Category: Free Essays

An Examination of the Advancement of Lesbian Theory & Criticism – America: 1950’s-1990’s.
Introduction

Lesbianism in American society is a concept imbued with social, political, legal, aesthetic and literary codes and conventions, whether considered in 1950 or currently. In the past half century, lesbianism has not only expressed itself as specific articulations of sexuality and lifestyle, but also of ideology and political aspiration. Sexuality has remained essential to conceptualisations of lesbianism in this time span, with its political formulations, societal censures, and social accommodations anchored to the vicissitudes of feminist theory and practice. American social and political morays which have prescribed female functionality in post World War Two years, have cast mainstream female identity in terms of motherhood, wifeliness and domesticity, a formulation of personhood deeply challenged by advancing lesbian ideology and praxis.

In this light, one of the significant threads of lesbian theory and criticism to be evaluated pertains to feminism’s examination of female identity in the past 50 years, and the status and reaction of lesbianism within this paradigm. This process encompasses events and issues pertaining to the biological, sexual and social validation of female gender, but also the intellectual development of modes of discourse pertaining to feminism and lesbianism, as a means of female empowerment, paralleled by considered or reactionary responses to wider societal trends.

So called second wave feminism, benchmarked by the Stonewall Riots at Greenwich Village in New York in 1969, targeted women’s liberation not only at the level of law, and concrete denotations of inequality and injustice, (akin to feminism’s first wave), but at the more visceral level of societal and political attitudes and values, including the ideological decoupling of female personhood from male sexuality.

Since the early 1990’s, the ideological and theoretical formulations of lesbianism have been advancing in disparate lines, at the bidding of post-structuralist or postmodernist discourses. Some of lesbianism’s intellectual impulses have focused upon notions of sexual and personal identity, and in spite of their intellectual sophistication have lost their momentum and coherence, collapsing into an “ambiguous polymorphy,”^[1] whilst attempting to dispense with unhelpful binary oppositional definitions of gender or sexuality. Conversely, an intellectual strength of third wave feminism and post 1980’s lesbian criticism has been the attention to personhood, the integrity of the self and the integration of public and private moralities.

Chapter 1

Homosexuality after World War I was broadly viewed as “an offence against the family and social expectations about gender.”^[2] A doctor’s post World War 1 contemporary observations noted that it was “improper to utter the word homosexuality, prurient to admit its existence and pornographic to discuss the subject.”^[3] The same doctor reflects the radical difference between American and European cultural and sexual values, implying that while Europe was perceived by Americans as decadent, European novels could discuss homosexuality openly within a European setting, yet American novels could not, since “if it existed at all, (as) our soil is unfavourable, our climate prejudicial, our people too primitive, too pure.”^[4] Furthermore, Fone contends that homosexuality had come to be seen as a “subversion of America itself.” ^[5] Fone also observes that since war is a “time of fear and upheaval-it produces a virulent, xenophobic strain of homophobia” tantamount to conceiving “sexual difference as a betrayal of American values”.^[6]

Retrospectively implicit among these anecdotal pre World War II dismissals of homosexuality, is the notable silence concerning any distinction between male and female homosexuality, or gay and lesbian sexual phenomenon. The grip of patriarchy was so overarching that lesbianism did not even feature as a notable offence against social sensibilities.

Be that as it may. The social discourse regarding lesbianism in the 1950’s was in part a response to the repositioning of women due to World War II. As war demanded heightened US defences and reconstituted the nation’s labour force, women formed the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) and were seconded to non-traditional jobs, accounting for one third of the work force. According to Kennedy and Davis, “World War II… had a tremendous impact on lesbian life, by offering lesbians more opportunities for socialising and meeting other women.”^[7] Since the war “gave more independence to all women… lesbians (were) more like other women and less easy to identify. Since all women were able to wear pants to work and to purchase them in stores off the rack, butches who only wore pants in the privacy of their home in the 1930s could now wear them on the streets.”^[8] Furthermore, in Buffalo women gained access to better jobs since productivity was heightened by war manufacturing. Since the male population of Buffalo was denuded for military service, lesbians had greater liberty to meet in public and pursue active social lives beyond hearth and home. Extensive social life revolved around “the proliferation of gay bars”^[9] and despite the “mere presence of homosexuals…interpreted by the State Liquor Authority as constituting disorderly conduct”,^[10] raids on premises were minimal in the 1940’s due to the shrewdness of business owners.^[11]

Concurrently, enlisted lesbians found a social space within the male world of military service since enrolment screening practices for lesbians entering the (WAC) were less stringent than for gay men.^[12] In this example, the lack of status for women in the military prior to the war resulted in ill-defined screening procedures for women recruits, matched by a choice to not investigate the sexual lives of women, as the goal was to optimise the war effort.^[13] The simplistic and binary designations of sexual orientation in the late 1940’s are noted by the comments from “a group of Marine Corps examiners at Camp LeJeune (who) advised their colleagues, “that women showing a masculine manner may be perfectly normal sexually and excellent military material.”^[14] By the late 1940’s however, “purging of lesbians from the military became increasingly problematic. Many women were forced to deny knowing any of their friends or marry gay men to pass as heterosexual.”^[15] Ominously, “mid 1950’s Navy officials secretly acknowledged that the homosexual discharge rate had become much higher for the female than the male.” ^[16]

When the end of the war brought a resumption of traditional family roles, there were no alternate social prescriptions for women apart from marriage, and enduring singleness subjected females to social disapproval, while the “aggressive harassment of lesbians and gays was connected to this glorification of the nuclear family and domestic sphere.Homophobia became a way of reinstituting male dominance and strict gender roles that had been disrupted by the war.”^[17] The 1950’s remained a social and political milieu of “severe oppression,”^[18] yet Roosevelt suggests the reduced harassment of gay bar culture and the desire of public lesbians to reach out to other lesbians, marked a “significant transformation in lesbian consciousness.” ^[19]

The emergence of tough butch lesbian sub-culture in the 1950’s, was, according to Roosevelt, a consequence of gay bar life and working class female job creation during World War II.^[20] Nonetheless, “alcohol, insecurity, and repression, in combination with the tough butch image, made fights among tough and rough lesbians a prominent part of the 1950s landscape which increased concern and attention from the larger culture.” ^[21]

Furthermore, the prominence of lesbians and male homosexuals holding positions within the American government agencies in the 1950’s was a matter of growing consternation, in light of the neo-conservatism and right wing extremism of this period. The political tirade against ‘un-American activities typified by the McCarthy led Senate committee inquiries and public hearings, not only felt virtue was found in the purging of communist allegiances and sentiments, but also coupled homosexuality and lesbianism with such perceived political aberrations. Politically enshrined deviance was aligned with sexually defined deviance. The 1950 congressional record addressed homosexuals in government, with congressman Miller of Nebraska addressing the House of Representatives. In an excerpt, Miller stated,

“I would like to strip the fetid, stinking flesh off of this skeleton of homosexuality and tell my colleagues of the House some of the facts of nature… Recently the spotlight of publicity has been focused not only upon the State Department but upon the Department of Commerce because of homosexuals being employed in these and other departments of Government. Recently Mr. Peurifoy, of the State Department, said he had allowed 91 individuals in the State Department to resign because they were homosexuals. Now they are like birds of a feather, they flock together. Where did they go? You must know what a homosexual is. It is amazing that in the Capital City of Washington we are plagued with such a large group of those individuals. Washington attracts many lovely folks. The sex crimes in the city are many.”^[22]

Miller went on to refer to the Sex Pervert Bill passed through Congress that he authored, exposing his jaundiced view of sexuality by alluding to the peril of homosexuals, as well as the ‘concession’ that “some of them are more to be pitied than condemned, because in many it is a pathological condition, very much like the kleptomaniac who must go out and steal.”^[23]

In addition to the homophobic cringe mentality epitomising the 1950’s which also applied to lesbianism, viewing any form of non-heterosexual sex as non-normative and therefore aberrant, prior to 2003, homosexuality (and by extension lesbianism), was “considered a disease, a sin (and) a threat to public order.”^[24] Further reasons why lesbianism was shunned by American mainstream society in the 1950’s concerns the belief that (in the absence of research to the contrary), sexual orientation was subject to change and able to be transferred.^[25] As such, a threat or fear existed that there was the possibility of an epidemic conversion from heterosexual to, homosexual, yielding a perceived need to ‘protect’ heterosexuals. Since homosexuals and lesbians were perceived to be engaging in indulgent, wayward and aberrant sexual behaviour by choice, rather than by predisposition, the persecution and stigmatization they received was not viewed as a breach of fundamental human rights. ^[26] Furthermore, another potent reason for the social and political aversion to lesbianism was the belief that heterosexual minors could become homosexual by way of seduction, justifying the protection of children and youth by means of criminal law.^[27]

Amnesty International’s recent statement addressing the decriminalisation of homosexuality globally, demonstrates that third wave feminist ideological battles (discussed later) are far from won. The paper makes the observation that “far fewer countries explicitly criminalise lesbianism than male homosexuality… as there (already) exists a raft of legislation to limit, police and control women’s sexual autonomy. (The writers’ explanation that), lesbianism is not generally subject to legal sanctions may be attributed to the absence of women from the public sphere and the resulting absence of awareness of lesbianism.”^[28] This “social invisibility”^[29] of lesbianism leads to some lawmakers denying that it even exists.

Miller’s attitudes not only exposed the entrenched criminalisation of homosexuality (and by association lesbianism), but the second social contrivance of lesbianism which coalesced in American culture in the 1950’s, namely its ‘medicalisation’, framing lesbianism as a social pathogen, rather than an issue of sexual difference and diversity, when compared with heterosexuality or monogamy. Such a pathological casting of lesbianism is foreseen in pre-1950’s homophobic stereotypes, where psychic differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals were fabricated – constructing the homosexual male as a deficit being without “will power, perseverance, and dogmatic energy.”^[30] These social postulations of male effeminacy merely mirrored manifestations of female ‘masculinisation,’ such as the butch bar working class lesbian sub-culture, already identified. Instead of current societal emphasis upon diversity and difference, the 1950’s construction of lesbianism underscored deficit and deviance.

Roosevelt draws attention to psychiatrists Henry & Gay duplicitous motives. Whilst formulating a committee for the Study of Sex Variants in the 1940’s, compiling case histories of over 300 lesbians, producing ‘Sex Variants: A Study of Homosexual Patters’, with the pretext of decriminalising lesbianism, in actuality, the hidden agenda was to legitimise the psychiatry profession, and as a consequence, medicalise lesbianism, merely replacing one construct of deviance with another. ^[31] Lesbianism remained an immoral practice in the USA until Illinois led the change with its homosexuality decriminalisation law in 1961.^[32] Prior to this time, “criminologists of the 1950’s depicted lesbian inmates as menacing social types which lead to a conflation between women’s prisons and lesbianism.”^[33] The shift to greater surveillance of lesbianism in women’s prisons was reflected in “U.S. popular and political culture in magazines, pulp novels, and movies where the, previously, comic and benign lesbian gave way to the dangerously aggressive lesbian criminal. By the 1950’s the term ‘women’s prison’ was synonymous with lesbian aggression,”^[34]casting sexuality as a potential signifier of membership of a “criminal underworld, losing class, race, and privilege.” ^[35]Such pulp novels as those published by Ann Weldy under the pseudonym Ann Bannon, included ‘Odd Girl Out’, (1957); ‘I Am a Woman (In Love With a Woman Why Must Society Reject Me’?) (1959); ‘Women in The Shadows’, (1959);‘Journey to a Woman’ (1960) and ‘The Marriage’, (1960); and Beebo Brinker (1962), the prequel to the first four books.^[36] The social limitations of same-gender sexuality identification are evident in the narrative outcomes of these early lesbian pulp fiction titles. “It was expected that the characters in a lesbian novel would never receive any satisfaction from a lesbian relationship. One or both usually ended up committing suicide, going insane, or leaving the relationship.” Describing the 1950’s as the hey-day of Lesbian Pulp Fiction, Bianco noted that while its boom was inspired mainly by publishers pitching successfully to straight males seeking titillation, oppressed lesbians found a private outlet and psychic survival through such writings denied them publicly by the censoriousness of 1950’s repressive American culture. Bianco noted the publicist’s irony, since while

“cover art of pulp novels always depicted ultra-feminine women, the ‘real’ lesbians in the stories were often tomboys or ‘bad girls’ who seduced innocent straight women. Reflecting psychological theories of the time, lesbian pulp writers often presented lesbianism as the result of a trauma, such as rape or incest. At the end, the innocent straight woman almost always returned to a ‘normal’ life with a man. If the lesbian protagonist wasn’t herself converted to heterosexuality, she usually became an alcoholic, lost her job, or committed suicide. Publishers insisted on these kinds of “moral” endings, condemning lesbian sexuality even while exploiting it. In this regard, lesbian pulps followed the formula of torment and sacrifice.”^[37]

As such, lurid and socially shunned fictionalisations of alternate sexuality merely reinforced the ethical and moral mainstream fabric of neo-conservative American culture. Anne Bannon, as she was publicly known, reputedly led a double life, a wife and mother who frequented lesbian bars on weekends in Greenwich Village, and strikingly only disclosed her authorship of her lesbian pulp fiction novels in the 1980’s, over two decades after they were published. In the view of Bianco, her works made a significant contribution to lesbian identity in the decade prior to ‘Stonewall’.^[38]

Theoretical perspectives on lesbian and alternate sexuality critical to the exploration of emerging critical paradigms of lesbianism in America in the second half of the twentieth century, do not merely address the enduring and at times overwhelming dialectical tension between mainstream heterosexual ideology and homosexual reaction; but the internal dialectic within the gay community and how it evolved and responded to dimensions of itself throughout this passage of social history. The butch/fem dialectic itself illustrates the politics of sex and psychology. An increase in sexual experimentation and practices, saw a sub-cultural practice emerge, whereby butch/ fem lesbian couples assumed strictly defined roles, the ‘stone butch untouchable’ finding sexual pleasure exclusively through giving pleasure to her fem, while the fem forbidden to reciprocate, was positioned within the codes of the relationship to only receive pleasure. While some critiqued this relational dynamic as a mere imitation of conventional masculine approaches to sex, others identified in butches “a discomfort of being (physically) touched rooted in their biology.There was also much importance placed on role distinction, an unwanted vulnerability involved in mutual lovemaking, the butch ego, and the butch’s ambivalence toward her female body. In the 1950s, Fems approached sexuality from a self-centred perspective…and lesbians who would not select a role, but changed roles,were derisively referred to as KiKis or AC/DC and were viewed with suspicion by other working-class lesbians.”^[39] That Butches apparently disliked switching roles, imposed such rigid relational rules and maintained such static notions of sexual identity, indicated that the delineation of sexual identity within this specific lesbian subculture, was just as restrictive and jaundiced a stance as the homophobic predilections of the 1950’s heterosexual community in general. The paralyzing dialectic of shame and shamelessness which more contemporary feminists have used to identify heterosexual impediments in the slow march towards sexual liberation^[40] is alive in the politics of sex and identity psychology played out in the binary relations of 1950’s butch/fem lesbianism.

While many look to the Stonewall Riots at Greenwich Village New York as the defining moment for the empowerment of the modern Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement, others trace the serious beginnings to 1951 in Los Angeles. In the 1950’s gay protest remained largely “bland, apologetic, unassertive and defensive…(relying) upon ‘experts’- psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts, lawyers, theologians…who spoke about us, to us, and at us, but never with us.” ^[41] By 1961, the Homophile Movement, represented in the US by a mere half dozen organizations, yet by 1969, numbering fifty or sixty such proactive bodies.

The origins of the Stonewall Riots have their foundation in the “immigrant, working class neighbourhoods of New York…(where) gay sexuality was very much in and of the streets…due in part to the economic and spatial limitations of the tenements. Enclaves of lesbians interacted with their gay male counterparts, congregating in the speakeasies, tearooms and drag balls of Harlem and Greenwich Village during the 1920’s.”^[42] Furthermore, Greenwich Village’s “bohemian life tolerated sexual experimentation which conferred upon the area an embryonic stature of erotica unbound…lesbian and gay clubs in the Village were founded on the ‘Personality Clubs’ of the bohemian intelligentsia.”^[43] Writers commonly view Greenwich as a social space freed from the normal “social constraints” of modern life, a “sexual free- zone” and a homosexual Mecca for predominantly white homosexuals, as Harlem was for black people.^[44] The anonymity of the city had become accessible to post war military linked Americans, and the semi public spaces of night cafe and bar cultures, served to straddle the psychological and spatial divide between the privacy, domesticity and intimacy of the home, and the disclosure and defiance of public morality played out in the Greenwich domain. As Munt suggests, this cultural transition captured in Lesbian Pulp fiction, tracked “the lesbian adventurer inhabiting a twilight world where sexual encounters were acts of romanticised outlawry initiated in some back street bar and consummated in the narrative penetration of the depths of maze-like apartment buildings.” ^[45]Munt views Bannon’s heroines as mythologizing the “eroticised urban explorer.” ^[46] The value of Stonewall’s mythologisation is viewed “as a constitutive moment, while admitting its cultural fiction.”^[47]

Other signposts of lesbians claiming a small cultural space and some public domain in this ensuing decade indicated by Mathison & Fraher, included the formation of the ‘Mattachine Society’ in 1951 (founded to aid homosexuals in the process of chronicling their collective histories and mitigate against social persecution); the initial publication of ‘One’ Magazine in 1953; the foundation of the lesbian organisation ‘Daughters of Bilitis’ in 1955; and the subsequent publication of their first magazine titled ‘The Ladder’ in 1956. Additionally, the Kinsley Report published in 1957 claimed 10% of the population to predominantly homosexual, while in 1961 Illinois became the first US state to criminalise homosexual acts. The Stonewall Riots in Greenwich Village in 1969 were closely followed by a Gay Rally in Chicago in 1970.^[48]

Chapter 2

Betty Friedan’s ground breaking book titled ‘The Feminine Mystique’, encapsulated the inexplicable toleration of millions of American women in the 1950’s and early 1960’s that had exclusively devoted themselves to the mutual socially prescribed roles of wife and mother. Friedan’s thesis was that this wholehearted devotion carried a contingent cost and sacrifice beyond the conscious level of comprehension of countless women, oblivious to the enormity of what they were surrendering in the process, as well as the significant parts of themselves they were denying as a result of idolising domesticity. Friedan herself in 1994 retrospectively explained the term ‘feminine mystique’ as when “women were defined only in sexual relation to men – man’s wife, sex object, mother, housewife- and never a person defining themselves by their own actions in society.”^[49] She conceived of this conceptualisation of women as a stifling barrier to their wider participation within society and therefore as fully functioning human beings. It was the notion that this existential position of women was so unchallenged and so instinctively accepted that Friedan found to be so perplexing, provocatively couched by the feminist as a ‘feminine mystique’ to ridicule the notion that the socially contrived roles had acquired the status of an implacable genetic predisposition. Quidlen acclaims Friedan’s foresight in the book’s introduction, as she succeeded in scrutinising ways “women had been coaxed into selling out their intellect and their ambitions for the paltry price of a new washing machine…(seduced by) the development of labour saving appliances…(yet being) covered up in a kitchen conspiracy of denial.”^[50] Friedan empowered women with confidence to reconceptualise their problems’ origins, lying beyond her marriage or herself.^[51] Furthermore, Friedan was a keen observer of hypocrisy, contradiction and imbalance, with a caustic view concerning “a generation of educated housewives maniacally arranging the silverware and dressing to welcome their husbands’ home from work.”^[52]

Friedan as many other feminists and indeed lesbians was a strident advocate of the wider participation of women in society. Typifying ways women were alienated from mainstream society and disenfranchised by males, were prevailing attitudes towards abortion, public censure or ambivalence about a woman’s right to choose; the invisibility of sexual abuse, the lack of acknowledgement of more subtle forms of sexual harassment, as well as the economic and social disempowerment with relation to exit strategies for women to leave bad marriages. Friedan observes the 1990’s obsession with defining and crystalising female identity,^[53] explaining this as a logical extension of the break down of the feminine mystique and the empowerment of women. This obsession manifested itself through a surfeit of women’s identity literature and college courses in women’s studies. ^[54] By logical extension, feminism did provide leverage for the liberation of lesbians and the sexual politics associated with lesbianism, in spite of Friedan’s disconnect with lesbianism as a valid expression of women’s rights.

Friedan did identify menopause crises, sexual frigidity, promiscuity, pregnancy fears, child birth depression, passivity, the immaturity of American men, discrepancies between women’s tested childhood intellectual abilities and their adult achievements and the changing incidence of adult sexual orgasm in American women as issues pertaining to the emergence of a fuller identity and societal participation for women.^[55]

It is clear that there was little room in the consciousness of women to process the notion of their sexuality prior to the 1960’s sexual revolution, since women drew neuroses was the energy needed to juggle the conflicting roles between motherhood, domestic duty and work beyond the home and manage the personal and societal guilt which emerged from this 9at times) impossible process.^[56] The social and political discourse of the era lionized women who did not lose their man, and balanced service of males, children and home. The wider world was beyond their consciousness and matters of sexual identity were not part of the public domain. Friedan contends that femininity in the 1950’s was a social construction, which, if attended to faithfully, was the only means by which women could achieve contentment and fulfilment, having historically made the blunder of trying to imitate masculinity , instead of embodying femininity, which was deemed to be characterized by sexual passivity, nurturing maternal love and male domination.^[57]

Furthermore, the classification of the political domain as a male intellectual and practical bastion did nothing to facilitate women re-evaluating sexual politics and notions of political disenfranchisement in the 1950’s. In 1960, Friedan recalled that “a perceptive social psychologist showed me some sad statistics which seemed to prove unmistakably that women under age 35 years were not interested in politics.”^[58] Furthermore, a false dichotomy was embedded in American national consciousness regarding female sexuality, with no middle ground, namely, women were good who came to the pedestal and whores if they expressed physical sexual desire or sought such pleasure. This dichotomous paradigm disempowered women’s sexual liberation.^[59]While the feminine mystique succeeded in precluding women from considering their own sense of personal identity – who they were alone from husband, children and home,^[60] the former emphasis of genetic determinism shaped women’s outlook on the path of their lives- plainly, “the identity of woman is determined by her biology.”^[61] (Ironically, the same conclusion regarding lesbianism was not reached by American society for decades, prior to the 1990’s, lesbianism being widely viewed as deviant sexual conduct determined by choice rather than orientation.)

Friedan counters the Freudian explanation for the desire of women to depart from the domestic centre, namely the motive of ‘penis envy’ propagated by Freud. ^[62]Instead, she presciently identified the objectification of women as a societal flaw, “she was, at that time, so completely defined as object by man, never herself as ‘I’, that she was not even expected to enjoy or participate in the act of sex.”^[63] The gay and lesbian revolution gained momentum in the late 1960’s, infused the female with a sense of subjectivity, to counter this objectification, poignantly exemplified through the centring of the female orgasm, which emphatically declared that women were sexual beings, capable and entitled to experience sexual pleasure, rather than being victims of abuse or neutral ‘sideline observers’ of sexual activity while their husbands were actualising their virility through sex. While Friedan acknowledged that “Freudian thought became the ideological bulwark of American of the sexual counter-revolution in America”^[64]…defining the sexual nature of women, conversely Friedan speculated that an insatiable female sexual desire existed due to the vacuum created by the absence of larger life goals for woman. ^[65] While she countered Freud with this ex

The author conceptualizes development as ‘the gap between an exclusive concentration on economic wealth and a broader focus on the lives we can lead’ (p.14) emphasizing that the theory of development goes well beyond wealth accumulation and gross national product growth. The chapter examines the relationship between development and freedom, the way in which freedom is a component of development and an extensive view of ‘freedom’ encompassing both opportunities that people have and processes that allow for ‘freedom’ of decisions.

The main arguments of the author is that development should be assessed by ‘freedom’ of accessibility to factors such as social opportunities, health care, clean water, economic security, civil rights and political freedom. Lack of accessibility means ‘unfreedom’. Development therefore should mean that people can live the lives they want to live and precisely, how can a nation say in all entirety that it has ‘freedom’ when its citizens cannot afford the very basic necessities of life or fulfill the rights they are entitled to?

Sen goes on further to compare different views of poverty in both developing and developed nation by analyzing ‘freedoms’ through values, poverty and inequality, income and mortality, markets and freedom, tradition and culture. The author sees the process of development beyond economic growth or physical and human capital and concludes by linking the understanding of a broad view of the development process to the substantive ‘freedoms’ of people.

Sen’s write up contains intriguing views but he hasn’t mentioned what justifies his classification into these ‘freedoms’ i.e. experience of developing countries, factual historical evidence or how far ‘freedom’ has progressed within each context he identified. His definition is quite different from Rapley’s in which Rapley describes development as “more concerned with flexibility and adaptability” (Rapley 2007 pp 5) and so raises a question. Can development be measured only by individual happiness without economic growth and stability? Happiness, in my opinion is geared more towards Rapley’s definition and should be adapted into the process of economic growth.

Willis, K. (2005) Theories and Practices of Development. London. Routledge. p. 32-42.

Willis’ chapter 2 of theories and practices of development analyses development theories and practices and how these theories were attached to the economic, social and political theories that developed in Europe from the 18th century. Willis’s interpretation raises some interesting facts about historical development of theories and she divides her study into various theories.

The classical economists such as David Ricardo, an advocate of free trade and Adam Smith, in his famous book, Wealth of Nations ‘responded to the trade focus of economic policy at that time’ (p.32) when trade was a major factor of economic growth. Here, protectionist measures such as high tariffs were highly used by merchants.

Willis goes on to say Adam Smith was not in favour of this form of regulation and that it was harmful to the country’s economic growth. Instead, greater focus on production and division of labour which will be regulated by the ‘invisible hand of the market’ (p.33).

The Great depression of the 1930’s and other economic happenings gave rise to Keynes argument of the free market not necessarily a positive force but government intervention in the promotion of economic growth while postwar reconstruction period was a time to reflect on the economic crises that occurred at that time and provide solutions to their re-occurrence. This led to the creation of the Bretton woods institutions to assist in the promotion of ‘stable economic growth within a capitalist system’ (p. 36)

Willis describes the linear stages theory and makes emphasis on Rostow, the American economist and political theorist’s stages of Economic growth to development. Here, development was seen as a state where a large number of the population could afford to spend largely on consumer products and development was viewed as modern, moving from agricultural societies to an industrial economy. While she tries to decipher early theoretical ideas, Willis has not made clear linkages between some of these theories and how they have come to evolve in economic debates and discussions over time.

Chang, H., and Ilene G. (2004) ‘Reclaiming Development from the Washington Consensus’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 27(2), 274-291.

The fundamental of this article is to correct the notion that there is no alternative to the Washington Consensus. The authors argue that ‘neoliberal policies have failed to achieve their goals in developing world’ (p. 274) and so discuss the major development myths for justifying neoliberal policies that have been harmful to developing world and perhaps as a complacency to the reader, possible alternatives to these policies.

These myths, evaluated individually, describe how these policies have lacked credibility. Myth 1; In contrast to the neoliberal policy success, the reality is that the policy has not promoted its main aim of economic growth. Myth 2; Developed countries gained success through free market policies whereas records claim they relied upon interventionist policies for development. Myth 3; Only neoliberal policies can succeed in today’s global environment whereas in fact there is evidence of ‘continuing institutional and policy divergence across national boundaries’ (p. 277) Myth 4; Discipline imposed by international institutions to keep them honest whereby placing policy making authority in the hands of these organizations. Myth 5; The East Asian model cannot be replicated when in fact most developed countries utilized this model. Myth 6; Developing countries should imitate the Anglo American model of capitalism which fared poorly in the economic boom of the 1990’s.

The authors went ahead to put forward alternative policies for faster economic development which includes the financial system providing adequate finance quantities for investment projects at appropriate prices, enforcing strict laws on new foreign loans incurred by domestic borrowers, defocusing on budget balance and maximizing FDI potentials to promote economic and industrial development in developing countries

While arguing for these policies, it will be sensible to note that economies are different and there can be no ‘best practice’ policy that everyone should use (Chang 2003). Policies for development should not be ‘fixed’ but depend on stages of development of a developing nation and other factors such as resource capacity, economic, political and social conditions.

Pender, J. (2001) ‘From Structural Adjustment’ to Comprehensive Development Framework’: Conditionality Transformed?’ Third World Quarterly, 22 (3), 397-411.

Pender reviews how the World Bank’s approach to development has changed over decades and brought about important shifts to its conditionality approach. In the light of new changes between the 90’s and today, the World Bank formulated a Comprehensive Development Framework, based on a relationship of partnership to replace its erstwhile structural adjustment lending (p. 397).

The author examines why the World Bank’s perspectives of development changed through different periods; In the 1980’s to early 90’s, GDP was used as a measure of development as the Bank was mostly concerned with rapid economic growth and sustenance for least developed countries (LDC) and the adoption of policies such as restriction of state spending, controlling inflation, commodity exports and privatization as factors to achieve development.

The 1990’s drew lack of confidence in these policies and there were strong doubts about its competence judging from the success of the Asian Economies that developed rapidly without the World Bank’s policy prescriptions. This informed the Bank to change its 1980 view about minimal state role in development and that ‘growth by itself is not enough’ (p 401). Thus in 1990, a formulation of an approach based on both ‘labour intensive growth’ and ‘widespread provision of basic social services’ (p.401). In spite of these alterations, there were criticisms that the Bank reforms were not aiding Africa’s growth but rather, increasing stagnant economies through the implementation of the Bank’s policies.

According to Pender, the Bank lost confidence in its policy framework in early 1995, with the Asian miracle and LDC’s failure and was forced to critique its own policies and re-orientate. This modification was experimented between 1995-1997 with ‘improvements in the understanding of economic development’ and poverty reduction as the central focus.

The author gives clear informed views of the process of policy change within the World Bank at different times but fails to analyze the impact of this new focus of poverty reduction and its success to the development of today’s third world countries.

Chang, H. (2003) Kicking away the ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspectives. London, Anthem Press. Chapter 1.

Chang’s analysis centers around one question, ‘How did the rich countries really become rich?’ He uncovers some myths about developed countries developmental experience and argues that developed countries did not develop through the same policies that they recommend to the developing world.

This pressure from developed countries to the developing world to adopt a set of ‘good policies’ that they adopted when they themselves were developing is faced with criticisms because ‘historical evidence suggests otherwise’ and goes on to say that they are trying to hide the ‘secret of their success’ (p. 2).

Some of these policies include liberalization of trade, privatization, restrictive macroeconomic policies and deregulation but facts show that most of the developing countries used export subsidies and industry protection, industrial policies that the WTO disapproves in the present world. The USA and UK were examples of ardent users of these same ‘policies’ frowned at in contrast to the free trade policies and free market they preach.

Chang quotes List, the German economist that ‘Britain was the first country to perfect the art of infant industry promotion’ which is the principle behind most countries journey to success (p. 3). He argues that developed countries, while alleging to recommend good policies to developing countries are actually trying to ‘kick away the ladder’ of their own economic development.

A conclusion is drawn on some methodological issues of David Ricardo’s neoliberal policies to Friedrich List’s infant industry argument that while developed countries preach Ricardo to developing nations, they actually pursued List’s policies in the past.

Although Chang did not confront and compare works of economic historians e.g. L.E Birdzell’s How the West grew rich in relation to his How did the rich countries really become rich to identify similar or different conclusions, his examination of historical materials to reach important and interesting conclusions is a contribution that is immensely valuable to the current debates on development that will evidently challenge contemporary policies and enrich development theory.

This paper analyzes the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration within a group of students that study in UK. We consider three different types of components that influence each individual approach towards immigration. In the first scenario, we assumed that people’s attitudes toward immigration will be influenced by which political party they support. In the second scenario, we assumed that individuals who live in a city will have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than an individual who lives in a town, or a village. The third assumption was that individual which have been outside UK several times are more likely to form positive attitudes towards immigration, than people who have never been outside UK. What we found was that there was not a significant difference in attitudes toward immigration in all three components.

Introduction

The definition of attitudes is: “Attitudes is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p1). The term is part of our commonsense language, and everyone understands and uses it to express attitude towards religion, racism, work, politics and many other things. Every day, each of us is exposed to countless stimuli which change and reinforce our attitudes. It is not coincidental, that Allport (1935) thought of attitudes as the most indispensable part of social psychology. A few psychologists even considered the whole psychology as scientific study of attitudes (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918).

Attitudes toward immigration vary within every society and there are many factors that play a significant role to that. In a paper examining the growing restrictiveness of late 19th century immigration policy, Timmer and Williamson (1998) argued that economic factors were sufficient to explain the anti-immigration backlash that occurred in the major host countries of the New World at that time. They constructed an index of immigration barriers in the US, Canada, Argentina, Australia and Brazil from 1850 to 1930, based on a careful reading of each country’s immigration legislation. What they found was that the most consistently significant variable explaining the rise in immigration barriers was economic inequality. Rising equality encouraged more open immigration policies, while rising inequality encouraged more restrictive immigration policies.

According to Mayda (2004), correlation between pro-immigration attitudes and individual skill, should be related to the skill of natives relative to immigrants in the destination country. Skilled individuals should favour immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants and oppose it otherwise. The results of her research support her hypothesis. Skilled individuals support immigration whether immigrants are skilled or not and oppose it if they are not skilled.

In similar fashion Scheve and Slaughter (2001) conducted a survey to analyze the determinants of individual preferences over immigration in USA. What they found was that less-skilled workers were significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows into the United States. Also, they found no evidence that the relationship between skills and immigration opinions is stronger in high-immigration communities.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) studied individual attitudes towards immigrants across Europe. What they found was that more educated people are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts. They are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole. On the contrary, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little to do with fears about labour-market competition. They also found that a large component of the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs.

Recent surveys conducted in UK show that two thirds of the people think that UK has immigration problem. The Guardian reports that the British are the only people in Western Europe who want immigration controls at the national rather than the European level, whilst they have little confidence in the UK authorities’ handling the issue. The poll suggests the British are more anti-immigrant and xenophobic than the rest of Western Europe, blaming immigrants for unemployment, and split over whether to grant them equal social benefits.

Given the impact of the recession on employment in the west over the last year, in one of the polls was found that 54% of the people in UK agreed with the statement that “the crisis meant that immigrants were taking jobs from the native-born”. Also the British thought that immigrants depressed wage rates.

Another interesting founding is that Britons wanted to deny legal immigrants equal social benefits, they favoured reinforcing border controls to combat illegal immigration, and they did not support legalising the status of illegal immigrants.

This study focuses on students studying in UK. The study that was constructed focused in three primary areas. Firstly, it took into consideration the place that its individual lives or live. The hypothesis was that people that lived in cities would more likely have positive attitudes toward immigration, than people who live in villages and towns. Secondly, it was thought that the political views of the individual will have an impact in his/her attitude toward immigration. In this question, it was hypothesized that people that support the liberal democrat party will have more positive attitudes than people that support the labour or conservative party. Lastly, travelling outside UK was thought that it will have an impact on the individuals’ attitude toward immigration. In this question it was assumed that individuals’ that had travelled outside UK several times would have more positive attitudes toward immigration than those that did not.

Method
Materials

The questionnaire consisted of four questions. The first question was “what is the general attitude towards immigration”? The answer was either positive or negative, and the participants had to tick one the boxes. The next question was “which political party best encompasses your views”? In this question there were three available answers and the participants had to tick one of the boxes. In this question we assumed that Liberal Democrats will have more positive attitudes toward immigration than the Labour and Conservative parties. Third question was “how would you describe the place where you live”? Again we have three available answers and participants have to tick on. In this question people that lived in a city would be more likely to have positive thoughts of immigration than people that live in towns and villages. Third question was “how many countries have you visited outside UK”? In this question we assumed that people who have travelled more abroad would have more positive attitudes towards immigration.

Participants and Procedure

Twenty undergraduate students at Swansea University took part in the questionnaire (14 female and 6 male) aged between 18 and 28.

The participants were given a questionnaire to complete. It was emphasized to them that their results will be treated in the strictest confidence, and that they will not be divulged to anyone in a manner that would allow their identification. Also the participants were told that there is no “right” or “wrong” answer to any of the questions and they should give their immediate response to the individual items, rather than having a careful thought out and deliberate response.

Results

Using Rx C Chi Square Test of association we found that for the political views the critical value was .29. For the countries visited we also found that critical value was .29. Lastly, for the place that its individual lives, critical value was 3.07. Comparing it to the critical value of chi square=5.99 we can conclude that there is not significant difference in all the questions. Therefore, participant’s attitudes towards immigration were not significant, whether where they grew up, what political party they support and how many times they have travelled abroad.

Discussion

The results in this study were not significant to support our hypothesis. In all the questions the critical value was lower than the chi-squares’ critical value, but we have to take into consideration that there were three or more cells that had an expected frequency of less then three which could explain why none of the results were significant.

Even though our hypothesis could not be supported while doing the chi-square test of association some of the results could be very useful. In the first question which was about the political party which each individual supports, from the 20 students that participated in the survey ten of them supported liberal democrats, and eight of them had positive attitudes towards immigration. Considering liberal democrats’ political views this result supports our hypothesis. In the second question where the participants had to describe the place they lived, we found that most of them lived in towns and village and only one in a city. Our hypothesis here was that people that lived in cities would probably have more positive attitudes about immigration since they would have to associate with more immigrants, and they would be more open minded, than they would if they lived in a village or a town. Since only one person lives in a city our hypothesis could not be argued. Nineteen of the participants live in villages and towns and most of them have positive attitudes toward immigration which does not support our assumption. Lastly, in the question of how many countries have they visited outside UK, we hypothesised that the individuals that had been outside UK several times would have more positive attitudes towards immigration than those that had never left the county. Seventeen of the participants had travelled more four times outside UK and twelve of them had positive attitudes toward immigration which supports our hypothesis.

In future studies, to provide better results we should have each individual complete the questionnaire alone and not among other people. Some individuals might have given wrong replies because they would not want other people to think that they are racists. Another thing we should consider is where each individual lives. We could argue our hypothesis better if we had equal amount of people living in cities, towns and villages. The same could be said for people that have travelled abroad many times, a few times, or have not travelled at all. Lastly we should have equal amount of women and men to compare if gender plays a role in attitudes toward immigration.

In this essay I address the claim that the dependency school sees development from a Third World perspective.^[1] I focus on two dependency theorists, Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as a way to examine such a statement. First, I describe dependency theory in a historical context as well as in general terms, in order to clearly situate the school within Third World discourse. Second, I examine the specific theoretical characteristics of Frank’s theories, and some of the criticism of it and how they relate to Third World issues. Third, I discuss Cardoso’s scholarship in relation both to the dependency school and to Frank’s research by emphasizing his theoretical divergence from orthodox dependency theory. Next, I comparatively discuss Frank and Cardoso’s theories in relation to an overall discussion on dependency and development. In conclusion, I review the reasons why the dependency school incorporates a Third World perspective, particularly a Latin American perspective.

Throughout this essay I refer to ‘dependency theory’, yet I would like to point out, as Roxborough (1979) has stressed, that rather than viewing the notion of dependency as a “specific theory” or a “theory of dependency” it be seen as a paradigm (p.43).^[2] This is because there are many competing theories and definitions of dependency as well as several historical intellectual shifts and revisions among dependency scholars (Hout, 1993). The dependency school of development is also variably referred to as the ‘structuralist’, ‘world economy’ and ‘underdevelopment’ schools (Bosch, 1997). It has its roots in theoretical debates discussing capitalism and Marxism (Gardner and Lewis 1996; Chilcote 1981; Roxborough, 1979; Frank, 1967). The earliest discussions emerging from the dependency school can be traced to the ECLA (Economic Commission of Latin America), established by the United Nations in 1948 whereby a radical group of scholars examined the inequities of North-South relations and trade. This enclave of scholars specifically focused on Latin American issues and the paradox of why these countries so rich in natural resources are so economically poor.

The need for the ECLA forum arose from an academic and political reaction toward the inability of Latin American countries to halt the “imperialist siphoning-off of the surplus value produced by their working classes”, hence, the association of dependency theory with a Third World perspective (Johnson 1981, p. 58). The ECLA theorists argued that Latin American countries are subjected to an international system that manipulates and controls them from beyond their own borders (Staniland, 1985). These ideas, moreover, offered a critique of modernisation theories that view less developed countries in terms of an evolutionary process whereby industrialization and economic development are seen as stages that they must undergo in order to achieve higher incomes and living standards. In contrast, dependency theory views less developed countries as resulting from conditions generated by a broader global system of exploitation set within wider social and historical processes (Bilton et al., 1996).

The theoretical debates surrounding dependency theory hinge upon the central idea that it is pointless to study the development of Third World societies in isolation from more developed countries. Debates further the notion that western capitalism in the industrialized world is built upon its ability to dominate and control the resources of non-industrial less developed countries and must thus sustain its dominant position to advance its own interests. The historical basis for such domination is the significant accumulation of capital that occurred during colonization and the industrial revolution. The continuation of such domination transpires through neo-colonialism. As such, dependency theorists primarily focus on the political structures that shape the relationships between the First and Third World (Staniland, 1985).

This main tenet of dependency theory is closely tied to what is widely refereed to as ‘world systems theory’, established by Immanual Wallerstein. In fact, ‘world systems theory’, is commonly viewed as an adaptation or extension of the dependency school (Chirot and Hall, 1982). Wallerstein (1974) views the world as an interrelated system, a world-economy, whereby each country is perceived in terms of its relationship to the whole. It is precisely through a world systems analysis that notions of ‘First” and ‘Third’ worlds have materialized as a way to portray the simultaneous differentiation and interdependency of distinct parts. Dependency theory suggests that the Third World “is not natural, but created through economic and political processes”(Gardner and Lewis 1996, p.17). Like dependency theory, ‘world systems theory’ is often criticized for being overly deterministic (Staniland, 1985).

Two of the most prominent dependency theorists are Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Frank and Cardoso are both ECLA scholars and associated with Latin American issues and the dependency school to the extent that they are often referred to as ‘dependistas’. Frank (1967) introduced the popular term ‘the development of underdevelopment’ and wrote specifically about how “the domestic, political and social structure of Chile was and still remains determined first and foremost by the fact and specific nature of its participation in the world capitalist system” (p.29). His work also attempted to address a major gap in the ECLA discussions: the role of class interests within Third World countries in creating cycles of dependency. To do this, Frank developed the notion of metropolis-satellite links whereby capitalism produces a developed center and its underdeveloped peripheries. He purported that the ties between metropolis and satellite can also represent links between advanced capital cities and their hinterlands. This metaphorical binary aims to examine the relationships between industrialised and non-industrialised countries. Although revisionist dependency theorists now refer to these as core-periphery relationships, this metaphor still forms the basis for many contemporary critiques of global capitalism. According to this view, the peripheries supply cheap raw materials and labour to the core. In return, the core supplies them with obsolescent technologies, manufactured goods and debt. This results in peripheral economies being oriented toward the outside whereby resources flow toward the core and, in turn, continue to flow toward the more dominant economic interests of other cores. Capitalism is seen to necessitate the core-periphery division for the efficient allocation of resources in favour of dominant countries. .

Despite, Frank’s intentional focus on class interests, he ignores questions of class formation and behaviour. In his analysis, the flow of resources between the divergent metropolis and satellite regions takes social classes as a given without specifically analysing their structures and roles in contributing to a system of domination. Hence, in Frank’s analysis, spatial relations are conflated with social class relations, a contentious point in criticisms of his work (Chilcote, 1981; Cardoso, 1972; Laclau, 1971). In other words, the shift of value from satellite to metropolis cannot always be viewed as an identical phenomenon to that of the exploitation of labour (Roxborough, 1979).

Another point that provoked much commentary in Frank’s analysis of Latin American underdevelopment was his claim that Latin America has been a capitalist society ever since the sixteenth century. For Ernesto Laclau (1971), an Argentinian scholar, Frank had misread Marx’s definition of capitalism and was thus mistakenly reducing capitalism to a mere equation of exchange and enterprise omitting the equally important emphasis on modes of production. This was particularly important in regards to labour since, at that time, much labour in Latin America consisted of slavery and debt peonage as well as other pre-capitalist forms. Laclau does not question the premise that at the time of colonization, market economies became tied in with those of First World countries; his main point is that the participation of a country in a world economic system does not necessarily render it as being capitalistic. As such, he indicates that Frank confounds the production of commodities with the commoditization of labour, a criticism which led Frank to revise his work.^[3]

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a Latin American sociologist who later served as the President of Brazil, draws ties between dependency theory and imperialism.^[4] Using the work of Leninist theories, Cardoso (1972) makes parallels with the dependency school over their mutual use of the term ‘dependency’ and their shared observations about how imperialism furthers the capitalist agenda and necessitates economic domination over less developed countries.

Cardoso’s analysis attempted to address those issues of social class that the dependency school had allegedly ignored. He looked at the social and economic as being inextricably tied together, stating, for instance, that “an economic class or group tries to establish through the social process a system of social relations that permits it to impose on the entire society a social form of production akin to its own interests” (ibid, p. 15). Cardoso went beyond the metropolis/satellite metaphor and the perceived asymmetry between First and Third Worlds by examining the political, economic and social links between the dominant local social classes within and between Third and First World countries (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). For Cardoso, “political institutions at a given moment can only be fully understood in terms of the structures of domination because these express the class interests behind political organization” (ibid, p. 14). He thus envisioned the capitalist economy as growing toward an internationalization in which societies become divided into antagonistic classes.

Cardoso’s delineation of class interests between and within countries departed from the more deterministic model offered by Frank, seeing dependency as varying by degree and thus allowing for a more unconstrained view of international relations. Furthermore, by placing dependency into situation-specific contexts, his position is a more relativist departure from that of Frank’s. Most importantly, Cardoso’s perspective is optimistic about the possibility that dependent relations can transform over time. In fact, Cardoso (1973) argues that in some contexts development and dependency can actually be compatible. This is a clear departure from Frank and other dependency theorists who are often labeled as having a stagnationist view toward development.

Both Frank and Cardoso agree that exploitation from dominant states is a key operating factor in how regional economies develop but whereas Cardoso might focus on class interests, Frank will more broadly hold the forces of capitalism accountable (Bosch, 1997). In fact, Cardoso’s critics accuse him of not detailing the more general conditions and mechanisms by which global capitalism operates (Staniland, 1985). Whereas Frank is pessimistic about liberal and neo-liberal trade theory’s claims to create equality and more fairly distribute resources and the access to them, Cardoso is optimistic.

Although Cardoso accepts the basic premise of dependency theory as describing third world countries as being conditioned by global agendas and constraints, he does not call for a socialist revolution, as does Frank, as a means to remedy these problems.^[5] Yet Frank is also critical of his own former position that assumed that in order for Third World countries to achieve economic independence from the First World they could voluntary de-link themselves from broader economic systems thus controlling their own internal resources, such as raw materials and labour, to develop their own economies. Frank claims that “experience has shown it to be extremely difficult, if not impossible for voluntarist political action to de-link particular countries from the world economy” (Frank, 2002).

Undoubtedly, as I discussed previously, the intellectual roots, vitality and application of dependency theorists have fostered around Third World issues and debates that, in turn, have greatly influenced development studies at large. I would make the case that even more specifically, dependency theory is also distinctively Latin American.^[6] First, its origins emerge from a think tank focused on Latin America as a region. Second, its main proponents are Latin Americanists of which many are also Latin American nationals. Third, the application and analysis of the dependency school of thought has been on Latin American development. Fourth, its popularity among Latin American scholars and policymakers has made it an important intellectual school of social thought within Latin American academia and politics. Through Latin American intelligentsia, such as Cardoso, dependency theory has even entered mainstream Latin American politics. Overall, Latin Americanists have used the main arguments of dependency theory to stress how the structural climate of the world economy shapes Latin American economies. As such, through dependency theory, they have strongly influenced the international scholarship on development. In conclusion, the dependency school, unlike other development perspectives, distinctively represents a Third World view.

The debates inspired by the dependency school have given voice to a Third World perspective, in terms of focus, point of view and representation. As I have shown, there are equally as many excellent expositions as there are criticisms of Frank and Cardoso’s studies and the dependency school at large (Smith 1981). What is significant is how these provocative and critical debates ultimately touch upon broader themes that, like the dependency school itself, address expansive global, economic, political and social issues.

References:

Bilton, Tony et al. (1996) Introductory Sociology, 3rd edition. London, Macmillan.

Ahiakpor, James C.W. (1985) The success and failure of dependency theory: the experience of Ghana. International Organization, 39(3), 535-552.

Bosch, Gerald R. (1997) Eric Williams and the moral rhetoric of dependency theory. Callaloo, 20(4), Special Issue: Eric Williams and Postcolonial Caribbean, p 817-827.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1972) Dependency and development in Latin America. New Left Review, 74,83-95.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1973) Associated dependent development: theoretical and practical implications.In: Alfred Stephen (ed) Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. New Haven, Yale University Press, p.142-76.

Cardoso, F. H. and Faletto, Enzo (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: Pergamon Press.

Chilcote, Ronald H. (1981) Issues of Theory in Dependency and Marxism. Latin American Perspectives, 8 (3/4), dependency and Marxism. 3-16.

Chirot, Daniel and Hall, Thomas D. (1982) “World-System Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology, 8, 81-106.

Frank, Andre Gunder (1967) Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America: historical studies of Chile and Brazil. London, Monthly Review.

Frank, Andre Gunder (1984) Critique and anti-critique: essays on dependence and reformism. New York, Praeger Publishers.

Frank, Andre Gunder (2002) Interview. In: Practical Strategies For Social And Economic Development. Aurora online (Simmons, Tony). February 2002. Available from: http://aurora.icaap.org/gifs/frank.gif [Accessed July 7, 2005].

Gardner, Katy and Lewis, David (1996) Anthropology, development and the post-modern challenge. London, Pluto Press.

Hout, Wil (1993) Capitalism and the Third World: development, dependence and world system. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.

Johnson, Carlos. (1981) Dependency theory and the processes of capitalism and socialism. Latin American Perspectives, 8 (3/4), Dependency and Marxism, 55-81.

Kleemeier, Lizz Lyle. (1978) Review: Empirical tests of dependency theory: a second critique of methodology by Vengroff, Richard. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 16 (4), 701-704.

Laclau, Ernesto (1971) Feudalism and capitalism in Latin America. New Left Review, 67, 19-38.

Roxborough, Ian (1979) Theories of Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan.

Smith, Tony (1981) The logic of dependency theory revisited. International Organization, 35 (4) 755-761.

Staniland, Martin (1985) What is political economy? A study of social theory and underdevelopment. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The modern world system: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century. New York, Academic Press.

1

Nationalism is a concept that is not easily defined. There are numerous definitions and forms of what is nationalism, and many of these definitions even overlap. However, there is no one definition that is more adequate than another. Keeping in mind that these definitions are constantly evolving, with thorough analysis and the juxtaposition of arguments set out by eight prominent scholars, a clearer definition of nationalism can be attained.

To begin with, the most well know definition today is from Professor Anthony Smith. He states that nationalism is simply “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation” (Smith, 2001).” In this definition, Smith reveals what he believes the three main goals of nationalism are: autonomy, national unity, and national identity. Even Smith’s profound definition has not been available for very long considering he was born in 1933. Although there is much argument on the definition of nationalism, Smith agrees that there is one main point of agreement and that is that the term nationalism is a modern phenomenon (Smith, 2001). Civic nationalism is basically defined as a group of people which have a certain loyalty to civic rights or laws and pledge to abide by these laws. Ethnic nationalism is basically a group that possesses a common culture, language, land, etc. It is more specific in terms of who can be in it (McGregor, 2010). Smith writes that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized (Smith, 2001).” Smith’s most popular argument features civic and ethnic types of nationalism as opposed to eastern and western types. Even more specifically, Smith makes the distinction between both civic and ethnic nationalisms. He also believes that “Many modern nations are formed around pre-existing, and often pre-modern, ethnic cores (Smith, 2001).” Smith is claiming that nations had pre-existing-origins prior to their ‘new origins’ of their new nation. One of the most important arguments by critics is that the civic and ethnic viewpoint of nationalism collapses too much on the ethnic category (Shulman, 2002). Smith’s definition seems to be the foundation for nationalism, although he certainly was not the first to attempt to define it. Other scholars go in to more detail on certain elements of the definition, but most relate back to Smith’s original definition.

On the contrary to Anthony Smith’s definition of nationalism pertaining to the civic and ethnic type, Hans Kohn has argued that the two main types of nationalism are eastern and western. His definition states, “Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state (Kohn, 1965).” Kohn’s argument includes both eastern and western types of nationalism which refer to Eastern and Western Europe. “Eastern nationalism conceived the nation as an organic community, united by culture, language and descent (McGregor 2010).” This particular idea could possibly be related to Smith’s ethnic type of nationalism. “Western nationalism conceived the nation as a political and civic community, held together by voluntary adherence to democratic norms (McGregor 2010).” Again, western nationalism could be perceived as a civic type of nationalism. This can be recognized as two similar classifications on two unfamiliar grounds. Kohn believes that nationalism relates directly with eastern and western Europe and that it is also where the ‘state of mind’ of nationalism originated. The main criticism of Kohn’s classification of nationalism is him being over simplistic. He certainly does not go into as much detail as Smith on the definition. He also relates only towards Europe which is why he is being identified as over simplistic.

Next, Carlton J. H. Hayes’ definition of nationalism states, “Loyalty and attachment to the interior of the group (namely the nation and homeland) are the basis of nationalism (Hayes, 1926).” In this definition, a common cultural background and a common cultural group are considered the main factors in forming a nation (Naqvi, Ali). That remains true with most of the definitions of nationalism. Hayes definition of nationalism seems to be more specific to the ‘ethnic’ ties toward nationalism. In other words, Hayes is saying that land, language, and blood are the basis of nationalism. He is saying that nation is something to be proud of (Naqvi, Ali). Hayes also believes that these ‘ethnic’ qualities are the most important; even religion does not compare. “It is attachment to nationality that gives direction to one’s individual and social postures, not attachment to religion and ideology. A human being takes pride in his national achievements and feels dependent on its cultural heritage, not on the history of religion and his faith (Hayes, 1926).” This quote further proves Hayes’s view on nationalism and how it relates to one’s culture and past, and specifically not related to religion at all. The reason Hayes’s definition is unique from others, is his emphasis on the fact that religion is not a factor in forming a nation. To further specify Hayes’s definition on nationalism he says, “What distinguishes one human being from another are not their beliefs, but their birth-place, homeland, language and race. Those who are within the four walls of the homeland and nation, belong to it, and those who are outside it, are aliens. It is on the basis of these factors that the people have a feeling of sharing a single destiny and a common past. (Hayes, 1926).” This quote goes hand in hand with Hayes’s definition of nationalism and just further explains it. According to Hayes, nationalism does not exist without that ‘ethnic’ background.

Furthermore, according to scholar Benedict Anderson, nationalism is, “a new emerging nation imagines itself to be antique (Anderson, 2003).” This is similar to how Anthony Smith and Carlton Hayes defined nationalism. It is mostly like Smith’s ethnic nationalism, which focuses more on the origin of the nation. Anderson focuses more on modern Nationalism and suggests that it forms its attachment through language, especially through literature (Anderson, 2003). Of particular importance to Anderson’s theory is his stress on the role of printed literature (Anderson, 2003). In Anderson’s mind, the development of nationalism is linked with printed literature and the growth of these printed works. People were able to read about nationalism in a common dialect and that caused nationalism to mature (Anderson, 2003). Anderson’s definition of nationalism and nation differ greatly from other scholars. He defines nation as “an imagined political community (Anderson 2003).” He believes this because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (Anderon, 2003).” Not only is Anderson’s theory distinctive because of the “printed literature theory”, but also because it is the “imagined political community.”

Another prominent Nationalist researcher, Ernest Gellner states that, “nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner, 1983)”. Gellner was once a teacher of Anthony Smith. Although most scholars would agree that nationalism appeared after the French Revolution, Gellner further argues that nationalism became a “sociological necessity in the modern world (Gellner, 1983).” His argument is similar to the uniqueness of Benedict Anderson’s “printed literature” theory, but Gellner focuses more on the industrialization of work and cultural modernization to explain how nationalism expanded (Zeulow, 1999). Gellner believes that “states only exist where there is division of labour, therefore the state comes before nationalism (Gellner, 1983).” Like other scholars, Gellner believes that nationalism is a political force. Gellner also stresses the congruency of nation and politics. He does not believe one can occur without the other one. There are many criticisms to Ernest Gellner’s theory, including Anthony Smith saying, “It misreads the relationship between nationalism and industrialization (Smith 1998).” Not all of the critics view Gellner’s theory as a misread. Most agree that he is the father of nationalism studies and most say that his nationalism work was brilliant (University of Wales Press). One can usually relate their definition of nationalism with Ernest Gellner or Anthony Smith. Gellner stresses the importance of the political side, while Smith puts the importance on cultural. Neither are right or wrong, just a difference of opinion.

Historian John Breuilly defends a more modern theory of nationalism, similar to Benedict Anderson’s. In reference to nationalism, he concludes, “The rise of the modern state system provides the institutional context within which an ideology of nationalism is necessary (Breuilly 1985).” Breuilly argues that the process of “state modernization provides an important factor in understanding historical signs of nationalism (Cormier, 2001).” Breuilly argues that nationalism does not have much to do with ethnicity or ethnic background, but rather more to do with political motivation. Breuilly is not the first scholar who believed that ethnic background had nothing to do with nationalism. In fact, Breuilly’s definition relates well to Gellner’s in the sense that they both argue in favor of political motivation. “Nationalists are seen to create their own ideology out of their own subjective sense of national culture. (Breuilly, 1982).” This particular quote is quite similar to Anderson’s imagined political community theory in that Breuilly does not support the ethnic side of nationalism nearly as much as others nationalists. Breuilly criticizes most scholars due to the fact that they believe in national culture because he believes that there is no such thing. He believes that the political component of nationalism is by far the most important. Breuilly indicates in his definition the importance of the state system; hence the political force necessary for nationalism to occur.

Next, Michael Hechter defines nationalism as a, “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit (Hechter, 2000).” He further explains, “Nation and governance can be made congruent by enacting exclusive policies that limit full membership in the polity to individuals from on one more favoured nations (Hechter, 2000).” Hechter stresses the importance of the correspondence of the government and the boundaries of the nation; much like Breuilly in the sense that both of them indicate that nationalism requires congruency for it to take place. In Hechter’s book, Containing Nationalism, he expresses his belief that the reason nationalism occurs is because of “self-determination.” Hechter further explains his definition and clarifies that there are two different types of nationalism. The first one is of the ideology of freedom and he gives the example of the French Revolution. The second form is “xenophobic or even goes as far as genocide” (Hechter). This explains where the different views of nationalism come in; civic versus ethnic or eastern versus western. Furthermore, Hechter defines the two different types of nationalism to even more specific forms of nationalism that go beyond his original definition. These definitions include: state-building nationalism, peripheral nationalism, irredentist nationalism, and unification nationalism (Hechter, 2000). Hechter doesn’t argue that there are two definitions of nationalism like other scholars do, but he concludes that nationalism is specific to the means of each and every situation.

In Peter Alter’s definition of Nationalism, he states, “Nationalism is a political force which has been more important in shaping the history of Europe and the world over the last two centuries than the ideas of freedom and parliamentary democracy or, let alone, of communism (Alter, 1994).” His argument is similar to John Breuilly in the sense that he agrees that there is a strong emphasis on nationalism being a “political force.” Alter is saying that it has everything to do with being a political movement instead of the idea of freedom. In reference to nationalism, Alter states, “It can be associated with forces striving for political, social, economic and cultural emancipation, as well as with those whose goal oppression (Alter, 1994).” His outlook on nationalism seems much broader than other scholars. This particular reference virtually sums up many scholars definitions together. Alter does not seem to have a specific argument on nationalism, as in civic vs. ethnic or western vs. eastern but just an acceptance that nationalism could be based on all of these arguments. Again, Alter says, “It can mean emancipation, and it can mean oppressionaˆ¦ dangers as well as opportunities (Alter, 1994).” There is no precise argument when he tries to define nationalism even though he does have the idea that nationalism is directly related to a political force. Alter also states that nationalism was important to shaping Europe, however most scholars agree with that statement to begin with. Most modern scholars would relate to Alter’s style of defining nationalism.

In conclusion, the definition of nationalism is not easily defined and scholars that have tried to define it differ, in some amount of detail, from each other. Each scholar seems to have his own uniqueness and input to the definition, however, these definitions tend to pertain to one certain area of nationalism. According to the eight previous scholars, there are a myriad of styles of nationalism including: political, cultural, ethnic, civic, eastern, and western. Many aspirations are desired because of nationalism, including establishment of homeland, separation, expansion, etc. Although the definition of nationalism is essentially particularistic, scholars have been able to identify a few common ideologies. Some common ground includes; most scholars agree that nationalism started after the French Revolution. They also agree that nationalism occurs because of a desire for national independence. Scholars are always doing research and finding new things which will result in new definitions. Most of the most protrusive definitions of nationalism have come about in the last fifty or so years, so no telling what scholars might come up with in future years.

Social capital is the the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu 1983: 249). Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure (Coleman 1994: 302).

‘Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital’ (Putnam 2000: 19).

‘Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions… Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together’ (The World Bank 1999).

According to John Field, the fundamental of social capital is that ‘relationship matters’. It helps people to commit themselves to people in the community. It eventually becomes a shared set of values, virtues and expectation within society as a whole. However, Robert Putman (1993; 2000) is the person who launched social capital which focused on research and policy discussions. The World Bank also chose social capital as a useful organising idea. They argue that ‘increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable’ (The World Bank 1999). In this piece we explore the idea of social capital and the contribution by voluntary clubs to social capital.

Types of Social Capital

There are three types of social capital: bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social capital.

“Bonding social capital refers to the links between like-minded people, or the reinforcement of homogeneity.” (Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000) Bonding Social Capital indicates ties between people in similar situation. It can be your neighbours, friends or even family. (Woolcock 2001: 13-4).

“Bridging social capital can be referred as building of connections between heterogeneous groups, which are likely to be more fragile, but more likely also to foster social inclusion.” (Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000) Bridging social capital covers distant ties of like persons, such as workmates and fast friends. (Woolcock 2001: 13-4)

Linking social capital, which reaches out to unlike people in dissimilar situations, such as those who are entirely outside of the community, thus enabling members to leverage a far wider range of resources than are available in the community. (Woolcock 2001: 13-4)

The discussion of social capital is credited to three main theorists – namely Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. Bourdieu stated that there are three kind of capitals, but for this paper we only look at ‘Social Capital’. Bourdieu provides a concise definition of social capital by stating: “social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resource which is linked to the possession of a durable network of more of less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (p. 249). Field and Wynne said that people access other forms of capital through social capital. In sporting circumstances, Bourdieu gives an example of golf clubs where individuals network to facilitate business, a social practice that is not available to all members of a community given the exclusive nature of many golf clubs (Field, 2003; Wynne, 1999).

According to Coleman, social capital is not a single body. It is a structure which facilitates certain action, which has positive outcome; otherwise it would not have been possible. Coleman, through his research, found out that the level of school drop-out rate had reduced due to parental investment and family social capital. Coleman, in this context defines social capital as a set of resources that are available in family relation which is important for social development of the child. These resources differ from person to person and an advantage to children to develop their human capital. (Coleman, 1994, cited in Coalter, 2007, p. 541)

According to Putman, social capital is not just a public good but is for the public good. Putnam states that, bonding social capital are when people of the same community, with similar values associate together to achieve shared goals. They tend to reinforce restricted identities and are homogenous group. Putman also says that this kind of association have some negative points as they tend to exclude outsiders. Exclusion of outsiders here means that a football club will have a tendency to include supporters and players from a same background. They would try to exclude those who are not from the same background. On the other hand bridging social capital is heterogeneous in nature. Heterogeneity of social connections promotes linkage with different type of people.

Bridging social capital however, has the potential to forge connections. People with same as well as from different background can connect within the community or outside the community (Narayan & Cassidy, 2001). We can thus see that people who are connected through bridging social capital have a wider range of associates. They also got more opportunities. Therefore Bridging social capital is very important to enhance social inclusion and to develop community’s ability.

Sports Volunteers: The Real Active Citizens?

Sports Clubs are career for the expression of active citizenship through volunteering. Volunteers are more important than any other thing in a club or a sporting organization (Nichols, et al., 2004). Clubs provide an opportunity which helps the community by contributing to social capital through social interaction (Coalter, 2007; Long, 2008; Weed et al., 2005). The volunteers share their values, a reflection of the society where their expressions of collective values are encouraged, which is a positive contribution towards society.

As Coalter (2007) points out “the diffuse and contested nature of social capital is central to the social regeneration/social inclusion agenda” (p. 159). The volunteers have a potential contribution to rebuild the social capital. Sport England (1999, p8) stresses volunteering as activity which is fundamental to the development of democratic society. It helps in contributing towards their public life and develops their communities. Consequently such policies are as much concerned with the instrumental use of sport for purposes of community development as they are in simply developing sport in the community (Coalter and Allison, 1996).

The key policy message here is that the potentially positive benefits of sport are not only to be obtained via participation – involvement in the organisation and provision of opportunities for sport and physical recreation can assist in the development of self-esteem and a series of transferable skills – a view of volunteering as “active citizenship”.

Race and race relations have been aspects of American society since the colonial era. With the exception of a handful of countries, no other nation has dealt with the struggles of a multiracial society and has had to overcome the problems created in its nation’s past. As a result, race in America is a complex issue with many facets and race relations have become increasingly difficult to define.

Richard Thompson Ford, in examining the current race situation in America in his book The Race Card, defines the period as “post-racism.” Focusing on Ford’s ideas, as presented in his book, as well as an investigation into the Jena Six story, which is a contemporary example of racism, a more defined picture of current race relations in America can be uncovered.

Ford’s The Race Card provides a critique on the current race situation in America. In his book, while Ford presents the idea that America is “post-racism,” he asserts that post-racism is not defined in the traditional way one might assume. To Ford, post-racism is a “…late stage of racism in which its contradictions and excesses both cancel out and amplify its original function” (2008:25). To Ford, the era of post-racism allows people to have internal feelings of racism, as long as their overt actions and behaviors are not racist. Racial stereotypes may still exist, but no longer are those stereotypes defined by “White Only” establishments.

With the elimination of the stereotypical racism, racism may now be harder to eliminate because overt racists will remain unidentified. Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, segregation laws and blatant bigotry provided easy markers to define racism and identify racists. Today there are laws preventing outward expressions of racism, making the process of defining the current state of race relations far more difficult.

According to Charles Hirschman, racism is the belief that people can be divided into categories based on certain features that define a particular look (2004). While characteristics that define a person as part of a particular race are biological, race is a socially constructed concept in which people place meaning on the biological features. The seeds of racism in America were planted out of the need for a cheap and renewable labor force.

When indentured servitude was no longer profitable to this country’s landowners, it prompted a needed change. Dark-skinned Africans, brought to this country as slaves, looked different from the white land owners. Based on that difference of appearance, along with the historical lack of a formal schooling, American society regarded them as inferior. This view by society eventually lead to the social construct of race, with whites seen as superior and blacks as inferior.

While slavery was abolished following the Civil War, the overt concept of racial inferiority continued until the Civil Rights movement in the 1960’s (Pinkney 1999). Up until the Civil Rights Act was passed, Jim Crow laws and other discrimination laws continued to segregate the races and reinforced the societal view of the inferiority of African Americans.

Following the passage of the Civil Rights legislation, overt racism no longer was socially acceptable. Racism is no longer is defined by superiority and inferiority, but rather is defined as an acknowledged difference between cultures, with one no better than the other (Miles and Brown 2003). Because of the years of segregation, there are inherent differences between the black and white cultures. While segregation and discrimination no longer are a common practice, there still are differences between the groups and implicit discrimination remains.

The faces of racism have changed, but racism has yet to disappear from society. Today, those who are identified as racists, under the old definition, are labeled as bigots and outsiders by society. Although there still are those who are viewed as racists under the traditional definition, there is a new form of racism present and it is much harder to define.

As defined by Ford, the current state of racial affairs revolves around “playing the race card.” In playing the race card, people must presume that discrimination remains and it is based on one’s race. More often than not, today’s discrimination is a based on the many years of inferior treatment. In other words, people today claim racism because, at one point in history, it could be considered a result of racism (2008:31). There are four instances of playing the race card that are outlined in Ford’s book, including racism without racists, racism-by-analogy, unclear definitions of what is racism, and unclear goals for the current movement.

People use the racism without racists definition because it is the easiest conclusion to use when explaining the motivations of others. There may be extenuating circumstances as to why people act a certain way, but people cry “racism” because it is an easy answer; they fail to see the situation from the other person’s point of view.

In racism-by-analogy, other groups claim that their struggles and discrimination are equal to those fought for in the Civil Rights Movement, even though they are not the same. As an example, people that are overweight or “not pretty enough” may make the claim that their legal rights are being violated, even though “overweight” is not a protected class under the legislation.

Having unclear definitions of racism causes people to overuse the claim. There are many factors that motivate people’s actions, and it is not always based on race. With no clear-cut definition of present-day racism, the resulting lines are blurred as to what actually constitutes racism in today’s society.

Without an accepted definition of racism and no clear goals for the improvement of race relations, it is difficult to determine when playing the race card may be beneficial or detrimental to a movement. This unknown result causes internal conflict within the movement itself, preventing it from moving forward.

Overall, Ford’s argument is correct in its assertions. The face of racism today has changed and a new era of race relations has begun. No longer are there overt forms of racism and discrimination, but rather there are more subtle situations affecting race relations in today’s society.

However, Ford’s argument is not as simple as post-racism and the race card; there still are societal and structural boundaries and obstacles that African Americans cannot seem to overcome. While legally discrimination and segregation are no longer present, there are still examples of it today.

As author Shawn Utsey, et al., argues, there are three forms of racism that still exist today: individual, institutional and cultural racism (2000). Examples of individual racism include racial profiling and the lingering sentiments of the overt racism seen during the Civil Rights Movement. Residential segregation and other societal restrictions constitute institutional racism. Cultural racism refers to the lack of African American influence in mainstream American culture and history. These new forms of discrimination and segregation define the current race relations in contemporary American culture.

A contemporary example to which Ford’s ideas of post-racism and the race card can be applied is the Jena Six incident. There are many incidents which occurred in Jenna, Louisiana, between September to December 2006, which contributed to the belief that racism and discrimination were involved in the Jena events (Newman 2007).

The first incident occurred in September, involving nooses hung from a tree at the local high school. As is common at most high schools, certain social groups congregate in specific areas, though not necessarily based on race. At Jena High School, a racially diverse school, a specific tree commonly was known as the “white tree.” A black freshman asked the principal if he could sit under the tree and the principal assured him that he could sit wherever he wanted. The next day, two nooses were hung from the tree, though the motivations behind the hanging of the nooses were unclear. The students responsible for hanging the nooses were identified and suspended. When the suspensions were announced, the black community of Jena was enraged, insisting that the nooses were a symbol of a threat against the black students of the high school.

There were two altercations between white and black students, which some claimed were a result of the events that occurred in September. At a party, five black students attempted to enter a party, but were denied entrance because they did not receive an invitation. An altercation ensued, resulting in a white student being charged with battery. The next day, another altercation occurred outside a convenience store between a white male and three black males, one of which had been involved in the previous altercation at the party the night before. One of the black students was charged with disturbing the peace, second degree robbery and the theft of a firearm.

The final event, which ultimately is what led to the national publicity, was an altercation between six black students and one white student, Justin Barker. Barker was badly beaten, but was released from the hospital after three hours in the emergency room. Five of the six black students were charged with attempted second-degree murder, though the charges later were reduced to battery. Mychal Bell originally was charged with aggravated second-degree battery and tried as an adult, but his conviction later was overturned. The five who originally were charged later were convicted of simple battery (Associated Press 2007).

Due to the events leading up to the attack on Justin Barker, many consider this to be a result of racial tensions in the town. This was reinforced by the filing of the charge of attempted murder to the Jena Six at the beginning of the trail proceedings, a charge many considered to be racially driven and not fitting to the crime. Many also believe that the all-white jury, which delivered the original guilty verdict against Bell, levied an unfair sentence.

While on the surface these events seem to be motivated by racism, the events involving the Jena Six are more of a case of Ford’s racism without racists. Because the events which occurred in Jena involved both whites and blacks, people assume racism was a determining factor. However, most of the events leading up to the Barker incident were unrelated. Even when considered separately, racism is not the only motivation for the actions which occurred.

The tree that was claimed as the “white tree” by the student body has since been refuted by the faculty and staff at Jena High School. According to later testimonies, students of all races sat under the tree at one point or another. There also was a conflict over the number of nooses which were hung from the tree on the following day, and further investigations revealed that only two were hung, not three, which is believed to be a symbol of the Ku Klux Klan. The nooses, it later was found, were a prank aimed at the rodeo team, not hung as racist symbols. As it later was learned, school administrators cut down the nooses before classes started because students were playing with them in inappropriate manners, not because of some underlying racial context.

Following the Jena incident, the United States Justice Department conducted an investigation to determine if the act was in fact a racially-motivated hate crime. It was determined that the hanging of the nooses was an isolated event without lasting racial tensions at the school. As such, there is no direct connection between the events occurring in September and the Barker attack. Each event was separate and unique, yet collectively were made to seem as a cause and effect relationship by the media.

Finally, the allegations accusing the all-white jury of delivering a racially-motivated verdict fails to take into account underlying causes. Due to the makeup of the town, there are only a small number of African Americans to select for jury duty. Of those summoned for jury duty, some were African American but failed to report on the day of the trial (Mangu-Ward 2007).

The events that occurred in Jena led to one of the largest race riots in recent history. Sensationalized by the media’s influence, the case seemed to be a series of events indicating the continued racial tensions of the South. When looking deeper into the facts, a different picture is seen. Instead, each event is isolated and unconnected. The coincidences surrounding the events seem to point to a plot against African Americans, yet the motivations had no racial underpinnings.

Throughout American history, racism has played a major role in race relations. Although overt racism has become a lesser focus, examples of racial discrimination and segregation still exist in today’s society. The era of post-racism has a new set of issues effecting society and the race relations within it. Until these issues are resolved, true racial equality cannot be attained.

In this essay I intend to define poverty, explain definitions and measurements of poverty absolute and relative. I will identify groups experiencing poverty, social exclusion and discrimination. I will then discuss the New Right and Social Democrat explanations for poverty, and assess their weakness and strengths.

Poverty is about a lack of economic, social, physical, environmental, cultural and political resources that prevent people of all ages from fulfilling their potential. There is, however, not just a only single definition of poverty. The term can be split into two views that are, absolute poverty and relative poverty. Despite the introduction of housing and education acts and other legislation to improve standards of living, poverty is still a reality. In society today there are still many who have little to sustain their everyday existence, and who survive well below the poverty line. The arguments surrounding the definition of poverty centre on the two concepts of absolute poverty and relative poverty. Absolute Poverty is the inability of a citizen to participate fully in the economic terms in the society in which he lives, also is experiencing lack of food, shelter clothing, healthcare care to survive. In many countries, absolute poverty is common people who face absolute poverty have short life expectancy, poor nutrition and high levels of infant mortality. Continents like, Africa, Asia, and South American are more likely to experience this type of poverty, this may occur because of a complete lack of resources, or unequal distribution of wealth.

Relative poverty is measured on poor standards of living relative to the rest of the society. The lack of access to many of the goods and services expected by the rest of the contemporary society. E.g. afford holidays this leads to social exclusion and damaging individuals and families in relative poverty.

Relative poverty is used in Britain because in a rich country such this, there should be certain minimum standards below, that no one should be. The British society is becoming more richer ,norms changes and the levels of income and resources that are considerate to be adequate rises , for instance if poor citizens can keep up with the growth in average incomes, they will become more excluded from the opportunities that the rest of the society enjoy. If there is a large numbers of people who fall below the minimum standards, then they are excluded from ordinary patterns. The strength of this approach is that advocate a poverty line which moves in response to changing social expectations and living standards. Peter Townsend argued that income alone is not a satisfactory measure of poverty because households may have a variety of other resources at their disposal. Townsend work was criticised from those on the right, they argued that his research measure inequality rather than poverty, because they see inequality as inevitable, they that the concept of relative poverty in meaningless.

Seebohm Rowntree devised a scale in 1901 to determine: the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency .Rowntree’s measure from Stitt and Grant, 1993, explains the differences between two types of poverty. Primary Poverty are families whose total incomes were insufficient to maintain physical efficiency and Secondary Poverty are families whose incomes would have been sufficient but for wasteful activity such as poor housekeeping, drunkenness and gambling. Those who fell below this minimum level were said to be in poverty. This method of defining poverty is known as the budget standard approach, some of which are still in use today in defining poverty. It is a measurement of absolute poverty, which is the most common way in which people visualise poverty. In other words looking at what level of income is needed to provide a nutritionally adequate diet and other necessities of life. This again can be and is debated. It is purely down to personal perception and opinion upon the subject. This method provides a very clear definition, however it conceals the fact that the minimum level changes continually with time.

“There are basically three current definitions of poverty in common usage: absolute poverty, relative poverty and social exclusion. Absolute poverty is defined as the lack of sufficient resources with which to keep body and soul together. Relative poverty defines income or resources in relation to the average. It is concerned with the absence of the material needs to participate fully in accepted daily life. Social exclusion is a new term used by the Government. The Prime Minister described social exclusion as “a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown”. The House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee.

However there are some critics say that absolute definitions of poverty have the merit of give fixed and universal definition which can be used for measuring and comparing poverty in all societies. They can also reveal changes in living standards in a society over time. Rowntree was been criticized by the fixed nature of absolute measurement. Some sociologists that support the relative definition of poverty argue that universal definitions not count since what count as poverty varies from time to time and place. They say that human needs cannot be objectively measured, based in measurement of human nutritional requirements in not possible. 2- physical needs are affected by age , sex, occupation and other social factors. 3- Necessities and essentials varies from time to time and place to place , human needs are culturally defined , reasonable standards of housing, diet, clothing in Britain are different from those in other societies and from Britain a hundreds years ago. In this ideology poverty is relative, it is measured in relation to the standards of a society and place, it is not fixed because circumstances changes over time.

The groups more likely to be in poverty are ethnic minorities, disabled, women , lone parents , older people, asylum seekers

Ethnic minorities live in low income households, twice the rate for white people. Although they are variations by ethnic groups. Unemployment rates are higher among this group, black people are more likely to be in lows paid jobs. Also are disadvantaged by the way the social security system operates. These group is more concentrated in the inner London normally they are rehoused together in group causing mini ghettos, creating isolation, fear and violence and discrimination .Ethnic minorities such as asylum seekers are discriminated by society, and other groups from ethnic minorities through religion or culture. By the government policies, being refused citizenship, receiving lower payments than other families on benefits. “Refugees could be considered by as a sub underclass”, Murray. 1994:26. I totally agree with this citation because they live below the poverty line and the minimum standards that Britain says that no one should ” Governments accept responsibility for ensuring all citizens receive a minimum income and have access to the highest possible provision in the fields of healthcare , housing education, and personal social services.”( Deacon 2000,51) Lone parents also are discriminated specially lone women with children , in these group also can be included elderly women pensioners ,women are likely to experience pay inequalities , men’s earning more, ” Blacks being labeled inferior compared to white men, women the weaker sex” Hacker, 1972,51, to tackle this type of discrimination was introduced anti -discrimination acts , such as Race Relations Act (1976, 2000 amended), Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Equal Pay Act 1970.

The risk of poverty, inequality and social exclusion is not shared equally. Some groups in society are more likely than others to find themselves in poverty. Children are at greater risk of poverty than adults in the UK and women are at greater risk than men. To investigate poverty it is necessary to look at statistics compiled from various sources. Whilst these statistics give some indication, it cannot completely show the poverty experienced by women and children. Despite compelling reasons, the importance of childhood poverty is not always recognised by policy makers. They may need a policy that addresses the shorter-term situation whist policies aimed at longer-term changes are implemented. It is therefore not good enough to say that a policy will be beneficial in the long term. Children who are growing up during that shorter-term period of lack of investment in primary health care or primary education, for example, will lose opportunities that they may not be able to regain later in life. Thus a generation may be facing to live in poverty.

The New Right view about poverty is that the welfare state is responsible for causing poverty, Marsland (1996) argue that in a democratic, capitalist society wealth is created by those who are successful in business, and by others who innovate ,have entrepreneurial ideas and start new companies, people work for them , and generate income, they say entrepreneurs are motivated by money , and the government need to support them e.g. free market. They say that taxation should be low , by minimizing the size of government and by keeping expenditure low. Cutting on the provision of state benefits for those unemployed, in a indirect perspective the welfare state cause of poverty , is because discourages the efforts of entrepreneurs to start new companies which create jobs. Established companies pay higher taxes. In a direct point of view they blame the welfare state because they provide free health, financial support for those who don’t want to work. People living in benefits increase the taxes and there is a lost of productivity. They say that just some will be successful , inequality will always occur. The welfare state and the minimum wage protect exploitation from employers

This approach was criticized because if they abolished the welfare state poverty was going to increase plus they saw poor people like lazy.

Social Democrat view about poverty is that the welfare state is related to the 1940, Crosland (1956) argues that in any society, there will be groups in poverty , thought are not their fault some may be disabled, retired, unable to work because of childcare. Or crisis in the economy and not having enough jobs. For them the welfare state is responsible for these people and have to guarantee a decent standard of living then everyone in poverty is in need. By this the welfare state eliminates poverty with income provided by the state and paid out of general taxation. However the Third way criticized the saying that they kept the same welfare state like in 1940, and was failed to respond to the growth in single parenthood, and the change of women in society, single mothers remain in poverty trap, the state benefits they lost when they start to work, outweighed the income they received, then disempowered them to work. Plus the costs of welfare state increased higher expectations on health care, housing.

However there will always exist poverty and inequality , the government will need to reform the welfare state , providing more professional courses given by the European Union , cut council tax, because I think that will make more people to going back to work. Instead of giving incentives for people to still waiting at home or in the bar waiting for the next payment.

Computer crime comes in many different forms and can cause serious amounts of damage. It has been around as long as the computer has and criminals are always finding new ways to beat the system. With the constant advancements in technology, it has become easier for criminals to hide information about their crime. Evidence is now handled and collected differently than it was in the past and requires a significant amount of careful forensic investigation.

What is computer crime?

Computer crime is illegal activity that is committed on the internet or through networks. The department of justice has three separate categories in which computer crime can be labeled. The first category is attacking computers of others, such as spreading a virus. The second category is using the computer to commit a crime which could also be committed the physical world, such as fraud or illegal gambling. The third and last category is using the computer to store stolen or illegal information (Citizenship.org).

There are several different types of computer crime committed in the world today. Of those include: fraud, identity theft, phishing scams, malware, viruses, cyber stalking, and child pornography. Computer crime has been around for nearly two centuries, with the first ever recorded occurring in the year 1820 (hubpages.com). With the continual advancements in technology, it has been made easier for criminals to hide information about their crimes. Cyber crimes are handled differently than they have in the past because of this fact. When computers are attacked, it can completely alter the system and most times it will even cause damage. Also, computers that have been attacked have the capability to spread the attack to other systems within the same network (CERT.org).

Statistics on Computer crime

According to Minnesota’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2008 Internet Crime Report, a total of 3,578 complaints came in. There are several different categories that the complaints are separated into. To name a few of those categories, there is check fraud, hacking, credit card fraud, Nigerian letter fraud, and identity theft. Here are some statistics that were collected during the year 2008:

Non Delivery of Merchandise/Payment was the top complaint and accounted for 31.9% of all internet crime called in.

Auction fraud came in second accounting for 27.5% of all internet fraud

78.5% of all perpetrators were male

Within the country, California is the home to the largest percentage of perpetrators accounting for 15.8%

Of the world, the United States is home to 66.1% of all perpetrators

This is just a small percentage of the statistics I discovered when visiting the website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi.org). According to the IC3, the rate of computer crime continues to climb as the years pass by. The group has been collecting information and statistics on internet crime for the past three years in hopes to find trends among perpetrators and crimes committed in order to better solve the crimes of the future.

Hacking: What is it?

The term “hacking” has several different meanings and it means different things to different generations. In the 1950s and 1960s, computer programmers viewed hacking as “an intellectual exercise” and prefer to use the term “cracking” instead in order to separate themselves with the negative connotation that came along with being considered a hacker. The younger generation feels that hackers of today are doing the real work of exploration which was made necessary due to the prior generation selling out (Thomas). According to the dictionary, the official definition of hacker is “a computer enthusiast” and “a microcomputer user who attempts to gain unauthorized access to proprietary computer systems (dictionary.com). Hacking has its own meaning to different people. To some it’s a means of exploration and education; to others it’s more about playing childish, but costly, pranks on people and companies (Thomas).

Hacking Then

Hackers of the 1960s and 1970s were found to be university graduate students with a profound interest in computers. Hacking grew to be quite popular in the labs of well respected colleges such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cornell, and Harvard. Students would play around with computers on their college campus and solve problems that eventually led to the creation of the personal computer. It was the birth of something that would lead to a new culture of innovative technological advances. Those who were able to hack were considered to be computer geniuses or nerds, rather than hackers (Thomas).

Hacking Now

Hackers of today are commonly found to be in their teenage years. The reason for such age difference between the times is that fifty to sixty years ago, you could only find computers on college campuses whereas today, it is uncommon to find a household that does not own at least one computer. They are more readily available for young children not yet in college to dupe around with. Technology today is also very different than it used to be. There are now passwords and PIN numbers in order to protect the user from having any information stolen. Security is stronger now, which is good for the common users of online systems such as eBay, online banking, or any other accounts which are password protected. However, as Thomas clearly states, security today is a “double-edged sword”. Although people are more protected, it also protects the hackers from becoming easily identified (Thomas). Hackers are able to take advantage of this and often continue to hack into systems of major companies, or even your personal computer at home.

It seems that hacking was something more positive 60 years ago. It was used to discover new technology and helped to design and create more advanced machines and programs for people to use. It was something great that only those who were quite knowledgeable were capable of doing. However, with such great accomplishments, it has been made easier for the younger generation to turn the term “hacker” into something negative. Thomas describes these hackers as “new-school hackers” and soon a new hacking culture was born. Soon, hackers of the new generation began to use their knowledge against the world. They would meet to share what they have learned and would develop new ways to attack systems (Thomas). This new generation would turn hacking into crime that so many were willing to commit.

Ethical Evaluation of Hacking

From what it seems, hacking can be used to do both good and bad, which may make one wonder whether or not it can be viewed as ethical. I have always assumed that hacking was a bad thing and went along with its ever common negative connotation. I feel that people hack into systems to steal information from another party; whether it be a large corporation’s secret files, or your next door neighbor’s bank account. From what I’ve studied so far, hackers from the past acted on a more ethical basis than the hacker of today. They used their knowledge for the better and acted on good will to try and find new ways to improve the age of computers. In order to really dig into it, I studied the ethics of hacking using two different working ethical theories; Kantianism and the Social Contract Theory.

Hacking and Kantianism

Kantianism has a lot to do with good will and the desire to do the right thing. The reason for doing a certain act, in this case hacking, should cultivate the desire to what is right. There are two categorical imperatives correlated with this theory. The first states that if you act on moral rule, you must first see how it will affect the universal more laws. This means that before you commit an act, first think about what would happen if everyone were to commit this same act (Quinn). To put this into perspective, hackers basically break security barriers to obtain information which they are probably not allowed to see in the first place. If there is a rule that makes it okay for everyone to break security barriers, it would completely defeat the purpose of having a secure system set up in the first place. There would no longer be such a thing as unauthorized information. Everyone would be allowed to somehow break in to the system and read it. The company might as well just display this information freely, for the world to see. This would not be right as the information is protected for a reason. It is for certain people’s eyes, and their eyes only and is not for anyone else to see.

The second categorical imperative states that you should treat both yourself and other as ends in themselves and not as a means to an end. This basically states that it is unethical to use someone for your benefit (Quinn). When relating this to the act of hacking, it tells us that we need to respect others and their right to privacy. When a hacker breaks into a system, they are using other people’s information to their benefit. They are invading privacy to get what they want, which is personal information.

The first categorical imperative seems to correspond better with the topic, but both imperatives basically state the hacking is an unethical act. It is not right to disrespect people or to treat them unfairly, and when hacking occurs, that is exactly what happens. Therefore, according to the Kantianism, hacking is deemed to be unethical

Hacking and the Social Contract Theory

The social contract takes place in a civilized society and is based upon two things. The first thing is that there is an establishment of moral rules to govern relations among citizens. The second thing is that there must be a government capable of enforcing such rules. The social contract theory states, “Morality consists in the set of rules, governing how people are to treat one another; that rational people will agree to accept, for their mutual benefit, on the condition that others follow those rules as well.” This contract suggests that no man has authority over another and that no one lives above the law. The community is supposed to determine the rules for its members, and all who is part of that community must abide by such rules. In order for this theory to work, the laws must not only be stated, but enforced as well. This will prevent anyone from trying to cheat the system (Quinn).

If hacking were to ever be considered socially acceptable, it would almost defeat the purpose of having secure systems. People would have the right to invade other people’s privacy and basically steal what does not belong to them. This type of crime is not accepted in the physical world, so why should we choose to accept it in cyberspace? The answer to that is we should not. The social contract theory has much to do with respect for yourself and respect for others. It is not very respectful to be deceitful and steal information or items which do not belong to you. Therefore, according to the social contract theory, hacking is deemed to be unethical.

How Does the FBI control Cyber Crime?

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a four-fold method that works to control and eliminate cyber crime. The first step in this process is to stop those behind the most serious computer invasions and the spread of malevolent code. Second, they must identify and put a stop to online sexual predators that use the internet to meet and exploit children and to produce, possess, or share child pornography. The third step is to counteract operations that target United States intellectual property, endangering our national security and competitiveness. Lastly, dismantle national and transnational organized criminal enterprises engaging in internet fraud (fbi.gov). Computer invasions are not taken lightly and it is very important that the FBI work to control such a crime. Here are some facts taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigation website on how serious these cyber crimes are taken:

A Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters “to address cyber crime in a coordinated and cohesive manner”

Specially trained cyber squads at FBI headquarters and in each of the 56 field offices, staffed with “agents and analysts who protect against investigate computer intrusions, theft of intellectual property and personal information, child pornography and exploitation, and online fraud”

New Cyber Action Teams that “travel around the world on a moment’s notice to assist in computer intrusion cases” and that “gather vital intelligence that helps us identify the cyber crimes that are most dangerous to our national security and to our economy;”

93 Computer Crimes Task Forces nationwide that “combine state-of-the-art technology and the resources of our federal, state, and local counterparts”;

A growing partnership with other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and others-which share similar concerns and resolve in combating cyber crime.

There are different levels of cyber crime, but we can never be too careful when it comes to protecting our people and our national security. There are several different ways of course in which the FBI will take action and that all depends on the type of cyber crime that is being committed. For example if it is trying to catch an online predator, a sting operation will be created and a member of the FBI will pose as a young child in hopes that someone will fall in to the trap. The FBI is full of highly trained professionals that know what they are doing and work their hardest to catch anyone who is being unlawful.

How is Cyber Crime Different Than Physical Crime?

Crime that takes place on in cyberspace is quite similar to physical crime. It is a person using their knowledge to break into another someone else’s personal property. There are several laws against both types of crimes, and the penalties are just as harsh in the cyber crime world as they are in the physical. Also, both of them have the potential to cause a lot of harm and damage to others.

The difference between the two is the way that the victims, or potential victims, feel about such cyber and physical crime. In recent surveys, it states that more people believe that their chances of being victims of cyber crime are much higher than being victims of physical crime. Many people are scared to participate in online banking or to shop online in fear of someone intercepting and hacking into their accounts. Also, it has been found that people are very cautious when it comes to documents that contain personal information on them by completely destroying them or assuring that they are safely stored (crime-research.org). According to a survey conducted by IBM, more than half of the businesses located in the United States believe that cyber crime is more costly to them than physical crime. The ways in which it costs them are through lost revenue, loss of current and prospective customers, and loss of employee productivity (allaboutroimag.org).

Conclusion

Cyber crime and hacking have been around for many years to date. It is something that developed as soon as the computing machine did. There have always been computer geniuses out there to use their knowledge for good, along with bad. After doing a lot of research and in my ethical evaluations, I have concluded that hacking is an unethical act. What started out as something that seemed like a good thing, quickly turned bad as soon as the personal computer became widely available. People began to use their knowledge against others and today we are faced with more cyber crime than ever. It is important for us and our government to keep it under control as it can cause a lot of damage to anyone who becomes a victim.

Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. But it is also about your social relationships, your complex involvement with others, and in the modern world these have become ever more complex and confusing. Each of us live with a variety of potentially contradictory identities, which battle within us for allegiance: as men or women, black or white, straight or gay, able-bodied or disabled, ‘British’ or ‘European’ … The list is potentially infinite, and so therefore are our possible belongings. Which of them we focus on, bring to the fore, ‘identify’ with, depends on a host of factors. At the centre, however, are the values we share or wish to share with others.

‘Identity politics’ was initially defined by and for the new social movements that came to public consciousness from the late 1960s: the black movement, feminism, lesbian and gay liberation and so on. The question of integrating these creative but diffuse and potentially divisive forces into the political mainstream has been part of the agony of the Left during the last decade. Issues of identity are now, however, at the centre of modern politics. When Mrs Thatcher utters anathemas against Brussels and all its works, or interfers in the details of the history curriculum, she is engaged in an exercise in delineating a cultural and political identity, in this case of ‘Britishness’, which she wants us to share. When President Gorbachev discourses on ‘our common European home’ he is striving to re-form our perception of the Soviet identity, and to re-fashion our idea of Europe. When the Bradford mullahs organize simultaneously affirming and fashioning an identity – as Muslims, but also as a black British community entitled to the protection of the blasphemy laws like Anglicans and Catholics and evangelicals. When we mourn with students in Beijing, or express solidarity with black South Africans, or run (or sing, or joke) ‘for the world’, we are striving to realise our identities as members of the global village, as citizens of the world.

Identities are not neutral. Behind the quest for identity are different, and often conflicting values. By saying who we are, we are also striving to express what we are, what we believe and what we desire. The problem is that these beliefs, needs and desires are often patently in conflict, not only between different communities but within individuals themselves. All this makes debates over values particularly fraught and delicate: they are not simply speculations about the world and our place in it; they touch on fundamental, and deeply felt, issues about who we are and what we want to be and become. They also pose major political questions: how to achieve a reconciliation between our collective needs as human beings and our specific needs as individuals and members of diverse communities, how to balance the universal and the particular. These are not new questions, but they are likely, nevertheless, to loom ever-larger as we engage with the certainty of uncertainty that characterises ‘new times’.

The Return of Values

This is the background to a new concern with values in mainstream politics. Most notoriously, Mrs Thatcher has invoked ‘Victorian values’ and has pronounced about everything from soccer hooliganism, to religion, to litter. Even the Labour Party, in an uncharacteristic burst of philosophising, has produced a statement on Democratic Socialist Aims and Values. And these are but the tips of an iceberg. Such flurries have not been entirely absent in the past from British political and cultural history. But on the whole, from the Second World War until recently, the political class eschewed too searching a discussion of values, preferring, in Harold Macmillan’s world-weary remark, to leave that to the bishops. During the years of the social-democratic consensus, welfarism, with its commitment to altruism and caring, provided a framework for social policy, but offered little guidance on the purposes of the good society.

Similarly, in the sphere of private life, the most coherent framework of moral regulation, that enshrined in the ‘permissive reforms’ in the 1960s of the laws relating to homosexuality, abortion, censorship etc, is based on a deliberate suspension of any querying of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. It relies instead on subtle distinctions between what the law may accept for public behaviour in upholding ‘public decency’, and what can be tolerated in private when the curtains are closed. Most of us are probably quietly grateful for such small mercies. As the postwar consensus has crumbled, however, the search for more or less coherent value-systems has become rather more fevered. On a personal level some people have moved promiscuously through drugs and alternative lifestyles to health fads and religion; a number seek to be ‘born again’. Perhaps most of us just share a vague feeling that things are not quite right. On the level of politics, various fundamentalisms, on Left and Right, have burst forth, each articulating their own truth, whether it be about the perils of pornography, the wrongs done to animals, the rights and wrongs of this or that religion, or the marvels of the market economy.

There is a new climate where values matter, and politicians, willy-nilly, are being drawn into the debate. ‘Speaking of values’, as the philosopher Paul Feyerabend has said, ‘is a roundabout way of describing the kind of life one wants to lead or thinks one wants to lead’.

1 Mrs Thatcher has been clearer about the sort of life she wants us to lead than any other recent political leader. She does not trust her bishops, so the values of the corner-shop and the cautious housewife have expanded inexorably into the culture of enterprise and the spiritual significance of capitalism. From her paean to ‘Victorian values’ in the run-up to the 1983 General Election to her address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May 1988, Mrs Thatcher’s moral outlook has had, in Jonathan Raban’s phrase, a peculiar ‘integrity’.

2 Questions of value have traditionally been more central to socialist debates than to conservatism but during the 1970s and early 1980s the nervous collapse of the Left allowed little room for such niceties. Recently, there have been welcome signs of a revival of concern with basic values. The Labour Party’s 1988 statement, Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, intended to frame the party’s policy review, may have been too bland for many people’s taste (‘The true purpose of democratic socialism … is the creation of a genuinely free society’) but it was the first time since 1917 that the Party had attempted to define its purposes, and in a recognizable philosophical tradition (essentially the rights based liberalism of the American philosopher, John Rawls). At the same time the Party seems to be attempting to resurrect the half-buried collectivist traditions of the British population. The lyrical Kinnock election broadcast in 1987 subliminally told us of the importance of rootedness and belonging as the basis for political advance. The Labour Party’s poster campaign early in 1989 – ‘The Labour Party. Our party’ – similarly articulated a sense of shared values, of communal spirit, lying latent in the collective unconscious. In part, of course, these Labour Party innovations illustrate the wizardry of ad-agency skills, but it is not too fanciful to see them as a reflection of broader tendencies towards reasserting universal humanistic values, which transcend conventional political divisions. In their different ways, President Gorbachev and green politics have made an impact because of their expression of a human solidarity underlying the divisions of the world. Gorbachev’s address to the United Nations in 1988 turned on a call to respect ‘universal human values’, and looked forward to an ending of the arbitrary divisions between peoples. Green philosophy calls on the same sense of our common destiny and interdependence, as human beings and as fellow inhabitants of spaceship earth, and in doing so claims to displace traditional divisions between Left and Right. It is impossible to underestimate the power of these various (and perhaps sometimes contradictory) appeals to human solidarity after a decade dominated by an ethic of human selfishness. We are reminded that what we have in common as human beings is more important than what divides us as individuals or members of other collectivities.

Difference

Nevertheless there are difficulties for the Left in an all-embracing humanism. As a philosophical position it may be a good starting point, but it does not readily tell us how to deal with difference. As President Gorbachev could bitterly affirm, it is difference – economic, national, linguistic, ethnic, religious – and the conflicting identities and demands that diversity gives rise to, that poses a major threat to perestroika, and to human solidarity. If ever-growing social complexity, cultural diversity and a proliferation of identities are indeed a mark of the postmodern world, then all the appeals to our common interest as humans will be as naught unless we can at the same time learn to live with difference. This should be the crux of modern debates over values. In confronting the challenge of social and moral diversity, the responses of Left and Right are significantly different. The Right has a coherent, if in the long run untenable, view of the moral economy. At its most extreme, expressed in Mrs Thatcher’s dictum that there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families, difference becomes merely a matter of individual quirks or pathologies. Social goods are products of individual wills or desires, mediated by family responsibilities. In the economic sphere, this leads to a privileging of individual choice, ‘the essence’ – as Mrs Thatcher put it during the 1987 election campaign – of morality. Rut moral choice, in turn, particularly with regard to issues such as sexuality, is limited by the commitment to a traditional concept of domestic obligation, in and through the family. The Left, on the other hand, is heir to a strong sense of collective identities, of powerful inherited solidarities derived from class and work communities, and of different social constituencies, however inadequately in the past it has been able to deal with them. Multi-culturalism, as it was articulated from the 1960s in the legislation on racial equality, embodied a notion of different communities evolving gradually into a harmonious society where difference was both acknowledged and irrelevant. In rather less hopeful times, the commitment to the co-existence of different value-systems is implied in the statement on Democratic Socialist Aims and Values: ‘Socialists rejoice in human diversity’.

But the Left has been less confident and sure-footed when faced by the reality of difference. When the Livingstone-led Greater London Council attempted to let a hundred flowers bloom at County Hall in pursuit of a new majority of minorities, the response of the Labour Party establishment varied from the sceptical to the horrified. Nor should we be entirely surprised at that: despite its political daring, and commendable commitment to those hitherto excluded from the political mainstream, it was difficult to detect behind the GLC policy anything more coherent than the belief that grass-roots activity and difference in itself were prime goods. ‘Empowerment’, yes; but whom should the Left empower? The Salman Rushdie crisis has dramatised the absence of any clear-cut philosophy on the Left. The Rushdie affair is important for socialists not simply because it concerns the fate of an individual (and an individual of the Left at that) but because it underscores in the most painful way the dilemmas of diversity. At its simplest we have an apparent conflict of absolutes: the right of an author to freedom of speech, to challenge whomsoever he wishes in a democratic society, set against the claims of a distinctive moral community not to have its fundamental religious beliefs attacked and undermined. Rut of course the real divisions are more complex and profound. The Left has not on the whole been willing to endorse an absolute right of free speech. On the contrary it has supported campaigns against racist and sexist literature, whilst a strong minority has supported the banning of pornography.

On the other side, the Muslim communities at the centre of the crisis are themselves not monolithic, bisected as they inevitably are by antagonisms of class and gender, and by political conflicts. At the same time the issues raised do not exist only in a meta-realm of principle: they work their way through the murky world of politics, in this case the complexities of international politics as well as the ward by ward, constituency by constituency problems of Labour politicians. Nevertheless, there is a central question at the heart of the Rushdie affair, and it concerns the possibilities and limits of pluralism in a complex society. Let’s take as an example the question of religious education in schools: the government by insisting under the 1988 Education Reform Act that there should be a daily act of Christian worship in maintained schools is in effect asserting the centrality of the Christian tradition to, in Mrs Thatcher’s words, ‘our national heritage’ – ‘For centuries it has been our very life-blood’. People with other faiths and cultures are always, of course, welcome in ‘our land’, but their beliefs can only, by implication, ever hope to have a secondary position in relation to ‘ours’.

Labour, however, accepts a less monolithic view of our religious past and present. As a result it seems prepared to support the principle of state-funding of separate ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim schools. There is a certain multi-cultural rationale in this: if Anglican, Jewish and Roman Catholic schools are supported by the state, there seems no logic in not supporting the schools of other faiths as well. But schools transmit cultural values, some of which in the case of fundamentalists run counter to oft-declared values of the Left. In this case, the schools will be based on a principle of sex-segregation which elsewhere Labour opposes. As a letter to the Guardian from Southall Black Sisters put it, ‘the Labour Party is prepared to abandon the principle of equality where black women are concerned. Instead, they deliver us into the hands of male, conservative and religious forces within our communities, who deny us our right to live as we please’.5 This underlines the danger of seeing communities as unified wholes, rather than as the locus of debate and divisions. Not surprisingly, the ‘multi-culturalist’ values of the Labour Party seem as likely to cause confusion, conflict and distrust as the explicitly mono-culturalist views of the Right. It is ironically appropriate that these dilemmas should have been brought to the surface by the publication of, and reaction to, Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. Not only was the book written by an ‘immigrant’ and about ‘immigrants’, but the book itself, as Malise Ruthven argued on its publication, is about ‘changing identities’, about the transformations of identities that affect migrants who leave the familiar reference points of their homeland and find themselves in a place where the rules are different, and all the markers have been changed. This is not simply the experience of the migrant: the sense of dislocation and disorientation, of the rules of the game subtly changing, of the co-existence within us of conflicting needs, desires and identities, is becoming a major cultural experience for us all.

Choice

The basic issue can be stated quite simply: by what criteria can we choose between the conflicting claims of different loyalties? To ask the question immediately underlines the poverty of our thinking about this. Can the ‘rights’ of a group obliterate the ‘rights’ of an individual? Should the morality of one sector of the population be allowed to limit the freedom of other citizens. To what extent should one particular definition of the good and the just prevail over others? These are ancient questions, but the alarming fact is that the Left lacks a common language for addressing them, let alone resolving them. There have been two characteristic approaches on the Left in confronting these dilemmas. Firstly, there is the ‘discourse of rights’, probably still the most potent mobilising force in the worlds of politics and morality. In the United States the protection of individual rights is enshrined in the constitution, and the claim to group rights has become the basis of many of the transforming currents of recent American politics, from the civil rights and black power movements to the women’s movement and lesbian and gay liberation. Elsewhere in the West, a rights-based politics is similarly enshrined in written constitutions, bills of rights, constitutional courts, and so on. In Britain, the tradition is enfeebled. Individual rights, though much bandied around in the political rough and tumble, are not entrenched in a constitutional settlement, and the concept of group rights barely exists. Rights are, however, clearly back on the agenda of the Left: the response to the launch of Charter 88, with its appeal for a new constitutional settlement, with government subordinate to the law and basic rights guaranteed, suggests there is a strongly felt need for a codification and protection of fundamental rights. Unfortunately, the claim to right, however well established at a constitutional level, does not help when rights are seen to be in conflict. To take the issue of abortion (yet again the focus of moral debate in America and Britain), here the conflict is between two violently conflicting claims to right: the rights of the ‘unborn child’ against the rights of a woman to control her own body. In these stark terms the conflict is unresolvable, because two value-systems tug in quite different directions. The problem is that rights do not spring fully armed from nature. They cannot find a justification simply because they are claimed. Rights are products of human association, social organisation, traditions of struggle, and historical definitions of needs and obligations: whatever their claims to universality, they are limited by the philosophical system to which they belong, and the social and political context in which they are asserted. This is not to deny the importance of rights-based arguments. But if we are to take rights seriously we must begin to articulate the sort of rights and the type of political culture we want.

This is the starting point for the second major approach to the dilemma of choice, the politics of emancipation. In his essay ‘On the Jewish Question’ in the 1840s Marx counterposed to the ‘morality of Rights’ a ‘morality of emancipation’, and even more powerfully than the claim to rights this has proved a potent mobilising force.8 It offers a vision of a totally free society, where everyone’s potentiality is fully realised, and a powerful analysis of the constraints on the realisation of human emancipation. At its heart is a denial that want, division, selfishness and conflict are essential parts of human nature. True human nature, it claims, can flourish in a truly emancipated society. Most of us who are socialist must have been inspired by this vision. As a politics of liberation it shaped the rhetoric of the social movements that emerged in the 1960s. It is still latent in the hungerfor utopia and for the transcendence of difference that shades our politics. The difficulty is that the practice has rarely kept up with the vision, particularly in the history of Marxism. The Marxist tradition has been reluctant to define the nature of the emancipated society, and has been noticeably blind to questions of nationalism, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. Nor do the experiences of the soi disant socialist countries offer much confidence in the attainability of emancipation in the terms offered by the tradition so far. We must not confuse a noble goal with the sordid practices of particular regimes, but we need to ponder whether the very project of human emancipation as conventionally set forth is not itself the fundamental problem. The glorious goal has all too often justified dubious means, whilst the absence of any detailed exposition of the meaning of emancipation has left us floundering when faced by the reality of conflicting claims to right and justice.