magnified by governments and collective communities that have bought into the austerity dogma. This has been criticised by high-profile academics such as Pikkety (2014), Stieglitz (2012), and Atkinson (2015).

The seeds of inequality were perhaps planted by Thatcherite economics and a legacy of tough-love when it comes to trade unions, workers, and the welfare state. Following Thatcher’s election, the government introduced a series of neoliberal reforms that placed socioeconomically vulnerable people in an even more precarious situation, stripped of participation in unions, their jobs, if they worked for a factory that closed down, and livelihoods as regressive taxation took its toll (Harvey, 2005). One of the most important features that is relevant for the purposes of this essay is that of deindustrialization and how it has engendered a deep north-south divide in the UK that is persistent and difficult to address. Through a strong and remorseless focus on the service industry, which was hailed as forward-looking, efficient and innovative, the UK’s industrial base concentrated in cities like Manchester and Glasgow (less so) took a back seat to the city of London (The Equity Trust, 2014). The latter has been consistently nurtured with state support and policy ever since at the expensive of other sectors, such as the manufacturing one which used to make up the backbone of the British economy. Instead, now it is, broadly speaking, lagging behind in terms of productivity as the latest findings of the CDI show (The Equity Trust, 2014).

(source: The Equity Trust, 2014)

The graph above shows pay gaps between the rich and the poor in different regions in the UK. It is clear that the pay gap in London is the most glaring, although London is by far the highest growing city. This is because the service industry caters mainly to the wealthy and lacks the traditionally job-creating economic multipliers of the industrial and manufacturing sectors that have suffered.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay first took up the ambitious task of delineating what is meant by poverty and inequality, which are inherently complicated concepts. It has also attempted to come to grips with global cities and why they should be viewed as the main reference point in any policy discussion about poverty and inequality. The relationship that this essay identified is, by no accounts static. Rather, it evolves with time and changes in government and collective dialogue. This essay has also aimed to dispel associations between growth and inequality throughout by pointing at the example of London and Glasgow, both of which should alter the reader to the holistic and insidious ways in which inequality and poverty work. The roots of inequality and poverty have also been briefly explored, looking at how they are not novel but the result of long-lasting legacies and engrained ways of political thinking. It has finally turned to how important and telling the current context is in terms of how inequality sustaining policies have been legitimized under the guise of austerity and in the name of balanced budgets.

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Introduction

On September 20th, 2001, President George W. Bush (2001, n. pag.) gave a speech addressing the events of nine days before: “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.” The speech drew upon the notion that America had been attacked and also laid the blame firmly at the door of terrorism whilst interpreting it as an act of war. Although the emotive rhetoric was designed to stir support for a response, it also heralded a new era in US foreign policy. Defined as a “foreign policy crisis” by Bolton (2008, p. 6), it was inevitable that it would elicit a response by American policymakers but the extent to which it has changed US foreign policy has been hotly debated. As such, this essay will discuss the changes in post-9/11 US foreign policy, identifying areas that marked a departure from the policy in place prior to 9/11. It will analyse each to determine the extent to which it was a direct response to the terrorist attack and evaluate how the change impacted upon long-term foreign policy strategy. This will be done with a view to concluding that many of the changes to US foreign policy in the post-9/11 era have been a response to the evolving security threat posed by terrorism and did force policy to evolve in order to accommodate strategies that address modern problems. However, those changes may have made an immediate impact but did little to alter the long-term course of US foreign policy.

Foreign policy arguably changed direction within days of 9/11 with the most immediate and most obvious change being the shift in focus towards terrorism. Bentley and Holland (2013) highlight that the focus had been foreign economic policy under Clinton but 9/11 produced a dramatic movement away from diplomacy and towards military solutions via the War on Terror. There was also movement away from policy that prioritised relations with the great powers of Russia and China. Earlier unilateralism had negatively impacted upon relations with both nations, thus causing deterioration that extended beyond the Cold War era hostilities and prevented effective relations between East and West (Cameron, 2006; Nadkarni, 2010). However, the American desire to create a “world-wide anti-terrorism alliance” (Nadkarni, 2010, p. 60) brought about a relative thaw between the nations and facilitated discourse in order to cater for shared security concerns. This change provides evidence of an immediate shift in US interests and this manifested in foreign policy. As such, this is an extremely important change that occurred post-9/11, especially as it emerged out of the first response to the attack and served to dictate US actions abroad for more than a decade afterwards.

The shift of focus from the great powers and towards terrorism provided policy space to address security threats via the three pillars of the Bush administration’s national security policy, which had become a fundamental element of foreign policy as, for the first time since World War II, the attack on American soil brought both ostensibly dichotomous strands of policy together. The pillars were missile defence (a continuation of policy prior to 9/11), pre-emption and homeland security, both of which were embraced after 9/11 in response to it (Lebovic, 2007). Although elements of this were rooted in domestic policy, the pre-emption aspect of policy was also manifest in foreign policy because non-state terrorist groups and rogue states became inextricably linked to US foreign policy as targets to be dealt with under the new priorities outlined in the wake of the terror attacks, although this was somewhat more gradual than the initial shift to focus on terrorism. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine marked a fundamental shift towards utilisation of policy that incorporates both pre-emptive action and preventative action, which marked the decline of the reliance on containment and deterrence that dictated policy from the Cold War era onwards (Jentleson, 2013; Levy, 2013). The pre-emptive strikes were indicative of a strategy that sought to defend by attacking those who posed an immediate security threat to the US and allowed policy to justify the unilateral military pursuit of specifically American interests. This suggests that 9/11 was used as an effective excuse to create foreign policy that better mirrored the ideology of the government than what was in place in the months prior to the attack.

There is extensive criticism of the policy that reinforces the assumption that the government manipulate foreign policy to suit its own ends. For example, Ryan (2008, p. 49) argues that Iraq, which was labelled a rogue state, was already a focal point of foreign policy but the events of 9/11 allowed policymakers to push their specific agenda: “Influential strategists within the Bush administration seized on the horror to gain assent from liberal Americans to move the country towards a war in Iraq that neoconservative strategists desired, but that many within the US… shunned.” Holland (2012) concurs, arguing that coercive rhetoric was used extensively in order to sell the War on Terror via culturally embedded discourse. In addition, Miles (2013, p. 110) advocates that “…Bush’s placement of rogue states at the centre of America’s response to 9/11 was welcomed as an opportunity to overthrow a number of old threats and terror loving tyrannies who stood in the way of democracy and freedom.” This perspective certainly offers a credible insight as to how 9/11 was manipulated in order to push foreign policy in a certain direction, and indeed one that was a continuation of what had gone before. However, the need to manipulate public opinion is indicative of the fact that foreign policy had deviated from that in place directly prior to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre.

US foreign policy has also responded to the increased demand for humanitarian assistance to aid failed states and nation building to ensure their reconstruction following 9/11. Shannon (2009) points out that the reconstruction of Afghanistan following the US invasion there has essentially helped to prevent the failure of the state, improve the quality of life for its people, introduce freedoms and democratic processes that were absent before and aided the avoidance of the state being controlled by terrorists. This was certainly a change from previous foreign policy: “Before 9/11, nation building was often caricatured as a form of idealistic altruism divorced from hard-headed foreign policy realism… In the post-9/11 era, nation-building has a hard-headed strategic rationale: to prevent weak or failing states from falling prey to terrorist groups” (Litwak, 2007, p. 313). This summary of the extent to which attitudes changed highlights the fact that a greater role in states that required humanitarian assistance was incorporated into foreign policy out of necessity rather than ideological choice. There was a distinct need to limit terrorist activity as far as possible and this actively manifested in this element of foreign policy. As Litwak (2007) points out, humanitarian action was not a staple element of American foreign policy by any means and so this, more than any other element of foreign policy, does signal that a change occurred within the strategic objectives inherent in the War on Terror. However, there are criticisms of this particular change because the US is charged with failing to follow through with humanitarian aid to the extent that it should have done. For example, Johnstone and Laville (2010) suggest that the reconstruction of Afghanistan was effectively abandoned with a failure to create institutions that would withstand future threats to freedom and democracy. This suggests that this particular area of strategy was not well thought out and did not achieve its ultimate aims. However, the fact that it was included in US foreign policy post-9/11 suggests that there was a concerted effort to implement a multifaceted policy to tackle terrorism as a new and dangerous global strategic threat.

However, despite the fact that the analysis here points to a change of direction for US foreign policy in the wake of 9/11 that was specifically designed to tackle the causes of and security threat posed by terrorism, some critical areas of policy did not change. For example, the long term objectives of the US were still manifest within new policy but they appeared in a different form that essentially provided a response to a different threat. Leffler (2011, n. pag.) argues that 9/11:

…did not change the world or transform the long-term trajectory of US grand strategy. The United States’ quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, its preference for an open door and free markets, its concern with military supremacy, its readiness to act unilaterally when deemed necessary, its eclectic merger of interests and values, its sense of indispensability – all these remained, and remain, unchanged.

This summary of the ultimate goals of US foreign policy draws attention to the fact that very little has changed. Although the British government supported the invasion of Iraq in the wake of 9/11, the fact that the United Nations Security Council refused to pass a resolution condoning the use of force did not prevent the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Hybel, 2014). This is evidence of the readiness to act unilaterally if it serves their interests. Gaddis concurs, noting that US self-interest remained the same with very little consideration of long term strategy that intervention elsewhere would require. Bolton (2008, p. 6), on the other hand, agrees that many of the changes to US foreign policy were made immediately but he disagrees with the assertions of Leffler and Gaddis concerning their long term impact. Bolton (2008, pp. 6-7) asserts that the changes have caused a longer-term impact, albeit one that has diminished over time as a result of the enduring nature of the national security policy and its evolution to accommodate the threat of terrorism in the wake of 9/11. Although this provides a dissenting voice in one respect, it demonstrates consensus on the fact that the changes in US foreign policy post-9/11 were a direct response to a new global threat but they were implemented alongside existing strategic goals. In effect, the approach may have changed but the ultimate objective had not.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis here has identified and discussed several changes that occurred within US foreign policy post-9/11. There can be little doubt that there was a distinct shift in focus to the need to deal with terrorism after the first attack on American soil for seventy years. Similarly, the policy content evolved to adopt a more humanitarian approach to global crises and a proactive and pre-emptive approach to potential threats. All of these changes did mark a departure from what had gone before in some way. However, although the majority of changes were incorporated into foreign policy within two years and were all undoubtedly a response to the attack and its causes, there is significant evidence to suggest that such actions provided an extension of foreign policy doctrine that had gone before. For example, although the focus of foreign policy shifted from the old Cold War objectives of containment and deterrence to terrorism, the interest policymakers took in some rogue states like Iraq was simply a continuation of established ideologies of ensuring freedom and democracy. Similarly, the US administration of foreign policy changed very little in terms of its determination to act unilaterally where necessary and lead the world in a battle against the latest threat to global security. As such, it is possible to conclude that many of the changes to US foreign policy in the post-9/11 era have been a response to the evolving security threat posed by terrorism. Furthermore, it was necessary for policy to evolve in order to accommodate strategies that address modern problems that were not as much of a priority in the late 20th century. However, whilst those changes made an immediate impact on foreign policy, it did not alter the long-term course of US foreign policy because that remained firmly focused on the outcomes of action elsewhere in the world in relation to American interests.

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Factors And Issues That Influence The Behaviour Of Software Engineering Groups

Most presentations on software engineering highlight the historically high failure rates of software projects, of up to eighty percent. Failure under the guise of budget overruns, delivery of solutions not compliant with specifications, late delivery and the like. More often than not, these failure rates are used to motivate the use of software engineering practices. The premise being that if adequate engineering practises were utilised, failure would become more of an exception rather than a rule. Best practise and lifecycles have been proposed and tailored to the various paradigms that the computer and information sciences throw up in rapid succession. There is extensive debate on what works and what does not within academia and without. The consensus being that what is best depends on the problem at hand and the expertise of those working on the problem.

A few software engineering group models have been popular in the history of software development. Earlier groups tended to be hierarchical, along the lines of traditional management teams. The project manager in-charge did not necessarily contribute in a non-managerial capacity and was responsible for putting together teams, had the last word on accepting recommendations and delegation to team members. Later groups worked around one or more chief-programmers or specialists. The specialists took charge of core components themselves and were assisted by other group members in testing, producing documentation and deployment. More recently, collegial groups have become common. Here, people with varied specialisations form groups wherein they organise themselves informally by assuming roles as needs arise.

The advantage of a particular model over the others becomes evident only in the context of specific projects. The hierarchical model is best suited to relatively large projects that are decomposable into sub-goals that can be addressed by near independent teams. This is usually possible for software tasks that are very well defined, that need reliable and quality controlled solutions, particularly those that are mission critical. A large project may inherently require many people working on it to successfully complete it, if it were to be deployed in multiple sites, for instance. Alternatively, a large group may be assembled to expedite delivery. In either case, structured organisation and well-defined roles facilitate coordination at a high level.

A central problem with adding people to expedite delivery, or otherwise, is that the effectiveness of a group does not scale linearly. One person joining another does not mean that they are collectively twice as productive. More importantly, the contribution of the seventh person in a seven-person group is a fraction of the contribution of the second person in a two-person group. This is due to additional overheads in communication and coordination as group size increases and to the dilution of tasks assigned to individual member. As is evident, this is a problem for any group; however, in very large groups the problem is exacerbated.

In hierarchical settings, group members do not have a sense of ownership of the bigger solution. This may be reflected in their productivity. Because of the concentration of decision-making powers to particular individuals according to some hierarchy, the success of processes ultimately lies with them. A lot rides on their ability to pick the best practises and recommendations, delegate effectively and keep track of the bigger picture. In quality-controlled or mission-critical settings, there are not many alternatives to having large hierarchical groups with redundant contributors.

Primarily in non-commercial settings, a single specialist engineers a complete software solution. Invariably, the solution being a prototype is accessible only to other specialists. In addition, it is not designed for general consumption and is put together without going through most recommended processes in software engineering lifecycles. Single programmers tend to practise evolutionary programming. This involves producing a quick working solution followed by repeated reworking of the solution to make it more accessible to the programmer for future review, incremental development and peer review or development. If demand for such a software solution gains momentum, for either its general utility or its commercial viability, the core solution would most likely be adopted for further development by a larger software engineering group. It stands to reason that the core developer, who is most familiar with the solution, retains the last word on further technical development. Other members organise themselves around the chief-programmer.

In general, some form of incremental development and periodic redevelopment from scratch of software solutions are common regardless of group models. The first incrementally developed solution tends to be the least well-engineered solution and is a patchwork of poorly designed and tightly coupled components. This is a reflection of the difficulty involved in producing quick solutions using new tools and techniques and inexperienced software engineers. Supported by a high immediate cost barrier to reworking solutions, incumbents from pervious software development cycles, spend a lot of their post deployment time in supporting and patching what they produced.

In collegial groups formed in smaller organisations or departments, software engineers assume roles as needs arise. Brainstorming may be carried out by all members and design approved by consensus but development may be carried out by a few individual members, while the others gain feedback from end-users, keep track of competitor solutions and the like. In the initial phases of a software development life cycle, the problem definition, feasibility study and system analysis phases, end users of the system and independent specialists may form part of the group. During the design and implementation phases, a disjoint group of outsiders could merge with the team. The external members may then be invited for their feedback post implementation during the quality assurance and maintenance phases. Generally, best practise suggests that groups should be adaptive or loosely structured during the creative phases and become more structured as the design becomes clearer.

Groups with loosely defined structures are the most flexible in adapting to changing user needs. However, the greatest risk to project cancellations and overruns are ill-defined and changing requirements. Adaptiveness to an extent is crucial. Given that users change requirements so compulsively, lacking adaptiveness completely would make an engineering group not viable. If group size is variable, the learning curve of new entrants must be kept in mind. A project manager hiring additional developers late in the software development cycle, after not meeting some deadline say, must factor in delayed contributions from the newcomers as a result of time taken by them to familiarise themselves with the project and time lost in coordinating their joining the group.

Following this, the next most common cause of failure is due to poor planning or management. If the person taking on the role of project manager has poor management or planning skills, the likelihood of which is heightened by the fact that each group member is called upon to serve in diverse capacities, projects are destined to fall over.

A number of reasonable software engineering guidelines are ignored by software engineers commonly. When programming, using descriptive names for variables is a good example. A section of program code will immediately make sense to its author for a reasonably long period, when reviewed. However, if the code were not documented sufficiently, which includes using descriptive variable names, and with the correct intended audience in mind, it would take a considerable amount of time for another programmer to understand what the other had implemented. In the extreme, some programmers obfuscate because they can or to ensure that only they will ever understand what they have written thereby making them indispensable. The potential for doing a half-hearted job of writing code is obvious in that poorly structured and poorly designed code is functionally indistinct from well-structured code and is less demanding a task. If software projects were evaluated only on their functionality, this would not pose a problem but upgrades and patches require someone to review the code and add to it or repair it in the future. The long term cost of maintaining software that is not well designed and documented may rise exponentially as older technologies are phased out and finding people competent to carry out repair and review shrink. In essence, this is an instance of a quality control problem.

Uncontrolled quality problems are the third most common cause of cancellations and overruns of software projects. It is convenient to group documentation along with quality control as they should be reviewed in tandem in a software development lifecycle. The first casualties of a late running project are quality control and documentation. The long-term costs of skimping on either have been illustrated by example above but there are short-term costs as well. In both evolutionary engineering common among specialist-centred groups and component engineering commonly employed by hierarchical groups, the quality of each revision or component affects the quality of subsequent revisions or combined components.

The next most common causes of failure are unrealistic or inaccurate estimates and naive adoption of emerging technologies. The blame for the former rests with both users and planners or project managers. Most engineering groups are unrealistically optimistic about the speed with which they can deliver solutions. Their estimates may be accurate for prototypes. In actual deployment, conformance to specifications, human-computer interfaces, quality control, training and change management are essential and take time. Users have a poor understanding of how descriptive their specifications are and much too often assume that implementers are contextually familiar with the environments in which they work and intend to use the system. Project managers and implementers have an affinity to emerging technologies ignoring their core competencies that are more likely to be established proven technologies.

Success among software engineering groups is a function of planning and execution. The responsibility of planning falls on a project manager. A manager must draw on the best a group has to offer, appreciate software and technical concerns, facilitate communication and coordinate a groups effort. Enforcing quality standards from the beginning by adopting design and programming guidelines, for example, helps formalise expectations. A project manager with a technical background has the advantage of understanding the position of other technical members and is likely to communicate more effectively with them and has the opportunity of leading by example. Given the emphasis on planning, it is worthwhile noting that it can be overdone. Over-engineering is not ideal engineering. It is often convenient for a single developer to take the lead for coding. Other developers and end-users should concurrently test the developing solution for functionality, usability and quality. Execution in isolation is likely to result in solutions that developers are comfortable with and even proud of but that end-users find lacking. The various stakeholders of the project must be simultaneously and consistently involved throughout the development cycle of software projects.

The greater the communication between specialist designers and specialist implementers, the more successful the group would be in terms of quality and ease-of-use of solutions. The technical crowd in a software engineering group sees the problem uniquely in terms of simplifying or making more elegant their contribution. The design crowd balances out this perspective by offering an alternative view, which is more likely to be aligned with that held by end-users, uncurtailed by technical considerations. Ultimately, end-users must be given an opportunity to have their say. The solution is theirs.

Changing requirements and specifications may be an acceptable excuse from the user’s perspective for delays in final solution delivery. Many projects are twenty percent complete after eighty percent of the initially estimated time. More people are brought in to expedite the process, budget overruns follow and sub-par solutions are delivered, albeit, late. Given the historical frequency, project managers should factor in possible requirement changes to arrive at estimates that are more realistic before commencing projects.