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Produce a draft plan for a Feature Article on: Effects of new communications technologies on youth culture in the United Kingdom

Introduction

Unlike news stories which are dictated by strict style guidelines and time and space considerations a feature article is more flexible. Having an increased number of options makes a draft plan essential to the creative process. Features may inform, entertain, persuade or amuse. A feature article goes beyond the factual brief of news and broadens the scope of the subject – features “offer an opportunity to tell the story behind the story.” This places responsibility on the writer to determine what the “story behind the story” is, why it’s worth telling and how best to tell it. Approaching the topic of the effect of new communications technologies on youth culture in the United Kingdom there are numerous possible angles. The first job of the writer is to decide which one to choose and where to pitch the idea.

Tone and Content

A feature’s tone and content can vary widely depending on the target market. For example, an analysis of new communications technologies for a mobile phone trade magazine would be very different from one written for a pop culture magazine. For the purpose of this plan the target is a broadsheet newspaper, so the article will be addressed to a general audience who know some information about youth culture and technology, but who may not have considered the impact of one on the other. The first question to ask, and answer, is why will they care? The theme of this feature takes a cultural analysis perspective. In social discourse “language is linked with practice, truth is constructed, and power exercised,” The importance of new communications technologies on youth culture is that the truths they construct and the power they exercise will become a part of the cultural landscape as they grow up.

Target and Theme

A focused target and robust theme are the essential building blocks of a feature. Next comes research. In this case, define the subject (does “youth” mean 14-18 years old? 16-20?) and then focus on getting the raw data: information on the types of new technology, percentage of the target age group that uses a given technology, the amount of time an average youth spends using new communications technologies. This information can be gleaned from news sources, product manufacturers and relevant related features. Good organisation is essential, use techniques such as feature files for storing all the data, contacts, questions, notes and information on a feature. The broad gist of this research should be to show that new communications technologies are widespread and widely used enough to be of serious cultural interest.

The Human Element

The next step is to find the human element in the facts and figures – people’s experiences distinguish features from news and bring the story to life. First identify useful potential interviewees. These include experts who can explain the function and scope of new technologies, cultural observers who can offer cultural or historical context about social change, teachers, parents and young people. Then decide what order to address them in; the order of your interviews is important to the direction of the story. Conducting interviews is a critical step. Make sure the questions and technique are suited to the subject. A teenager will respond different than a professional who is used to giving interviews. Listen and observe carefully, allow for pauses while the thinks and collect the facts objectively. When writing about young people bear in mind any legal issues. For example, publishing anything that could lead to the identification of someone under 18 who is under police investigation is an offence.

Writing

When the research and interviews are completed it is time to write the feature. Write an outline or use notes to create a first draft, paying attention to the structure (i.e., will it be chronological, bullet-points or a narrative?) Make sure there is a gripping opening using a dramatic fact or anecdote. Since the theme of the feature is the socio-cultural impact of the effect of new communications technologies on young people it might be interesting to compare the UK with other countries as a way of establishing the global significance of communication technology. For example, a study about technology use by Czech young people showing that: “CMC [computer mediated communication] is providing opportunities, before unknown, for young people to participate in post-socialist civic discourse in very creative ways” makes a thought-provoking parallel. Bearing in mind the general audience keep technical jargon to a minimum and focus on accessibility and clarity.

Boxes and Sidebars

Boxes and sidebars are essential to features and are an economical way to convey important facts or information. Adult newspaper readers are probably not familiar with all the different new communication technologies so a box profiling the most popular communication tools could be useful. For example, “hardware versus software” outlining innovations like touch-screen mobiles, blue-tooth headsets, Twitter and Facebook Mobile.

Proofread and Revise

After completing all the steps of the draft feature plan read the feature with an objective point of view. A plan is a guideline to create a professional piece of work, but if there is something missing, or something in the original plan doesn’t fit with the finished piece carefully consider and revise. The job of a feature is to speak to its audience – if the plan gets in the way then the plan needs to change.

Bibliography

Hennessy, B., Writing Feature Articles, Focal Press, 2006

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Hicks, W., Adams, S., & Gilbert, H., Writing for Journalists, Routledge, 1999

Lengel, L., Culture And Technology In The New Europe: Civic Discourse In Transformation In Post-Communist Nations, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000

Mackay, H., Maples, W., & Reynolds, P., Investigating the Information Society, Routledge, 2001

Pape, S., & Featherstone, S., Feature Writing: A Practical Introduction, SAGE, 2006

Peterson, F., & Kesselman-Turkel, J., The Magazine Writer’s Handbook, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006

Rudin, R., & Ibbotson, T., An Introduction to Journalism: Essential Techniques and Background Knowledge, Focal Press, 2002

Sheridan Burns, L., Understanding Journalism, SAGE, 2002

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Introduction

Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is a novel method for extracting oil and natural gas that involves injecting highly pressurised water, sand and chemicals into shale rock deep beneath the Earth’s surface (Sica 2015; Holloway & Rudd 2013, p.xi). Commercially viable fracking techniques have been honed over the past two decades in the USA, and have proved to be an effective means by which “difficult to reach resources of oil and gas” can be exploited (BBC News 2013).

Fracking is generally agreed to have had a dramatic effect on the price of fossil fuels, leading some to declare a “fracking revolution” (Ruhl 2013). The Brookings Institute estimates that average US gas prices in 2013 were 47% lower than they would have been without fracking. This means that, overall, consumers of gas saved approximately $13 Billion in the period between 2007 and 2013 – a figure that is increasing exponentially as production of fracked fuel increases (Dews 2015).

As fracking was pioneered in the USA – a market recently described by McDonald (2014) as “account[ing] for practically all of the world’s commercial production” – this paper will base its outlook on the impact of fracking on US energy security. We will begin by looking at the potential opportunities presented by fracking, then turn to the domestic challenges before considering the global impact, which will be split into a critique of the geopolitics and an assessment of the environmental factors raised by the technique.

The potential of fracking

The United States Energy Information Agency estimates that there are approximately 7229 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas reserves globally (EIA-ARI 2013). This figure is likely to increase significantly, given that during this study, the EIA surveyed just 46 regions in 41 separate countries (p.1). For comparison, the Oil and Gas Journal’s 2012 “Worldwide look at Reserves and Production” put the total figure of proven recoverable conventional gas reserves at 7074 trillion cubic feet; a figure already smaller than the potential of shale gas, and one that is likely to be dwarfed as further shale exploration yields new gas fields.

Although commentators such as Inman (2014) have called the predicted size of potential reserves of shale gas into question, the potential for independent energy production is obvious, and has already been hinted at by the American experience. Between 2005 and 2013, the USA reduced net imports from 10.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas, to just 4.8 billion cubic feet. Over the same period, the wholesale price of gas collapsed from a high of $8.79 to a low of $3.71. Some experts expect the USA to become a net exporter of natural gas as soon as 2018 (Oil and Energy Trends 2013). Chief economist and Vice President of BP, Christof Ruhl (2013), predicts that, in a short space of time, the USA will also replace Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest energy producer.

Although turbulence in the price of gas is not solely down to increased supply (and is presently exacerbated by a global economic slowdown), fracking has two important benefits for the energy security of countries with reserves of shale gas:

They are insulated from fluctuations in global price such as those found between 2005 – 2013; and
The risk of sudden, unexpected geopolitical events impacting on supply is greatly mitigated.

Similar potential benefits are open to other nations with reserves of shale gas, which perhaps explains why countries such as the United Kingdom, which could supply its entire gas needs for the next 50 years by extracting just 10% of its estimated reserves, are so keen to expand their onshore fracking activities (Cooper, Stamford & Azapagic 2014).

Domestic challenges of fracking

Fracking is not without its critics. In a major survey of media portrayals, Groat & Grimshaw (2012) found that two-thirds of stories across all forms of news media in the USA were negative. They go on to criticise the fact that that less than a quarter of all stories made any reference to scientific research on the issue. The UK, where the government has shown a commitment to developing fracking that could make it the second major economy to follow the lead of the USA, has seen major public objection to fracking, sparked in part by a number of earthquakes that were attributed to drilling activities (BBC News 2011). Others have highlighted drinking water contamination, air pollution, and limited regulation (meaning wells can be constructed on church grounds and schools) as major criticisms of fracking in the USA (Goldberg 2013).

Holloway & Rudd (2013 p.126) reject many of these criticisms, noting that no link had been found linking fracking to reports of groundwater contamination. They cite a major study by the University of Texas, which concluded that “many problems ascribed to hydraulic fracturing are related to processes common to all oil and gas drilling operations” and that “any reports of contamination can be traced to above-ground spills or other mishandling of wastewater produced from shale gas drilling, rather than from hydraulic fracturing” (Holloway & Rudd, p.126). These justifications seem disingenuous; the issues identified are a direct consequence of fracking, even if they are not unique to it as a form of energy extraction. Over 15 million Americans now live within a mile of an oil or gas well, a figure likely to skyrocket as more wells are constructed, especially if densely populated nations such as the UK commence drilling operations (Gold & McGinty 2013).

As fracking is a technology that brings production closer to communities, it is imperative that the industry do more to address these issues, rather than dismissing them as normal consequences of fossil fuel production. If they do not, they will fail to win over public opinion, which in turn could result in a hostile regulatory regime that could act as a major impediment on the proliferation of fracking worldwide, negating any positive effects on energy security.

The Geopolitical significance of fracking

It is not just the size of potential shale gas reserves that is significant; it is also their global distribution. Presently, Russia tops the current list of nations with proven gas reserves, closely followed by Iran, with Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela all featuring in the top ten – all nations with questionable human rights records, or a history of animosity towards the USA (Oil and Gas Journal 2012). By contrast, China – with negligible traditional energy reserves – tops the list of technically proven shale gas reserves. Brazil, the USA, and South Africa also feature in the top ten of this list (EIA 2014). This means that fracking has an enormous potential to impact on global energy security.

Six out of the top ten companies in the world are involved in the energy sector, and the future of fracking could well impact on their long-term fortunes (Fortune 2014). Large exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela depend on oil and gas exports for their security and standing in the world, and plan their foreign policies accordingly (Orttung & Overland 2011). Control of fossil fuel reserves has been a factor in many global territorial disputes, and is a major motivating factor behind US political and military involvement in the Middle East (Overland 2015).

Clearly then, any change to the existing status quo with regards to the production, import, and export of gas is going to have a profound impact on global politics and the future of global energy security. If the USA does indeed become a net exporter of energy, its strategic interest in the Middle East – where it has a huge military presence, and has been directly involved in two recent wars – is likely to wane (Index of US Military Strength 2015, p.117). Some nations that exert their foreign policy objectives through energy are likely to see their influence decline, while others will see potential for their security to improve.

European energy security

At present, relations between Russia, Europe and the USA are strained. As much as a quarter of the EU’s gas is imported from Russia, and nearly 80% of it has traditionally travelled in pipes through Ukraine (BBC News 2009). Successive disputes between Ukraine and Russia regarding payment for gas resulted in almost annual cut-offs in European supply over successive winters in the latter half of the decade, causing some governments to declare a state of emergency as schools and factories closed and people struggled to survive the freezing temperatures (Cendrowicz 2009). These cuts in supply were short-lived, but demonstrate how vulnerable European energy security is to geopolitical events beyond its control.

The overthrow of pro-Russian president in Ukraine, the Russian annexation of Crimea, consequent European sanctions, and a Ukrainian gas production base that is centred to the east where insurgent fighting continues to wreak its toll all point to major, continued threats to global energy security, and perhaps underline why European nations might want to reconsider their initial reluctance to pursue the option of fracking (Oil and Energy Trends 2014). It is clear that if predictions of shale gas reserves prove accurate, Russian influence on global energy security will be greatly diminished, and a new hierarchical relationship will develop.

It is also noteworthy that while Russian influence might decline, two other BRIC nations – China and Brazil – may step onto the stage as global players in the global energy market. Some observers have commented that this could accelerate the USA’s decline as a hegemonic superpower; however, with the alluring prospect of energy independence itself, fracking might actually help to revive American fortunes (Dunn & Mcclelland 2013).

Climate Change

Although fracking has the potential to guarantee energy security for many nations, while precipitating the decline of influence for some producers and hastening the rise of others, in the long term, it has the potential to be a retrograde step for energy security.

At a time when scientific consensus seems to be that the use of fossil fuels is adversely impacting on the economic and ecologic future of the planet, it seems unfortunate that fracking – with its promise of low cost energy independence – has been developed as a technology. The UK seems almost certain to miss its objectives under the Climate Change Act 2008 of reducing carbon emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 if it continues to pursue its policy of fracking (Cooper, Stamford & Azapagic 2014). Although carbon taxes could offset the economic consequences of climate change, the political hurdles to implementing such policies have proved challenging to date (Rabe & Borick 2012). Furthermore, carbon taxes will not mitigate against the physical consequences of climate change, which even by conservative ‘best case scenario’ estimates, is likely to exacerbate food and water security, result in more frequent ‘freak’ weather events, and mean a rise in sea levels by the middle of the century (Schneider et al 2007). These factors are likely to result in greater instances of conflict, as populations compete for increasingly scarce resources (Scott 2012). As such, the short term benefits to energy security that fracking could bring could eventually contribute to long term global instability as the more serious effects of climate change begin to take effect.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the fracking revolution has the potential to shake up the largely static hierarchical energy relationships that have existed since the end of World War Two. Nations such as the USA and the United Kingdom have the potential to become energy independent within a generation. Growing economies with limited traditional energy reserves such as China have the potential to become energy producers, which, until now, they have largely been excluded from. For the winners, a future of energy independence beckons, which in turn means greater energy security and greater global security.

Although there are many benefits, the impact of climate change cannot be ignored. Fracking provides cheap domestic fuel, which in turn means that the point in time at which it becomes economically viable for societies to switch to renewable sources of energy disappears further into the future. This means that, long term, fracking could contribute to increased political volatility and uncertainty, which in turn could result in reduced global energy security.

Ultimately, fracking could prove to be a false economy.

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1. Introduction

The Arab Spring is a revolutionary movement in North Africa and the Middle East, which began in December 2010 with the Tunisian Revolution – before spreading to other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, amongst others. While the Arab Spring was not predicted by political commentators and the media, in retrospect, there are a number of reasons with regard to why it occurred, such as longstanding oppressive regimes and difficult economic conditions. However, despite all of this, the catalyst for the Arab Spring came from a twenty-something fruit vendor in Tunisia who, frustrated and angry about the treatment he was receiving from local officials, set himself on fire in protest – and subsequently died (Haas & Lesch, 2013). In years gone by, such an event might have been largely covered up by an autocratic regime that was able to control the mass media – but nowadays, in the age of the Internet and social media, such a task is more difficult. Indeed, Adi (2014) has suggested that the use of social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) did play an integral part in the Arab Spring uprisings – but reiterates that social media was used as a tool to gather increasing support for the cause, rather than being the catalyst in itself. Therefore, this paper shall discuss the impact of social media during the Arab Spring, and try to ascertain the extent to which it facilitated the growth of the movement.

2. Social Media and the Arab Spring

To begin with, Howard & Hussain (2013)state that:

“Social protests in the Arab world have spread across North Africa and the Middle East, largely because digital media allowed communities to realize that they shared grievances and because they nurtured transportable strategies for mobilizing against directors” (p. 3).

Moreover, Howard & Hussain (2013)go on to unequivocally state that the Internet, mobiles phones, and social networking have transformed politics in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, in light of the Arab Spring movement that began in late 2010, it would be difficult to argue against such a notion. Furthermore, Bebawi & Bossio (2014) also point out that the mass media has labelled the Arab Spring as a ‘social media revolution’, with citizen journalism and social media reporting helping to sustain the wave of protests in North Africa and the Middle East from 2010. Thus, there are two ways in which social media has been used during the Arab Spring, these being: (1) by helping to coordinate protests on a mass scale, and (2) by reporting on the events without any media bias. This then, is something that was also used to great effect during the 2011 riots in England, when social media was used to coordinate riots in various English cities (Briggs, 2011) – and it is perhaps no coincidence that these riots coincided with the Arab Spring movement and the successful use of social media in North Africa and the Middle East at that time. However, in oppressive regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, unlike in the UK, such technologies are a revelation in communication – as these are countries that have traditionally had their media manipulated by despotic rulers and regimes, and have been subjected to extreme censorship and manipulation.

Gismondi (2014) notes that a study in Washington found that social media helped to shape and lead the debate with regard to the politics of the Arab Spring, and that young and educated people tended to lead this discourse, with women also being highly involved with social media participation (and the riots and protests themselves). For example, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali discovered the power of social media when revolutionaries posted a video of him and his wife using a government-funded jet to travel to Europe on lavish shopping trips – something that angered locals, who were struggling with economic conditions; and ultimately contributed to his downfall. Moreover, the Washington study cited by Gismondi (2014) also found that social media was instrumental in sharing democratic ideas internationally, and this no doubt also helped to fuel the Arab Spring, and to make people in the region dream of living in a free and democratic society.

In addition, Khondker (2011) also notes that social media played a vital role in the Arab Spring in the absence of an open media and civil society. Indeed, in Syria, for example, the regime there is notorious for controlling the mass media – and remains a very dangerous place for journalists to ply their trade; with there being very few press freedoms, and with Internet activity also being monitored by the government, and being highly censored. However, it is very difficult to monitor and control all Internet activity, and in this respect, social media likely played a vital role in the uprisings there too. Therefore, as a result of the threat that social media now poses to autocratic regimes, places such as the United Arab Emirates now have laws in place that have the power to punish people if they discuss or post photos of other people (which of course includes politicians or people in positions of power), which is causing some concern amongst human rights groups (Tovey, 2015).

Thus, while food shortages as a result of the 2008 global economic crisis, global warming, and poverty may all have been factors that led to the mass uprising in the region, it could be said that it was social media that help to sustain this discontent, and this is something that autocratic leaders are now well aware of – and as in the UAE, are attempting to mitigate through laws that prohibit people from disseminating information about other people without their consent. However, ironically, it is such violations of human rights and individual liberties that are perhaps causing discontent in the first place – and the flexing of such political muscles might only serve to further distance the people from the regime that they are being oppressed by. Indeed, Beaumont (2011) has noted that due to the volume of people now using the Internet and social media in North Africa and the Middle East, that blocking such activity might actually cause more problems, and even more discontent. Moreover, it is also highlighted how social media was crucial in covering the initial news of the man who set himself on fire in Tunisia (which could be seen as the catalyst for the whole Arab Spring movement), as a similar event had taken place three month before, but nobody really knew about it because it had not been filmed and posted on social media. As a result of this, in Egypt, the government even went as far as pulling the plug on Internet services and 3G networks so that the public could not organise protests and riots. However, this was responded to with the analogue equivalent of Twitter: via handheld signs that were held aloft at demonstrations, which contained information about the next protest (Beaumont, 2011).

Perhaps then, the power of social media comes from its unedited and uncensored format, which allows people to get closer to the truth than traditional media in the region has allowed. Moreover, it is also a tool that allows people to organise, to quickly gather support for a cause, to disseminate information, and to galvanise people into action before momentum is lost. In addition, Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) note that the role of social media in collective action cannot be understood without first examining the political environment in which it operates, and that a significant increase in the use of new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it – and this was also the case in the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, while some might play down the role of social media in the Arab Spring uprisings, others – such as Eltantawy & Wiest (2011) – suggest that more research is needed in order to ascertain the true extent to which social media influenced the direction of the Arab Spring movement.

In hindsight, it seems axiomatic that social media had a big part to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, and helped to maintain the momentum of the movement by continually updating the public with news of oppression and violations of human rights – that would, under past regimes, have been covered up. However, it seems that it would be a mistake to suggest that social media caused the uprisings, as the protests continued in Egypt – as mentioned – even after the government pulled the plug on Internet services and 3G connections. Social media then, is merely a tool for disseminating information in a quick and efficient manner – in much the same way as leaflets and written manifestos have been in the past (although this is obviously a much slower process). Moreover, the multimedia nature of social media also allows people to instantly post photographs or videos, which can potentially be seen by millions of people – which is an unprecedented innovation; and one that could have a big effect on world politics for many years to come. Nevertheless, while the use of social media led to many successful campaigns and the overthrowing of dictators in some countries (such as Tunisia), elsewhere, civil wars are still raging; as in Syria.

Kassim (2012) states that: “In Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by the government” (n.p.). This then, is something that seems to be fairly clear in a subjective sense. However, this sentiment is also backed up with empirical data, such as the study done by Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid (2011), which analysed over three million tweets, gigabytes of You Tube content, and thousands of blog posts, to find that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Thus, they note that: “Conversations about revolution often preceded major events on the ground, and social media carried inspiring stories of protest across international borders” (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid, 2011, n.p.). Indeed, this is a study that is also commented on by O’Donnell (2011), who notes that in the week before Egyptian president Hosni Mubaraks resigned, tweets from Egypt – and around the world – that talk about political change in Egypt proliferated from around 2,300 per day, to around 230,000 per day. Thus: “Online activists created a virtual ecology of civil society, debating contentious issues that could not be discussed in public” (O’Donnell, 2011, n.p.). As such, in the absence of a civil society and an elected government in places in the Middle East and North Africa, a virtual and comparable environment was created in cyberspace where political discourses could be relatively safely held.

3. Conclusions

While this relatively brief discourse has shown that social media had a major role to play in the Arab Spring uprisings, it has also demonstrated that there is still a lack of consensus on the extent of its impact. Thus, while Wolfsfel, Segev & Sheafer (2013) suggest that social media discussions tended to increase in volume after a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring, Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazai (2011) suggests the opposite: that social media content increased before a major revolutionary event during the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, what can be said without any doubt is that social media was used during the Arab Spring to great effect, and that it had some degree of influence on its outcome. Indeed, without people posting images and videos of events in the Arab Spring, and commenting on what they saw, then the revolution may have never gained the momentum that it needed to topple the long-standing regimes that activists opposed. However, with laws being formulated – in places such as the UAE – that curb social media use by making it illegal to comment on and post photos and videos of people without their consent; autocratic leaders are now clearly afraid of the power of social media and the impact that it can have.

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Nuclear warfare is often posited as essentially different from conventional warfare. Certainly they are conceived of as so, since dominating the cultural imagination in the Second World War (Gamson, 1989, 2). Dozens of films have been made depicting disasters caused by nuclear war in the past few decades, especially when the threat was most imminent during the cold war, and these films generally depict nuclear weapons as distinct from other violent weapons of war (Perrine viii, 1998). This differentiation is further mirrored in fiction which heavily suggests that psychologically, nuclear weapons are perceived as different and unique. But does this psychological classification reflect real differences, or are nuclear weapons simply the most dangerous weapon of war on a continuum of deadly weapons? Examining the history and the policy trends since the first use of the weapons, I argue that nuclear warfare is different not because the weapons themselves are deadlier, but because their damage is inflicted on all participants in the war; as a result, nuclear states pursue a policy of deterrence through mutually assured destruction (MAD).

To evaluate nuclear war and weapons in comparison with conventional war and weapons and determine their difference, if any does exist, I will use two main criteria. First, I will examine the violent capabilities of nuclear weapons compared to war fought with conventional weapons and second, I will examine how these weapons are interpreted and used in international relations. I conclude that the difference between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare is not the weapons themselves, as the damage in terms of destruction of lives, infrastructure, and landscape can be matched by other forms of violence; however, the way in which nuclear weapons perform this violence causes them to be interrupted differently, and this different interpretation means that the way political entities view and use them is also different.

Nuclear weapons are understood to be distinct from conventional weapons precisely because of their increased destructive capacity, a capacity which negates the goal of warfare. Here, war is seen as a tactic used for the purpose of gaining power in a struggle between organised political groups. As such, it is a political instrument, “the resort to force to advance political purposes and to settle political conflicts between sovereign communities” (Cohen and Lee, 1986, 9). In a rational political system, in order to go to war, the party waging it must believe that the end result will be conditions so preferable to the pre-war ones that they justify both the risk and the cost of war. In short, “the object of war is to attain a better peace. Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, for one’s people, is better after the war than before” (Hart 1974, 353). If nothing can be gained by war, then it is illogical to wage.

Because nuclear warfare has the distinct possibility of destroying whole continents, it can be said it is distinct from conventional war. Moreover, the threat of its use can be utilised as an effective diplomatic tool in a way that conventional war cannot really match. This notion provides the foundations behind the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which assumes that the threat of global devastation is sufficient to deter states from conflict (Sokolski 2004, v). MAD also supports the notion that the possession or development of these weapons gives a state power, however it would be illogical for such a state to utilise them. For example, India views its official defence policy as “a doctrine which expressly calls for deterrence by threat of putative retaliation” via their nuclear force (Sokolski 2004, 293). If India were to be attacked by nuclear weapons, so long as India still retained the possibility of striking back with its own weapons – a distinct possibility as the technology stands today – then its counter-attack would be destructive enough to the aggressor as to nullify the original aims. In short, to a rational actor, nuclear warfare would never be worth the risk, and therefore, it can be suggested that possessing destructive weapons is the key to peace.

Unfortunately, the counter to this theory argues that nuclear weapons are not a special kind of weapon, and simply function as a deterrent today because they are the latest weapon. Indeed, there is a history of other weapons which have also been seen as destructive enough to destroy the aims of war. In the escalation of violence during World War II for example, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only marginally more horrific in terms of destruction of life and property than the firebombing of Tokyo and Dresden which were conducted through the use of so-called conventional weapons (Leviton 1991, 252). Moreover, the holocaust of Nanking by Japan early in the war certainly wrought similar levels devastation though it took the matter of days rather than seconds (Chang 2012, 15). Looking further back into history, civilisation-ending destruction has always been a consequence of war. When the Golden Horde of the Mongols attacked the northern Chinese Jin, the most advanced and populated cities in the world at the time, the death toll was in the millions as the Mongols ground the cities into dust. Moreover, at the time, it also appeared that death on that scale was both unprecedented and unlikely to occur again. The scale of this attack is demonstrated by this account from Arab historian Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233) “a tremendous disaster such as [this] had never happened before…It may well be that the world from now until its end…will not experience the like of it again” (Burgan 2009, 27). Looking back even earlier to the Punic Wars, Carthage was destroyed with the Roman equivalent of weapons of mass destruction: salt sewn into the ground to prevent life from ever emerging again (Cornell, 2012, 443). Biological and chemical pathogens are newer, but equally deadly and fast-acting: mustard gas, for example, became taboo after its effective use for mass-slaughter by the Germans in World War I (Price 1997, 61).

This historical overview shows that the deadliness of nuclear weapons in terms of capacities to destroy civilisations and their civilian populations is not unique. While the decades of research and development since Hiroshima and Nagasaki have certainly amplified the deadliness of the weapons, their capability to kill is not unique. What has changed from the days of Carthage, though, is the speed at which this destruction is done. This is because a state, once the victim of a nuclear attack, can possibility still retain the ability to launch a nuclear retaliation, and in so doing, create enough to do mass destruction to the victor. Complete destruction has always been a possible outcome in warfare, but the ability to win a war and still be destroyed to the point that life is no longer sustainable is unique to modernity. As nuclear scholar Cohen writes, “a state in a post-nuclear war would not be which political system would survive, but whether any would” (Cohen 1986, 9).

This categorical difference of MAD makes nuclear warfare an irrational act, waged only by a nihilist system unconcerned with its own existence. However, these weapons obviously play a role in the international system. There are two reasons for this. First, the weapons are not ubiquitous; only a few developed countries have the weapons, giving them a clear military advantage over non-nuclear states. So long as this advantage remains, deterrence via mutually assured destruction is not possible. This is one of the reasons which nuclear countries refuse to completely destroy their arsenals; moreover, it becomes a reason for non-nuclear states to pursue such weapons. “States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat that cannot be met through alternative means” (Sagan 2007, 54). Put simply, if two states are in conflict, and neither possess a weapon which will cause mutually assured destruction, the weaker state will seek such a weapon as an insurance policy. At the same time, third party states both with and without such weapons will oppose the acquisition, as expanding the nuclear club is only an advantage to the state seeking admittance.

Because having nuclear weapons is so important for deterrence, states in possession cannot abandon them nor publically claim that they will not use these weapons. This how the paradox of nuclear deterrence is reached. States seeking to avoid nuclear warfare must therefore make a credible commitment to use them; if such a commitment cannot be made, then other states will not be afraid of attacking. As Cohen summarizes: “threatening to do what would serve no political purpose [launch a war of mutually assured destruction] is the only way to avoid nuclear war” (Cohen 1986, 10).

This principle of nuclear deterrence leads to brinksmanship behaviour, where nuclear powers continually assert their readiness to use the weapons. Such behaviour can be observed especially during the Cold War, where the USSR and the USA both threatened nuclear war precisely because they did not wish it to occur. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, both states demonstrated their willingness to use weapons; it was because their wiliness was so well demonstrated that neither side felt free to use them (Trachtenberg 1985, 142). Had either power capitulated early, the other would have felt free to attack.

Since the end of the Cold War, brinkmanship behaviour exists only between actively hostile states. The USA, not having a serious rival in the unipolar international system, no longer needs to demonstrate its wiliness to use its arsenal. Where brinksmanship is seen is between states such as India and Pakistan, where both states have reason to engage in conflict and both possess nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2013, 147).

Adding to MAD, there are two other factors which determine nuclear behaviour: psychological categorisation of nuclear weapons as worse and more inhumane than other weapons, and the existence of non-rational actors with the possibility of becoming nuclear powers. The psychologically distinct category of nuclear weapons arose in part due to the significant pushback against the weapons after the Second World War. While the violence and destruction caused by the bombs was not significantly worse, as I earlier argued, the newness and manner of destruction caused them to be singled out for condemnation (Tannenwald 2007, 74). As a result, political leaders have come to see them as taboo – that using them or even advocating using them is a breach of ethnics, and that discussing using them in a democratic setting will prohibit election (Wittner 2009, 49).

Unfortunately, the existence of a nuclear taboo creates a problem for democratic politicians who must, by the principles of MAD, continue to pursue brinkmanship behaviour. As a result, a type of doublespeak emerges from nuclear powers. In order to maintain the image that they are humanitarian and with the added purposes of maintaining relative military power by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, they must condemn nuclear force. At the same time, however, these leaders must continually suggest that they are willing to use the weapons if necessary (Bundy 1988, 536).

Finally, in the post-September 11th world, nuclear powers have become increasingly concerned with the actions of non-rational or non-state actors who might use not operate by the principles of MAD. Because non-rational or non-state actors have nothing to lose, they therefore have no reason to prevent them from using such a weapon. As a result, nuclear policy of the twenty-first century has focused on containing weapons of mass destruction (Cirincion 2014, 293). This focus on containing non-state actors is because, should MAD be properly used against other rational states with comparative military power, these actors represent the greatest threat to the nuclear state.

In sum, nuclear warfare compared to conventional warfare is not different in terms of the scale of possible destruction inflicted on the losing state. However, because the destruction occurs much faster and the losing state is capable of inflicting such a serious blow to the victorious state that negates the entire purpose of war, nuclear warfare is unique. As a result, the weapons have taken on a psychological taboo as well as a commitment by rational actors not to use them, precisely by threatening to use them. These powers are also eager to see that nuclear weapons do not spread to new states or non-state actors. It is this paradox that has defined military strategy since the Second World War.

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Introduction

This discussion examines the increasing influence of NGOs in global politics and focuses specifically on the role of development NGOs and the way in which they have challenged traditional understandings of state sovereignty. The discussion focuses on development NGOs in order to understand how many such organisations have taken on roles which were traditionally seen as the preserve of the nation state, being directly involved in healthcare provision, infrastructure development and educational provision. The discussion begins with a look at the increasing importance of NGOs in international development before highlighting how this has then led to them challenging state providers in terms of influence. The final two sections of the discussion cast a critical eye on the issue and examine the extent to which these developments have directly challenged state sovereignty and also the extent to which this should be seen as a problem.

The increased role of NGOs in development

The increasing influence of NGOs in global politics is something which has taken off in the post-war years (Weber 2010). Increasingly, the trend has reached such significant proportions that international relations theorists have argued that many traditional theories of international relations such as realism are now no longer relevant in light of these increasingly important global institutions (Weber 2010). As globalisation has gathered pace, and media coverage has become ever more comprehensive the number of NGOs which now have a truly global reach has grown dramatically (Green 2008). Organisations such as Oxfam now have a comprehensive global reach and an institutional and logistical capability which makes them one of the best equipped organisations in the world (Green 2008). Both Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that this professionalisation of what were once small charities run largely by well-meaning volunteers (or frequently religious organisations), has fundamentally changed the capabilities of what these organisations are able to achieve. By logical extension, this enhanced capability therefore, gives such organisations a much greater scope and power which inevitably results in enhanced political power and relevance. A key positive is that such organisations are now able to achieve far more than was ever thought possible less than a century ago. However, the downside for some is that this power is frequently not coupled with democratic accountability and responsibility.

Large scale development NGOs and state sovereignty

The controversial element of large scale development NGOs in relation to state sovereignty comes on those occasions in which NGOs provide services which are traditionally seen as the role of the state. In some cases this is not controversial, for example in developing countries which have experienced a major natural disaster where immediate relief is urgently needed. However, in other cases where NGOs are involved in more long term provision of services, their impact on state sovereignty can be seen as being problematic. Perhaps the main reason for this is that they undermine the relationship between state and citizen and frequently undermine the sovereignty of political institutions (Riddel 2014). Whilst this is done with the best of immediate intentions writers such as Riddel (2014) and Houtzager (2006) have argued that the long term impact of this can be damaging both to the actual conditions in the particular country, but also to the political strength and accountability of the state. The argument goes that by taking over services which the state could provide, NGOs undermine the longer term planning and development of the state and effectively make it reliant on NGOs for service provision. Academics such as Houtzager (2006) argue that the only long term method for sustainable development, revolves around a strong and accountable state with genuine political power, and therefore NGOs which undermine this are in his view damaging to the longer term prospects for developing states.

A further area in which NGOs are able to undermine state sovereignty, relates to the way in which NGOs are able to undermine the diplomatic positions of sovereign states by addressing problems or issues directly at source (Thakur 2006). For example, a nation state may invoke economic sanctions on a particular state in order to create diplomatic pressure but NGOs are able to bypass this to a certain extent by taking funds direct from citizens and using them in the way they best see fit. By remaining unaccountable to direct state power they are able to challenge the power of the state in numerous ways.

Overall, it can therefore be seen that, in the vast majority of cases NGOs have never directly challenged state sovereignty but by virtue of their contribution towards a variety of issues, they have gradually eroded the role of the state in many areas. Also in some cases it can be seen that large scale NGOs have at times directly challenged the power of the state through the provision of certain services and their sheer size and capability. Broadly speaking however there is no major evidence put forward by any of the writers examined which would suggest that NGOs have directly challenged or undermined state sovereignty. Rather, the picture which emerges points to one in which state sovereignty and power is undermined by global governance institutions and large corporations, and then the gaps are plugged (or attempts are made to plug them) by myriad forms of NGO. This point is also supported by Eimer (2009).

Critical Reflection

The relationship between the modern political and international landscape and state sovereignty is particularly problematic. The role of supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the EU frequently make the news because of what is seen as their lack of true democratic accountability. However, the arguments made above show how NGOs are also contributing to this challenge on state sovereignty. The extent to which one sees this as a problem, is largely driven by the perspective one takes on the importance of the state as a provider of security and long term support. A key threat of such significant NGO involvement is that in huge numbers of cases the NGO in question is based in a different country to that country which it is attempting to help. This therefore, makes longer term security much harder to obtain from such involvement.

However, in contrast to this view it must also be noted that the vast majority of major NGOs work closely with many governments in attempting to support and develop infrastructures and key provisions (for example health provision) and that the idea that they undermine sovereignty in the state is questionable. This point is highlighted by Eimer (2009) in relation to China with Eimer (2009) highlighting the fact that the Chinese government has actively encouraged growth in the voluntary and NGO sector within China and has even encouraged foreign NGOs to become involved. Eimer (2009 p.1) points out that;

Officials are now actively talking up the role of charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as they hope to harness the newfound enthusiasm amongst the Chinese for giving to charity and volunteering that has appeared since the Sichuan earthquake. Because it has little experience of its own of working with such groups, China plans to use some of Britain’s most famous charities as role models for their own voluntary sector.

For a country with such a strong government as China to actively introduce NGOs and third sector involvement in the country shows that they do not perceive NGOs to represent a threat to sovereignty. Eimer (2009 p.1) highlights points made by Dr. Wang (the Minister in charge of NGOs in China) as directly looking towards major existing NGOs as examples of what can be achieved, arguing that;

Dr. Wang is looking to Britain and charities like Save the Children, which works extensively in China, for examples of how best to boost China’s charity sector. “The way Save the Children operates is a good example for us,” said Dr Wang. “I think we can learn a lot from the UK. For example, the laws relating to charities, the institutions that govern charities and the way they are managed, both large charities and grassroots ones. In the past, charities played a very important role in transforming the UK into a modern society.

However, it must also be acknowledged here that the Chinese government has such a strong power base that there are virtually no institutions on the planet which could challenge them. That said, it does provide some evidence that NGOs do not necessarily undermine sovereignty even where they have major involvement. Indeed, many such as Green (2008) and Chang (2003) argue that even with well-functioning democratic governments in wealthy states there are still areas in which NGOs can improve life for the majority of people without remotely undermining state sovereignty.

It is certainly important to acknowledged that the way in which globalisation has changed the world is unlikely to be reversed any time soon, and there is therefore an important question to be asked as to whether NGOs themselves are to blame for declining state power, or whether or not forces such as large corporations, supranational institutions and other similar entities are more to blame. Certainly NGOs have increased their role whilst state sovereignty has undoubtedly declined but this relationship could very well be as much coincidental as it is a correlation. Given the evidence examined above, it would therefore, seem much more plausible to argue that NGOs have not caused a trend of declining state sovereignty but that their increased involvement in plugging important provisions gaps within many countries has undoubtedly contributed or cemented this trend in place. Fundamentally however, it can be argued that this does not represent a significant issue for the majority of states.

It can therefore be argued, that the rise of NGOs has gone hand in hand with a decline in state sovereignty, particularly in some of the world’s poorest countries but that this decline in state power is unlikely to have been driven by NGOs and is much more likely to have been driven by other international forces. In many ways, the most likely outcome here is that NGOs have stepped in to fill in the gaps in provision, which have been left by the decline of state sovereignty caused by the increased power of institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major global corporations. This is certainly the view of a number of thinkers including Peet (2003) and Stiglitz (2002).

It can therefore be seen, that the evidence and arguments examined above point more to a situation in which NGOs are not directly responsible for the erosion of state sovereignty in many cases but that they have probably indirectly contributed towards it. There is certainly a problematic relationship between many NGOs and many poorer states in the sense that many NGOs have now become so powerful that they are able to support large parts of state infrastructure in many countries (Green 2008). In addition there is strong evidence that many NGOs have intervened in states and have contradicted the power of the state by introducing policies such as supporting women into jobs (unpopular in some countries) and encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour in many other states through the use of microfinance (Smith 2013).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can therefore be argued, that the rise in power of NGOs has certainly coincided with declining sovereignty in many of the world’s poorest countries and indeed in some of the wealthiest as well. However, the arguments examined above show that to solely blame NGOs for this decline in sovereignty is likely to be wrong. Indeed, much of the evidence suggests that the decline in sovereignty has been pushed much more by organisations such as global corporations and particularly global governance institutions which have comprehensively challenged state power in many institutions. That said, it must also be acknowledged that many of the larger NGOs have evolved into very powerful institutions which have directly challenged state power. To the extent that this trend is likely to continue, it must therefore be acknowledged, that NGOs have contributed to a decline in state sovereignty but also that they are certainly not the root cause of this decline.

References

Chang, H-J. (2003). Rethinking Development Economics. London: Anthem Press.

Eimer, D. (2009). China turns to British charities to plug gaps left by communist party. London: The Telegraph. [available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4526715/China-turns-to-British-charities-to-plug-gaps-left-by-communist-party.html ] (accessed 21/10/2015)

Green, D. (2008). From Poverty to Power. London: Oxfam.

Houtzager, P (2006). Changing Paths: International Development And The New Politics Of Inclusion. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

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International co-operation in Kyoto Protocol.

The environment started to be seen as a serious issue for some during the 1970’s. Many politicians at that point in time did not regard the environment as being an important issue, although the oil crisis of 1973 did make people think about pollution and resources. Concern for the environment was manly confined to ecologists and a few fringe environmental groups such as FOTE. However, greater scientific evidence of environmental damage that could seriously damage the future of the planet placed the environment firmly on the global political agenda (Evans& Newnham, 1998, p.149). Although the environment got onto the political agenda it has not proved straightforward to gain full international co-operation over taking meaningful measures to reverse or at least halt environmental damage. Effective co-operation has been delayed by the reluctance of some countries to reduce their pollution levels, as it would mean lowering their prosperity like the United States. Also there is resentment from third world countries being told they should stop their economic development because the West have already used most of the global resources. There are issues concerning who owns the remaining natural resources and who pays for the pollution that that they cause (Bannock, Baxter & Davis, 2003, p.120).

Ecological movements are not new to the late 20th century and the early 21st century yet the amount of influence that environmentalists have is greater than ever. There were people and movements opposed to industrialisation due to its social as well at its environmental impact (Eatwell & Wright, 2003, p.231).Ecological movements would usually have far more expansive plans for reversing environmental damage and would not be popular with political leaders, consumers and voters. Politicians rather than ecological movements almost always determine the pace and direction of international co-operation on the environment. The ecological movements have won a partial victory in that the environment looks set to remain on the agenda indefinitely. The difficult part is to make sure that agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol are truly co-operative and effective rather than just meaningless gimmicks by all governments that signed up to it (Eatwell & Wright, 2003, p.250).

It was probably no coincidence that modern ecological movements emerged in the West during the 1960s when growing affluence amongst the young middle classes allowed them the chance to think about the global economy and the impact that it had upon the global environment. In the 1960s many people if they thought about the environment at all assumed it meant nothing more or less than making the air and water clean (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 262). The main political and economic to capitalism, communism may have had different aims to its capitalist rivals yet it still aimed at rapid economic growth. Neither capitalism nor communism were or are intended to be guardians of the environment. However growing knowledge of the damage being caused to the environment would force countries to co-operate with each other especially after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (Brown, 2002, p. 240). In the ever increasing consumption of natural resources and increasing levels of pollution arguably intensified the Global Warming problem and would mean that co-operation over the environment would become a major area of contention. For the instance the United States consumption of oil increased by 300 per cent between 1950 and the start of the oil crisis in 1973. The highly ineffective factories of the Soviet Union produced almost as much as the United States for the production of far fewer goods (Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 252-253).

Complacency about the environment started to be lifted during the 1970s eventually leading to international protocols to reduce pollution. The oil crisis of 1973 led to some attempts to find alternatives to fossil fuels although it did nothing in the long term to reduce oil consumption even if it did hurt the pockets of Western motorists and Third World governments. As the human population continues to grow upwards of 6 billion plus beyond the use of resources and resulting pollution will grow (Nicholson, 1998, p.157). Environmental and ecological movements started to make headway in Western Europe and North America with concerns about acid rain, the emission of CFC’s reducing the ozone layer and most significantly global warming (Brown, 2001, p.252).

Global warming is now a concern of most governments although they do not have an equal say as to the policies that should be pursued to stop or reverse the process. Rising sea levels are more of a threat to the Netherlands, parts of Britain or Bangladesh than they are to the United States, Russia and China. The relative wealth of the Netherlands and Britain make their co-operation with the Kyoto Protocol than that of Bangladesh. The exclusion of the United States, Russia and China plus India would seriously damage the co-operation needed to make the Kyoto Protocol near being effective (Nicholson, 1998, p.165).

It has been encouraging that has been co-operation between governments over the environment. However, that co-operation has to be bought about by a process of negotiations and compromises with little to force countries, especially more powerful ones such as the United States, Russia and China into agreeing to effective measures to protect the environment. Aside from appealing to sense and reason there is little way of enforcing measures agreed at the Kyoto Protocol or any other environmental summit. The Kyoto Protocol, like its predecessor the Rio Earth summit, was the result of long drawn out talks similar in complexity to the GATT rounds or EU treaties or summits. Co-operation over the environment is often to the minimum restrictions and measures that can be agreed rather than the maximum. The agreements over reducing CFC (chloroflurocarbons) emissions can be regarded as starting the process on international co-operation to slow down environmental damage although it amply demonstrated that politicians are only willing to take action once there is enough scientific of environmental damage. By that time much damage has already been done (Brown, 2002, p. 240).

The Rio Earth Summit was intended to introduce measures and co-operation to tackle global warming on a greater scale. To a certain extent it succeeded in producing co-operation even if it was hampered by the unwillingness of the Bush senior administration to agree to the most stringent measures that could have been agreed. The United States remains the world’s largest individual polluting country yet its governments are generally unwilling to jeopardise American living standards to save the planet. The Bush senior administration did not however block the agreement at R as it could have done. The United States government came under pressure from other governments to take greater action yet did yield to it (Brown, 2002, p. 243).

Third World and developing countries were not happy and remain unhappy that the United States does not do more to protect the environment as it gained most from the way that the global environment operates (Nicholson, 1998, p.173). Other countries mainly in the EU and Scandinavia have been more active in seeing the environment as being of vital importance and wished to go further that the agreements reached at Rio. The EU can play its part in protecting the environment as it can pass legislation and regulations that its member states have to conform to (McCormick, 2002, p.128).

EU states plus Australia and New Zealand played their part in the Kyoto Protocol. Once again the United States proved reluctant to adopt tough measures. That reluctance was despite President Bill Clinton being keen on environmental issues. He was unwilling to cut American living standards and also realised that tough restriction were unlikely to get through a Republican controlled Congress (Crystal, 2003, p.513).

European countries such as Britain, France and Germany were unhappy about the lack of United States support for the Kyoto Protocol. Tony Blair was especially disappointed as he expected Bill Clinton to have been more supportive of the Kyoto Protocol and protecting the environment (Young, 2003, p.150). George W Bush was even less willing for the United States to be constrained by any parts of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed prior to the 9/11 attacks the bush administration seemed cool to the idea of government co-operation most issues. Since 9/11 the United States government has been more interested in pursuing the war on terrorism rather than co-operation to uphold the Kyoto Protocol or protecting the environment. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have done harm to the environment. The soaring oil prices seen after the invasion of Iraq may however boost the moves towards finding alternative fuels as much as any of the target son reducing emissions agreed within the Kyoto Protocol would have done on their own. OPEC countries seem far happier to cut oil production to maintain high prices, as it is not in their economic interests to co-operate with other countries to reduce oil production. Such is the demand for oil that the consumption does not decline even when prices are at record levels. Western governments when talking with OPEC countries would rather get the oil production quotas raised than discuss co-operation towards reduced consumption (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 397).

The need for global co-operation to achieve the 5 per cent emission targets set out with the Kyoto Protocol would seem to gathering with global warming seeming to contribute to climate changes that are increasingly costly and dangerous(Crystal, 2003, p. 513). Climate changes have and will make floods and droughts more common whilst lack of adequate food and water supplies will contribute to greater instances of famine and severe poverty. Whilst countries can take steps to avoid economic problems there is little they can do to stop a hurricane or tsunami. The costs of reducing pollution or improving irrigation and building up flood protection with no certainty that they will be successful (Eatwell and Wright, 2003, p. 251). There was large-scale international co-operation to help the Asian countries devastated by the tsunami of December 2004. Countries can only hope that such disasters are confined to unpopulated or lightly populated areas to keep death and destruction to a minimum. Aside from such hopes countries can increase their levels of co-operation by encouraging recycling, energy and water conservation schemes to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.

Therefore although the Kyoto Protocol was a sign of global co-operation to start reducing pollution and trying to make the global environment safer it has had its limitations. The failure of the United States to co-operate with the process means that the world’s greatest polluter is not taking active steps to help protect the environment. Perhaps that might change depending on who succeeds George W Bush to the presidency. Not every country has signed up to the Kyoto Protocol and of those that did not all have ratified it. Should the current high oil prices continue there maybe co-operation to find alternative fuels that are cheaper and possibly cause less pollution? Some countries are more committed to co-operation in order to protect the environment. The member states of the EU are formerly aiming towards sustainable development and the mission reductions agreed to as part of the Kyoto Protocols.

The selfishness of the United States and other countries that fail to co-operate to reduce environmental damage will come back to haunt us all and leave a terrible legacy to our descendants to deal with its full consequences. However the Rio Earth Summit and the Kyoto Protocols have provided a framework for global co-operation that needs to be built upon. Perhaps global co-operation could be increased through the auspices of the United Nations and aided by scientific evidence of the urgent need to act now. People should also consider acting on an individual and community basis to conserve and protect the environment as best they could by recycling and conserving water and energy.

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In his 1946 Iron Curtain speech, Winston Churchill (2015, n. pag.) stated that “[n]either the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the [UK] and the United States.” The end of World War II did indeed mark the start of a special relationship between the two nations and it has been characterised by political, diplomatic, economic and military relations as well as shared values and strategic objectives in the intervening years (Wallace & Phillips, 2009). However, there has been significant coverage and analysis of the special relationship since the 2008 election of Barack Obama as US President, with many political commentators, academics and journalists alike speculating as to how relevant such a relationship may now be as a result of changing strategy on the part of both nations. This essay will establish the state of the special relationship between the UK and the United States prior to the election of Barack Obama before exploring the political, economic and social changes that occurred in the wake of his inauguration. This will be done with a view to concluding that 2008 was a watershed for the special relationship as a result of changing US and UK priorities, transitional leadership and the global financial crisis. However, despite the evolution of the special relationship as a result of a shifting global political and economic climate, it is still a key strategic alliance that is relevant to the security of both states and the international community as a whole today.

Prior to 2008, the special relationship between the UK and US had the purpose of forming close cooperation between the two in terms of nuclear weapons technology, economic activity, trade and military planning and execution, amongst other areas (Wither, 2006). In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it forged a mutual recovery and support in the rebuilding of states that had been damaged by the war with the added point of America becoming the global leader (Arnold, 2014; Friedman, 2007). Lee (2010) argues that the UK was the weaker partner throughout the second half of the 20th century was a result of the fact that the defence cooperation between the two was dominated by the US, who had larger strategic forces and often demanded UK cooperation in initiatives during the Cold War. Wright (2002) supplements this perspective and notes that this imbalance persisted into the 21st century as a result of the UK’s backing of George W. Bush’s actions in the wake of 9/11 in exchange for maintaining British influence internationally. The British support for US foreign and security policy in the aftermath of 9/11, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq, suggested that the special relationship remained strong despite the fact that it did not have popular support in Britain and raised significant questions as to whether it was in the best interests of the UK to follow American international strategy (Dumbrell, 2009). However, regardless of the controversy that surrounded the actions of both nations, there can be little doubt that there were strong political, strategic and military links in place prior to the election of Obama in 2008.

Following Obama’s election in 2008, the special relationship has been called into question as a direct result of the ideological disparities between the new President and his predecessor. Obama’s diplomatic objectives and strategic goals departed significantly from the approach taken towards alliances and security by George W. Bush. For example, Dumbrell (2009) notes that Obama had an ambivalence towards the protectionist strategy that had previously been employed and those applying pressure on the president to continue to pursue it as well as committing to diplomacy with other European states to encourage engagement in Afghanistan. As such, the foundation of the special relationship had become distorted as a direct result of the fact that Obama did not wish to prioritise relations with Britain in order to secure an ally in the international community based on a traditional mutual need. Indeed, both Gordon Brown and Barack Obama sought to address global issues like climate change (Dumbrell, 2013) and the restructuring of international institutions to create an effective and efficient global society (Dumbrell, 2008). These issues were not prioritised on Bush’s agenda and the cooperation between the US and UK on them provides evidence of a shift in focus. However, the fact that both pledged to cooperate on matters of international rather than domestic importance does underscore the fact that diplomatic and political relations were still in place despite Obama’s determination to redefine US foreign policy. As such, the special relationship did change in the field of diplomacy but remained resolutely in place.

In highlighting Obama’s tentative departure from the traditional American protectionist stance, Dumbrell (2009) also drew attention to the fact that Obama sought to build military alliances to strengthen his position in Afghanistan and this also impacted upon that particular aspect of the special relationship. For example, Self (2010) states that Obama exerted pressure on the British government into committing more troops to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. This was done via coercive rhetoric in a bid to overcome policy differences that were geared towards protecting the British national interest in a time of economic crisis. As such, there was significant conflict in the area of military cooperation because of the circumstances that had changed the priorities of both nations. The military element of the special relationship also evolved after the inauguration of Obama in other ways that were directly linked to the shift in American strategic priorities (Wither, 2006). For example, Wither (2006, p. 47) argues that:

…the longstanding defence partnership is threatened by a number of factors, including interoperability problems, the UK’s national and defence spending priorities, the likely impact of a decision to replace Trident and the decline in the importance of the transatlantic strategic partnership in NATO.

This identifies several areas where US priorities were distinctly different to those of the UK and therefore marks a major disjunction between the policies of both. This had not existed before as the UK had actively supported the US in its global endeavours, often without question (Dumbrell, 2009). There can be no doubt that the UK was not able to do so to the same extent after 2008. British military capabilities were significantly reduced in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, which raised significant questions about the UK’s ability to contribute to global security as well as compromising any future usefulness in collaborative overseas operations (Wither, 2006). This was also paired with a reluctance to aid Obama via bilateral agreements to take action overseas, with a prime example being parliament’s rejection of Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposal to ally with Obama and commit to air strikes in Syria in 2013 and the resultant strained relationship between the two leaders (Rothkopf, 2014). As a consequence, the special relationship had fundamentally changed in numerous ways based upon the reluctance of the UK to tow the American line and the frustration that manifested in the military relationship between the two, at least on a governmental level if not on the ground where cooperation did occur.

Although cooperation may not have been as forthcoming in a military context as it had been prior to 2008, there are areas of policy and the special relationship in which new forms of cooperation flourished. For example, according to Wallace and Phillips (2009, p, 263), the “…US-UK special relationship today has a political and ideological superstructure and an embedded military and intelligence substructure.” This suggests that there is active cooperation between the two in the intelligence sphere and that is reinforced by the creation of a National Security Strategy Board, which was designed to provide a clear line of communication between officials in the UK and the US to discuss security and strategy as and when necessary (Watt, 2011). In addition, there are ongoing intelligence operations that require cooperation between the two, most notably the running of CIA networks within British communities in conjunction with MI5 in order to prevent terrorist attacks (Svendson, 2010). In effect, stronger links have developed in this particular area of the relationship and illuminate how it has changed based upon need.

The economic aspect of the special relationship also demands scrutiny. Despite the global economic crisis that damaged both the US and UK economies significantly there is extensive economic activity that ties them together, including trade and investment that renders each the largest investor in the other (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010). This irrevocably bound the nations together and provided a point of cooperation that was seemingly unaffected by global goals as it benefitted both nations. Indeed, Stacey et al (2015, n. pag.) note that Obama perceived the US and UK economies as the two that were “standing out at a time when a lot of other countries are having problems” at the beginning of 2015, thus ostensibly reaffirming the special relationship publically. The implication here is that the strength of both economies reinforced the relationship as a result of the ongoing benefits that both nations were able to reap from the situation. It should be noted that there were points of disagreement, such as the fact that Obama sought to insert clauses into World Trade Organisation UK stimulus packages that were designed to protect American industry and jobs. However, these did not actively impact upon the economic support or cooperation that one provided the other. In effect, this particular area of the special relationship changed very little despite the global economic climate and the uncertainty it introduced impacting upon other areas.

However, despite the changes to the special relationship illustrated above, there are certain elements of it that have altered little since 2008. For example, despite the fact that Obama has favoured a partnership with the collective of European states rather than one nation, the UK is still the weaker partner in the relationship: “…relief that [Obama’s] first phone call to a European leader was to Gordon Brown, indicates how dependent Britain’s claim to global status is on Washington’s approval” (Wallace & Phillips, 2009, p. 283). Although the UK is no longer a bridge to Europe as a result of Obama’s desire to establish relationships with the European Union and its individual states (Cameron, 2007), it still maintains the closest relationship of all European states to the US and continues to be its closest ally. This is important in determining how far the special relationship had changed and denotes the presence of common ground that has endured from the end of World War II and is still in place.

In conclusion, the analysis in this essay points to the special relationship between the UK and United States undergoing a fundamental change in the wake of the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. Although the channels of communication remained open and were consolidated as a result of cooperation in the field of intelligence and via the new National Security Strategy Board, the strategic goals of both nations were undoubtedly impacted by economic crisis, involvement on a changing international stage and the need to develop enhanced relations with other European nations. There is also evidence of friction between the two nations and this manifests in an unwillingness to support the other unless initiatives and policies were also in the national interest. These points outline how the special relationship changed on an ideological and a practical level. However, the economic element of the special relationship remained intact, in spite of the attempts by the US government to insert clauses into stimulus agreements to aid the American economy, and this underlined the remaining importance of each power to the other. As such, the analysis reinforces the idea that 2008 was a watershed for the US-UK special relationship as a result of the impact that changing priorities, transitional leadership and the global financial crisis had on both nations. There has certainly been a need for the evolution of the special relationship as a result of a shifting global political and economic climate but the relations between the US and UK still facilitate the maintenance of a key strategic alliance that is relevant to the security of both states and responds to the demand for global leadership by the international community today.

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Feminism is a political movement that seeks to overturn gender inequalities between men and women (Blunt and Wills, 2000: p. 90). It is concerned with the power relations that influence not only how individuals relate to each other, but how spheres of life are gendered in particular ways. Feminism is therefore, inherently linked to international law and is one of the ways in which it can be theorised. While the international legal system may be broadening in scope, it remains narrow in perspective. In particular, the boundaries and limits of international law can be seen from a critical and feminist perspective. Feminist legal theory is comprised of two broad strands. The first is to analyse and critically interrogate the implicit and masculinist assumptions of international law in theory and in practice. The second is to reform international law such that it might better serve the interests of women across the world. It has been argued that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’ (Hunter-Williams, 2009). However, despite this criticism, feminist theories have much to contribute to the study of international law. The importance of feminist theories in international law can be seen through the inadequacies of traditional theories of law and also in the application of feminist theories in areas such as human trafficking and refugee law. The absence of women in international law has distorted the discipline’s boundaries and “produced a narrow and inadequate jurisprudence that has, among other things, legitimised the unequal position of women around the world rather than challenged it” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.1). Feminist theory acts to challenge this situation and thus offers a significant contribution to the study of international law.

Traditional theories of international law have seriously failed to address the situation of women worldwide (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.25). Feminist theories, however, contribute to our understanding of international law and the global inequality of women. As such, the remainder of this essay will refute the claim that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’. It should be stressed that there is no single school of feminist jurisprudence and the categories do overlap in some respects.

Liberal feminists typically accept the language and aims of the existing domestic legal order. Charlesworth and Chinkin explain how liberal feminists “insist that the law fulfil its promise of objective regulation upon which principled decision-making is based” (2000: p.39). Their primary goal is to achieve equality of treatment between women and men in public areas, such as political participation and representation, and equal access to and equality within paid employment, market services and education (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.39). Liberal feminism therefore, has something to add to international law in that it seeks to achieve equality between men and women.

Charlesworth and Chinkin define cultural feminism to be “concerned with the identification and rehabilitation of qualities and perspectives identified as particular to women” (2000: p.40). Epistemologically, it is a standpoint theory in that it emphasises the importance of knowledge based upon experience and asserts that women’s subjugated position allows them to formulate more complete and accurate accounts of nature and social life (Harding, 1986: pp.24-29). In this area, the work of Carol Gilligan is particularly relevant. Gilligan investigates whether there is a distinctively feminine way of thinking or solving problems (Gilligan, 1982). She identifies a ‘different’ voice which bases decisions on the values of caring and connection in contrast to a style of decision-making based on abstract logic (Gilligan, 1982: p.24). The former is associated with women and the later with men (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.40). Gilligan’s work has been useful to the critical analysis of legal reasoning, which lays claim to abstract, objective decision making. Accordingly, “if legal reasoning simply reproduces a masculine type of reasoning, its objectivity and authority are reduced” (Charlesworth, et al., 1991: p.615). This illustrates the contribution of cultural feminism to international legal theory.

Radical feminism explains women’s inequality as the product of domination of women by men. Catherine Mackinnon has been a consistent exponent of this view. Her view is that the law keeps women ‘out and down’ (Mackinnon, 1987: p.205) by preserving a hierarchical system based on gender and sex. Radical feminism has paid attention to the public/private dichotomies that also feature in liberal thought. The public realm of the workplace, the law, economics, politics and intellectual and cultural life is regarded as the natural province of men; while the private world of the home, the hearth and children is seen as the appropriate domain of women (Charlesworth et al., 1991: p.626). This dichotomy has led to a debate amongst feminist scholars over whether this distinction often operates to obscure or legitimate men’s domination of women. This dispute could be seen to weaken radical feminist theory. However, the awareness it raises of the domination of women by men and particularly the hierarchical system of international law outweighs its flaws.

Feminist campaigns have not only been restricted to women from the Global North. The term ‘third world feminisms’ refers to approaches developed by women from the Global South and women of colour in the Global North. These approaches explore the differences among, as well as between, men and women. For instance, Alice Walker coined the term ‘womanism’ (1984, quoted in Blunt and Wills, 2000: p. 114) because many black feminists prefer the term ‘womanism’ to ‘feminism’, as the later has been largely white and largely uncritical of its whiteness. Charlesworth et al. assess third world feminisms in terms of the notion of a ‘different voice’ (1991: p.615) in international law. The authors argue that third world states have challenged international law as either disadvantageous to them or inadequate to their needs (Charlesworth et al.: p.616). However, they also suggest that although the challenge of the ‘different voice’ of the developing nations to international law has been fundamental, it has focused on disparities in economic position and has not questioned the silence of half the world’s population in the creation of international law, or the unequal impact of rules of international law on women (1991: p. 618). Despite the limitations of third world feminisms, it still provides an important contribution to international law in that it highlights the application of Western feminist theories to third world communities and societies (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.46).

The importance of the contribution of feminist theories to international law can be seen in practice in relation to human trafficking. In December 2000, over 80 countries signed the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol), (Doezema, 2002: p.20). The Trafficking Protocol works to conceptualise an international problem; it established the first definition of trafficking in international law and put in place a set of measures for international co-operation to address this problem (Sullivan, 2003: p.68). The Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion” (United Nations, 2003: p.2). Trafficking in women for the sex industry is highly profitable for those running the trade. The UN estimated that 4 million people were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of USD 7 billion for criminal groups (Sassen, 2002). Feminists and feminist organisations were particularly involved in discussions about the text of the Trafficking Protocol (Sullivan, 2003: pp.67-68). Feminist lobbying regarding the Protocol was split into two ‘camps’ espousing differing views on prostitution. One group, the Human Rights Caucus, viewed prostitution as legitimate labour. The other, represented by the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), considered all forms of prostitution to be a violation of women’s human rights.

Differences about the possibilities of distinguishing between free and forced prostitution divided feminists. Consequently, the definition of trafficking incorporated in the Protocol has some important weaknesses. Furthermore, the debate amongst feminists on this topic has fuelled claims that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’ (Hunter-Williams, 2009). However, the Protocol does have its strengths. The Trafficking Protocol has had significant worldwide impact on the status of women. As such feminist theory should be seen as making an important contribution to the study of international law.

A further area in which feminist theories are viewed as important in international law is that of refugee law. Carving out territory for refugee women within mainstream legal realms has been one way that feminists have successfully redressed their invisibility within refugee discourse (Oswin, 2001). Efforts have largely focused on eliminating the male bias within the legal definition of ‘refugee’ in order to incorporate the experiences of refugee women into refugee status determination processes. Emphasis has also been placed upon the recognition of violence against women as a ground of persecution. Those feminists who have sought to incorporate women’s experiences into refugee law can claim success on a variety fronts. For instance, the UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, adopted in 1991, emphasises the fact that gender-based persecution exists and should be recognised by ‘refugee-receiving’ states as a basis for asylum (Oswin, 2001: p.350). In this way, feminist efforts have been instrumental in putting refugee women’s experiences on the agenda of international refugee law. However, it could be proposed that feminist theories have not had a substantial involvement in refugee law as feminists “have only been granted a small portion of what is already extremely finite territory” (Oswin, 2001: p.347).

A final example of the significant impact that feminist theory has had on the study of international law is that of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. SC1325 is an eighteen-point resolution that develops an agenda for women, peace and security. It calls for the prosecution of crimes against women, increased protection of women and girls during war, the appointment of more women to the UN peacekeeping operations and field missions and an increase in women’s participation in decision making processes at the regional, national and international level (Cohn, et al., 2004: p.130). The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 31 October 2000. SC1325 is highly significant because it is the first time the Security Council has devoted an entire session to debating women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations. The resolution was influenced by feminist campaigners and the case highlights the growing influence of feminist theories on international law.

Women are on the margins of the international legal system (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.48). Charlesworth and Chinkin comment that: “Women form over half the world’s population, but their voices, in all their variety, have been thoroughly obscured by and within the international legal order” (2000: p.1). Feminist excursions into international law have been reproved for criticising the male-centredness of international law while at the same time invoking the international legal order to improve the situation for women (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.59). The implication of this is that “feminists forfeit the right to invoke international law if they point out its biases” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.59). Such claims have led to assertions that ‘feminist theories have nothing to add to the study of international law’. However, the development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a “rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory” (Charlesworth, et al., 1991: p.613). This is highlighted by the inadequacies of traditional theories of international law, and the important contribution of feminist ideas both in theory and in practice, such as in the Trafficking Protocol and refugee law. Consequently, feminist theory can be used to “reshape the way women’s lives are understood in an international context, thus altering the boundaries of international law” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: p.337).

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What are the main differences between ‘classical realism’ and ‘neo-realism’?
Introduction

Realism has become a foremost theory within international relations over six decades. Its contemporary construction is attributed to Hans Morgenthau and his work in the late 1940s. Morgenthau utilised previous works from scholars and strategists, which include, Ancient Greek scholar Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and his notions of the anarchic state, and the 1939 work of E.H Carr. Realism became the primary theory as the discipline of International Relations blossomed, forming political hypothesis based on its philosophies, such as Real Politik. As International Relations expanded as a discipline with Realism at its centre the theory become reformed. Kenneth Waltz succeeded in becoming the father of Neo-Realism in the same way Morgenthau had done with Realism thirty years prior. This resulted in a schism in the Realist theory between classic Realism and structural (neo) Realism.

The purpose of this essay is to investigate this split and to distinguish the major differences of the two Realist strands. These theories are vast volumes of work that have been considered by the brightest minds of discipline for several decades, the salient features of the two theories discussed in this text will offer just a glimpse into their philosophies. Investigation to compare the differences of the two shall be split into two parts, firstly examining the theoretical base and highlighting the noticeable distinctions. The second part will conceptualise these points in a practical sense, attaching them to historical events predominantly from the twentieth century.

Theoretical

Morgenthau’s key principles of Realism consider states as individuals, a ‘unified actor.’ One state represents itself, and these states are primary in international relations. Internal politics and contradictions are irrelevant as states pursue interests defined by power. Power, is a further key proponent of Morgenthau’s paradigm, he believed it central to human nature and therefore state actors. Morgenthau considered human nature as corrupt, dictated by selfishness and ego, resulting in a dangerous world constructed by egotistical greedy actors. Thus Realism possesses at its core a very pessimistic outlook of constant threat and danger, logically therefore Realism submits as one of its fundamental considerations that state actors are driven by survival and the need for greater dominance and power to create a favourable balance of power and decreasing the actors potential to diminish. (Gellman, 1988). Realists consider these attitudes to consume national interest, trumping any other concern. Self-help becomes a necessity. Reliance or trust of other actors is foolish as Machiavelli describes – “today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy” (Morgenthau, 1948).

Realisms success and prominence in international relations naturally exposed it to a series of critiques. Authors and scholars disagreed with its ideological theory and often advocated alternative theories. These included a Liberalist outlook that promotes the importance of democracy and free trade, while Marxists believe international affairs could be understood as a class struggle between capital and labour. Other theories derided the lack of morality, collectivism and simplicity in Realism. Despite it retaining several of the basic features of classical Realism, including the notions that states are primary unitary actors and power is dominant. Neo-Realism provided criticism of the classic paradigm. Structural Realism directed attention to the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than to its components (Evans and Newham, 1998). Kenneth Waltz detaches from Morgenthau’s classic Realism suggesting it to be too ‘reductionist’. He argues that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure, Realism in his view, is unable to conceptualise the international system in this way due to its varying limitation, essentially due to its behavioural methodology. (Waltz, 1979) Neo-Realism considers the traditional strand as being incapable of explaining behaviour at a level above a nation state. Waltz is described as offering defensive version of Realism, while John Mearsheimer promotes an offensive consideration of Realism, suggesting Waltz’s analysis fails to chart the aggression that exists in international relations, however they are often considered as one through neo or structural Realism. (Mearsheimer, 2013)

The idea, that international politics can be understood as a system, with an exact construct and separate structure, is both the starting point for international theory and point of departure from the traditional Realism. The fundamental concern for Neo-Realists is why do states exhibit similar foreign policy behaviour regardless of their opposing political systems and contrasting ideologies. The Cold War brought two opposing superpowers that although were socially and politically opposite behaved in a similar manner and weren’t separate in their pursuit of military power and influence. Realism in Waltz’s view was severely limited, as where other classic disciplines of international relations. Neo-Realism is designed as re-examination, a second tier explanation that fills in the gaps classic theories neglected. For example, traditional Realists remain adamant that actors are individuals in international affairs, referencing the Hobbesian notion that two entities are unable to enjoy the same thing equally and are consequently destined to become enemies. Whilst, Neo-Realists consider that relative and absolute gains are important and they may be attained by collusion through international institutions. (Waltz, 1979)

Practical

The salient theoretical differences exhibited in the first section will be strengthened in this second section by applying the theory to practical situations in order to enhance the understanding and the degree of separation. As one has discussed, traditional Realists consider that the foundation of international affairs is war, perpetrated by states. A Realist doctrine is exhibited by the actions and musings of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, during their time together during Nixon’s presidency and with Kissinger’s influence on Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. While in the theatre of the Cold War, they attempted to maximise American power in order to safeguard American security against fellow actors. Incursions in Vietnam and Korea were designed at a basic level to keep their ideology as the primary superpower and increase American dominance. Nixon’s presidency was associated also with his administrations dialogue with China, and their keenness to exploit the Sino-Soviet split in order to tip the balance of power in America’s favour, all illustrating a class Realist mentality of international relations, that it is constructed entirely between state interactions and a grasp for power. (Nye, 2007)

Another example that depicts this mentality is Thucydides work concerning The Peloponnesian War, an often-utilised example used by traditional Realists; Thucydides in his works expresses an unrelenting Athenian desire to pursue self-interest, and achieved this through the use of force and hard power. He famously wrote, “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides, 1972, p402). Thucydides sentiments illustrate the Realist notion of human nature being motivated primarily by power, and it is similar to subsequent wars throughout human history. Colin Gray a modern scholar concurs with the Realist outlook suggesting an inherent human characteristic that still drives states in the same way it did in 400 B.C (Gray,2009).

Neo-Realists tend to distance themselves from this notion of a corruptible human nature. They blame the starting of the Second World War, not on innate human corruptibility, but on the failure to achieve a recognised international system. They disagree with Realist logic that the primary reason for the Second World War was Hitler’s lust to institute his power and influence across Europe. In their estimations the disorder provided by the Treaty of Versailles was principal in throwing the world back into war. Its adoption on the behest of French, British and American states provided the opportunity and the catalyst for the Nazi Party to flourish. Resentment in Germany of the allied powers, coupled with a weak nation unable to recover because of this ‘dictate’ rendered the German economy and military perpetually weak, all contributing to Hitler’s ability to snatch power and consequently produce the elements to start a world war. The world was failed in Neo-Realist estimations by a lack of substantial system (Jervis, 1994).

The response classic Realists provide to Neo-Realists is that their re-worked form of the theory is simply presented in a way that is more structural and scientific but with the core maintaining the original doctrines offered by traditional Realism. Although Neo-Realists do not deny that their ideology is extremely similarIt is an improvement on the original theory offering a more structured and formulated paradigm., but Realists argue those alterations, which include these structural formations is what inhibits the new theory. Richard Ashley is one author that concurs with these sentiments stating traditional Realism, provides an advanced concept of analysis (Ashley, 1984). For example, even if the Treaty of Versailles did create bleak conditions on Germany that incited the Nazi’s upsurge, the fundamental lust for power Hitler exhibited in the extreme was still predominant for starting World War Two regardless of structural factors. This analysis echoes Colin Gray’s opinions regarding the characteristics exhibited from the Peloponnesian War still being relevant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and illustrates Realism relevance.

A further crucial difference between the two strands is the role of political belief or governance. Classic Realism has always established this consideration. Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Hirohito all had what was classed as un-democratic governances. Stalin, with a similar totalitarian system had initially signed a pact with Hitler, it was only the latter’s covetousness for supremacy that scuppered that particular alliance, illustrating the pessimistic nature of traditional Realism, not being able to trust other actors. Conversely, Neo-Realists, led by Waltz concluded that there is no “differentiation of function between different units, i.e. all states perform roughly the same role” (Halliday, 1994). Neo-Realism came at a time where the system had altered from what classic Realism was founded upon, a pre-war world of several great powers. The Cold War heralded a bi-polar system, dominant on nuclear weapons rendering the differing ideologies and political regimes irrelevant, it was the system that prevailed. Furthermore, America propped up highly undemocratic regimes throughout the Cold War in Asia, South America and the Middle East. Suggesting classic Realist arguments of governance systems is incomplete (Merhasimer, 2013).

Traditional Realism witnessed a degree of a resurgence post-9/11, the event itself and the subsequent fallout was deemed textbook of classic Realism. Actors had to employ self-help and act unilaterally to stop attacks and an assault on the states survival. 9/11 produced a real illustration to the strength non-state actors can have on the international relations. Although Neo-Realism maintains the classic theory consideration of state primacy, it does reference non-state actors as relevant in the international system. Additional actors however must adapt to the actions of states Waltz suggests, “When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.” (Waltz, 1979, p94) Furthermore, America’s democratic crusade dubbed ‘the war on terror’ was viewed as traditional Realism in action, inferring Morgenthau’s consideration of autocracy vs. democracy. However, Neo Realists will reference American support for very non-democratic states, such as its unwavering support for Saudi Arabia as the system still triumphing over the state and its form of governance. The actions of the US tie in with Mearsheimer’s offensive Realist outlook to seek hegemony, “great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.” (Merhasimer, 2001)

Conclusion

In conclusion whilst both strands of Realism remain constant in key areas such as the anarchic state, unitary actors and the importance of Power. Neo-Realism presents a shift away from the traditional theories offering a tangible alternative to the corruptible human nature consideration being the root of the cause conflict, as exemplified aptly by the debate on the outbreak of World War Two. However, the crucial point of departure that Neo-Realism provides is the importance given to the international system over the state, claiming that traditional Realism is inhibited by its methodology, failing to explain behaviour of an entity above the nation state. Neo-Realism allows for co-operation among states at a higher level than Realism permits, this provides an opportunity to succeed in achieving absolute and relative gains. The concept flourished during the Cold War, rejecting Morgenthau’s system of governance analysis, suggesting that states behave the same regardless whether it’s democratic or not. Neo-Realists still maintain this is relevant. Classic Realists disagree using the events of this century to prove that its methodology was always correct.

In Sum, the two differ fundamentally on approach, Neo-Realism seeks to offer a systematic and scientific approach that they believe is lacking in traditional Realism; according to its proponents it complements the original theory by correcting its fallacies, building on classic Realism emphasis on self-interest, power and the state, challenging the human nature concept and behaviour above state level.

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Recent years have seen an increase in military force being used as a tool for increasing the scope for humanitarian values within conflict zones. This paper assesses this trend, and uses a number of conflict case studies as a vehicle for evaluating this premise. In doing so, this paper considers that the Libyan intervention in 2011 offers a case study which argues that state led humanitarian intervention is borne out of a political, as opposed to a humanitarian, need. This undermines the promotion of humanitarian values.

The concept of military led humanitarian intervention can be found within a highly subjective area of academic and political thought. With regards to this, there are some commentator’s, such as Waxman (2013: n.p.) who consider that military led humanitarian intervention consists of “the use of military force to protect foreign populations from mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses” whilst others, including Marjanovic (2012: n.p.) see this particular course of action as being “a state using military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed”. With regards to this subjectivity there is a series of overlapping concepts that help to further the debate in this area. These overlapping areas can be found within a number of conceptual areas including war and conflict within which humanitarian values are negatively impacted by activities which impact upon non-combatants, these include human rights abuses. Where humanitarian values are considered, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2013) holds a perspective which suggests that these comprise of aspiration in relation to humanity, neutrality, independence, and impartiality. In this regard, therefore, one can suggest that where military forces are deployed in order to promote or support humanitarian operations it is necessary that these forces act accordingly within the boundaries of these guiding principles. In their totality, therefore, it is arguable that there exists a number of factors which need to be present where a situation occurs that requires military led humanitarian assistance.

With regards to any underpinning intervention that relates to issues covered within humanitarian interventions, Weiss (2012: 1) believes that it is possible that an underlying notion of a “responsibility to protect” is a dominating factor in contemporary geo-political thinking, however instead of this doctrinal approach being used across the globe Weiss (2012) believes that the global community tends to cherry-pick the various conflicts that it intervenes in, this is discussed elsewhere in this paper. That said, Minear & Weiss (1995) had previously indicated that any military intervention that seeks to promote humanitarian values should incorporate a post war recovery planning and redevelopment programme. However recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has seen an increase in the numbers of military led humanitarian interventions that are related to “activities undertaken to improve the human condition” (Weiss, 2012: 1). This latter issue, concerning the human condition, suggests that there has been a genuine shift in the contemporary conflict environment. This shift is primarily based on the progression from conventional warfare to of asymmetric warfare which involves a number of non-state actors and combatants. This is a factor that has not been ignored by Weiss (2012). Here the suggestion that, today, only state led military interventions can promote humanitarian values has been promoted because non-state actors are not bound by regulations and international protocols regarding the dynamics and conduct of war. Indeed this particular perspective gains an increased level of support where the current post Cold War conflict environment is considered.

For Pattison (2010) the years following the end of the Cold War have resulted in a vastly increased number of military operations that have been designed to support humanitarian values through intervention. These interventions have occurred in a plethora of collapsed or failed states and include, but are not limited to. post Gulf War (1991–2003) Iraq, Bosnia – Serbia (1995), The Balkans and Kosovo (1992-1999), East Timor (1999) Somalia (2002), Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011). These interventions, for some, also include the post 9-11 era’s intervention in to Afghanistan and latterly in Iraq (2003-2010) (Pattison, 2010). In this regards, Weiss (2012) believes that the underlying concept of humanitarian intervention has helped to increase the potential for international interventions into other states because of a need to increase the level of protection offered to non-combatants from conflict. However, the earlier indication of cherry picking conflicts offers for a greater insight into the nature of political discourses which take place at the United Nations (UN) Security Council with regards to these conflicts and where state led political aspirations are an overbearing factor in the intervention tools and choices made by states. Indeed one can argue that the current and ongoing conflict in Syria offers as a casing point particularly since all state actors which have intervened possess their own aspirations in shaping the future of that particular country (Haaretz, 2014; Press TV, 2013; Ruthven, 2014; Time, 2015). In some respects, therefore, the issue of humanitarian intervention and its related values base is being abused in order that these political aspirations can be furthered (Dagher, 2014). This aspect, however, is a perpetual factor in the international arena, particularly where realist agendas are taken into consideration (Bayliss & Smith, 2001). One area where international intervention has been encouraged is in relation to ethnic conflict.

Kaldor (1998) recognises that the end of the Cold War resulted in an increase in the frequency of ethnically charged conflicts and that these types of conflict have been offered as a rationale for international humanitarian based interventions In respect of this, Kaldor (1998) argues that the changes that have taken place within conflict dynamics that has resulted in belligerent forces not being constrained by international regulations, including the Geneva Convention protocols, Laws of Armed Conflict or relevant United Nations Charters (Kaldor, 1998) has led to humanitarian values being used as an excuse to further the political aspirations of a number of states. The result of this changed dynamic has perpetuated and has spread to a number of conflict zones around the world. However, it has led to an increase in the reliance upon conventional forces whose role has been to offer peace keeping and security services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in support of their own operations. In this respect it is noted that Christoplos, Longley, and Slaymaker (2004) consider that the intervention strategies have also altered in recent years. Here, they note that the underpinning intervention programmes now seek to promote humanitarian values and that this is evidenced by the creation of a tripartite doctrinal system which now utilises areas of national and personal rehabilitation; added to this are post war recovery programmes that are intended to help redevelop both the state and social infrastructures; finally there is the central issue of relief programmes that seek to maintain the fabric of civil society during crisis periods. For Seybolt (2007) this perspective adds weight to any argument that promotes the possibility that military humanitarian interventions can assist NGOs in their duties via the provision of security provisions. However, it is also recognised that adding external military forces into a combat zone has can lead to further complications primarily because military operations possess a potential for using force when necessary (Davidson, 2012; Ministry of Defence, 2011).

In promotion of a perspective which says that deployed military forces can utilise force is well grounded in military doctrines. For example the UK Ministry of Defence promotes a policy whereby “The peacekeeper fulfils a mandate with the strategic consent of the main warring parties, allowing a degree of freedom to fulfil its task in an impartial manner, while a sustainable peace settlement is pursued.” (Ministry of Defence, 2011: 1.1). This perspective suggests that it is possible for military personnel whose primary function is to assist NGOs as part of the promotion of humanitarian values is in fact a secondary consideration. Ultimately the use of military force within humanitarian interventions is a purely political choice that is intended to help reshape the political landscape of the affected region or state in the post conflict environment. With regards to the current Syrian conflict, one can argue that the divergent and conflicting political perspectives and aspirations is a factor which will undermine the potential for any real focus upon the promotion of humanitarian values. Indeed, it is also recognised that this eventuality does little to promote the principles of humanitarianism as argued by the likes of the ICRC (2013). In effect the possibility that military forces can conduct purely military operations, or war phase fighting, during a humanitarian intervention undermines any utilitarian or altruistic claims made by the respective political powers. In its totality this suggests that the aforementioned issue of political realism is both present and ongoing. Indeed such an argument can be backed up by a policy review of the recent and ongoing Afghan conflict.

A review of UK doctrinal papers promotes this paper’s preference that military operations incorporate the possibility that war fighting, as well as security duties, is a contingent factor in the preparations for any military force. Stabilisation programmes in the Afghanistan intervention occurred in an environment where the UK’s military “had the consent of the host nation government but no other warring party (Afghanistan: Taliban 2001 – present)……..A military force may decide in such situations that the defeat of a specific enemy is essential to the success of the operation.” (Ministry of Defence, 2011: 1.1). Essentially, therefore, in political terms it is feasible that political intentions can undermine any altruistic argument in relation to the deployment of military forces to carry out humanitarian operations. For some the recent ‘humanitarian’ intervention into Libya is an example of this outcome.

The recent UN backed military intervention in Libya was mandated via humanitarian intervention that was intended to provide relief and assistance (United Nations, 2011). The promotion of this intervention was supposed to further the seven values of humanitarian intervention, as promoted by the ICRC (2013) however one can argue that the resultant intervention was mainly politically motivated because there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Gaddafi’s regime had been a long time foe of those states which executed the intervention (USA, UK & France) (Boulton, 2008). In promotion of their intervention, the USA UK, and France had argued that a failure to intervene would result in a humanitarian crisis caused by the perpetuation of conflict. However, Kuperman (2011) argues that the resultant UN Resolution 1973 (United Nations, 2011) created conditions where the intervening military forces could operate beyond the realms of Resolution 1973. These included, for example, allowing the USA, UK, and France to conduct stabilisation operations so that the authority of the Gaddafi regime could be undermined, thereby helping to bring this conflict to a swift conclusion. In layman terms this meant military intervention via war fighting. With regards to this, Kuperman (2011) also argues that Libyan state functions were impacted, including the freezing of its financial and economic assets. It was also argued that the intervening forces of the USA, France and the UK oversaw the deployment of private military contractors whose role was to undertake anti Gaddafi operations thereby seeking to overthrow his regime (RT News, 2012). In effect, the usage of humanitarian justifications for military intervention in conflict can be defined in terms of the actions and justification of the states whose forces have been committed to operate in those areas and regions.

In its totality, therefore, the usage of military force as an effective instrument for the promotion of humanitarian values is limited. These limitations can be found within the underlying political rationales that exist within states that are prepared to commit forces for these operations, particularly where these states have an interest in the realisation of a particular outcome. Whilst humanitarian led interventions have become a mainstay of the post Cold War climate, one can argue that the promotion of the seven humanitarian values that are promoted by the ICRC (2013) are undermined by the intervening forces because of their ability to both flout their mandate, as well as their ability to conduct war fighting operations under the guise of humanitarianism. In essence, therefore, one can argue that there are genuine limits to the ability of military forces to promote humanitarian values however these limitations are not factors which states consider when seeking to intervene in any conflict.

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