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Critically analyse the way the courts have developed and limited the law in relation to claims for psychiatric harm by secondary victims

Introduction

There has been judicial comment in Australia that in relation to claims for psychiatric harm, the law has progressed haphazardly or pragmatically rather than logically or scientifically: [1]

“The ways in which the law of liability for nervous shock has been developed by courts in England and here, and extended to new situations, have been empirical, with results and limitations that appear as pragmatically rather than as logical applications of principle.”

The development of the common law in Australia in relation to secondary victims, particularly under the law of negligence, has seen a gradual liberalising or expansion of the categories for recovery in recent years, most notably in the High Court decisions of Tame and Annetts

[2]

and Gifford

[3]

. This has, to some extent, been in response to a traditional reluctance by the Courts to allow secondary victims to recover for mental due to a perceived flood of imaginary claims. [4]

The view used to be held that ‘nervous shock’ without physical symptoms was not compensable at law, but it has long been recognised that mental harm has the same status in torts law as physical harm. [5] A secondary victim is understood in this context to mean a person who suffers a ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’, [6] typically as a consequence of perceiving injury to another, but not necessarily at the impact scene or its aftermath.

The fear of an avalanche or flood of mental harm cases led to policy restrictions or control mechanisms being imposed, including that the secondary victim must suffer ‘sudden shock’, be a witness to the accident scene or its aftermath’, or be in a relationship having close ties of love and affection with the primary victim.

The view that that the conditions for recovery have been unduly restrictive and led to arbitrary decisions seems to have been exacerbated by a lack of predictability in the common law applying said control mechanisms, as well as by a lack of uniformity on the part of the State and Territory legislatures in responding to the ‘insurance crisis’ of 2002, which sparked fears that the law was moving too fast to award damages to new classes of plaintiff. [7]

The foregoing matters will be discussed under the following headings:

1. Requirement of Sudden Shock

2. Requirement of Proximity

3. Requirement of Relationship

4. Foreseeability – Person of ‘Normal Fortitude’

5. Statutory Restrictions

Conclusion.

1.
Requirement of Sudden Shock

The first control mechanism restricting recovery for both primary and secondary victims is the requirement that there can be no liability in the absence of a sudden shock to the nervous system. [8] The limitation can be traced back to Brennan J’s interpretation of the case law in Jaensch v Coffey [9] and has been applied in numerous subsequent decisions. [10] However, there are exceptions to the general principle such as the ‘work stress’ cases [11] and ‘fear for the future’ cases. [12] The shock must in reality be a psychiatric illness of a lasting and clinical nature. It is clear that from the 1970s judges have required plaintiffs to be suffering a ‘recgonisable psychiatric illness”, [13] (although McHugh and Callinan JJ in retain the use of “nervous shock” in Tame and Gifford [14] ), in order for the harm to be compensable. Medical consensus suggests that lasting damage does not occur in ‘normal’ individuals. [15] It is therefore inappropriate to insist that an immediate reaction such as a sudden sensory perception be a prerequisite to recovery. This was the conclusion reached by a majority of the High Court in Tame. [16] However, the sudden shock rule remains relevant as a factor in determining whether psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable, as subsequently confirmed by the Civil Liability Acts. [17] The sudden shock rule is perhaps a striking example of the pragmatic and unscientific development of the common law. It is possible that this principle may yet operate to deny recovery or at least will operate unpredictably, turning upon the particular facts and evidence of each case.

2.
Requirement of Proximity

The common law has, however, gradually relaxed the restriction that, in order to recover, the plaintiff be present at the impact scene. [18] That process began in 1925 with Hambrook v Stokes in which a mother recovered for shock she suffered from fear for her own and her children’s safety from a runaway lorry. [19] The requirement that the plaintiff had to be present at the scene and witness the accident was gradually extended to witnessing the aftermath at the scene, extended to witnessing the aftermath at hospital during the immediate post-accident treatment. [20] The High Court suggested in Jeansch [21] that absence by the relative from the accident scene might not be a bar to recovery. In Annetts, [22] the Court finally removed the direct perception requirement as a bar to recovery. The aftermath requirement would always be a limitation in borderline cases, penalising family and friends who are too affected by shock and grief to go to the scene or a bar where there is no aftermath or no scene to perceive (as in Annetts, in which the body was not discovered at the time of the shocking event). [23]

However, the gradual innovation of the common law has been complicated by the legislative response to the insurance crisis of 2002. The Civil Liability Acts (and variants) were legislated in each jurisdiction as a response to perceptions that the common law was moving too fast to allow new classes of plaintiffs to recover, including secondary victims. [24] Earlier legislation [25] provided that family members (other than parents, spouse and close family) were required to be within sight or hearing of the accident in order to recover. [26] Under the common law, that requirement was effectively removed as a condition for recovery by the High Court in Annetts and Gifford. At the time of the Gifford decision the Civil Liability Act 2002 took effect which excludes compensatory recovery for a person who is not a witness at the scene nor a close family member. [27] Yet similar provisions of other States do permit recovery for a plaintiff who witnessed the immediate aftermath [28] , or who was ‘present at the scene.’ [29] The civil liability provisions differ across jurisdictions creating disunity and much less predictability across Australia for secondary victims who suffer mental harm.

3.
Requirement of Relationship

Another limiting factor is that the plaintiff must have a close tie of relationship or care with the primary victim. Relationship is likely to lead to a conclusion in which there was foreseeability (which appears to be the predominant view in the UK authorities). [30] However, it is just as foreseeable that a harm could be suffered by those unrelated to the primary victim. Thus in Australia, Deane J in Jaensch was of the view that close ties of love and affection should override the direct perception limitation on reasonable foreseeability. [31] It is clear from Gifford that the absence of a pre-existing relationship is not a bar to recovery. [32] Involuntary participants is another category in which the shock stems from an apprehension that the plaintiff is the involuntary cause of injury to another. [33]

Legislative reforms introduced as a result of the insurance crisis of 2002 has complicated the picture. For example, the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) restricts the class of plaintiffs to a “close member of the family” (parent, spouse, partner, child, stepchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, step-brother/sister) [34] , in contrast with earlier legislation which said that the defendant’s liability extended to those cases, and also to “any other member of the family” who saw or heard the plaintiff injured or put in peril. [35] Yet, somewhat haphazardly, the categories of potential claimants differ across jurisdictions. In Victoria, for example, the plaintiff must be or have been in “a close relationship with the victim”. [36] Yet “close relationship” is not defined, leaving it open for the courts to interpret the categories more expansively beyond family relationships to perhaps those with “close ties of love and affection” [37] as giving rise to a duty of care.

4.
Foreseeability – Person of ‘Normal Fortitude’

The doctrine that the shock must have been foreseeable to a person of normal fortitude acts as a control mechanism against unduly burdening human activity by indiscriminate claims of exposing others to the risk of mental harm. Such claims could interfere with otherwise tolerable conduct, such as making a loud noise which could cause a person peculiarly vulnerable to suffer shock. [38] Yet the onus of proving a special vulnerability lies on the defendant [39] who takes the victim as they are found. [40] However, the normal fortitude test has been criticised as unscientific and impracticable to apply, as it depends upon arbitrary judge-made distinctions as to what is ‘normal’ along a ‘slippery slope’ of psychiatric abnormality. [41] Yet under negligence law the foreseeability test is necessarily concerned with a balancing exercise by the Courts to assess whether a reasonable person would recognise an act or omission as posing an unreasonable risk of harm to a normal person [42] . The Courts do not insist upon foreseeing the specific kind of psychiatric damage, rather, if compensable mental harm is foreseeable, the predisposition is necessarily included. [43] Thus the High Court in Tame clarified the fortitude principle by establishing that the test is merely one consideration within reasonable foreseeability. [44] Whilst that consideration did not alter the outcome in Tame, it seems a sensible solution to a complex problem.

5.
Statutory Restrictions

However, statutory law has returned to the old test in respect of ordinary fortitude. At the time of the Tame decision in 2002 there was a nationwide concern as to the way in which the law of negligence was operating in personal injury cases, with the effect of driving up insurance premiums and making it difficult to obtain liability cover (eg. in the practice of medicine). The Commonwealth Government appointed a panel to review the law of negligence and the resultant report recommended greater restrictions to recovery in some areas. In the area of foreseeability of mental harm to primary and secondary victims the panel urged that:

“a person (the defendant does not owe another (the plaintiff) a duty to take care not to cause the plaintiff pure mental harm unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care was not taken.” [45]

Civil liability legislation in six Australian jurisdictions subsequently adopted a general principle which closely resembled this formulation. [46] The principle that if the defendant knows or ought to know that the plaintiff is a person of less than normal fortitude is specifically preserved. However, the re-formulation by eh High Court in Tame is pointedly ignored. The change in the law effected is to limit the principle that where a plaintiff suffers personal injury, there can be recovery for all consequential harm, physical or mental. That limitation had not previously been imposed by the common law and is viewed as a way of reducing the size of damages awards. [47] The result of these legislative reforms in response to the insurance crisis is that Australian personal injury law restricts recovery to claimants previously classified by the common law as deserving in a range of situations, but in a way which is far from consistent across jurisdictions.

Conclusion

In many ways, the common law has developed incrementally in the area of psychiatric harm by showing innovation. For example, in Tame and Gifford in removing the proximity requirement and focussing more on the relationship between primary and secondary victim as the touchstone for reasonable foreseeability. In that sense, the common law has come a long way since the Coultas decision in recognising the particularly devastating nature of psychiatric injury. However, such developments are coloured by the response of the legislatures to the insurance crisis of 2002. The Civil Liability Acts across the Australian jurisdictions are characterised by a lack of consistency and uniformity in approach, and in some cases went beyond the recommendations of the panel Report. For example, seemingly outdated legal rules such as the ‘sudden shock’ requirement persist, and a person unrelated to the plaintiff present at the aftermath may be permitted to recover damages for psychiatric harm in Tasmania, but not in New South wales. This disunited and unsatisfactory state of Australian law will await a legislative solution in the future, and will continue to pose challenges for the Courts as they proceed “step by cautious step” to develop the foregoing policy considerations in ways which will deliver appropriate and just outcomes for deserving secondary victims.

Bibliography

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Butler, D. 2002. Employer liability for Workplace Trauma. Aldershot, UK. Ashgate.

Dietrich, J. 2003. Nervous Shock: Tame v NSW; Annetts v Australian Stations. Torts Law Journal, 11, 1-9.

Foster, N. 2004.Psychiatric Injury Following Workplace Trauma or Death: Actions by Fellow Workers and Relatives in New South Wales. Tort Law Review, 12, p. 59.

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Teff, H. 1996. The Requirement of ‘Sudden Shock’ in Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Damage. Tort Law Review, 4, 44-61.

[47] The statutory preference for the term ‘recognised’ rather than ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ is a further

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Scenario:

The Herbert City Council owns a Olympic Pool and Training Centre which is managed by a Mr Samuel Phlipper. Until February 18, 2011 the facility had been used by both the Under Water Hockey Federation of Australia and the National Synchronized Swimmers’ Association. This has been possible because, up to now, the national teams of the respective associations have not made heavy use of the only available time in which the pool is closed to the public, that is, from 6:00am to 8:00am. Both groups have now decided to use Herbert as the base for their Games training programmes and, as a consequence, they are claiming the right to the full two hour session every day. Both parties assert that priority usage agreements have been signed with the Herbert City Council. Mr Phlipper is not willing to extend the hours at which the pool is open because this would incur excessive . overtime costs and any variation of hours would not only inconvenience him but would impact on the use of the pool by the general public. In addition to the dispute over the use of the pool itself, the two groups have become increasingly antagonistic. The all male Under Water Hockey Squad objects to the ‘bee-bop’ music played by the synchronized swimmers and claim that discarded hair pins and dislodged nose pegs left on the floor of the pool have caused the hockey players to sustain minor injuries during practice. For their part the women swimmers have taken offence to pictures of scantily clad females which have been placed in communal areas by the Hockey Squad and at the frequent remarks with sexual innuendo made by the Hockey Squad members. The men also have a record of leaving equipment around the pool and expecting the women to clean up at the end of the training sessions.

Question 1

Identify the parties’ issues and interests. The two teams nominate a representative to attempt a resolution of the issues through direct negotiation. The President of UWHF, Chuck Fitzpatrick, is concerned not to appear sexist, and is very keen to appease the women’s team. The representative of the non-hierarchical swimming squad, Ms Georgia Douglas, has been democratically elected because she is a person who can be relied on to hold firm to an agreed position. She does not intend to move from her bottom line. Her team must be guaranteed priority usage and all the offensive material must be removed from the pool complex.

This factual matrix revolves around a dispute between the key parties, the Under Water Hockey Federation of Australia, the National Synchronized Swimmers’ Association and the Herbert City Council and its manager Mr Samuel Phlipper. It arises over the two teams’ assertion to use the pool in the two hour time slot that it is closed to the public, each claiming a contractual priority right to the pool at this time.

Additionally, just as with most disputes, alongside the major issue there are secondary issues arising either directly out of the major issue or as a result of the antagonism between parties. These include having the pool closed for more than two hours in the morning [Mr Phlipper’s concern]; the ‘bee-bop’ music and discarded hairpins and dislodged nose pegs [The Hockey Squad’s concerns]; the pictures of scantily clad women placed in communal areas, the sexual innuendo and leaving pool equipment to be put away by the ladies [concerns by the Swimming team about the men’s behaviour] and last but not least the antagonism between the teams and the attitude of the Swimming team and their representative to the Dispute Resolution process. The pool’s public clientele are also a party, albeit minor. Though they do not have an ‘issue’ as such, they none the less have an interest which should not be completely ignored.

The aim here as with any form of negotiation, is to reach a solution as satisfactory as possible for all, within the attendant resource boundaries. Quintessentially, “[N]egotiating is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back and forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.”¹ Note that the operative word here is ‘interests’. That is, not what the parties want, but why they want it.

Aside from a concern for the public interest noted already, Mr Phlipper’s personal interest is in avoiding excessive overtime fees and the inconvenience of having the pool open for longer. The Under Water hockey Squad’s interests are impliedly, a desire to maintain an attitude and behaviour of male superiority and /or the area as totally their own, avoid minor injuries and it would seem common sense that Chuck [as the team’s President] would have an interest in maintaining the Squad’s reputation and/or want damage control on behalf of the Squad. The Synchronised Swimmers interests are not to have to deal with the Hockey Squad’s sexist attitude and behaviour and expectations.

Just as with the President of the UWHF, the representative of the Swimming Squad also has an interest however her interest is in being positional. That is, she is focused on making sure that a certain outcome is achieved rather than in fulfilling the interests of the team. This is clear since it is stated that “Ms Georgia Douglas, has been democratically elected because she is a person who can be relied on to hold firm to an agreed position. She does not intend to move from her bottom line.”² As mentioned above, this creates a tangential issue, interalia, because of the difference in power that can be created by the differing approaches to the negotiation.

As noted earlier, a vital, almost inherent component to any successful negotiation is a concentration on the parties’ interests. Mackie in his book reviewing different negotiation strategies notes clearly that although there are different personality types resulting in different negotiating strategies and some more productive than others, position bargaining really has no place in negotiation . ³ “Ineffective competitives, however were described as irritating, headstrong, unreasonable, arrogant and obstructive, lacking the perceptiveness and realism of the effective competitiveness – ‘The problem of the ineffective/competitive is relatively easy to define: he is obnoxious’”. ⁴

Question 2

Advise Chuck on negotiation strategy and how he might deal with Georgia. The negotiators make little progress, so the two representatives decide to request a meeting with Samuel Phlipper. The sticking point appears to be that both teams must have 1 ? hours each in order to prepare, train and shower afterwards.

A brief discussion of the different types of negotiation techniques available to Chuck in the circumstances, with their possible outcomes and recommendations, will be undertaken, in order to more thoroughly advise Chuck on the strategy he might use to deal with Georgia.

There is no ‘one and only way’ to negotiate. Since personalities differ, negotiation styles and their adjunct strategies will also differ. Whether shy, competitive, demanding, accommodating, compromising, bullying or retiring, all of these will affect the way in which we deal with others and so too the way we negotiate. In essence however, these can be boiled down to two main approaches as very briefly alluded to earlier, the competitive adversary and the co-operative problem solver.⁵

Following the style of the problem solver, the Principled Negotiation concept and its accordant strategies, which arguably changed the landscape in the area of Alternative Dispute Resolution, was introduced by Fisher and Ury in the 1980’s.⁶ This system has been tested and found to have a higher success rate with 59% of negotiators using this manner being effective whilst effectiveness with the adversarial model was only 25%.⁷ Furthermore, a follow up study found time the effectiveness of adversarial bargaining continuing to decline, being only 9% at the time the later study was conducted a decade later. ⁸

There are five founding principles to this approach. The first step is to deal with the problem, not the people. The parties should direct any frustrations at the problem not each other and work together rather than being distracted by misdirected emotions and communication. The problem should be ‘the bad guy’ not the other party. The second and arguably most important point is, as was already explained, looking at the parties’ interests – what is behind what they ask for? Concentrating on this allows step three to almost flow naturally, that is, brainstorming to arrive at win/win situations instead of demanding certain outcomes. The fourth element is important to ensure that all parties are confident that the outcome was fair and this can be achieved through solutions based on objective standards. Lastly but by no means least is the BATNA – ‘Best Alternative To a Negotiated Outcome’. This simply means doing the requisite preparation and knowing exactly what your bottom line is before you go in. As opposed to a positional stance, this is not what is brought in at the start and demanded but rather something each party is aware that beyond this point any agreement would be unworkable.

Given the success rate of the problem solving approach to negotiation, Chuck should normally be advised to take this approach. However, despite its success rate and as mentioned previously, sometimes there are obstacles, and in this case it is Georgia’s adversarial approach. Numerous authors who commend the work of Fisher and Ury none the less state that different strategies need to be employed when a co-operative negotiator must deal with an adversarial party, making the playing field uneven.⁹

It is the opinion of this author that Principled Negotiation should still form the foundational strategy of Chuck’s approach since ultimately this technique also aims to ensure satisfaction as much as is possible for both sides, and as such is most likely to mean a more enduring solution.

However rarely are negotiations purely co-operative and to do so here is, paradoxically, likely to be naive and counter-productive. ¹⁰ Therefore it is recommended that some further strategies also be employed. Wade points out in his article on strategies for difficult negotiations that the party making the first offer and the content of that offer are two very vital considerations. ¹¹ It is suggested here that Chuck’s desire to appease the women’s team, well intentioned as it is, not be allowed to result in Chuck’s premature agreement. This is pivotal; a certain amount of delay may be necessary to allow room for thought.

Given that they are both in training, it seems likely that a competition of some sort is approaching for both teams and therefore possibly suggesting to Georgia that her unwillingness to even discuss ‘her position’ could cost them both a great deal of time, may also help. McLean when discussing difficult people posits that “[A] helpful strategy is to agree with the superficial complaint but then direct attention to the matter of costs and that perhaps there is something to be gained by compromise”. ¹²

McLean also notes that it might also be important for Chuck to consider a way of allowing Georgia ‘to save face’ without letting go of anything that falls below the teams bottom line.¹³ Since the sticking point is the actual time required to use the pool it seems that the Under Water Squad may be willing to amend the ‘offensive’ behaviour and this could be used by Chuck as a sign of compromise and allows Georgia the opportunity to show she has still managed to at least secure part of the girls ‘demands’. ¹⁴

Question 3

Samuel is faced with a number of impasses and at least one difficult person. Identify them and suggest strategies he might use at the meeting.

The Impasses and People

The impasses seem to ultimately be that both parties need use of the pool for at least an hour and a half but it is only open for 2 hours each morning. A change in the behaviour of the men’s team and the nose pegs, hairpins and bee-bop music of the women’s team were an issue but these seem to be negotiable since we have been told that the ‘sticking point’ is the time for use of the pool so it seems these are no longer impasses. Opening the pool for longer will affect Samuel and the public interest and incur excessive overtime costs and though this is not a major impasse, it none the less still needs consideration and last but not least as pointed out earlier, Georgia is demanding that her team have priority use of the pool making her a more difficult person to deal with.

The Strategy

Samuel is brought in for a meeting with the two teams. His strategy will be largely determined by his role. If we are to take this scenario at face value, then Samuel would not be considered a neutral party since he does have an interest in and to a great extent, power over, the outcome of the dispute. Therefore the most obvious role of just mediator is highly unlikely. NADRAC,¹⁵ the main governmental body overseeing Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia explains that Mediationis a process in which [T]he mediator has no advisory or determinative role in regard to the content of the dispute or the outcome of its resolution , but may advise on or determine the process of mediation whereby resolution is attempted. ¹⁶

Therefore Samuel is most likely to be acting in a hybrid process described by NADRAC as follows,

Combined or hybrid dispute resolution processes are processes in which the dispute resolution practitioner plays multiple roles. For example, in conciliation and in conferencing, the dispute resolution practitioner may facilitate discussions, as well as provide advice on the merits of the dispute. In hybrid processes, >such as med-arb, the practitioner first uses one process (mediation) and then a different one ( arbitration).

The strategy therefore is likely to be one of combined mediation, negotiation and quazi adjudication, the last role arising out of the power he has to determine the other two parties’ contractual rights giving him the power essentially to ‘adjudicate’ the matter. In Capolingua v Phylum, costs were not awarded to the winning party despite the rule that costs follow the event because of the winning party’s unnecessary protraction of the matter. ¹⁷ One important factor about the inclusion of Samuel and his adjunct authority is his ability to control the outcome by taking Georgie’s power to insist on her position out of her hand whilst simultaneously helping her ‘save face’.

Samuel’s best plan considering the interest of both parties could be to try to negotiate separately with each party first to see if they are willing to do alternate days, which would avoid Samuel having to keep the pool open for longer with its consequent problems. Should this fail, he could suggest the option that the pool be open for an extra hour at the end of every day for the public, in place of keeping it open for the extra hour required in the morning to accommodate both parties. This would be on the basis that both parties are willing to share the extra cost and inconvenience of having the pool open and possibly opening it themselves. As noted earlier, if no agreement could be reached, Samuel is in opposition to make a final determinative decision.

References

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A Brief Literature Review and Self-reflection on the Critical Period Hypothesis

Introduction

Is there really an ideal age at which second language learning should begin? Is there only a slim chance for an adult learner to master a second language? These thought-provoking questions arising from the Critical Period Hypothesis, as well as the interesting phenomena relating to the hypothesis that occurred during my life as a teacher make it the focus of discussion of the essay.

The Critical Period Hypothesis: A highly debatable issue

One prominent proponent of the Critical Period Hypothesis (CPH) was Eric Lenneberg (1967), who based his hypothesis on neurological development. He explained that there is a maturation process called cerebral lateralization, during which the brain loses its plasticity as it gradually matures.

This process, starts at around two, is supposed to be completed at puberty, after which it is very difficult or even impossible for a learner to successfully acquire a new language. The CPH has been widely discussed in the area of second language acquisition (SLA) and has aroused much controversy.

The CPH is most closely linked to the acquisition of the phonological system. As put forward by Scovel (1988), it is not possible for learners beyond the age of 12 to attain a native-like pronunciation though they might be able to master the syntax and vocabulary of a second language.

A similar view regarding phonological attainment was propounded by Flege and Fletcher (1992, p.385). They concluded from their studies that ‘a foreign accent first emerges at an age of L2 learning of between 5 and 8 years’, which probably implies, in the domain of phonology, that the ‘critical period’ ends even earlier than what Lenneberg proposed. This coincides with later studies conducted by Krashen (1973), who claimed that lateralization is completed at around age 5.

Mark Patkowski (1980) conducted a study on how the age factor is related to the acquisition of linguistic features other than accent. The findings further supported the CPH as the results indicated that the age factor is very important in a sense that it limits the learner’s development of a native-like mastery of various linguistic features of a second language. Jacquline Johnson and Elissa Newport (1989) also carried out a study relating to the rules of English morphology and syntax and found that those earliest starters got the highest scores on the grammaticality judgement test.

Despite some clear evidence that supports the CPH, a remarkable research undertaken by Catherine Snow and Marian Hoefnagel-Ho_hle (1978) provided evidence against it. The findings revealed that both adolescent and adult learners could surpass the children learners by making enormous and rapid progress in a wide range of language knowledge. White and Genesee (1996) also revealed in a grammaticality judgement task that late starters are able to achieve near-native proficiency.

Robert Dekeyser (2000) done something along the line of Johnson and Newport and found that adult and children might have different way in learning language.

Insights gained from the CPH: A Self-reflection

Taking into account what I have explored from the literature review, I do believe that the evidence for CPH is somewhat mixed, especially when I reflected upon the L2 learners I taught in a secondary school in Hong Kong. In all my years of teaching, I have had a chance to teach a fairly large number of L2 learners who are immigrants from the Mainland. They are of diverse backgrounds in terms of age, gender, financial condition, etc.

Very importantly, not all of them started learning English at the same age. There are a few cases which impressed me most. Two girls who first came to Hong Kong at the age of 17 joined my S4 class. Both of them started learning English at the age of around 12 when they were in the mainland. What was so remarkable was that both of them could write very fluently with highly accurate grammar and a variety of sentence patterns. Their performance in writing and reading even surpassed their local counterparts who started taking up English in kindergarten.

This can somewhat be taken as counter-evidence to the CPH. Both girls revealed that they had an extraordinary strong motivation to improve their English and to catch up with their classmates. These social-psychological factors did play a part in their success of L2 acquisition. As discussed in Lightbown (2006), learners beginning at primary school level might not have an absolute advantage over adolescent learners in attaining greater proficiency in the long run.

This is especially true when learners, confining to a classroom setting, receive just a few hours of training every week. Interesting enough, despite extra tutorials to improve the girls’ oral skills, they carried a rather strong foreign accent. In fact, they do speak Cantonese (a different dialect) with an accent, let alone English, a language which is far different from their mother tongue. This seems to support findings demonstrating that it is very unlikely for late starters to attain native-like pronunciation.

Conclusion

As an experienced and sensible teacher, I believe that one should not constrain ourselves too much in any one of the theories or models. If a teacher is a true believer of the CPH, it would somehow affect their expectation on their students who are beyond the puberty period. This in turn would also lead to a lower expectation of the students themselves even though they are not aware of the fact that their teachers assume that they have already gone beyond the optimal period of learning a second language.

Instead we should be flexible and reflective enough to cater to our learners’ needs and facilitate their learning regardless of their age. Though I am convinced that the age factor does play a part in affecting SLA, I concern more in how I could adjust my teaching methods to suit the needs of learners at different ages.

It is no doubt that the hypothesis should not be oversimplified and overgeneralized and to be indiscriminately applied to our students because second language learning is a really complicated process in which a lot of factors can be intermingled to affect how successfully a person can learn a second language.

To conclude, there has been no overwhelming evidence showing that young learners have absolute superiority over their adult counterparts. Despite the difference in the research findings, there seems to be a general consensus that there are a number of factors interacting to affect SLA, and it is possible that late learners might achieve success in SLA, most likely via a different route from children learners, as discussed by Krashen (1975); (Dekeyser 2000). I believe it is also due to this reason that a lot of other factors cognitive, psycholinguistic and socio-cultural that come into place as to how a learner acquire a second language.

References

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Daniels, D. and Moos, R.H. (1990). Assessing Life Stressors and Social Resources among Adolescents: Applications to Depressed Youth. Journal of Adolescent Research, 5, 268-289.

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Hall, J.A. (1987). Parent-Adolescent Conflict. An Empirical Review. Adolescent, 22, 767-789.

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Ormrod, J.E. (2000). Educational psychology: developing learners (3^rd ed.). London: Prentice Hall.

Rice, F.P. (1993). The adolescent: Development, relationships, and culture (7^th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

The concept of critical period was initially introduced by Wilder Penfield and Lamar Roberts (1959). As summed up by Hong and Morgan (2005), they proposed that the relatively higher plasticity of a child’s brain, as compared to that of an adult, enables a child to learn a language more easily.

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A Proposal of Effective Improvement of English Speaking Skills in Non-Native Speaking Children

In recent decades, English has become a worldwide language and plays an important role in many fields of education and employment. Because of the use of English as a Lingua Franca, people in non-English speaking countries have tried very hard to improve their English skills; listening, reading, writing and speaking.

Many of them have failed in this attempt even though they have tried intensively throughout their lives. Speaking fluently and effectively in English is the skill that non-native people want to achieve. On the other hand, it is also very difficult for non-native people to improve their speaking skills.

It is important, therefore, for English teachers to examine what difficulties that non-native people, especially children, have in speaking English as a foreign language and to help to enhance the proficiency of speaking English in children effectively.

According to Brown & Yule (1983), spoken language production, learning to talk in the foreign language, is often considered to be one of the most difficult aspects for the teacher to help the student with learning a second language. This is evident in the following practical areas. The most challenging aspect of spoken English is to be able to communicate with at least one other speaker via interaction.

This means that a variety of skills are necessary at the same time: understanding and observing other speakers, thinking about the contribution of oneself, creating that contribution and monitoring its effect. Speaking occurs in ‘real time’, like listening, and usually the speakers do not have time to prepare and perform their careful utterances.

In this essay, different points of view on the effective improvement of English speaking skills for non-native children will be presented. The first section is about the difficulties faced by non-native children in speaking English. The second part explains how second language is learned. The third part is about how English teachers can help non-native children to improve their speaking skills in English. The last section presents suggestions for effective activities in the teaching of spoken English.

Difficulties for non-native children in speaking English

Learning a second language is difficult in terms of the requirement of time for processing and reacting with the new language. With regard to the language skills: listening, speaking, reading and writing, speaking skill is classified as a productive skill, as is writing, whereas listening and reading are receptive skills.

Davies & Pearse (2000) indicates that there are two common misconceptions of productive and receptive skills. Productive skills, usually, are considered to be more ‘communicative’ than the receptive skills. So, people often misunderstand that speaking is basis of the process of learning itself.

However, to some extent, these misconceptions are understandable, but in fact children begin to learn their mother language by listening before speaking, and it is the same for learning a second language of adult, such as immigrant or foreign resident. Thus, it is difficult for non-native children to develop their communicative skills by improve their speaking without improving their listening first.

Many non-native children find it hard to produce language in English since they lack adequate natural language acquisition provision. It is argued that they are often taught to memorize grammatically rules and English vocabulary in order to perform English speaking task. They are not adequately encouraged to produce natural English conversation. Those children, therefore, may feel uncomfortable and can feel guilty if they make grammatically mistakes when they produce a verbal task in English alone.

Harmer (1998) highlights that a constant interruption from teachers to correct mistakes every time the students speak will destroy the conversational flow and the purpose of the speaking activities. Furthermore, children will tend to be less confident in speaking English. However, his point of view of the correction of mistakes in children is not particularly to criticize individual students. The teacher should handle the mistakes they heard by general correction without mentioning who made the errors.

Moreover, a lack of practice in and interaction with the English language outside the classroom creates difficulties in performing in English. It can also obstruct speaking fluency.

Stage of second language acquisition: speaking

According to Haynes (2005), there are five stages in which children acquire a second language. All new learners of English develop through the same stages of language acquisition. However, the time length each student spends at a particular stage may be greatly different.

Stage one: Pre-production

This stage is the silent period. Non-native children at this stage may have a receptive vocabulary of up to five hundred words but they are not yet producing language. They may only repeat everything they have heard, but they may still not speak.

These children will listen attentively and will be able to respond to the programme aids, such as pictures and other visuals. In addition, they can show comprehension by duplicating gestures and movements. They will work well with total Physical Response. Much repetition of English, therefore, is very necessary for these English language learners at this stage.

Stage two: Early production

This stage may remain of up to six months and the children will progress at about a thousand words of a receptive and active vocabulary. Children can usually produce one or two word phrases during this stage. Furthermore, they can use short groups of language that they have memorized although this language may not always be correctly used.

Stage three: Speech Emergence

Children at this stage have developed about three thousands words of receptive vocabulary; they may also be able to communicate with simple phrases, sentences and questions, which may not always be grammatically correct. These learners will also start holding short conversations with classmates. In addition, they can follow well with easy stories with the support of pictures.

Stage four: Intermediate Fluency

At the intermediate fluency stage, children will have six thousands active words of vocabulary. They are beginning to use sentences which are more complex when speaking and they are more likely to share opinions and express their thoughts. At this stage, children will use strategies from their mother language as a tool to communicate and learn content in English. Many children may translate assignments from their mother language into English. Teachers, therefore, should pay more attention on studying strategies in order to help them understand more complex concepts without excessive translation.

Stage five: Advanced fluency

To achieve cognitive academic language proficiency in a second or foreign language, takes about four to ten years for learners. At this stage, children will have the ability to perform in subject areas close to those of native speakers. Most learners at this stage will feel confident to operate alone in English; however, the beginning of this stage they may still need support from their classroom teachers.

Role of the teachers to enhance speaking of the children

In the teaching of spoken English, teachers play the most important role in supporting and enhancing the ability of children to speak English. These English teachers, therefore, should understand the fundamental needs of a learner in speaking and listening to the language and how children acquire language. As a result, children will be taught in the most effective way.

According to Davies & Pearse (2000) there are some obvious implications for teachers in teaching spoken English:

Create and provide a relaxing atmosphere and welcoming environment in the classes so that the children are not afraid of speaking in front of the rest of the class. In addition, teachers should provide as many speaking activities as possible in class both in pairs and in groups; the children, therefore, can speak English without being too nervous that the rest of the class will be listening to them.

Expose the children as much as possible to pronounce speech naturally, and try to integrate some pronunciation assignments into the classes. The children will not be able to learn intelligible pronunciation or develop speaking skills in general without hearing enough natural speech.

Make the children become familiar with combining listening and speaking, in natural interaction, in real time. The general use of English particularly in the classroom may be the most beneficial opportunity for children to practise natural English interaction.

Speaking activities

In teaching speaking skills, teachers need to be particularly skilful in organising activities in the classroom that are motivating, authentic and diverse. The use of authentic and engaging interesting materials should be the foundation for classroom activities. It is also very beneficial and enjoyable for children to listen to native speaker speech from the showing of films or television programmes as well as audiotapes and songs, so that the children can attune their voices with the sounds of the native speech that they hear.

Additionally, Celce-Murcia (2001) states that the teacher can also assign outside classroom activities, such as watching and listening to English language films, television programmes and radio channels. This learning activity can become the input for following classroom activities: discussions, debates, oral presentation or oral examinations. Students should be encouraged or assigned to go English-speaking places or areas, for example going to travelling places or hotels to find native speakers to interact with.

Furthermore, inviting native speakers to the classroom to give speeches, talks, or presentations is another good opportunity for children to be able to interact with the real native guest speakers. Children can also be assigned to ask some questions or interact with native speakers in order to improve their communication skills. Teachers can also encourage children to participate in an English club or to be a member of the English group in the school or to find an English speaking conversation partner.

In terms of communication, speaking is classified as a productive skill. Due to the fact that we communicate because we need to exchange information, focusing on content, not the language or the use of a variety of vocabulary and grammar, to promote real productive ability, teachers should, therefore, use interesting topics and fun activities to stimulate and support the efforts of the children to communicate and focus on information and ideas. They should avoid correcting grammatical mistakes all the time since it risks the creation of a lack of confidence in speaking English.

To summarise, the improvement of English speaking skills requires understanding of the difficulties encountered by non-native children in speaking English, the stages of language acquisition, strategies and effective activities from English teachers. As stated above, speaking conversation takes place in ‘real time’ and involves many skills. So, it is inevitable that children will make mistakes.

For all these reasons, teachers, therefore, should create a relaxing environment and atmosphere, accustom natural interaction in listening and speaking for the children, encourage incidental classroom conversation activities as well as giving the children the opportunity to express their needs. To enhance English speaking skills in non-native children, teachers need to be aware of the communicative purpose of the language, not linguistic objectives.

References

Brown, G., & Yule, G., 1983. Teaching the Spoken Language. 12^th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Celce-Murcia, M. 2001. Teaching English as a Second or Foreign Language. 3^rd ed. Boston, MA: Von Hoffmann Graphics.

Davies, P. & Pearse, E. 2000. Success in English Teaching. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harmer, J. 1998. How to Teach English. Essex: Addison Wesley Longman.

Jones, D., & Hodson, P., 2006. Unlocking Speaking and Listening. London: David Fulton.

Haynes, J., Stages of Second Language Acquisition. [online]. Available at:

http://www.everythingesl.net/inservices/language_stages.php [accessed 28 August 2008]

Bibliography

Finocchiaro, M. 1986. English as a second/foreign language. 4^th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Medgyes, P. 1994. The non-native teacher. 6^th ed. Germany: Macmillan.

Vale, D., & Feunteun, A., 1995. Teaching Children English. 6^th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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When Frederick S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm’s first introduced Theories of the Press more than 40 years ago, it constituted the most well-known attempt to clarify the link between mass media culture in modern world. Their theories have been widely accepted and utilized by media scholars. However, their theories appear in some respects outdated and too simplistic to be useful in today’s global mass media environment.

The four theories are: the authoritarian theory – in this theory, the function of the press is to support the policies and actions of the state, and its authorities. The press should foster social solidarity and national unity. The state has the right to control the press for the overall public good.

In many cases, controlling the press means preventing the press from embarrassing the existing government, to repress criticism and protest, and to severely restrict press freedom. The authoritarian view was prevalent in 17th century Europe where publishing came under the prerogative and censorship powers of the monarch and church. The authoritarian theory is embraced today by many leaders of non-democratic states;

Next, the libertarian theory – the function of the press is to protect the people’s liberties and rights, and to inform the public so they can participate as citizens in democratic self-government. The liberal theory prefers a privately owned news media that is maximally free to inform citizens and criticize public policy, as well as act as a watchdog on authorities.

The right to publish and express oneself freely is not a prerogative of the state or a government. It is a fundamental right of free individuals. The liberal theory argues that a free marketplace of ideas, while it may cause harm over the short term, is the best safeguard in the long run for a free and liberal society.

Third, the social responsibility – an American initiative in the late forties brought forth the social responsibility theory. Realizing that the market had failed to fulfil the promise that press freedom would reveal the truth, The Commission on Freedom of the Press provided a model in which the media had certain obligations to society. These obligations were expressed in the words “informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity, and balance”. Siebert wrote that the goal of the social responsibility system is that media as a whole is pluralized, indicating “a reflection of the diversity of society as well as access to various points of view”

As opposed to the libertarian theory, the social responsibility principle is to provide an entrance to different mass media to minority groups. The journalist is accountable to his audience as well as to the government. It attempts to balance the liberal stress on the freedom of the press.

It argues that such freedoms of a powerful news media must be balanced by social responsibilities. Journalists have a duty to provide well-contextualized news in a comprehensive manner. They have a duty to provide a diverse forum of views and values. They have a duty to go beyond entertaining news consumers and to provide a core of in-depth analysis on the most serious issues. Most media systems in Western Europe today come close to the social responsibility theory.

Lastly, the Soviet communist theory – it is closely tied to a specific ideology; the communist. Media in communist societies are state-owned and the government had a division of censorship. Other means of control included the appointment of editors, a large number of directives regarding press content and press reviews and criticisms. The media organizations in this system were not intended to be privately owned and were to serve the interests of the working class.

Today, the name of this theory is only of historical interest. The clearest current example of the communist theory is how the media function in China, where TV, radio, and newspapers are controlled by the communist government. However, the press in China has come a long way since the Chinese Communist Party took over the Chinese government in 1949 and it continues to expand its freedom heading into the 21st century.

Even though the communist press theory was based on the model of the Soviet press system it does not fully describe the Chinese press system today after more than 20 years of economic liberalizations and opening to the outside world.

For instance, the Soviet press model removes the profit motive from publishing and broadcasting. But China’s economic reforms started in 1978 changed all that. Economic reform of the media in China began almost as early as the overall economic reform (Zhao,1998, p.53). In addition, media commercialization has become an important part of the development of the market economy as the Chinese government has adopted a policy of gradually cutting subsidies and encouraging commercialized financing.

More importantly, advertising, the capitalist genie, has finally made its way to the world of communist media. To meet the new challenge, the press, including the ones directly under the control of the party, not only has to publicize the party’s policies, but also keep an eye on the bottom line as the press has been assuming increasing responsibilities in covering the cost and balancing the sheet. Even the official Xinhua news agency and the party paper, People’s Daily, are trying to turn out more profitable publications.

Editors in China are made aware that newspapers are not only political tools, but they have to be money-makers as well. To be competitive on the market, newspapers in China have to appeal to the readers, not just the party officials. The biggest challenge facing Chinese editors today is to strike the right balance between being politically correct and commercially viable.

Also the Soviet model mostly prescribes a positive role for the press – the press should be an agitator, an organizer and promoter for the socialist cause. In the Chinese press today, readers can find more negative news, which is a taboo in the rigid communist media model as bad news are seen as demoralizers.

Given the rampant corruption among government officials in China, some high-level government officials encourage the press to engage in more investigations (People’s Daily, 2002). For example, Caijing,a financial magazine, made a name for itself for its investigative reporting of the financial sector (Kurtenbach, 2002). And some provincial governments have made new laws banning their officials from refusing interviews with the press (China Daily, 2001). Such laws were unimaginable before the reforms or under the Soviet media model.

Under the communist media system, all media are owned by the state and no foreign media are allowed. But even thought the majority of the media in China today are still owned by the state, there are some joint ventures already with foreign investment, including a joint-venture Internet service in technology information between the People’s Dailyand the News Corp owned by Australian media tycoon, Rupert Murdoch (Reuters, 1998). Now as a member of the World Trade Organization, China will face more and more foreign capital in its media industries whether it likes it or not.

China is also working on an international media centre with a total floor space of 130,000 square meters, which will serve as an office building for more than 100 foreign media organizations in Beijing (Beijing Morning Post, 2002). The centre is planned to be equipped with state-of-the-art satellite communication and fibre optical devices for fast transmission of data, texts and pictures. And in 2001, Reuters’ Qing Niao website, a site for trade information and e-business, made a low-key entry into China (Reuters, 2001). The Soviet communist media model is a closed system. But China has opened up. It is China’s national policy to reintegrate itself into the world community.

However, one of the major problems concerning the Chinese press today is the low ethical standard held by some local papers. It is no longer rare news that newspapers are sued for their inaccurate and sensational stories, which seldom occurs under an orthodox communist media system. The Soviet communist media theory would be an inaccurate summary of the lively and messy, and yet controlled press in China today.

In the wake of the theories old and new one important question remains: How should the ethics of journalism change to face the challenges of a new media environment whether in China, the United States or any other country? To make matters more complicated, the news media are now global in a radically pluralistic world.

Is a new global journalism ethics required? In conclusion, while the four theories of the press have the beauty and elegance of a very simple but clear structure, they have difficulties in providing a reliable guide in today’s global press systems because the universality of the theories is limited. However, if we try too hard at being specific and accurate in describing press systems, we may end up with as many press theories as the number of press systems that exist.

Another important factor in building a more reliable theoretical guide may be that more dynamics need to be built into the theories so that they can accommodate the changes in the press systems around the world.

References

Beijing Morning Post. China to build international media centre. 8 August 2002

People’s Daily. Giving the media a greater voice. 31 March 2002.

Kurtenbach, Elaine. The World: Filling Void in China’s Financial News Reporting. Los Angeles Times. 16 June 2002

Ward, Stephen, J.A. History of Journalism Ethics and Global Journalism Ethics. School of Journalism. The University of British Columbia. 24 July 2008.

ethics.ca/research_ethics/history.htm>.

China Daily. Reporters need legal help and discipline. 6 February 2001.

Reuters. Media Mogul Rupert Murdoch Meets China’s President. 11 December 1998.

Reuters. Qing Niao website makes low-key entry into China. People’s Daily. 27 September 2001.

Skjerdal, Terje S. Siebert’s Four Theories of the Press: A Critique.(1993). 24 July 2008.

CapitolHill/2152/siebert.htm#soviet>.

Zhao, Yuezhi. (1998). Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2152/siebert.htm#authoritarian

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Produce a draft plan for a Feature Article on: Effects of new communications technologies on youth culture in the United Kingdom

Introduction

Unlike news stories which are dictated by strict style guidelines and time and space considerations a feature article is more flexible. Having an increased number of options makes a draft plan essential to the creative process. Features may inform, entertain, persuade or amuse. A feature article goes beyond the factual brief of news and broadens the scope of the subject – features “offer an opportunity to tell the story behind the story.” This places responsibility on the writer to determine what the “story behind the story” is, why it’s worth telling and how best to tell it. Approaching the topic of the effect of new communications technologies on youth culture in the United Kingdom there are numerous possible angles. The first job of the writer is to decide which one to choose and where to pitch the idea.

Tone and Content

A feature’s tone and content can vary widely depending on the target market. For example, an analysis of new communications technologies for a mobile phone trade magazine would be very different from one written for a pop culture magazine. For the purpose of this plan the target is a broadsheet newspaper, so the article will be addressed to a general audience who know some information about youth culture and technology, but who may not have considered the impact of one on the other. The first question to ask, and answer, is why will they care? The theme of this feature takes a cultural analysis perspective. In social discourse “language is linked with practice, truth is constructed, and power exercised,” The importance of new communications technologies on youth culture is that the truths they construct and the power they exercise will become a part of the cultural landscape as they grow up.

Target and Theme

A focused target and robust theme are the essential building blocks of a feature. Next comes research. In this case, define the subject (does “youth” mean 14-18 years old? 16-20?) and then focus on getting the raw data: information on the types of new technology, percentage of the target age group that uses a given technology, the amount of time an average youth spends using new communications technologies. This information can be gleaned from news sources, product manufacturers and relevant related features. Good organisation is essential, use techniques such as feature files for storing all the data, contacts, questions, notes and information on a feature. The broad gist of this research should be to show that new communications technologies are widespread and widely used enough to be of serious cultural interest.

The Human Element

The next step is to find the human element in the facts and figures – people’s experiences distinguish features from news and bring the story to life. First identify useful potential interviewees. These include experts who can explain the function and scope of new technologies, cultural observers who can offer cultural or historical context about social change, teachers, parents and young people. Then decide what order to address them in; the order of your interviews is important to the direction of the story. Conducting interviews is a critical step. Make sure the questions and technique are suited to the subject. A teenager will respond different than a professional who is used to giving interviews. Listen and observe carefully, allow for pauses while the thinks and collect the facts objectively. When writing about young people bear in mind any legal issues. For example, publishing anything that could lead to the identification of someone under 18 who is under police investigation is an offence.

Writing

When the research and interviews are completed it is time to write the feature. Write an outline or use notes to create a first draft, paying attention to the structure (i.e., will it be chronological, bullet-points or a narrative?) Make sure there is a gripping opening using a dramatic fact or anecdote. Since the theme of the feature is the socio-cultural impact of the effect of new communications technologies on young people it might be interesting to compare the UK with other countries as a way of establishing the global significance of communication technology. For example, a study about technology use by Czech young people showing that: “CMC [computer mediated communication] is providing opportunities, before unknown, for young people to participate in post-socialist civic discourse in very creative ways” makes a thought-provoking parallel. Bearing in mind the general audience keep technical jargon to a minimum and focus on accessibility and clarity.

Boxes and Sidebars

Boxes and sidebars are essential to features and are an economical way to convey important facts or information. Adult newspaper readers are probably not familiar with all the different new communication technologies so a box profiling the most popular communication tools could be useful. For example, “hardware versus software” outlining innovations like touch-screen mobiles, blue-tooth headsets, Twitter and Facebook Mobile.

Proofread and Revise

After completing all the steps of the draft feature plan read the feature with an objective point of view. A plan is a guideline to create a professional piece of work, but if there is something missing, or something in the original plan doesn’t fit with the finished piece carefully consider and revise. The job of a feature is to speak to its audience – if the plan gets in the way then the plan needs to change.

Bibliography

Hennessy, B., Writing Feature Articles, Focal Press, 2006

Herbert, J., Journalism In The Digital Age: Theory And Practice For Broadcast, Print And On-Line Media, Focal Press, 2000

Hicks, W., Adams, S., & Gilbert, H., Writing for Journalists, Routledge, 1999

Lengel, L., Culture And Technology In The New Europe: Civic Discourse In Transformation In Post-Communist Nations, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000

Mackay, H., Maples, W., & Reynolds, P., Investigating the Information Society, Routledge, 2001

Pape, S., & Featherstone, S., Feature Writing: A Practical Introduction, SAGE, 2006

Peterson, F., & Kesselman-Turkel, J., The Magazine Writer’s Handbook, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006

Rudin, R., & Ibbotson, T., An Introduction to Journalism: Essential Techniques and Background Knowledge, Focal Press, 2002

Sheridan Burns, L., Understanding Journalism, SAGE, 2002

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Introduction

Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is a novel method for extracting oil and natural gas that involves injecting highly pressurised water, sand and chemicals into shale rock deep beneath the Earth’s surface (Sica 2015; Holloway & Rudd 2013, p.xi). Commercially viable fracking techniques have been honed over the past two decades in the USA, and have proved to be an effective means by which “difficult to reach resources of oil and gas” can be exploited (BBC News 2013).

Fracking is generally agreed to have had a dramatic effect on the price of fossil fuels, leading some to declare a “fracking revolution” (Ruhl 2013). The Brookings Institute estimates that average US gas prices in 2013 were 47% lower than they would have been without fracking. This means that, overall, consumers of gas saved approximately $13 Billion in the period between 2007 and 2013 – a figure that is increasing exponentially as production of fracked fuel increases (Dews 2015).

As fracking was pioneered in the USA – a market recently described by McDonald (2014) as “account[ing] for practically all of the world’s commercial production” – this paper will base its outlook on the impact of fracking on US energy security. We will begin by looking at the potential opportunities presented by fracking, then turn to the domestic challenges before considering the global impact, which will be split into a critique of the geopolitics and an assessment of the environmental factors raised by the technique.

The potential of fracking

The United States Energy Information Agency estimates that there are approximately 7229 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas reserves globally (EIA-ARI 2013). This figure is likely to increase significantly, given that during this study, the EIA surveyed just 46 regions in 41 separate countries (p.1). For comparison, the Oil and Gas Journal’s 2012 “Worldwide look at Reserves and Production” put the total figure of proven recoverable conventional gas reserves at 7074 trillion cubic feet; a figure already smaller than the potential of shale gas, and one that is likely to be dwarfed as further shale exploration yields new gas fields.

Although commentators such as Inman (2014) have called the predicted size of potential reserves of shale gas into question, the potential for independent energy production is obvious, and has already been hinted at by the American experience. Between 2005 and 2013, the USA reduced net imports from 10.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas, to just 4.8 billion cubic feet. Over the same period, the wholesale price of gas collapsed from a high of $8.79 to a low of $3.71. Some experts expect the USA to become a net exporter of natural gas as soon as 2018 (Oil and Energy Trends 2013). Chief economist and Vice President of BP, Christof Ruhl (2013), predicts that, in a short space of time, the USA will also replace Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest energy producer.

Although turbulence in the price of gas is not solely down to increased supply (and is presently exacerbated by a global economic slowdown), fracking has two important benefits for the energy security of countries with reserves of shale gas:

They are insulated from fluctuations in global price such as those found between 2005 – 2013; and
The risk of sudden, unexpected geopolitical events impacting on supply is greatly mitigated.

Similar potential benefits are open to other nations with reserves of shale gas, which perhaps explains why countries such as the United Kingdom, which could supply its entire gas needs for the next 50 years by extracting just 10% of its estimated reserves, are so keen to expand their onshore fracking activities (Cooper, Stamford & Azapagic 2014).

Domestic challenges of fracking

Fracking is not without its critics. In a major survey of media portrayals, Groat & Grimshaw (2012) found that two-thirds of stories across all forms of news media in the USA were negative. They go on to criticise the fact that that less than a quarter of all stories made any reference to scientific research on the issue. The UK, where the government has shown a commitment to developing fracking that could make it the second major economy to follow the lead of the USA, has seen major public objection to fracking, sparked in part by a number of earthquakes that were attributed to drilling activities (BBC News 2011). Others have highlighted drinking water contamination, air pollution, and limited regulation (meaning wells can be constructed on church grounds and schools) as major criticisms of fracking in the USA (Goldberg 2013).

Holloway & Rudd (2013 p.126) reject many of these criticisms, noting that no link had been found linking fracking to reports of groundwater contamination. They cite a major study by the University of Texas, which concluded that “many problems ascribed to hydraulic fracturing are related to processes common to all oil and gas drilling operations” and that “any reports of contamination can be traced to above-ground spills or other mishandling of wastewater produced from shale gas drilling, rather than from hydraulic fracturing” (Holloway & Rudd, p.126). These justifications seem disingenuous; the issues identified are a direct consequence of fracking, even if they are not unique to it as a form of energy extraction. Over 15 million Americans now live within a mile of an oil or gas well, a figure likely to skyrocket as more wells are constructed, especially if densely populated nations such as the UK commence drilling operations (Gold & McGinty 2013).

As fracking is a technology that brings production closer to communities, it is imperative that the industry do more to address these issues, rather than dismissing them as normal consequences of fossil fuel production. If they do not, they will fail to win over public opinion, which in turn could result in a hostile regulatory regime that could act as a major impediment on the proliferation of fracking worldwide, negating any positive effects on energy security.

The Geopolitical significance of fracking

It is not just the size of potential shale gas reserves that is significant; it is also their global distribution. Presently, Russia tops the current list of nations with proven gas reserves, closely followed by Iran, with Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela all featuring in the top ten – all nations with questionable human rights records, or a history of animosity towards the USA (Oil and Gas Journal 2012). By contrast, China – with negligible traditional energy reserves – tops the list of technically proven shale gas reserves. Brazil, the USA, and South Africa also feature in the top ten of this list (EIA 2014). This means that fracking has an enormous potential to impact on global energy security.

Six out of the top ten companies in the world are involved in the energy sector, and the future of fracking could well impact on their long-term fortunes (Fortune 2014). Large exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela depend on oil and gas exports for their security and standing in the world, and plan their foreign policies accordingly (Orttung & Overland 2011). Control of fossil fuel reserves has been a factor in many global territorial disputes, and is a major motivating factor behind US political and military involvement in the Middle East (Overland 2015).

Clearly then, any change to the existing status quo with regards to the production, import, and export of gas is going to have a profound impact on global politics and the future of global energy security. If the USA does indeed become a net exporter of energy, its strategic interest in the Middle East – where it has a huge military presence, and has been directly involved in two recent wars – is likely to wane (Index of US Military Strength 2015, p.117). Some nations that exert their foreign policy objectives through energy are likely to see their influence decline, while others will see potential for their security to improve.

European energy security

At present, relations between Russia, Europe and the USA are strained. As much as a quarter of the EU’s gas is imported from Russia, and nearly 80% of it has traditionally travelled in pipes through Ukraine (BBC News 2009). Successive disputes between Ukraine and Russia regarding payment for gas resulted in almost annual cut-offs in European supply over successive winters in the latter half of the decade, causing some governments to declare a state of emergency as schools and factories closed and people struggled to survive the freezing temperatures (Cendrowicz 2009). These cuts in supply were short-lived, but demonstrate how vulnerable European energy security is to geopolitical events beyond its control.

The overthrow of pro-Russian president in Ukraine, the Russian annexation of Crimea, consequent European sanctions, and a Ukrainian gas production base that is centred to the east where insurgent fighting continues to wreak its toll all point to major, continued threats to global energy security, and perhaps underline why European nations might want to reconsider their initial reluctance to pursue the option of fracking (Oil and Energy Trends 2014). It is clear that if predictions of shale gas reserves prove accurate, Russian influence on global energy security will be greatly diminished, and a new hierarchical relationship will develop.

It is also noteworthy that while Russian influence might decline, two other BRIC nations – China and Brazil – may step onto the stage as global players in the global energy market. Some observers have commented that this could accelerate the USA’s decline as a hegemonic superpower; however, with the alluring prospect of energy independence itself, fracking might actually help to revive American fortunes (Dunn & Mcclelland 2013).

Climate Change

Although fracking has the potential to guarantee energy security for many nations, while precipitating the decline of influence for some producers and hastening the rise of others, in the long term, it has the potential to be a retrograde step for energy security.

At a time when scientific consensus seems to be that the use of fossil fuels is adversely impacting on the economic and ecologic future of the planet, it seems unfortunate that fracking – with its promise of low cost energy independence – has been developed as a technology. The UK seems almost certain to miss its objectives under the Climate Change Act 2008 of reducing carbon emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 if it continues to pursue its policy of fracking (Cooper, Stamford & Azapagic 2014). Although carbon taxes could offset the economic consequences of climate change, the political hurdles to implementing such policies have proved challenging to date (Rabe & Borick 2012). Furthermore, carbon taxes will not mitigate against the physical consequences of climate change, which even by conservative ‘best case scenario’ estimates, is likely to exacerbate food and water security, result in more frequent ‘freak’ weather events, and mean a rise in sea levels by the middle of the century (Schneider et al 2007). These factors are likely to result in greater instances of conflict, as populations compete for increasingly scarce resources (Scott 2012). As such, the short term benefits to energy security that fracking could bring could eventually contribute to long term global instability as the more serious effects of climate change begin to take effect.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the fracking revolution has the potential to shake up the largely static hierarchical energy relationships that have existed since the end of World War Two. Nations such as the USA and the United Kingdom have the potential to become energy independent within a generation. Growing economies with limited traditional energy reserves such as China have the potential to become energy producers, which, until now, they have largely been excluded from. For the winners, a future of energy independence beckons, which in turn means greater energy security and greater global security.

Although there are many benefits, the impact of climate change cannot be ignored. Fracking provides cheap domestic fuel, which in turn means that the point in time at which it becomes economically viable for societies to switch to renewable sources of energy disappears further into the future. This means that, long term, fracking could contribute to increased political volatility and uncertainty, which in turn could result in reduced global energy security.

Ultimately, fracking could prove to be a false economy.

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1. Introduction

The Arab Spring is a revolutionary movement in North Africa and the Middle East, which began in December 2010 with the Tunisian Revolution – before spreading to other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, amongst others. While the Arab Spring was not predicted by political commentators and the media, in retrospect, there are a number of reasons with regard to why it occurred, such as longstanding oppressive regimes and difficult economic conditions. However, despite all of this, the catalyst for the Arab Spring came from a twenty-something fruit vendor in Tunisia who, frustrated and angry about the treatment he was receiving from local officials, set himself on fire in protest – and subsequently died (Haas & Lesch, 2013). In years gone by, such an event might have been largely covered up by an autocratic regime that was able to control the mass media – but nowadays, in the age of the Internet and social media, such a task is more difficult. Indeed, Adi (2014) has suggested that the use of social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) did play an integral part in the Arab Spring uprisings – but reiterates that social media was used as a tool to gather increasing support for the cause, rather than being the catalyst in itself. Therefore, this paper shall discuss the impact of social media during the Arab Spring, and try to ascertain the extent to which it facilitated the growth of the movement.

2. Social Media and the Arab Spring

To begin with, Howard & Hussain (2013)state that:

“Social protests in the Arab world have spread across North Africa and the Middle East, largely because digital media allowed communities to realize that they shared grievances and because they nurtured transportable strategies for mobilizing against directors” (p. 3).

Moreover, Howard & Hussain (2013)go on to unequivocally state that the Internet, mobiles phones, and social networking have transformed politics in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, in light of the Arab Spring movement that began in late 2010, it would be difficult to argue against such a notion. Furthermore, Bebawi & Bossio (2014) also point out that the mass media has labelled the Arab Spring as a ‘social media revolution’, with citizen journalism and social media reporting helping to sustain the wave of protests in North Africa and the Middle East from 2010. Thus, there are two ways in which social media has been used during the Arab Spring, these being: (1) by helping to coordinate protests on a mass scale, and (2) by reporting on the events without any media bias. This then, is something that was also used to great effect during the 2011 riots in England, when social media was used to coordinate riots in various English cities (Briggs, 2011) – and it is perhaps no coincidence that these riots coincided with the Arab Spring movement and the successful use of social media in North Africa and the Middle East at that time. However, in oppressive regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, unlike in the UK, such technologies are a revelation in communication – as these are countries that have traditionally had their media manipulated by despotic rulers and regimes, and have been subjected to extreme censorship and manipulation.

Gismondi (2014) notes that a study in Washington found that social media helped to shape and lead the debate with regard to the politics of the Arab Spring, and that young and educated people tended to lead this discourse, with women also being highly involved with social media participation (and the riots and protests themselves). For example, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali discovered the power of social media when revolutionaries posted a video of him and his wife using a government-funded jet to travel to Europe on lavish shopping trips – something that angered locals, who were struggling with economic conditions; and ultimately contributed to his downfall. Moreover, the Washington study cited by Gismondi (2014) also found that social media was instrumental in sharing democratic ideas internationally, and this no doubt also helped to fuel the Arab Spring, and to make people in the region dream of living in a free and democratic society.

In addition, Khondker (2011) also notes that social media played a vital role in the Arab Spring in the absence of an open media and civil society. Indeed, in Syria, for example, the regime there is notorious for controlling the mass media – and remains a very dangerous place for journalists to ply their trade; with there being very few press freedoms, and with Internet activity also being monitored by the government, and being highly censored. However, it is very difficult to monitor and control all Internet activity, and in this respect, social media likely played a vital role in the uprisings there too. Therefore, as a result of the threat that social media now poses to autocratic regimes, places such as the United Arab Emirates now have laws in place that have the power to punish people if they discuss or post photos of other people (which of course includes politicians or people in positions of power), which is causing some concern amongst human rights groups (Tovey, 2015).

Thus, while food shortages as a result of the 2008 global economic crisis, global warming, and poverty may all have been factors that led to the mass uprising in the region, it could be said that it was social media that help to sustain this discontent, and this is something that autocratic leaders are now well aware of – and as in the UAE, are attempting to mitigate through laws that prohibit people from disseminating information about other people without their consent. However, ironically, it is such violations of human rights and individual liberties that are perhaps causing discontent in the first place – and the flexing of such political muscles might only serve to further distance the people from the regime that they are being oppressed by. Indeed, Beaumont (2011) has noted that due to the volume of people now using the Internet and social media in North Africa and the Middle East, that blocking such activity might actually cause more problems, and even more discontent. Moreover, it is also highlighted how social media was crucial in covering the initial news of the man who set himself on fire in Tunisia (which could be seen as the catalyst for the whole Arab Spring movement), as a similar event had taken place three month before, but nobody really knew about it because it had not been filmed and posted on social media. As a result of this, in Egypt, the government even went as far as pulling the plug on Internet services and 3G networks so that the public could not organise protests and riots. However, this was responded to with the analogue equivalent of Twitter: via handheld signs that were held aloft at demonstrations, which contained information about the next protest (Beaumont, 2011).

Perhaps then, the power of social media comes from its unedited and uncensored format, which allows people to get closer to the truth than traditional media in the region has allowed. Moreover, it is also a tool that allows people to organise, to quickly gather support for a cause, to disseminate information, and to galvanise people into action before momentum is lost. In addition, Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) note that the role of social media in collective action cannot be understood without first examining the political environment in which it operates, and that a significant increase in the use of new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it – and this was also the case in the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, while some might play down the role of social media in the Arab Spring uprisings, others – such as Eltantawy & Wiest (2011) – suggest that more research is needed in order to ascertain the true extent to which social media influenced the direction of the Arab Spring movement.

In hindsight, it seems axiomatic that social media had a big part to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, and helped to maintain the momentum of the movement by continually updating the public with news of oppression and violations of human rights – that would, under past regimes, have been covered up. However, it seems that it would be a mistake to suggest that social media caused the uprisings, as the protests continued in Egypt – as mentioned – even after the government pulled the plug on Internet services and 3G connections. Social media then, is merely a tool for disseminating information in a quick and efficient manner – in much the same way as leaflets and written manifestos have been in the past (although this is obviously a much slower process). Moreover, the multimedia nature of social media also allows people to instantly post photographs or videos, which can potentially be seen by millions of people – which is an unprecedented innovation; and one that could have a big effect on world politics for many years to come. Nevertheless, while the use of social media led to many successful campaigns and the overthrowing of dictators in some countries (such as Tunisia), elsewhere, civil wars are still raging; as in Syria.

Kassim (2012) states that: “In Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by the government” (n.p.). This then, is something that seems to be fairly clear in a subjective sense. However, this sentiment is also backed up with empirical data, such as the study done by Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid (2011), which analysed over three million tweets, gigabytes of You Tube content, and thousands of blog posts, to find that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Thus, they note that: “Conversations about revolution often preceded major events on the ground, and social media carried inspiring stories of protest across international borders” (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid, 2011, n.p.). Indeed, this is a study that is also commented on by O’Donnell (2011), who notes that in the week before Egyptian president Hosni Mubaraks resigned, tweets from Egypt – and around the world – that talk about political change in Egypt proliferated from around 2,300 per day, to around 230,000 per day. Thus: “Online activists created a virtual ecology of civil society, debating contentious issues that could not be discussed in public” (O’Donnell, 2011, n.p.). As such, in the absence of a civil society and an elected government in places in the Middle East and North Africa, a virtual and comparable environment was created in cyberspace where political discourses could be relatively safely held.

3. Conclusions

While this relatively brief discourse has shown that social media had a major role to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, it has also demonstrated that there is still a lack of consensus on the extent of its impact. Thus, while Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) suggest that social media discussions tended to increase in volume after a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring, Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazai (2011) suggests the opposite: that social media content increased before a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, what can be said without any doubt is that social media was used during the Arab Spring to great effect, and that it had some degree of influence on its outcome. Indeed, without people posting images and videos of events in the Arab Spring, and commenting on what they saw, then the revolution may have never gained the momentum that it needed to topple the long-standing regimes that activists opposed. However, with laws being formulated – in places such as the UAE – that curb social media use by making it illegal to comment on and post photos and videos of people without their consent; autocratic leaders are now clearly afraid of the power of social media and the impact that it can have.

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Nuclear warfare is often posited as essentially different from conventional warfare. Certainly they are conceived of as so, since dominating the cultural imagination in the Second World War (Gamson, 1989, 2). Dozens of films have been made depicting disasters caused by nuclear war in the past few decades, especially when the threat was most imminent during the cold war, and these films generally depict nuclear weapons as distinct from other violent weapons of war (Perrine viii, 1998). This differentiation is further mirrored in fiction which heavily suggests that psychologically, nuclear weapons are perceived as different and unique. But does this psychological classification reflect real differences, or are nuclear weapons simply the most dangerous weapon of war on a continuum of deadly weapons? Examining the history and the policy trends since the first use of the weapons, I argue that nuclear warfare is different not because the weapons themselves are deadlier, but because their damage is inflicted on all participants in the war; as a result, nuclear states pursue a policy of deterrence through mutually assured destruction (MAD).

To evaluate nuclear war and weapons in comparison with conventional war and weapons and determine their difference, if any does exist, I will use two main criteria. First, I will examine the violent capabilities of nuclear weapons compared to war fought with conventional weapons and second, I will examine how these weapons are interpreted and used in international relations. I conclude that the difference between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare is not the weapons themselves, as the damage in terms of destruction of lives, infrastructure, and landscape can be matched by other forms of violence; however, the way in which nuclear weapons perform this violence causes them to be interrupted differently, and this different interpretation means that the way political entities view and use them is also different.

Nuclear weapons are understood to be distinct from conventional weapons precisely because of their increased destructive capacity, a capacity which negates the goal of warfare. Here, war is seen as a tactic used for the purpose of gaining power in a struggle between organised political groups. As such, it is a political instrument, “the resort to force to advance political purposes and to settle political conflicts between sovereign communities” (Cohen and Lee, 1986, 9). In a rational political system, in order to go to war, the party waging it must believe that the end result will be conditions so preferable to the pre-war ones that they justify both the risk and the cost of war. In short, “the object of war is to attain a better peace. Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, for one’s people, is better after the war than before” (Hart 1974, 353). If nothing can be gained by war, then it is illogical to wage.

Because nuclear warfare has the distinct possibility of destroying whole continents, it can be said it is distinct from conventional war. Moreover, the threat of its use can be utilised as an effective diplomatic tool in a way that conventional war cannot really match. This notion provides the foundations behind the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which assumes that the threat of global devastation is sufficient to deter states from conflict (Sokolski 2004, v). MAD also supports the notion that the possession or development of these weapons gives a state power, however it would be illogical for such a state to utilise them. For example, India views its official defence policy as “a doctrine which expressly calls for deterrence by threat of putative retaliation” via their nuclear force (Sokolski 2004, 293). If India were to be attacked by nuclear weapons, so long as India still retained the possibility of striking back with its own weapons – a distinct possibility as the technology stands today – then its counter-attack would be destructive enough to the aggressor as to nullify the original aims. In short, to a rational actor, nuclear warfare would never be worth the risk, and therefore, it can be suggested that possessing destructive weapons is the key to peace.

Unfortunately, the counter to this theory argues that nuclear weapons are not a special kind of weapon, and simply function as a deterrent today because they are the latest weapon. Indeed, there is a history of other weapons which have also been seen as destructive enough to destroy the aims of war. In the escalation of violence during World War II for example, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only marginally more horrific in terms of destruction of life and property than the firebombing of Tokyo and Dresden which were conducted through the use of so-called conventional weapons (Leviton 1991, 252). Moreover, the holocaust of Nanking by Japan early in the war certainly wrought similar levels devastation though it took the matter of days rather than seconds (Chang 2012, 15). Looking further back into history, civilisation-ending destruction has always been a consequence of war. When the Golden Horde of the Mongols attacked the northern Chinese Jin, the most advanced and populated cities in the world at the time, the death toll was in the millions as the Mongols ground the cities into dust. Moreover, at the time, it also appeared that death on that scale was both unprecedented and unlikely to occur again. The scale of this attack is demonstrated by this account from Arab historian Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233) “a tremendous disaster such as [this] had never happened before…It may well be that the world from now until its end…will not experience the like of it again” (Burgan 2009, 27). Looking back even earlier to the Punic Wars, Carthage was destroyed with the Roman equivalent of weapons of mass destruction: salt sewn into the ground to prevent life from ever emerging again (Cornell, 2012, 443). Biological and chemical pathogens are newer, but equally deadly and fast-acting: mustard gas, for example, became taboo after its effective use for mass-slaughter by the Germans in World War I (Price 1997, 61).

This historical overview shows that the deadliness of nuclear weapons in terms of capacities to destroy civilisations and their civilian populations is not unique. While the decades of research and development since Hiroshima and Nagasaki have certainly amplified the deadliness of the weapons, their capability to kill is not unique. What has changed from the days of Carthage, though, is the speed at which this destruction is done. This is because a state, once the victim of a nuclear attack, can possibility still retain the ability to launch a nuclear retaliation, and in so doing, create enough to do mass destruction to the victor. Complete destruction has always been a possible outcome in warfare, but the ability to win a war and still be destroyed to the point that life is no longer sustainable is unique to modernity. As nuclear scholar Cohen writes, “a state in a post-nuclear war would not be which political system would survive, but whether any would” (Cohen 1986, 9).

This categorical difference of MAD makes nuclear warfare an irrational act, waged only by a nihilist system unconcerned with its own existence. However, these weapons obviously play a role in the international system. There are two reasons for this. First, the weapons are not ubiquitous; only a few developed countries have the weapons, giving them a clear military advantage over non-nuclear states. So long as this advantage remains, deterrence via mutually assured destruction is not possible. This is one of the reasons which nuclear countries refuse to completely destroy their arsenals; moreover, it becomes a reason for non-nuclear states to pursue such weapons. “States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat that cannot be met through alternative means” (Sagan 2007, 54). Put simply, if two states are in conflict, and neither possess a weapon which will cause mutually assured destruction, the weaker state will seek such a weapon as an insurance policy. At the same time, third party states both with and without such weapons will oppose the acquisition, as expanding the nuclear club is only an advantage to the state seeking admittance.

Because having nuclear weapons is so important for deterrence, states in possession cannot abandon them nor publically claim that they will not use these weapons. This how the paradox of nuclear deterrence is reached. States seeking to avoid nuclear warfare must therefore make a credible commitment to use them; if such a commitment cannot be made, then other states will not be afraid of attacking. As Cohen summarizes: “threatening to do what would serve no political purpose [launch a war of mutually assured destruction] is the only way to avoid nuclear war” (Cohen 1986, 10).

This principle of nuclear deterrence leads to brinksmanship behaviour, where nuclear powers continually assert their readiness to use the weapons. Such behaviour can be observed especially during the Cold War, where the USSR and the USA both threatened nuclear war precisely because they did not wish it to occur. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, both states demonstrated their willingness to use weapons; it was because their wiliness was so well demonstrated that neither side felt free to use them (Trachtenberg 1985, 142). Had either power capitulated early, the other would have felt free to attack.

Since the end of the Cold War, brinkmanship behaviour exists only between actively hostile states. The USA, not having a serious rival in the unipolar international system, no longer needs to demonstrate its wiliness to use its arsenal. Where brinksmanship is seen is between states such as India and Pakistan, where both states have reason to engage in conflict and both possess nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2013, 147).

Adding to MAD, there are two other factors which determine nuclear behaviour: psychological categorisation of nuclear weapons as worse and more inhumane than other weapons, and the existence of non-rational actors with the possibility of becoming nuclear powers. The psychologically distinct category of nuclear weapons arose in part due to the significant pushback against the weapons after the Second World War. While the violence and destruction caused by the bombs was not significantly worse, as I earlier argued, the newness and manner of destruction caused them to be singled out for condemnation (Tannenwald 2007, 74). As a result, political leaders have come to see them as taboo – that using them or even advocating using them is a breach of ethnics, and that discussing using them in a democratic setting will prohibit election (Wittner 2009, 49).

Unfortunately, the existence of a nuclear taboo creates a problem for democratic politicians who must, by the principles of MAD, continue to pursue brinkmanship behaviour. As a result, a type of doublespeak emerges from nuclear powers. In order to maintain the image that they are humanitarian and with the added purposes of maintaining relative military power by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, they must condemn nuclear force. At the same time, however, these leaders must continually suggest that they are willing to use the weapons if necessary (Bundy 1988, 536).

Finally, in the post-September 11th world, nuclear powers have become increasingly concerned with the actions of non-rational or non-state actors who might use not operate by the principles of MAD. Because non-rational or non-state actors have nothing to lose, they therefore have no reason to prevent them from using such a weapon. As a result, nuclear policy of the twenty-first century has focused on containing weapons of mass destruction (Cirincion 2014, 293). This focus on containing non-state actors is because, should MAD be properly used against other rational states with comparative military power, these actors represent the greatest threat to the nuclear state.

In sum, nuclear warfare compared to conventional warfare is not different in terms of the scale of possible destruction inflicted on the losing state. However, because the destruction occurs much faster and the losing state is capable of inflicting such a serious blow to the victorious state that negates the entire purpose of war, nuclear warfare is unique. As a result, the weapons have taken on a psychological taboo as well as a commitment by rational actors not to use them, precisely by threatening to use them. These powers are also eager to see that nuclear weapons do not spread to new states or non-state actors. It is this paradox that has defined military strategy since the Second World War.

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Introduction

This discussion examines the increasing influence of NGOs in global politics and focuses specifically on the role of development NGOs and the way in which they have challenged traditional understandings of state sovereignty. The discussion focuses on development NGOs in order to understand how many such organisations have taken on roles which were traditionally seen as the preserve of the nation state, being directly involved in healthcare provision, infrastructure development and educational provision. The discussion begins with a look at the increasing importance of NGOs in international development before highlighting how this has then led to them challenging state providers in terms of influence. The final two sections of the discussion cast a critical eye on the issue and examine the extent to which these developments have directly challenged state sovereignty and also the extent to which this should be seen as a problem.

The increased role of NGOs in development

The increasing influence of NGOs in global politics is something which has taken off in the post-war years (Weber 2010). Increasingly, the trend has reached such significant proportions that international relations theorists have argued that many traditional theories of international relations such as realism are now no longer relevant in light of these increasingly important global institutions (Weber 2010). As globalisation has gathered pace, and media coverage has become ever more comprehensive the number of NGOs which now have a truly global reach has grown dramatically (Green 2008). Organisations such as Oxfam now have a comprehensive global reach and an institutional and logistical capability which makes them one of the best equipped organisations in the world (Green 2008). Both Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that this professionalisation of what were once small charities run largely by well-meaning volunteers (or frequently religious organisations), has fundamentally changed the capabilities of what these organisations are able to achieve. By logical extension, this enhanced capability therefore, gives such organisations a much greater scope and power which inevitably results in enhanced political power and relevance. A key positive is that such organisations are now able to achieve far more than was ever thought possible less than a century ago. However, the downside for some is that this power is frequently not coupled with democratic accountability and responsibility.

Large scale development NGOs and state sovereignty

The controversial element of large scale development NGOs in relation to state sovereignty comes on those occasions in which NGOs provide services which are traditionally seen as the role of the state. In some cases this is not controversial, for example in developing countries which have experienced a major natural disaster where immediate relief is urgently needed. However, in other cases where NGOs are involved in more long term provision of services, their impact on state sovereignty can be seen as being problematic. Perhaps the main reason for this is that they undermine the relationship between state and citizen and frequently undermine the sovereignty of political institutions (Riddel 2014). Whilst this is done with the best of immediate intentions writers such as Riddel (2014) and Houtzager (2006) have argued that the long term impact of this can be damaging both to the actual conditions in the particular country, but also to the political strength and accountability of the state. The argument goes that by taking over services which the state could provide, NGOs undermine the longer term planning and development of the state and effectively make it reliant on NGOs for service provision. Academics such as Houtzager (2006) argue that the only long term method for sustainable development, revolves around a strong and accountable state with genuine political power, and therefore NGOs which undermine this are in his view damaging to the longer term prospects for developing states.

A further area in which NGOs are able to undermine state sovereignty, relates to the way in which NGOs are able to undermine the diplomatic positions of sovereign states by addressing problems or issues directly at source (Thakur 2006). For example, a nation state may invoke economic sanctions on a particular state in order to create diplomatic pressure but NGOs are able to bypass this to a certain extent by taking funds direct from citizens and using them in the way they best see fit. By remaining unaccountable to direct state power they are able to challenge the power of the state in numerous ways.

Overall, it can therefore be seen that, in the vast majority of cases NGOs have never directly challenged state sovereignty but by virtue of their contribution towards a variety of issues, they have gradually eroded the role of the state in many areas. Also in some cases it can be seen that large scale NGOs have at times directly challenged the power of the state through the provision of certain services and their sheer size and capability. Broadly speaking however there is no major evidence put forward by any of the writers examined which would suggest that NGOs have directly challenged or undermined state sovereignty. Rather, the picture which emerges points to one in which state sovereignty and power is undermined by global governance institutions and large corporations, and then the gaps are plugged (or attempts are made to plug them) by myriad forms of NGO. This point is also supported by Eimer (2009).

Critical Reflection

The relationship between the modern political and international landscape and state sovereignty is particularly problematic. The role of supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the EU frequently make the news because of what is seen as their lack of true democratic accountability. However, the arguments made above show how NGOs are also contributing to this challenge on state sovereignty. The extent to which one sees this as a problem, is largely driven by the perspective one takes on the importance of the state as a provider of security and long term support. A key threat of such significant NGO involvement is that in huge numbers of cases the NGO in question is based in a different country to that country which it is attempting to help. This therefore, makes longer term security much harder to obtain from such involvement.

However, in contrast to this view it must also be noted that the vast majority of major NGOs work closely with many governments in attempting to support and develop infrastructures and key provisions (for example health provision) and that the idea that they undermine sovereignty in the state is questionable. This point is highlighted by Eimer (2009) in relation to China with Eimer (2009) highlighting the fact that the Chinese government has actively encouraged growth in the voluntary and NGO sector within China and has even encouraged foreign NGOs to become involved. Eimer (2009 p.1) points out that;

Officials are now actively talking up the role of charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as they hope to harness the newfound enthusiasm amongst the Chinese for giving to charity and volunteering that has appeared since the Sichuan earthquake. Because it has little experience of its own of working with such groups, China plans to use some of Britain’s most famous charities as role models for their own voluntary sector.

For a country with such a strong government as China to actively introduce NGOs and third sector involvement in the country shows that they do not perceive NGOs to represent a threat to sovereignty. Eimer (2009 p.1) highlights points made by Dr. Wang (the Minister in charge of NGOs in China) as directly looking towards major existing NGOs as examples of what can be achieved, arguing that;

Dr. Wang is looking to Britain and charities like Save the Children, which works extensively in China, for examples of how best to boost China’s charity sector. “The way Save the Children operates is a good example for us,” said Dr Wang. “I think we can learn a lot from the UK. For example, the laws relating to charities, the institutions that govern charities and the way they are managed, both large charities and grassroots ones. In the past, charities played a very important role in transforming the UK into a modern society.

However, it must also be acknowledged here that the Chinese government has such a strong power base that there are virtually no institutions on the planet which could challenge them. That said, it does provide some evidence that NGOs do not necessarily undermine sovereignty even where they have major involvement. Indeed, many such as Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that even with well-functioning democratic governments in wealthy states there are still areas in which NGOs can improve life for the majority of people without remotely undermining state sovereignty.

It is certainly important to acknowledged that the way in which globalisation has changed the world is unlikely to be reversed any time soon, and there is therefore an important question to be asked as to whether NGOs themselves are to blame for declining state power, or whether or not forces such as large corporations, supranational institutions and other similar entities are more to blame. Certainly NGOs have increased their role whilst state sovereignty has undoubtedly declined but this relationship could very well be as much coincidental as it is a correlation. Given the evidence examined above, it would therefore, seem much more plausible to argue that NGOs have not caused a trend of declining state sovereignty but that their increased involvement in plugging important provisions gaps within many countries has undoubtedly contributed or cemented this trend in place. Fundamentally however, it can be argued that this does not represent a significant issue for the majority of states.

It can therefore be argued, that the rise of NGOs has gone hand in hand with a decline in state sovereignty, particularly in some of the world’s poorest countries but that this decline in state power is unlikely to have been driven by NGOs and is much more likely to have been driven by other international forces. In many ways, the most likely outcome here is that NGOs have stepped in to fill in the gaps in provision, which have been left by the decline of state sovereignty caused by the increased power of institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major global corporations. This is certainly the view of a number of thinkers including Peet (2003) and Stiglitz (2002).

It can therefore be seen, that the evidence and arguments examined above point more to a situation in which NGOs are not directly responsible for the erosion of state sovereignty in many cases but that they have probably indirectly contributed towards it. There is certainly a problematic relationship between many NGOs and many poorer states in the sense that many NGOs have now become so powerful that they are able to support large parts of state infrastructure in many countries (Green 2008). In addition there is strong evidence that many NGOs have intervened in states and have contradicted the power of the state by introducing policies such as supporting women into jobs (unpopular in some countries) and encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour in many other states through the use of microfinance (Smith 2013).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can therefore be argued, that the rise in power of NGOs has certainly coincided with declining sovereignty in many of the world’s poorest countries and indeed in some of the wealthiest as well. However, the arguments examined above show that to solely blame NGOs for this decline in sovereignty is likely to be wrong. Indeed, much of the evidence suggests that the decline in sovereignty has been pushed much more by organisations such as global corporations and particularly global governance institutions which have comprehensively challenged state power in many institutions. That said, it must also be acknowledged that many of the larger NGOs have evolved into very powerful institutions which have directly challenged state power. To the extent that this trend is likely to continue, it must therefore be acknowledged, that NGOs have contributed to a decline in state sovereignty but also that they are certainly not the root cause of this decline.

References

Chang, H-J. (2003). Rethinking Development Economics. London: Anthem Press.

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Green, D. (2008). From Poverty to Power. London: Oxfam.

Houtzager, P (2006). Changing Paths: International Development And The New Politics Of Inclusion. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Krasner, S. (2001). Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Peet, R. (2003). Unholy trinity. Zed Books

Riddel, R. (2014). Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment. Crawford School of Public Policy: Development Policy Centre.

Smith, B. (2013). Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalisation and its discontents. London: W.W.Norton.

Thakur, R. (2006). The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, C. (2010). International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge.