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The marriage of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle which will take place in May of 2018 will constitute a considerable departure from some of the protocols regarding royal marriage which have characterised the history of the Royal Family in Britain. Inevitably, Prince Harry’s decision to marry an American divorcee will draw comparisons with the same decision made by the Duke of Windsor with respect to Wallis Simpson, leading to the abdication crisis of 1936 (Valente, 1998). The Royal Family has changed dramatically in the eighty or more years which have passed since this crisis which almost brought down the Royal Family as an institution altogether, but Meghan Markle will nevertheless make a considerable impact, and bring about certain changes, even today. This essay will consider some of those changes, and assess the degree to which Prince Harry’s somewhat unconventional choice of bride will have repercussions for the image and function of the Royal Family in Britain and around the world. It will be argued that Markle, in her nationality, ethnicity, career history and personality, represents a radical departure from some of the conventions and traditions of the royal bride, ones which will likely have the impact of bringing about a significant modernisation and image development for the Royal Family. Further, if she and Harry were to have children, the impact on the Royal Family would be truly transformative and lasting, and may indeed preserve it from the abolition that may otherwise result from its becoming, or appearing to be, obsolete.

In the case of Princess Diana and Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, Prince Charles and his son Prince William chose women who were not themselves royal but, in the case of Diana, of aristocratic English background and, in the case of Catherine, of British middle-class background (Church Gibson, 2011). A progression might be seen towards a less selective and restrictive choice of possible marriage partners between Charles and William. William, in marrying Catherine, chose a wife who did not have a royal or aristocratic background, something which in itself marked a departure from the traditions of royalty. In choosing Meghan Markle, Harry is departing even further from the conventional model of the royal bride, as she is both an American and someone whose background is in entertainment, meaning she was already in the public eye before her engagement to Harry was announced. Catherine has been credited with doing a great deal to modernise and de-formalise the image of the royal family. In coming from a middle class rather than aristocratic background, and in insisting on a more hands-on approach to child-rearing which departed from the more distant, aristocratic royal model, Catherine has brought the royal family in her generation and that of her children a distance away from some of its traditional past (Palmer, 2013). She has been engaged with the media and the public in a way which has blended formal responsibility with more light-hearted informality, and she has been identified with an increasingly modernised Royal Family.

Markle will not therefore constitute an unprecedented change, as she is of the same generation as Catherine and someone who has a lot in common with her. Instead, Markle’s impact can be considered in part a continuation of the work in transforming the Royal Family which has already been evidenced by Catherine. As was noted in the Belfast Telegraph, ‘Meghan is a modernising figure for the monarchy – which puts her in the same league as Kate, who has been credited with transforming its public face over the past six years.’ However, as will be outlined below, there are ways in which Markle represents a unique change. Nonetheless, it might be argued that the greatest changes will be made by Meghan rather than Harry or the rest of the Royal Family upon their marriage. Indeed, Markle will no longer pursue her acting career, and instead will devote herself to the kinds of humanitarian work which are a necessary part of the royal duties that Harry, her future husband, will be performing as part of his role as the likely Duke of Sussex. Moreover, she will be baptised into the Church of England and will be required to accompany Prince Harry on a number of his royal duties. Nevertheless, although the change to Markle’s life will be significant, it is equally true that she has had, is having, and will continue to have, a transformative impact on the Royal Family itself.

One of the ways in which Markle’s coming into the Royal Family will likely change it is in the kind of background and life experiences which she is bringing into her role. Indeed, her background is notable for being unconventional in royal terms and, as was noted above, for having already involved her in the public eye in her role as an actress before meeting Harry. She is from Los Angeles, and has spent her career in the acting industry, acquiring a number of Hollywood and show business connections as well as a degree of fame in the United States and the world. Although she has deleted her social media in the light of her new membership of the Royal Family, her forthcoming marriage has only increased interest in her and following from the United States. This Americanness is central to the ways in which she will transform the Royal Family, bringing it both into a more transatlantic, international alliance with other parts of the world and integrating it into areas of youth and popular culture from which it has always traditionally remained distant. Markle is notable for her calm and friendly media appearances, informed by her own career in the media spotlight, and this marks a distinction from some of the stiff or awkward interactions which have defined the Royal Family’s media engagements in the past. The Daily Telegraph has noted both Markle’s greater maturity when compared with Diana (being nearly twice the age Diana was when she announced her engagement to Prince Charles), as well as her and Harry’s greater ease and comfort in engaging with the media: ‘compared with the stilted, coy and embarrassing interview that pair gave when they became engaged in 1981, both Harry and Meghan displayed an assuredness and emotional maturity that bodes well for their future success.’ Harry, who is notably lower down the order of precedence for the throne than were either Charles (first in line) or William (second in line) at the time of their marriages, is also himself entitled to a greater freedom and liberality in his behaviour and associations than would be afforded to someone who was the heir or heir-but-one to the throne, and this is an element which Markle will be able to contribute to and exploit in her own fashion. Indeed, Harry has long been considered one of the more fun-loving and engaging members of the Royal Family, and thus in conjunction with Markle it is likely that their marriage and her contribution will be one of mellowing the somewhat austere and traditional image of the Royal Family abroad, and modernising both its perception and its actual practices.

The fact that Markle will transform the Royal Family, and the degree to which she will do so, can be evidenced by considering certain events which have taken place since the announcement of her engagement which, although seemingly innocuous, reveal in fact a striking departure from tradition. One such unprecedented event is her being invited by the Queen to join the Royal Family for their traditional Christmas Day lunch. Kay (2017) notes of this decision that it ‘represents a sea change in the Victorian attitudes which for so long have coloured the royal approach to modern life.’ This is an invitation which has never been extended to an unmarried partner, with Diana, Camilla and Catherine all being excluded from such an invitation. This despite the fact that the engagement had only been announced shortly before in November. This represents not only the fact that Markle is approved of by the Queen, but also that there are changes in protocol and tradition which are being brought about by her presence. Exceptions such as this demonstrate the degree to which Markle is likely to modernise and de-formalise some of the more standoffish or coldly traditional behaviours which have defined the Royal Family for centuries. This is a view which rhetorically voiced by Gore (2017: n.p.) who asks if it is ‘too mad to wonder, once the Brexit dust settles, whether the younger royals may – against all the odds – represent a Britain looking forward to the future rather than an imagined past?’ Markle, with her informal attire, relaxed attitude with the media, experience in the film and television in the United States and, by royal standards, humble origins, may very well provide the catalyst for bringing the Royal Family into the twenty-first century in a way which is compatible with internationalist and inclusive values.

Finally, it can be noted that the greatest impact and change that Markle will likely have on the Royal Family will be long-term in nature. She will take British citizenship with dual American citizenship, and so will any children she might have with Prince Harry. This means that future members of the Royal Family will be American, forging closer links between the two countries and also bringing the Royal Family into a more internationalist, modern light. Perhaps even more significant than this question of nationality is the one of race, with Markle the daughter of a white father and a black mother, her mixed-race status meaning that future generations of the British Royal Family will have parents and grandparents of African American ethnicity, bringing a further degree of integration and internationalism to the complexion of the Royal Family in this and future generations (Hirsch, 2017). It has been argued that the lack of debate and discussion about this aspect of their union is both evidence of changed social attitudes in Britain and evidence that the Royal Family, always slow to move with the times with regards to socio-cultural issues, has also moved beyond questions of miscegenation that might have plagued older putative unions. As Gore (2017: n.p.) has noted, ‘the lack of agitation suggests that British society has largely moved on and that the royal family has moved on with it: this union thus stands as important statement about the degree to which progressive values and diversity have been entrenched in the UK mainstream.’ Other commentators have said that the symbolism of a multi-ethnic Royal Family will change Britain’s relationship with race forever (Hirsh, 2017). In any case, this racial diversity, combined with Markle’s ties to the American entertainment industry, means that the Royal Family will likely be radically changed by the new links that its members will have with the rest of the world. All of these factors point to a Royal Family which is increasingly far removed from the antiquated and insular image which has come to define it in previous decades and centuries.

To conclude, the impact of Markle’s marriage to Prince Harry in Spring of 2018 has already been and will be huge in terms of changes to her own life. However, and perhaps more surprisingly, the impact in terms of changes to the Royal Family itself, the evidence suggests, is likely to be just as huge. Indeed, one can perhaps best characterise Markle’s integration into the British Royal Family in terms of a mutually transformative process. She represents, in her nationality, previous career, ethnicity and personal character, a strong departure from some of the traditional ideas and characteristics which have defined the Royal Family. In Prince Harry, she has found a member of the Royal Family who has frequently been more open and engaging than is the traditional model of royal behaviour, and the likely consequence of their union in the short-term is an increasingly modern-looking, internationally-engaged and informal Royal Family, and in the long-term the kind of future generations of royals who may not only change the British Royal Family but save it.

References

Belfast Telegraph. (2017). ‘Meghan and Kate: Will these royal sisters-in-law really shake up the monarchy?’ The Belfast Telegraph. 2nd December 2017. Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/life/features/meghan-and-kate-will-these-royal-sistersinlaw-really-shake-up-the-monarchy-36368611.html

Church Gibson, P. (2011). New patterns of emulation: Kate, Pippa and Cheryl. Celebrity studies, 2(3), 358-360.

Daily Telegraph. (2017). Prince Harry and Meghan Markle wedding will give royals a boost.’ 1st December 2017. Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/entertainment/sydney-confidential/prince-harry-and-meghan-markle-wedding-will-give-royals-a-boost/news-story/6b49375970613474d52a5ab297aa8d8c

Gore, W. (2017). ‘Meghan Markle: the royal family needs a desperate update – could a Trump-bashing American actress be the answer?’ The Independent. 27th November 2017. Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/meghan-markle-prince-harry-engagement-royal-family-suits-actress-trump-update-needed-a8078936.html/

Hirsh, A. (2017). ‘When Meghan weds Harry, Britain’s relationship with race will change for ever.’ The Guardian. 27th November 2017. Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/27/prince-harry-meghan-markle-britishness-monarchy-relevant.

Kay, R. (2017). ‘How Meghan Markle is transforming the Royal Family.’ The Daily Mail. 13th December 2017. Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-5177145/Meghan-Markle-transforming-Royal-Family-RICHARD-KAY.html.

Palmer, R. (2013). ‘It’s ‘hands-on’ parenting for the future monarch.’ Available online [accessed 26th January 2018] at: https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/416809/It-s-hands-on-parenting-for-the-future-monarch

Valente, C. (1998). The deposition and abdication of Edward II. The English Historical Review, 113(453), 852-881.

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The term abstraction manifoldly pervades Marx’s writing. The heterogeneity of its meaning is related to the fact that Marx understands production within a system of capitalism to be a totalizing process which presides over the finiteness of the individual mind and therefore determinations, particulars and forms must be understood as relations in an ongoing process and they can only be considered in isolation as abstractions.

Nevertheless, these abstractions are real insofar as they constitute the spaces, actions and behaviours of concrete social reality for individuals whether they are experienced as such or not. Using Roberto Finelli’s response to Chris Arthur’s work on abstraction, this essay will focus on a particularity drawn out by Marx in the Grundrisse related to the engagement of exchange and from this, will elaborate on Marx’s deployment of the term abstraction in his critique of political economy.

In The Chapter on Capital, Marx considers the nature of the putative social relations into which individuals must enter in order to engage in exchange. Before particularizing the moment of exchange, Marx tactfully draws our attention to the perceptual limitations induced by the totality of capitalist production, where the subject holds that “a social relation, a definite relation between individuals…appears…as a purely physical, external thing which can be found, as such, in nature and which is indistinguishable in form from its natural existence.” (Marx, 1993, p.240) Marx rejoins this faulty apprehension with the simple fact that “Nature does not produce money, any more than it produces a rate of exchange or a banker.” (Marx, 1993, p. 240) In this discreet move through which the concrete given of social reality is revealed to be the hidden operations of capital, Marx offers an early indication of his method for interrogating abstraction as a way of life.

Looking at the form in which the moment of exchange realizes itself, Marx distinguishes an equality brought to bear on the individuals involved in exchange. The expression of exchange value in commodities through the labour time spent in their production means that the moment of exchange, no matter the use values being compared, rearticulates that equivalence and in so doing transforms the individuals involved in the exchange into equivalent exchangers. Both the exchangers and the commodities they exchange, are by the logic of exchange value, equal; “The subjects in exchange exist for one another only through these equivalents, as of equal worth, and prove themselves to be such through the exchange of the objectivity in which the one exist for the other.” (Marx, 1993, p.242) The content outwith the act of exchange, the natural differences between the exchangers (needs, production, wealth etc.), does not alter the state of equality enshrined in the act of exchange. Rather, it is the natural differences of exchangers outside the act that are the very precondition of the equality expressed in the exchange. The social relation within which individual exchangers find themselves in the act of exchange is one predicated on the fact that each individual needs something from the other and has produced something the other needs in return, whether it is commodities, labour or money makes no difference in this case. The condition where individuals reciprocally produce the objects that service the needs of others and meet as such, determines the equivalence that anchors the act of exchange. Through the act of exchange, individuals acknowledge and realize in each other’s mutual compulsions the general self-seeking interest of human beings. Yet, when thoroughly considered it is forgotten that in the act of exchange, the presupposition of exchange value…in itself implies compulsion over the individual, since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only becomes such in the social process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless external form; and that “the individual has an existence only as producer of exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his natural existence is already implied; that he is therefore entirely determined by society.” (Marx, 1993, p.249)

What at first appears as a natural and concrete moment in social reality is in fact riven by historical process. The formal determinations expressed in the act of exchange produce equality insofar as they coerce the individual into furnishing the needs of society in general in the form of exchange value through abstract labour.

Roberto Finelli draws attention to this role of formal determinations as much as it concerns a form as something that “is ‘invisible’, something not directly perceptible, unlike ‘material determination.’” (Finelli, 2007, p.4) In Marx’s conceptualisation of totality, Finelli sees the “abstraction-emptying out” (Finelli, p.6) of the concrete. Finelli’s view holds that the surface of concrete reality, including as we saw the example of the act of exchange, is propped up by a repression of abstract processes ongoing in the totality of production. Abstraction, says Finelli, is a “colonisation which is dissimulated and negated through an hysterical over-determination of the surface which, coloured and embellished, always has to display the contrary of that which it is.” (Finelli, p.66) With the concentration and centralisation of abstractions as a way of life, historically configured processes that reproduce social relations are naturalised and become perceived as concrete. The mediations comprising the disjunctive moments in social reality are made invisible by the cult of exteriority where objects don “a superficial appearance in order to strike and seduce that ideological and deceitful organ par excellence which is our eye” (Finelli, p.69), making the abstract symptoms of capital domination appear coherent and real. The predominance of exteriority over material essence is the result of appearance submitting to the “expansive-reproductive logic” (Finelli, p.66) of the totality of capital, which perpetually resumes its own basis in social reality.

The concrete, which is now discovered to be the congelation of real processes abstracted from the totality of capital production, is hallowed, formed and determined to supply the relational totality of capital its iterative force; as Marx says, “Within the value relation and the expression of value contained in it the abstract universal is not a property of the concrete, the sensuous-actual; on the contrary, the sensuous-actual is a mere hypostasis or determinate form of realization of the abstract universal.” (Marx, 1992, p. 32) The final chapter, therefore, in the domination of abstraction over social life occurs when individuals become psychologically inducted into the realm of superficiality, when the mind receives as and responds as if to concretise that which is abstract, “And there, through the abstract activity of many, the concrete is produced.” (Finelli, p.70)

Returning to our consideration of the act of exchange, the freedom promised there, as we saw earlier, proved in fact to be the contrary: “inequality and unfreedom” (Marx, 1993, p.249) The perceived freedom in the act of exchange is the historically produced naturalisation of exchange value behind which is hidden the social force of abstract labour. The social compulsion to embody the so-called freedoms in the act of exchange reinforces the grip of abstract labour over the exchanger, as the satisfaction granted by the former exchange realizes and legitimates abstract labour through exchange value, persuading the exchanger to see as free and beneficial a process that is ultimately coercive. To this, Finelli adds: “In the society of capital, abstraction assumes the explicit contours of matter of fact…it becomes a practically true abstraction…The universal is real only when it is the fruit not of logical intellect or even of theoretical ideation but of collective historical praxis.” (Toscano, 2008, p. 276) The universal realization of abstract processes as concrete objective reality occurs when the perceptual field is conditioned to the dissimulation of abstraction through social and historical mediation. This occurs when individuals internalize real abstractions and behave and act as such and when society binds its members to the capital-subject through their mutual adherence to the lure of the exchange value viz real abstraction, thereby manufacturing a radical reciprocal dependency.

Lucio Colletti notes in his introduction to Marx’s early writing that “The result [of the domination of real abstractions] is – given that ‘labour’ in general is, in Marx’s words, ‘…the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence’ – that the light of eternity comes to be cast upon the particular historical figure of the wage-labourer.” (Marx, 1992, p.28) The concealment of forced abstract labour behind the ostensible form taken up by the act of exchange structures the needs and wants brought to bear on the act by the labourer/exchanger. The obligation attached to the act of exchange forcing the exchanger to labour in order to furnish the general abstract wants of society, produces his social reality in such a way that his desires become caught up with the reproductive logic of capital. His needs become malformed by the guiding principle of reproducing his labour power and the basis of his own subjection. The increasing separation of the labourer from his own concrete basis in reality “which is an expression of the complete domination of dead matter over men” (Marx, 1992, p. 319) results in the pursuit and production of alien objects and, symptomatically, the “loss of and bondage to the object” (Marx, 1992, p.324) The more real-abstractions operate as the governing logic over social life, “the more powerful the alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over against himself.” (Marx, 1992, p.324) Thus, the obligation of entering into estranged labour, concealed behind the form taken up by exchange (with its promise of mutual satiation) forces the individual to naturalize an alien reality without being aware of its taking place; “What the product of his labour is, he is not.” (Marx, 1992, p.324) The labourer’s alienation resides in his being compelled to embody an ontology that goes contrary to his own nature, or breaks his dialogue with nature, by deceptive abstractions reified as concrete reality.

The worker must continue to produce even when he is liberated from immediate physical need to service the needs of general society and thus continues to produce his own inorganic objective reality until “he regards….his objectified labour, as an alien, hostile and powerful object which is independent of him [and] then his relationship to that object is such that another man – alien and hostile, powerful and independent of him – is its master.” (Marx, 1992, p.331) The alienation generated by abstract labour is one which pervades man’s relationship with nature and others to the extent that a class formation emerges, grouping individuals whose estranged relationship with objective reality is made equivalent under the control of the capitalist.

However, Finelli prudently reminds us that the class, the proletariat, communism have been values and locations, ideal and real, conceived on the basis of the principle of abstract equality alone, or of an equality not vivified and made concrete by differences. It therefore ended up reflecting, in itself, precisely that same abstraction which it wanted to combat and eliminate. (Finelli, p.72)

The ideal function of the proletariat, antagonistic as they are to the reproductive alienation generated by the abstract labour process and the real abstractions structuring social life through exchange value, is built upon the same abstract equality that stabilizes the act of exchange in capitalist circulation. With this threat in mind, Finelli resolves that real change can only emerge when “a new anthropology” is conceived “that knows how to articulate difference together with equality, the right of everyone to see their own strictly unrepeatable singularity recognised, respected and developed.” (Finelli, p.73)

Abstraction continues to be a real reckoning force in modern life, particularly with the acceleration of global flows in our era of multinational capitalism. New forms of dissimulated abstractions synthetically generate the surface of concrete objective reality and condition the perceptual field to validate their hypostatization. Information technology is one obvious example of this process at work on contemporary lives. Comprehensively tracing the evolution of Marx’s writing on the subject of abstraction and the explications and extensions offered by Finelli will, however, give us an opportunity to reveal the real abstractions at work in our lives and salvage the real concrete from complete vacancy.

Bibliography

Finelli, Roberto. 2007. Abstraction versus Contradiction: Observations on Chris Arthur’s The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, in Historical Materialism 15, 61-74

Marx, Karl. 1992. Early Writings. London: Penguin Books

Marx, Karl. 1993. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin Books

Ollman, Bertell. 2003. Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Postone, Moishe, and Brennan, Timothy. 2009. Labor and the Logic of Abstraction: An Interview, in South Atlantic Quarterly 108(2), 305-330

Toscano, Alberto. 2008. The Open Secret of Real Abstraction, Rethinking Marxism, in A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 20(2), 273-287

Sayer, Derek. 1987. The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

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Introduction

David Collinson and Jeff Hearn posit that “… a challenge to men’s taken-for-granted dominant masculinities could facilitate the emergence of less coercive and less divisive organisational structures, cultures and practices” (Collinson and Hearn, 1996: 73). This paper offers a critical evaluation of this proposition within a structuralist/poststructuralist conceptual framework, centring on discourse as a means by which taken-for granted dominant masculinities may be ameliorated.

The theoretical examination, detailed under Conceptual foundations below, begins with an appraisal of the value of discourse in both the workplace and wider society. Discourse is shown to be powerful and widely accepted, with the potential to challenge dominant masculinities. This potential, however, is not without its difficulties.

The practical considerations of the potential challenge identified are examined under The challenge to dominant masculinities below. Previous challenges to taken-for-granted masculinities are considered and are found to have been limited in their success, inter alia, due to the external points of origin of their discourses.

Finally the Conclusion recapitulates upon the paper’s findings. Collinson and Hearn’s (1996) proposition is found to be valid but conceptually flawed and optimistic, requiring a more robust challenge than they imply.

Conceptual foundations

Language is the tool of the various discourses that contribute to the formation and communication of social structures, cultures and practices (Van Dijk, 1997). The “linguistic turn” – the name given to the encapsulation of the centrality of language in the development of structures, cultures and practices – is a product of structuralist and post-structuralist philosophy (Barrett, 1998), and is most commonly associated with the nineteenth and twentieth century work of Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (Potter, 2000). The linguistic turn concept captures the importance of both words and interpretation – “signification” (Barrett, 1998) – which may be described as being either “internal”, i.e. that which is acceptable to and readily adopted within the relevant settings (and usually originating therein), or “external”, i.e. that which is unacceptable and rejected by the relevant settings, due to having originated from outside and hence being recognised as alien. The processes by which these significations arise are herein respectively described as “internalisation” and “externalisation”.

Collinson and Hearn’s (1996: 73) suggestion can be read in two ways – as a workplace challenge, or one with a wider, societal base. Examination of the quoted sentence in its entirety – “The possibility of a challenge to men’s taken-for-granted dominant masculinities could facilitate the emergence of less coercive and less divisive organisational structures, cultures and practices, a fundamental rethinking of the social organisation of the domestic division of labour and a transformation of ‘men at work’” – suggests that their reference point encompasses the domestic division of labour (the private sphere) as well as the workplace (the public sphere). Collinson and Hearn (1996) optimistically suggest that dominant masculinities are “precarious” due to their inherent conflicts and the absence of solidarity between men. An alternative understanding of this is that dominant masculinities are necessarily in conflict due to masculinity’s characteristic division and competitiveness: it is in divisiveness that masculinity achieves its conceptual unity; the contradiction inherent in the converse situation, where divisive, competitive masculinities would be founded on consensus and trust, illustrates this. Collinson and Hearn’s (1996) conceptualisation may, therefore, be faulty and over-optimistic, and dominant masculinities may be less precarious and more difficult to challenge than they suggest. The dominance of masculinity is long-standing and deeply rooted; however, there is no deeper root than language, and from the root of language springs perception, assumption and understanding about reality, and importantly, the construction of reality (Potter, 2000). Any purely workplace-based challenge to masculinity would be unlikely to be sufficient, raising the question whether the domestic challenge has prospects of success. At the functional level it appears not: there have been many challenges that attempt to encourage or shame men into tackling domestic chores, yet these have met with overt resistance or subtle resistance, and have achieved little success (Crompton, 1997). It is, therefore, the contention of this paper that to be successful, any challenge must be rooted in language, as this is the only way in which discourse can be modified – the discourse which will ultimately shape the private sphere and the public sphere together, leading to the consensual and unitary structures, cultures and practices that Collinson’s and Hearn’s (1996) suggestion requires.

The challenge to dominant masculinities

Men’s specific experience in the workplace and society has only recently become the subject of academic focus. For masculinity to be challenged, however, issues around it must be considered from this particular perspective (Goodwin, 1999). Challenges to masculinity are not new, even though many take the form of explanations for gender segregation or discrimination and the challenges themselves remain implicit. Indeed, the promotion of feminine characteristics such as that favoured by Hong Kong businesswomen in contrast with their western counterparts (Hills, 2000) presents an oblique challenge, mirrored by Cockburn’s (1991) call for equivalence rather than equality. Feminism too, in its typical western form, represents such a challenge, albeit still a secondary one emerging from feminism’s aims, many of which are conceived in terms of gender conflict. Previous conceptual challenges typically took the form of critiques of patriarchy – a conceptualisation whereby women are subordinated through tacit co-operation between men and capital (Pateman, 1988), or whereby capital and patriarchy are not supportive but are mutually exploitative in the interests of their survival (Johnson, 1996). Alternative challenges emerge from conceptualisations including preference theory, within which women’s biological circumstances govern their choices (Hakim, 1996), and social reproduction, whereby despite women’s education levels having equalled and sometimes exceeded those of men, women are conditioned to expect discontinuous employment and lower-level work (Blackburn et al, 2002). Additionally direct, top-down challenges arose from more practical and codified bases, typically in the form of equality legislation and workplace initiatives. Included in these challenges was the modification of language so that it came to use the explicitly gender neutral and spectacularly clumsy singular pronouns “s/he” and “him/her”, and the grammatically difficult plural pronoun “their” in place of the singular, the latter typically favoured by those who wish to be fair but do not wish to be seen to be motivated by a feminist agenda, an example of which is BT’s missed-call message “You were called at 5.32pm today. The caller withheld their number.” (Humphrys, 2004: 287-288).

This modification of language has not, so far, been central to the feminist process; it has not driven the process forward, but has merely followed along as a by-product of it and a useful signifier of “correct” attitudes. As detailed in the previous section, language has a long history of reflecting thought and forming thought (Van Dijk, 1997). In language there is a historically accredited and widely accessible means of challenging men’s taken-for-granted dominant masculinities, but to be successful, language must be the main focus of the challenge, internalised in the cultures, structures and processes of society and the workplace, and its signification must be internal.

It is easy to explain what the challenge must do, but less easy to imagine what it will look like. The two strands described above – nouns (and by extension, pronouns) and discourse – are good places to start. Each is examined in turn below.

It has been shown that nouns carry meaning and assumptions, and that they establish and perpetuate the dominance of masculinities. It is true that there is a feminist critique of, in the terminology of this approach, “malestream” nouns – exemplified by the comparatively new noun “womyn”, the use of which is intended to neutralise the adjunct-to-“men” associations of the noun “women” (Warren, 1989). Unfortunately, due to faulty signification, this strategy has not achieved the sought-for outcome; “womyn” has, for some, come to mean no more than “woman” expressed in the context of the feminist critique of patriarchy – effectively it has externalised itself from the settings it was designed to reform (Kendall, 2008). Dialect of the Middle Ages provided the non-gendered pronoun “a” and the sixteenth century similarly contributed “ou” (Wright, 1898), but both have fallen out of usage and reintroduction would be difficult without externalisation, although due to its comparative contemporary familiarity “one” may be used with greater prospect of success and with reduced likelihood of externalisation.

Discourse in both the private and public spheres traditionally uses metaphors relating to confrontation, struggles, hunting, warfare and the sports field. In the commercial world, examples can be readily found in management statements, an interesting example of which may be found in IBM’s corporate song: “… we’ve fought our way through, and new fields we’re sure to conquer too; forever onward IBM!” (Deal and Kennedy, 1988: 115). The winning of contracts is also frequently conceptualised and verbalised as “winning a battle” in the “commercial jungle” (Collinson and Hearn, 1996: 69-70). The “jungle” image implies a view of the market as a place where “survival of the fittest” and “dog-eat-dog” are recipes for success, with failure to achieve these being “soft”, i.e. feminine. The overarching signification implies that masculine equals success and feminine equals failure. This is the basis of dominant masculinity, and it is through long-standing usage and deep internalisation of these admittedly useful and vivid metaphors that dominant masculinities come to be taken for granted. The Hong Kong businesswomen mentioned above wanted their femininity, not their ability to imitate the behaviour of their male colleagues, to be respected (Hills, 2000). If they wish to achieve this they must begin by revolutionising the discourse of their lives and their workplaces. This means that “fighting” must become “discovering”, and “goals” or “victories” must become “answers” or “solutions”. The ways in which discourse must change are as numerous as the types of structures, cultures and practices in which they operate. It is not through the appreciation of female characteristics that the discourse and structures, cultures and practices of the workplace will become less coercive and less divisive; it is through discourse that female characteristics will come to be appreciated and structures, cultures and practices of the workplace will become less coercive and less divisive. It is, among other things, from discourse that dominant masculinity came to predominate, and it is, among other things, through discourse that it may be abated. Within the compass of this paper it is discourse that is the root and the cause of the problem, not the symptom and the outcome.

Conclusion

Critically evaluated, it has been shown that the initial statement may be too optimistic. Collinson and Hearn’s (1996) view that dominant masculinities are precarious as a result of their inherent division and competitiveness seems at first sight to be reasonable, although this may be illusory. Examination of the converse situation, that of a hypothetical consensual and trusting masculinity, reveals that, conceptually at least, masculinity’s divisions and competitiveness are to be expected and in this it finds a kind of unity, and hence calls into question the validity of Collinson and Hearn’s (1996) conceptualisation of the problem. That is not to say that a challenge cannot successfully be made. The common shortcomings of previous challenges are that they all suffer from faulty signification, having originated externally or having become externalised. The suggestion made in the context of this paper is that for the challenge to be successful it must originate in discourse. The power of discourse as a support to dominant masculinities has been shown, and so it is not unreasonable to suppose that a similarly rooted challenge may have comparable power and resultant success. The key to success, however, is that the challenge must begin with discourse and be – and remain – wholly internal. Previous challenges developed their own discourses but these were weak due to their emergence from externalised agendas: they were effectively limited to their academic, political or feminist original locus. To be successful and all-embracing in both the workplace and wider society, the agenda must emerge from discourse, not vice versa, and must encompass all aspects of the public and private spheres.

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Social control can be defined as a system of ‘measures, suggestion, persuasion, restraint and coercion’ by which society brings people into conformity with an accepted code of behaviour (Sharma, 2007, p. 220). There are many forms of direct and indirect social control. The family has always provided a strong means of social control in its direct influence on the behaviour of its members. However, with the changing nature of the family structure in modern Britain, the family’s ability to provide an effective means of social control has been called into question. This essay will explore the concept of social control in relation to the changing role of the family and the increasing influence of other areas, in particular the mass media and the internet.

Social control comes in two distinct forms: direct control and indirect control. Direct social control works when someone exerts influence on a person directly due to their close proximity, for example, the family. Indirect social control is provided by other factors removed physically from the person, such as institutions, traditions, customs and culture: these indirect means of social control are ‘invisible and subtle’ (Sharma, 2007, p. 221). There are also two forms of social control within these groupings: control by sanction, which rewards the compliant and punishes the miscreant, and control by socialisation and education (Sharma, 2007, p. 222).

Social control can be maintained by positive means and negative means. Positive means of social control make people want to conform to society in order to enjoy rewards, such as praise, social recognition or respect. Negative means of social control work in the opposite way, making people want to conform to society in order to avoid emotional or physical punishment, criticism, ridicule or shame (Sharma, 2007, p. 222).

Formal and informal types of social control are also recognised as mean of controlling people’s behaviour within society. Formal social control is ‘carried out by an agency specifically set up to ensure that people conform to a particular set of norms, especially the law’ (Browne, 2011, p. 17). Forms of formal social control include the control exerted by official institutions such as the government, education establishments, religion, the police and the army. Informal social control, in contrast, is ‘carried out by agencies whose primary purpose is not social control’ (Browne, 2011, p. 18), such as family and friends, who influence us by socialising us into certain customs, values, ideals and norms.

One example of socialised ‘norms’ is gender roles. Boys and girls are encouraged to behave in way which accords with what society accepts to be masculine (assertive and dominant) or feminine (passive and submissive) forms of behaviour. To step outside these socialised expectations would be seen as transgressive and may lead to disapproval from others. Gender roles have been proven to be socially constructed rather than the result of any natural inclinations by studies that show men and women’s accepted gender roles to be very different in other cultures and tribes around the world (Browne, 2011, p. 20).

The family has always provided a strong means of social control. Parents provide children with direct guidelines to follow regarding acceptable behaviour. Social control through the family is achieved by both positive and negative means, with children keen to gain praise from their parents, while wanting to avoid punishment in any form for disobedience. According to social control theory, ‘those who are socially integrated … are more likely to engage in socially sanctioned behaviours and less likely to engage in risky behaviours’ (Baron, 2007, p. 9). In this way, social integration offered by the family unit helps to encourage socially accepted behaviour.

However, the role of the family has changed significantly over the years. There has been a reduction in economic functions due to an increase in government help; a reduction in activities performed by the family with an increase in baby sitters and nurseries; an increase in family recreation with the advent of television and radio; and most importantly, a change in the relationships between men and women (Sharma, 2007, p. 256), which has seen the dominance of the patriarchal head being replaced by a need for co-operation among equals (Sharma, 2007, p. 259).

The traditional idea of the nuclear family, consisting of the mother, father and two children, is no longer relevant in modern times. Today, there are many families made up of unmarried parents and single parents, while there are also many step-families and increasingly, homosexual partners with children. The traditional family is also being replaced by other modes of living, for example, single-person homes and house-shares of friends. The changing nature of the family unit means that today the word ‘family’ can suggest such a variety of situations that no typical ‘family’ now effectively exists. Bernardes suggests that ‘… family situations in contemporary society are so varied and diverse that it simply makes no sociological sense to speak of a single ideal-type model of “the family” at all’ (Bernardes, 1997, p. 209).

Indeed, the Office of National Statistics tells us that the number of unmarried parent families has increased significantly ‘from 2.2 million in 2003 to 2.9 million in 2013’ (Office for National Statistics, 2013). There has been a slow but steady rise in the number of single parent families, 1.9 million in 2013, up from 1.8 million in 2003. Out of 26.4 million households in the UK in 2013, 29% consisted of only one person, while ‘the fastest growing household type was households containing two or more families (Office for National Statistics, 2013).

It is clear that the family unit is constantly changing as society changes and so it seems natural to suggest that there are many elements of diversity within families that can affect their social control. Fogarty, Rapoport and Rapoport (1982) identify five main types of family diversity in modern Britain:a. organizational, b. cultural, c. class, d. life-cycle of family, and e. cohort. (Rapoport, Fogarty and Rapoport, 1982, p. 479) Organisational diversity speaks of the family structure, kinship patterns and division of labour within the home. For example, traditional nuclear families, consisting of husband, wife and two children; single-parent families; ‘dual-worker’ families where both parents work; and step-families. (Rapoport, Fogarty and Rapoport, 1982, p. 479)

Cultural diversity refers to the differences in lifestyles between families of different ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds. For example, Catholic societies do not allow abortion or contraception, so this would necessarily lead to larger families and thus, perhaps, a stronger social influence over younger members. Class diversity means the class divisions between different classes, which give different amounts of access to resources. This can be seen in relationships between men and women, parenting of children and connections with extended family. (Rapoport, Fogarty and Rapoport, 1982, p. 479)

Life-course refers to differences in family life that occur over time. For example, young parents living with their child have a different experience from an elderly couple with adult children. Cohort refers to generational links within families, which can be important when extended family members live close to the nuclear family (Rapoport, Fogarty and Rapoport, 1982, p. 479); this would generally increase the strength of familial social control.

The family unit has historically always been an important in shaping the characters and behaviour of its members, so that ‘the family is the first institution that helps in implementing social control mechanism’ (Pandit, 2009, p. 73). Children grow up within the moral framework laid down by the older family members. However, with the breakdown of the traditional nuclear family structure, there have been other modes of social control that have become increasingly important.

The mass media is actively engaged with virtually all people’s homes in the modern world. Mass media, such as television and newspapers, influences our attitudes and even our values can be skewed by the media as products and services are advertised as necessities. Advertising acts as an effective form of positive and negative social control by encouraging the consumer to confirm to social norms. For example, we are encouraged to buy deodorant to avoid body odour and thus the disapproval of others, while we are also encouraged to buy fashionable clothes to impress others (Batra, Myers and Aaker, 2006, p. 359). It is, in this way, that the media has become an important source of social control on a day to day basis because the more pressing influences on our daily behaviour are those influences that exist in our immediate vicinity. Indeed, ‘the proliferation of the media has altered the very nature of contemporary social order’ (Innes, 2003, p. 60). However, the most pressing influence of the media is not necessarily as a form of social control but as a form of ‘social ordering’ in that it determines not how we think but what issues we tend to think about (Innes, 2003, p. 60). The media directs public attention to certain issues and causes them to be the subject of public and private debate.

More specifically within the media, the rise of the internet has made social media an important element in social control and social ordering, particularly among young people. The rise in personal technology and popularity of social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, has meant that informal social control has grown between young people and their peer group. Friends can share photos on social networks and record every event in detail, tagging each other in photos, thus appearing on other pages without explicit consent. There is less privacy than ever before and people are being pressured into social conformity in many different ways via social networks: ‘social media can enable teens to succumb to peer pressure en masse’ (Firger, 2015).

There is no other form of media that allows for greater recording and sharing of the smallest details of every interaction. These details can be projected around the world at the touch of a button. The social control exerted by social media is effective due to its wide reach and easy access. This kind of influence can be used for both good and bad (Herring, 2015, p. 50). The ability to connect with people so easily is a positive element of social media, strengthening bonds and encouraging greater understanding of other people’s cultures and viewpoints (Herring, 2015, p. 141).

However, other areas of negative social control have also arisen in the digital space. Not only can social media be a means to communicating the wrong information, it has also led to new forms of social control, such as cyber bullying; disturbingly, ‘twenty-five percent of teens have reported being bullied online via social media on their phones’ (Herring, 2015, p. 142). Social media has also been cited as a main cause for the marked increase in eating disorders among young people in recent years (Dugan, 2014). People are now being threatened in new ways, often from a great physical distance, to conform to their peer group. This kind of digital social control is distinct from other social control in that it can be wielded 24 hours a day, in a similar way to familial social control.

The family has always been an important part of social control due to its close proximity to us, especially as children. However, with the changing face of the family, this form of social control has become less obviously effective. The change in the family unit and the reduction in traditional nuclear families means that the social control of families is more diluted. At the same time, the development of personal technology combined with the rise in internet usage and social media has meant that people now have more media influence in their lives. Indeed, powerful modern ‘technology is making it more difficult for individuals to exert control over their personal worlds’ (Spring, 2013, p. 62), as they are effectively controlled by social influences entering their lives through their own mobiles and tablets. The media as a type of formal social control and social ordering has always been powerful but now that news and entertainment can be accessed 24 hours a day from a mobile phone, and social networks mean every moment can be shared, people are more influenced by the media than ever before.

Despite this surge in the social control and social ordering by the media through the internet and social networking sites, the family still remains a highly effective means of social control. Robert Chester points out that, although times have changed, most people do still tend to spend a part of their life at least, within a typical family structure. We are usually born into a family, experience some kind of relationship and develop awareness of what family means (Chester, 1985). Although the media has increased its influence due to greater access to technology and the development of the internet, the primary role of the media, certainly for adults, tends to be in the realm of social ordering rather than social control. The family unit, in all its modern wide variety of forms and its strong influence over our values and morals, still maintains an effective role as a means of social control through its physical and emotional proximity and its direct influence over our behaviour, especially in our earlier, most formative years.

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Is society influenced by and organised around popular culture? Do some films, novels or songs have an effect on social relations and ritual?

For instance, do the releases of major films, or the spread in popularity of certain novels and songs, have a significant effect on social relations and ritual? Discuss, focusing on recent examples, in light of sociological theory.

This essay will examine the extent to which society may be influenced by and organised around popular culture. An introductory section will define key terms, before going on to analyse the opening question through a sustained focus on one key area of popular culture, that of television and its audiences. The essay will restrict itself to UK programming and scheduling. Following sections will assess the possible effects on social relations and on ritual, and will incorporate relevant sociological theories, approaches and concepts, and in particular a focus on the concept of ideology. The main thrust of the essay will be from a Marxist perspective, and will use ideas derived from Karl Marx and his successors in left-wing sociological thought.

Storey (2001, pp. 1 – 16) defines popular culture as being conceptualised in several different, though overlapping, ways. Often, for Storey (2001, p. 1), popular culture is an “empty conceptual category” always defined “in contrast to other conceptual categories: folk culture, mass culture, dominant culture, working-class culture” and so on. Storey (2001, pp. 1 – 15) offers six working start-points: first, that popular culture is simply that which is well liked with many people. In television terms, we might examine programmes or channels with high viewerships, or who cater to a general audience rather than to a niche. Second, that popular culture is what’s left over when high culture or art is discounted, that it’s the preserve of ITV or ITV2 rather than, say, Sky Arts or BBC4, channels that feature content we might understand as high culture, such as Proms concerts and biographies of arts movements. Storey’s third definition is of popular culture as being a mass culture. This is seen as a pejorative, in that (Storey, 2001, p. 9) such output is over-commercialised and bland, offering easy unthinking (and often American) entertainment. Notable work was done by the Frankfurt School of post-Marxist theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in this regard.

Fourth of Storey’s definitional possibilities refers to popular culture as being authentic folk culture of the people, as opposed to that which is provided to them by cultural and economic elites. Storey (2001, p. 10) critiques this as being overly-romanticised, with a definitional issue in understanding quite who “the people” might be, and an avoidance of the capitalist context in which much popular culture is produced and disseminated. Could there really be, with the possible exception of community television services (Ponsford, 2014) such as those offered in some UK localities – examples include London Live and the Humber region’s Estuary TV – a folk television that would be popular according to this potential definition?

The fifth of Storey’s definitions, and the one that his writing leans towards supporting, draws upon Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Hegemony is the term given to the intellectual and cultural domination of the people by elites over and above that physical domination which may be achieved through political and cultural organisations and ultimately the rule of law backed by force in the operation of those elites. A hegemonical approach, for Gramsci, explains how and why the people are controlled; it is done through their implied consent through inaction. Storey (2001, p 10) develops this, seeing the popular culture is not necessarily a mechanism for domination and control, but a site of negotiation; there are processes of incorporation and resistance, moving along at least two axes. The first of these axes (Storey, 2001, p10) is historical; a programme such as the BBC 1980s sitcom The Young Ones may be anarchic and subversive on one generation, but safely nostalgic in another. The second axis is synchronic, so that the perceived cultural value or status of a given text or practice may move “between resistance and incorporation at any given moment” (Storey, 2001, p. 10). The recently-cancelled BBC programme Top Gear may be simultaneously controversial, anarchic, morally conservative, patriarchal, classist and/or safely bland entertainment depending on one’s reading of the programme (Baird, 2014).

Storey (2001, pp. 1 – 16) goes on to outline five competing definitions of ideology. First, there is the perhaps straightforward notion of ideology as a coherent system of concepts and ideas understood by a defined group of people. Second, the definition of ideology as that which masks a truth beneath; an ideology is a distortion of the true picture that is passed off as truth itself. Here, there is a question of inequalities in power to be perhaps considered when looking at examples; this will be considered with regards to television scheduling, in the next section. The third of the definitions that Storey considers relates to the ways in which cultural texts (such as individual television episodes or whole series of shows) present a consistent worldview. Such a worldview may be deliberately skewed, and thus, in Storey’s terms, be both political and ideological.

Storey’s fourth definition draws on the work of Louis Althusser, whose “main contention is to see ideology not simply as a body of ideas but as a material practice” (Storey, 2001, p. 4). Habits, routines and customs have the effect, according to this perspective, of capturing us inside the social order; television viewership will be examined with this in mind. The fifth and final of Storey’s definitional aspects of ideology draws on Roland Barthes’ work, particularly his notion that (Storey, 2001, p. 5) “ideology operates mainly at the level of connotations”, and that subconscious inferences are provoked or allowed to be drawn that favour hierarchies and power-wielders in society.

So, popular culture is definitionally challenging and may be the site of top-down attempts to control or persuade the population towards the interests of social elites, and my also be the site also of what Storey (2001, p. 10) terms “struggle between the ‘resistance’ of subordinate groups in society and the forces of ‘incorporation’ operating in the interests of dominant groups in society”. For Croteau and Hoynes (2003, p. 15) mass media, of which television is a significant aspect, plays “a crucial role in almost all aspects of daily life” its social significance extending beyond communication and entertainment, affecting “how we learn about the world and interact with each other”. Television is a dominant medium, there being over 95% of UK households having at least one television set according to regulatory body Ofcom (BBC, 2014). Its penetration exceeds that of the internet, with only 73% of UK homes having domestic internet connections (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Our experience of major political events, such as the 2015 UK general election, is a mediated one; we experience it through our laptops, smart phones and through our television screens as much, if not more, than our unmediated selves do. So the ways in which politics are represented on our screens may have importance for our understanding of politics. Often, as in the 2015 election, issues may be simplified or essentialised; the current vogue for leader debates perhaps inevitably focusing on the personalities and performance of the party leaders, rather than on issue-based and record-based politics (BBC, 2015).

Though the digital switchover has complicated the situation somewhat, offering the Freeview service of over 40 – mostly niche – channels to all viewers, (Evening Standard, 2012), the main (and former terrestrial channels in the pre-2012 days of analogue broadcast) channels: BBC 1 and 2, ITV, Channels 4 and 5, operate a system whereby schedules are designed according to viewership. The viewing day “is divided into a number of time zones. The most important time zone is peak time, or prime time … from 7 p.m. to 10.30 p.m., and it is at that time that the television audience is largest” (Stewart, Lavelle & Kowaltzke, 2001, p. 235). Correspondingly, this is when the channel will broadcast its best-performing shows.

The TV schedule in itself may provoke a form of social ritual; people gather communally at the same time in their own homes to watch their favourite shows. Being able to hold conversations and opinions about soap opera storylines, reality contest contestants, televised sports events, new dramas and the like, is an aspect of everyday life. The perception of such a communal experience may be seen as a positive, a kind of social glue uniting the “imagined community” of the citizenship of the UK (Benedict Anderson, 1981). Alternatively, it may be seen as a negative; a site of the kind of hegemonic processes warned about by Gramsci as outlined above.

A sample view of an evening’s viewing may illustrate this. Taking the BBC1 prime time 7 – 10.30 p.m. schedule for Tuesday 25th August 2015 as a snapshot specimen (Radio Times, 2015), the schedule runs thus: The One Show, EastEnders, Holby City, New Tricks, the Ten O’Clock News. EastEnders and Holby City are long-running soap operas. The One Show is a weekday magazine programme offering celebrity interviews and light entertainment features. Both Holby City and New Tricks offer public service employees (the NHS and the police respectively) in the course of their daily duties.

Different approaches, as summarised above, might take different views of these programmes. A mass culture approach, for example, might critique the formulaic nature of each of these programmes, and their rote characters and situations going beyond that to concern itself with the ways in which audiences are lulled into accepting the preferred or dominant reading. These might include: an acceptance of celebrity and the trappings of success as worthy of merit and positive comment in a capitalist society, a focus on the fake problems of soap opera others than on your own problems and issues, an acceptance of the power and authority of the state and its agents, as represented here by the NHS and the loveable curmudgeons of the character-actor cast of police comedy-drama New Tricks.

That, though, may be overly negative an approach. Audiences are active, and not necessarily passive. The dominant reading is not the only possibility; oppositional or resistant readings “are made when a person finds their own life experiences are at odds with the views in the text” (Stewart, Lavelle & Kowaltzke, 2001, p. 27). Negotiated readings are made when “mental negotiations are needed to overcome some disagreement with the text” (Stewart, Lavelle & Kowaltzke, 2001, p. 27). Over time, sociological positions have shifted from a media effects perspective, where a simplistic sender-receiver – or hypodermic needle – model of communication assumed that audiences would passively take in what was broadcast or otherwise transmitted to them towards more inclusive models (Branston and Stafford, 2006, 271).

Television audiences are engaged, active and perhaps increasingly pro-active about their viewing. Models of audience behaviour such as the uses and gratifications model focus not on the television programme but on the audience and “emphasises what the audiences and readerships of media products do with them”, power being positioned not with the broadcaster but with the consumer, who navigates and negotiates constantly to gratify their own needs and their particular interests (Branston and Stafford, 2006, 275 – 6). In an age of real-time commentary on television viewing through social media services such as Facebook and Twitter, the active and engaged audience member may add their own voice, and interact with others adding their own, all from their sofa, or though time-shifting and on-demand services such as the BBC’s iPlayer service, can resist, create or subvert the schedules by devising their own should they wish.

This essay has approached the question of social ritual and relations in popular culture by focusing on television schedules and audiences. It has suggested that there is an importance attached to popular culture and its study, and that there are, and have been over time, a range of theoretical alternatives put forward to better understand the ways in which texts and audience engagement may be analysed. This essay has focused on Marxist and post-Marxist approaches, though there are others. The fact of the television schedule implies a set of social rituals; communal viewing at specified times and comment on them as a form of social glue as examples. The social relations we have in an interconnected society are perhaps necessarily mediated ones, and television remains a – if not the – dominant broadcast, entertainment and communications medium. For that alone it deserves serious study. The essay assert that audiences may best be conceptualised as active and engaged, and in the age of social media, that serves to reinforce the network of social relations and rituals underpinned by our experiences of watching, commenting and interacting with television programming.

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Historically, British society has been defined by a clearly demarcated system of social classes. In the medieval period, this was characterised by a feudal system of landowners and serfs (Bloch, 2014); in the early modern period the courtly aristocratic model defined the British class system, and this morphed in the last two centuries to form the traditional tripartite model of the working, middle and upper classes. However, in recent years such a system has been called into question. It has been argued that Britain is a class-less society, that socio-economic and democratising political forces have combined to rid the society of its vertical, pyramid structure. Proponents of this levelling process have argued that Britain, in the globalised twentieth century, is characterised by other, wider contextual forces than those of the national class system (Portes and Walton, 2013). However, this essay will take issue with this contention, and argue that announcements of the death of the class system in Britain are not merely premature or exaggerated, they are fundamentally wrong. Whilst net measures of wealth, education and so on point to improvements and progression en masse, the kinds of intra-societal divisions which mark out the class system have, if anything, increased in recent years, rendering Britain a society not merely defined but dominated by its class system.

One of the defining features of a class system is that it has a lowest strata or group. This has been defined variously as the lower classes, the working classes, the serfs or the ‘under class.’ Irrespective of terminology, this presence of a lowest social group is one which is a defining feature of class systems; it is seen, notably, in other cultural contexts such as the ethno-religious Hindu caste system, which identifies a clearly lowest class in the form of the so-called ‘untouchables’ (Rahaman, 2015). Thus, one argument in favour of Britain no longer exhibiting a class system might be the contention that no such underclass exists any longer. Such an argument is false, however, as social marginalisation, social exclusion, greater inequality and other social realities of contemporary British life make evident. What has often been mistakenly identified as the erosion of the class system is in fact a net movement upwards with respect to standards in British society as a whole. Therefore, it is true that British people, across the income spectrum, are better educated, live longer, and enjoy better living standards than they did in previous centuries (Graham, 2012). Yet, this has been matched by a general increase in standards for British people as a whole. The class system is a measure of demarcations within the collective social body, not a measure of general standards, and thus, it may be argued that the class system in Britain has become more rather than less entrenched in recent decades, as a net increase in standards has taken place alongside an increase in inequality.

The effects of the free market economic policies which defined the Thatcher governments of the 1980s and which were repackaged and continued in the form of New Labour have been significant in their impact on the British social structure and class system. They can be understood in the context of global free market economics, identified elsewhere with economics figures such as Milton Friedman, political figures such as Ronald Reagan, and concepts such as Monetarism, Neoliberalism, and so-called Reaganomics (Hill, 2015). Such policies have resulted in considerable wealth creation. In Britain under Thatcher, they were predicated on the so-called ‘trickle down’ effect, whereby it was believed that wealth creation among the upper echelons of society would have a knock-on effect whereby those members of the lower classes benefited from it. The very terminology – the idea that wealth would trickle down from higher up – betrays the degree to which these policies were predicated on the idea of a still-existent class system (Vinen, 2013). Indeed, Thatcher’s aspirational emphasis in her rhetoric and policy-making was indicative of this fact: she stressed the desire to create a British society (a term which she famously would not have used) in which members of the lower classes could aspire to join the ranks of the middle and upper classes, and that upward-mobility was something of which a society and its people could be proud (Hill, 2015). The very possibility of upward-mobility implies a class system, but what these policies effected was, rather than a collective move upwards for the lower classes and therefore an abolishment of the class hierarchy, was the exact opposite. Instead of reducing class differences, Thatcherism increased them. It enabled some to become enormously wealthy and others to remain poor. Even if the latter group were to be better off, the class system is a relative one and as such, a greater relative difference between one social strata and another compounds class differences, even if the overall result is that everyone is better off in absolute terms.

This misconception is at the heart of arguments which, this essay contends, mistake absolute changes in the nature of British social life for changes to the relative position of its social classes. The net result of Neoliberal economics, both globally and domestically in Britain, has been an increase in the wealth gap, a shoring up of the class system, and a greater distinction between the haves and the have-nots (Mount, 2012). This is seen most evidently in the persistence of the social underclass, which has been rendered relatively worse off by the wealth creation at the top of society, wealth which has not trickled down (Jones, 2012). Indeed, the creation by the New Labour government of a Social Exclusion Unit in 1998 (Stanley et al., 2011), tasked with the job of intervening among the lower classes to prevent people from being excluded from the benefits that society has to offer, is evidence of the fact that wealth has not trickled down. The severe economic disparity between the wealth of London – Britain’s financial capital – and the rest of the country, particularly the North-East, is further evidence of class division on a geographical level. Cribb et al. (2013) have shown that income inequality has knock-on effects in terms of social exclusion, such that even in the event that people want to move up the class system, the system itself, pace Thatcherism, works to prevent this from being feasible. The decision by Thatcher to privatise a number of British industries, to actively take on industrial and manual workers such as in the case of the Miners’ Strikes, and to concentrate much of British wealth and financial power in the hands of a number of leading banks and corporations in the City of London, all contributed to this greater division in British society (Jones, 2012). The result is that the poor are, relatively speaking, poorer, and the rich are, absolutely speaking, much richer and, relatively speaking, fantastically richer. A large percentage of Britain’s wealth is possessed by an increasingly small percentage of its population. The knock-on effects in terms of class division, social exclusion, and the perpetuation of the so-called underclass, are palpable.

It might be argued that, so far, this essay has demonstrated how income inequality and wealth gaps have increased in Britain in recent decades, and that this is not the same as saying that the class system has been entrenched and increased in the same way. Indeed, wealth is not a straightforward synonym for class in Britain. This essay has so far avoided defining the term ‘class’ for the very reason that it is nebulous and not something which can be defined in straightforwardly quantitative terms. It is, to some extent, a question of self-identification. Thus, a family with a low net income might identify itself as middle class, whereas a family or couple or individual with a greater net income might, conversely, consider themselves to be lower class. However, a useful working definition of class is inclusion/exclusion (Kraus et al., 2012). The higher the social class, the more social opportunities, resources and capital one is privilege to. The higher the social class, the greater access there is to the things the country has to offer, the greater the individuals are included. By contrast, lower social classes are defined by their being excluded from certain resources and opportunities that the society has to offer. Therefore, the lower classes might be excluded from private education, top universities, higher standards of medical care, and leisure opportunities and facilities (Scott, 2014). Whilst these are correlated with wealth, they are not simply coterminous with it. For example, a family might have the money to put their children through university, but if they or the children feel socially excluded from higher education (because they feel they are too lower class to belong there), then they will not attend and could therefore be socially excluded in any case. It is the contention of this essay that social exclusion remains a defining feature of British society, and as such the class system continues to operate to distinguish between those who are part of the ‘in’ group, and those that are not.

As noted above, this is seen in areas such as education and healthcare. One might cite the life expectancy variation in privileged parts of London compared with less privileged areas as evidence of the degree to which the poor are socially excluded from the benefits of British medical resources, technology and science (Scott-Samuel et al., 2014). Furthermore, one might cite the preponderance of public school educated children at top higher education institutions, and in the upper echelons of British social life more generally, as evidence of the degree to which people from lower-incomes or lower socio-economic groups are not afforded the same opportunities and the same inclusive rights as other individuals from higher class backgrounds. The prevalence of gang culture in inner-city environments is evidence of the marginalisation of youth from deprived socio-economic backgrounds (Jones, 2012). The London Riots of the summer of 2011 brought this class division into the spotlight, and constitute quite damning evidence of the idea that Britain is no longer a class-defined society. Similarly, the UK Uncut movement, whilst situated in the global context of the financial crisis, and its opposition to the 1%, is further evidence of a groundswell of social discontent within the UK at the degree to which the country’s population is socio-economically divided (Mount, 2012). This is not to mention some of the wider social problems which affect Britain and which impinge on the idea of class: among them questions of language (Standard English being the preserve of an elite class and contrasted with ‘lesser’ forms of speech such as regional or dialect English), race and nationality (with immigration and the resistance to inward-migration into the UK being topical political issues which impinge on ideas of class and social status).

In sum, and to conclude, Britain remains a society sharply divided on socio-economic and class lines. That these divisions have increased in both number and degree is clear evidence of the perpetuity of the class system. Although there has been net increases in living standards throughout the history of modern Britain (with the possible exception of periods of war (Price, 2013)), the relative changes which have taken place, especially in the last four decades, have been ones which have exacerbated difference rather than reduced it. The class system has been stretched rather than diminished, such that the socially excluded bottom is now excluded to a greater degree than before, whilst the wealth and privilege of the elite has increased exponentially. Whilst wealth difference is not a fool proof indication of class difference, analysing inclusion and exclusion (with the upper classes enjoying the former and the lower classes suffering the latter) makes clear the degree to which Britain is not an equal society of equal opportunities. The class system operates on the principle that there are those who have, and there are those who have-not. British society operates on the same lines, and as such continues, not merely to exhibit, but to be defined by its class system.

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In the twenty first century, employment of domestic workers is entirely universal. They carry out tasks such as child-rearing, food provisioning and preparation, cleaning, laundering and other homemaking tasks. Most of this invisible work throughout recorded history has been considered to be outside of production, either unwaged or so poorly paid it cannot serve to reproduce the labourer. However, domestic work, traditionally undertaken by women, is social reproduction, and is necessary to sustain productive labour. Marxists believe that social formations arise from the dominant mode of production and necessarily reflect and reproduce that mode in order to continue it through time. In a capitalist system, the reproduction of both the means of production and the forces of production must be ensured, otherwise production will cease and the system will flounder. The global capitalist economy has altered the social reproduction over the past three decades and many wealthier sections of society in developed countries now pay woman from poorer countries in the developing world to care for their children and carry out their domestic requirements. This migration for work in domestic service occurs on international, regional and rural-urban scales, and has become a major mechanism by which Third World women are incorporated into the waged labour market. However, the widespread phenomenon of the contemporary ‘maid trade’ (Momsen, 1999: p.9) possess a number of disturbing similarities to the slave trade of the 16th to 19th centuries. Maids experience violence, are highly vulnerable and have limited access to political, social and economic citizenship rights. This causes them to become ‘frustrated or defeated by the awesome power of the state to restrict or prohibit their capacity to belong to the imagined community of the nation’ (Mitchell et al, 2003).

In order to assess whether migrant domestic labour is a 21st century form of international slavery, it is necessary to recognise the reasons for its occurrence: the capitalist economy. Globalised capitalism has changed the face of social reproduction worldwide over the past four decades, enabling intensification of capital accumulation and exacerbating differences in wealth and poverty. During the 1960s and 1970s, feminist theories labelled housework as the great equaliser of women. Whatever women did, they all did housework, and if there were some women who hired others to do it they were a privileged few. All women were workers and their home was the workplace. This work was unpaid and unsupervised. Since then, the demand for domestic help has altered considerably. During the 1960s, the dual career family emerged as a new family form (Gregson and Lowe, 1994), but one that could only function if there were surrogates to take over the wife’s domestic role. In addition, for many countries the 1980s saw the demise of the social contract as a result of neoliberalism, privatisation, and the fall of the welfare state. The result was a reliance on private means of securing and sustaining social reproduction characterised by an increase in hiring of workers to cope with childcare and eldercare. This is usually done by women, and has clear class, race and national components.

Many women immigrate from Third World countries in search of work in the First World. The increasing global wage gap is a powerful incentive for the move. In addition, migrants can also receive more security in the developed world, having access to a variety of jobs, which is a crucial factor in the instabilities that globalisation creates. In 1996, over half of those who legally emigrated to the United States were women (Hochschild, 2000). The majority of these female migrants found work as domestics. The burden of middle-class working mothers in the rich North is reduced at the expense of increasing the burdens of these servants immigrating from the developing world, who are often also mothers themselves. Immigrant workers must rely on the help of others to care for their own children. In this global care chain, poorer women raise children for wealthier women while still poorer women raise their children. Parrenas (2001: p.86-88) describes this ‘globalisation of mothering’ by detailing how one domestic worker relies on a paid domestic worker to care for her children in the Philippines as she takes care of the household work of a professional woman in Italy. Although it is important to recognise that the employer is not directly responsible for this separation of mother and child, the situation does possess similarities with separation of slave children from their mothers during the slave trade.

Many migrant workers are illegal, as in the case of Paraguayan women working as domestic servants in Buenos Aires, or they are largely undocumented, as in Singapore (Momsen, 1999). They choose to work as live-in domestics because it is an occupation which provides a place to live for newly- arrived immigrants, and it is least likely to be checked by immigration authorities. Cox and Watt (2002) carried out a survey of domestic workers in the Hampstead area of North London, and the women sampled were all employed on an informal basis. The consequence of this was that these immigrants have no legal rights to basic requirements such as sick or holiday pay, or health and safety cover. This arrangement was highly beneficial to employers as they had no responsibility for their employees. Furthermore, in receiving countries, state policy often treats foreign domestic workers as no more than a form of commodified labour to be bought and sold in the open market (Yeoh, and Huang, 1998). In Singapore, foreign workers are largely seen as ‘a buffer to even out the swings of the business cycle’ (The Straits Times, November 17, 1988, quoted in Yeoh and Huang, 1998) and are subject to repatriation during periods of economic downturn such as the 1984/5 recession when 200, 000 workers were sent home (Salaff, 1990). This treatment cannot be equated with slavery, but nonetheless it is exploitation of financially less advantaged people and reinforces the domination and control of one group over another.

Migrants who work in domestic services experience a further lack of basic rights in the way in which their employers have a significant degree of control over their movement. For example, the employer often exerts power over the worker by holding their passport to ensure their good behaviour. his means that the worker’s liberty is severely restricted and her movements controlled by her employer. In addition, while employers do not ‘own’ their workers, in the United States, the visas given to domestic workers require them to only work for the employers who sponsor them. If they leave the employer they are liable for deportation. The actual experience of the worker in this sense may therefore, be similar to that of a slave (Anderson, 2000).

Domestic workers are increasingly recognised in the international community as among ‘the most widely exploited and most vulnerable to abuse and violence’ (Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997: p.32). Violence against domestics is hard to quantify, but incorporates a variety of types including physical violence, poor living conditions and overwork. The most severe violence towards domestics was highlighted in May 2015 when Indonesia announced that it would stop sending new domestic workers to 21 Middle Eastern countries after two Indonesian women were executed in Saudi Arabia (France-Presse, 2015).

Poor living conditions are also witnessed and are characterised by a lack of food and privacy. In Canada, thousands of migrant workers gain access to the country via the Live-in Caregiver programme. This is a visa programme designed and implemented by the Canadian federal government, to create a supply of domestic workers at rates affordable to middle-class Canadian families. The vast majority of domestic workers come from the Philippines and since 1984 this origin has accounted for over 60 per cent of migrant workers (Pratt et al, 1998). The programme stipulates that the migrant domestic worker must live in their employer’s home. Some employers fail to provide a lock for the door and respect the worker’s room as a private space. The insecurity of their own room means that domestic workers cannot properly claim a place, and it communicates to them their lack of rights and the transitory nature of their ‘stay’ in Canada (Pratt, et al 1998). Hunger is also a problem for some domestic workers. If starvation is not really the issue, their diminished status is communicated and absorbed through food restrictions. Beyond the shortage of food, some domestic workers also feel a great awkwardness about introducing their own cultural food habits into the house. This lack of privacy and food alone cannot be claimed to be a form of slavery, however the relationship that it creates between employer and employee does have parallels with the control and power exerted over slaves by their master during the slave trade.

A major feature of the exploitation of domestic workers occurs through the restricting, controlling or even striking out of the maid’s day of rest. A survey by Yeoh and Huang (1998) on migrant domestic workers in Singapore found that 28.4 per cent of the maids have no day off at all, about one third have one day off per month, and just over 10 per cent have one day off per week. Pratt, et al (1998) describes the discomfort felt by Filipino domestic workers in Canada, within the rest of the house when their employers were home, because of feelings that they must continue working and a sense of being scrutinised. Domestic workers are also subject to non-payment or a reduction in wages. Furthermore, the management of these companies find ways of shaving off nearly an hour’s worth of wages a day, such as time spent travelling from house to house and unpacking equipment. It can be suggested therefore, that domestic work is a form of economic slavery.

Suggestions that migrant domestic labour is a 21st century form of international slavery particularly come from the nature of the work they must carry out and also physical violence that they are subjected to. For example, domestic workers are often told to scrub the floor twice daily with a toothbrush and stand to attention while the employer is out. Anderson (2000) illustrates the horrific treatment migrant servants all too frequently face. She gives details of a 15 year old girl from Burma who was sold by her parents and taken to Bangkok where she worked 18 hour days, cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry, massaging her employers and sleeping on the floor in a store room. She was required to do this for 5 months without pay. The girl attempted to escape, but was brought back at gunpoint. In other cases, male employers have been found to rape and sexually abuse migrant workers.

Migration for work in domestic service, although having deep historical roots, has been reinvented in the last three decades in response to the global spread of neo-liberal economic policies and the increased paid employment of women. It has now become a transnational activity, in which women leave their native land to work for a short period in a foreign country, in order to support the families left behind. Much of this work is done by racialised minorities and those whose legal status is precarious (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003). These groups are therefore, highly vulnerable and their treatment by the middle- class has led to claims that migrant domestic labour is a 21st century form of international slavery. This is highlighted through the separation of mother and child, a lack of basic rights and the abuse of power and control over employees. However, it must be recognised that these experiences are not uniform within and between countries. Many domestic workers are well treated and lead happy lives. Moreover, it has been argued that while some worker’s experiences may be similar to those of slaves, the mechanisms of power exercised over them are different. The legal limitations on the power held over migrant domestic workers in the 21st century are generally greater than those that were held over slaves.

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Essay Question:

Examine how ideas about race were elaborated in the second half of 19th century and the early 20th century.

Race is a historically and culturally specific notion, embedded in a constellation of economic, political, and cultural discourses and uniquely linked to specific relations of power and authority’ (Hirschfield, 1998, p.34).

It has been argued that race was an Enlightenment project that resulted from the desire to classify (Cohen, 1974, p.207). Racial thinking certainly existed before this period, but the modern concept of race is a more recent one that has developed from the encounter of more Europeans with other peoples (MacDonald, 1973, p.241). There is some disagreement as to when the construction of race took its current form. First, it has been suggested that the descriptions of race in ancient literature demonstrate that it originates in xenophobic beliefs (Hirschfield, 1998, p.34). The system of natural classification that developed in the Eighteenth Century is also seen as an important contribution (Hannaford, 1996, p.188). However, almost all studies agree that a distinctive development of racial thinking began to take place in the Nineteenth Century (Hirschfield, 1998, p.35). The Nineteenth Century saw the search for the historical and biological origins of race (Hannaford, 1996, p.235). It went beyond the simply classification of race and towards a more significant delineation of race into one that embodies characteristics, personalities and even mental abilities. Several key developments were relevant to this progression. These will be examined as follows: first the importance of the development of biological categories and the influence of power will be examined. Secondly, the development of scientific dialogue of Darwinism and Eugenics will be discussed. Thirdly, an examination will be made of the influence of nationalism and imperialism. Finally, the notion to which the discourse became self-serving will be considered in that as the connection between cultural features and racial stereotypes became ingrained, there was recourse to the scientific argument to justify the features of power.

The urge to divide the human race into broad categories similar to the animal kingdom seems to be a starting point for many of the theorists in the Nineteenth Century (James, 1981, p.19). Kant’s On the Different Human Races is characteristic of this view: he draws analogy to how the animal species are divided to demonstrate a division in the human race. ‘A natural division is based upon identifying lines of descent that divide according to our reproductive relations’ (Kant, 2000, p. 8). This description of racial characteristics holds a number of significant features of the developing views of race. It seeks to explain differences as accruing from environmental change (James, 1981, p.19). Despite attempting to read as a scientific study, it demonstrates some significant bias towards the North Europeans, describing those who live in the humid heat of a warm climate, which he states produces ‘a thick, turned up nose and thick fatty lips’ (Kant, 2000, p.17). The skin needs to be oily to avoid the absorption of the ‘foul, humid air’ (Kant, 2000, p.17). This thus demonstrates that the scientific foundation became the vector for the view of ‘racial development and the perceived superiority of white.

The foundation of the racial paradigm can therefore be discerned in the need to classify elements of the human race in a manner similar to the natural world (Lazarus, 2011, p.4). As has been seen, the development of classification resulted in a derogation of the non-European races. From one point of view, this can be seen as a natural progression, as those doing the classification may tend to regard themselves as the superior race, simply defining all alternatives as the ‘other’ (James, 1981, p.19). However, this went much further than a simple scientific approach to considering all races to be inferior in a general sense to a kind of opposition to other races (Bayly, 2004, p.227). The classification was extended not simply to demonstrate different racial characteristics to ones that included personalities, attitudes and associated capabilities. The urge to categorise therefore does not simply predetermine the unequal distribution of racial characteristics between different races (Cohen 1974, p.207).

Darwinism can be seen as a significant academic contribution to the racism paradigm. The notion that some races had evolved to a more complete end than others dominated the discourse (Bayly, 2004, p.230). This represented a significant departure from the old notions of racism and pointed towards the solution: the other, more advanced races would attempt to educate the other races and complete their evolution. The triumph of Western Capitalism was seen as a self-evident manifestation of evolution’s triumph in the Western Europeans, with the success of the ex-colonies such as the United States being seen as further proof of a racial superiority of white people (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2006, p.563). This was intertwined with the notion of social Darwinism, where the formation of societies were seen as corresponding to the same principles of evolutionary racism. This can be seen in the declaration by the German General Friedrich von Bernhardi in 1907: ‘war is a biological necessity of the first importance… since without it unhealthy development will follow, which excludes the advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization’ (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2006, p.563).

The development of Eugenics in the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries represents the clearest manifestation of the racial characteristics. This can be described as the science of racial improvement (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2006, p.564). This characterises the racist paradigm at that time, whereupon differences had become interpreted as significant and strong manifestations of elements that are better or worse within a race (Benedict, 1983, p.45). Selective breeding was seen as a method by which the tendency of racial characteristics would tend towards an average could be modified. This provided further scientific rationale that justified racial stereotypes. Furthermore, it demonstrated that intermixing between the races could result in interbreeding, and thus ‘pollute’ racial stocks (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2006, p.546). The formation of the British Society for Eugenics in the early Twentieth Century represented a significant development of the scientific rationale attempting a social cause, whereby some elements of society were encouraged to breed whereas others were discouraged. This, evidently reached its apogee in the Nazism of the 1930s and 1940s, but the principles were prevalent before this took a particularly strong manifestation. The Nuremberg laws in 1935 redefined German citizenship on racial grounds and ultimately this resulted in sterilisation and genocide of undesirable elements in society. It was the extremes that this manifestation reached that contributed to its dramatic decline in popularity following the war (Benedict, 1983, p.46).

Biological determinism offers one starting point for the justification of slavery in the mid-Nineteenth Century and therefore offered a starting point for the justification of racial oppression; in other words it provided the means of defining unequal power relationships (Cohen, 1974, p.209). The associated racial characteristics applied to other races by Europeans and their descendants can be seen in the manifestation of power (James, 1981, p.25). At a point where the anti-slavery movement was growing in importance across the old colonial powers, it seemed required that justification of the submissive state of such individuals in society was required (Gupta, 1983, p.27). Slavery in the USA became to be seen more as a paternalistic benevolence by slave owners to a race who, by their nature, were unable to thrive for themselves outside the framework of slavery (Bayly, 2004, p.277). It was widely held in the USA in the Nineteenth Century that black people were slow of learning and had little natural intelligence (Hannaford, 1996, p.188). The power relations that were involved in the suppression of one group by another therefore justified the characterisation of that race as limited in natural ability, and thus suggested the oppression of the race was of benefit to them rather than the exploitative relationship it was. This idea will be further explored in the development of nationalism and imperialism, but it is important to note the manifestation of power relationships in a wide range of contexts before the late-Nineteenth Century developments (Hannaford, 1996, p.189).

The notion of racism also developed to encompass not only significant differences of race, but differences in nationality (Gupta, 1983, p.23). This ‘racism without colour’ requires attention owing to its growth in the period of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries (Gupta, 1983, p.22). It has been argued that race and racism are ‘inextricably linked’ but this is difficult to support (Morris, 1994, p.845). Although there is significant racial heterogeneity in the UK, there are strong arguments that suggest that a perceived racial homogeneity is a cultural construct (Gupta, 1983, p.23). The growth of nationalism can be seen as a significant contribution to the development of racist ideologies (Lazarus, 2011, p.3). According to a number of studies of nationalism, the notion became increasingly important in the Nineteenth Century resulting in the theme of nationalism that is present today (Brubaker, 2011, p.1785). The later Nineteenth Century was the period during which the theme of nationalism was very strong (Anderson, 2006, p.11). This, therefore, resulted in the development of racism to extend to national characteristics rather than simply focusing on biological differences.

A significant corollary of the development of nationalism was that it was founded on shared values and national characteristics (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010, p.773). This therefore provided the notion that other cultures and nations did not share such characteristics. This can be seen as part of the foundation of the notion of racism based upon essentially nationalistic characteristics. As Benedict (1983, p.128) states ‘if Frenchman and Germans differed, by that token they were different races.’ A crucial element of a number of nationalisms was the notion that the population within the set geographical limitations were of the same race (Anderson, 2006, p.15). This intertwined the notion of race and national boundaries in a way that had not received such a complete notion before. However, in order for this developed to take place, the notions of racial-nationalism drew heavily upon the developing paradigm that suggests that there is a coincidence between the race of an individual or a group and other features, such as learning acumen, personality features, attitudes and so on (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010, p.775).

The application of this idea to the set of national characteristics was relatively smooth: it simply posited that, in the same way the geography changed the racial characteristics of people in terms of physical features, it further had an effect on their personal characteristics (Kant, 2000, p.17). Therefore individuals living in a nation state that had a different geographical location would thus develop similar characteristics as each other and different ones from different states. This paradigm could only apply to a certain number of states and does not fully explain the existence of entrenched racism that occurred in other areas such as the USA, South Africa and Australia (Anderson, 2006, p.16). In such cases the notion of power represents the most significant explanatory variable. However, it is significant that there was an attempt to provide a strong adherence to a common set of values in late Nineteenth Century; particularly such values as might be deemed Anglo-Saxon, which reinforced the supremacy of the white make, the Protestant Church and the English Language (Bayly, 2004, p.229). This can be seen as perhaps resulting from the same factors that produced a racial conception of nationality.

The later Nineteenth Century was a period during which imperialist theories were also legion (Bayly, 2004, p.227). In the historical context of creation, these views were intertwined with nationalism. However, within the context of the development of racial arguments, they have a significant role to play. This has been characterised as ‘new’ imperialism, during which most of Africa was seized by Europeans (Bayly, 2004, p.228). These views are considered separately as it can illustrate the significance of the importance of nationalism in emphasising the racial characteristics of nation states (Anderson, 2006, p.11). Imperialism, however, demonstrated the importance of power relations in the development of the racial discourse. In many senses, the racial discourse can be seen as developing from a concerted attempt to justify the unequal power relationship between the rulers and ruled. This can be seen in extent to which most Europeans gave humanitarian or religious justification for their actions, suggesting that the superiority of European civilization compelled them to impose it upon the primitive cultures (Bayly, 2004, p.229). Social Darwinism played a significant role in the development of imperialisms justified on academic racism, whereby the primitive aspects of the race were seen as justification in itself for the imperialist activities. Other motives for imperialism, such as the economic imperative, all drew on the racist paradigm to provide a less selfish justification for the new empires (Bayly, 2004, p.230). This therefore resulted in an increase in the notion of race being a defining characteristic.

Racial ideologies were not simply advanced by a conglomeration of nationalism, imperialism, Darwinism and Eugenics (Giroux, 1992, p.165). In the early Twentieth Century, there became evidence strands of simply cultural racism that can be seen as running alongside the biological determinism that was largely prevalent. From this perspective, individuals were suspicious or negative towards to other races not solely on the basis on racial differences, but because those differences represented a divergence in cultural values (Giroux, 1992, p.164). This can be seen in the number of miscegenation laws that prevailed in the USA in this period, which have been interpreted as founded on notions of biological mixing (Hirschfield, 1998, p.24). However, there was considered to be more at stake than simply the eroding of biological race: marriage resulted in social responsibility and constituted more than simply the biological element; it did not outlaw illicit sex but simply marriage. This therefore was an attempt to assert the supremacy of the white man over all other races (Giroux, p.165). However, during this period, challenges to miscegenation laws included the argument that the continual subdivision of racial categories made no sense in terms of an identification of race as a biological characteristic (Mason, 1994, p.845). Therefore, this period includes not only the development of the biological classification of racism in the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, but also the gradual eradication of this notion in the courtrooms of the USA and the continued definition on the grounds of power relationships (Bayly, 2004, p.231).

The results of this investigation therefore demonstrate the following features of the definition of racism in the late Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth Century (Jackson, 2004, p.4). First, the starting point was the biological definition of racism, which, coupled with unequal power relationships resulted in the definition of certain features as being undesirable, less advanced or primitive (Bayly, 2004, p.227). Second, the development of the sciences of evolutionary Darwinism and Eugenics provided further scientific validity to these views, justifying unequal power relationships either by pinpointing the inability of certain races to develop, or by suggesting the more advanced races had a personal benevolence to the others (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2006, p.563). Third, the growth in nationalism resulted in the extension of the racist paradigm to encompass characteristics defined by nationalism rather than identified by biological features (Anderson, 2006, p.11). Fourth, the growth in imperialism in this period drew upon evolutionary theory to define the colonised as less developed and therefore justifying their colonisation as a duty for the more evolved (Bayly, 2004, p.227). Finally, cultural separatism played a role, where the biological racial argument was used as a cover to simply perpetuate the inequalities in society (Giroux, 1992, p.165). During this period, racism went from a series of speculations to a firmly developed and justified academic discipline; different elements of the paradigm intertwined to justify unequal power relationships and vindicate oppression.

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Macdonald, I., 1973. The Capitalist Way to Curb Discrimination. Race Today,pp.241-2.

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Introduction

There is a difference between the terms sex and gender. Sex refers to biological differences such as chromosomes, hormones and internal and external sex organs, whereas gender is the way in which males and females behave in society, displaying what are considered as masculine or feminine traits. These traits are often stereotypes about what constitutes being a male or female in society (Unger, 1979). There are a number of ways in which children develop gender and an understanding at a young age that they are a boy or a girl. The development may occur through social learning theory, (SLT, Bandura, 1977) or through cognitive schema theory (Martin and Halverson, 1981). Children tend to grow up understanding they are a boy or girl and this knowledge becomes a part of their self-concept. The following essay will consider the ways in which gender develops in childhood and how stereotypical perspectives of gender are perpetuated.

The Biological Approach to Gender

A powerful argument for the biological influence on gender can be made when evaluating the study of David Reimer (Money, 1975). Money worked with children born with genitalia that was not clearly defined as either male or female, and, in his role as a doctor, he believed that gender could be reassigned. It was argued by Money that children are born gender neutral and their gender identity develops as a consequence of behavioural interventions and SLT as proposed by Bandura (1977).

David Reimer was one of a pair of male monozygotic twins whose penis was burnt off during an operation for circumcision. The penis could not be repaired and at 7 months it was decided by doctors and his parents that a functional vagina could be constructed and David should be raised as a girl, Brenda. Money reported originally that the gender reassignment had been a success and Brenda as a child was feminine, liked wearing dresses and playing with dolls. Although Brenda also had tomboyish characteristics it was suggested that this was due to the games played with her twin brother.

However, despite Money’s claims that nature could be overcome by nurture and gender was not biologically determined it was later reported that Brenda had been desperately unhappy as a female child and at 14 years she became male again (Diamond and Sigmundson, 1997). It was argued by Money that the study was reliable because David’s twin brother acted as a control as the twins shared the same genes and environment which meant their behaviours could be classified as being either nature or nurture. The findings of the study were biased and based on the subjective interpretations made by Money, perhaps to prove the veracity of his theory regarding gender reassignment. The study was a unique case study and ethically could not be replicated to investigate whether other children, perhaps younger than David, could adapt to gender reassignment. There have been cases have reported successful adaptation such as Daphne Went, who was born with the condition testicular feminising syndrome (TFS). This means that although the individual is biologically male they have external female genitalia. Daphne was happy as a female, unlike David Reimer, who in adulthood committed suicide (Goldwyn, 1979)

Another supporting argument for the biological differences between males and females was found using neuroimaging techniques and electroencephalogram (EEG). It has been shown, for example, that males tend to use the left hemisphere of the brain more than their right hemisphere, whereas females are less lateralised and this may have an effect on gender. The right hemisphere of the brain is involved in aspects of language and it has been found that females tend to use both hemispheres more equally than males (Koles, Lind and Flor-Henry, 2010).

Is Gender Socially Constructed?

There is a strong argument that gender is a socially constructed concept. This means that labels such as gender are meaningless as there is no scientific foundation for such labels. Nevertheless, such labels become entrenched in everyday language and knowledge with only a few people questioning such terms (Gergen, 2009). Gergen argues that gender can be classified in various forms in addition to the male/female dichotomous representation. Diamond and Butterworth (2008) similarly propose that gender should be a fluid concept that allows individuals who do not see themselves as fitting into either a male or female heterosexual category, to define themselves as lesbian, bisexual or transsexual.

The Role of Play in Gender Development

Children typically become aware of their gender identity and that they are either a boy or a girl at a very young age. When gender awareness develops, children tend to participate consistently in what society perceives as being gender appropriate behaviours. Kohlberg, (1966, p.89) proposes that by the age of 3-years a child has a cognitive representation of the relationship between behaviour and gender, for example, ‘I am a boy, therefore I want to do boy things, therefore the opportunity to do boy things (and to gain approval for doing them) is rewarding’. However, a criticism of Kohlberg’s theory is that children are exposed to many influences before the age of 3-years that have a fundamental role in the formation of gender identity. Martin and Halverson (1981) propose that young children develop a gender schema (a set of beliefs or expectations) about the self which includes roles for males and roles for females, which they observe in everyday life, thus they remember gender specific behaviours and forget or ignore information about opposite-gender behaviours. Martin and Halverson’s model explains how gender stereotypes develop and are resistant to change for most children as they become older.

Parents, siblings and peers reinforce gender stereotypes from birth and therefore it could be argued that gender-related behaviours develop because they are encouraged by other people who are close to the child. Female infants typically have pink clothes and nurseries, while boys often have blue clothes and nurseries. It is suggested by Bandura (1977) that children learn behaviours through the observation and imitation of others and in particular the behaviours of same-sex others (such as mothers or sisters). Behaviours are further reinforced if they are rewarded or praised, for example, behaviours that are perceived as being gender appropriate. If behaviour is perceived as being gender inappropriate this tends to be discouraged (Fagot, 1978). In a study undertaken by Fagot (1985) the notion of same sex-peers influencing behaviour was observed with a group of 21-25 month old boys and girls. Behaviours of the children were classified as male, female or neutral and the reactions of the teachers and children to the behaviours were recorded. It was found that the boys gave positive responses when other boys engaged in male activities and the girls responded positively to the other girls rather than boys. The nursery school teachers could influence the girls to alter their behaviours, from physical activities to quieter activities. Neither the girls nor the teachers could influence the boys to change their behaviour, and they continued with physical activities, tending not to take any notice of the teachers. The boys did not respond to the teacher’s requests even when the quieter activities were positively reinforced, which does not support SLT, although the boys themselves had a greater effect in changing other boy’s behaviours.

There have been a large number of studies which have found that children play with toys that are gender-specific (Bussey and Bandura, 1999). A study conducted by Fagot (1978) asked parents to rate the play of their children aged between 20- and 24-months in their own homes. It was found that parents rated the most appropriate behaviours for girls as playing with dolls, dancing and dressing up. For boys the more appropriate behaviour was physical activities such as rough and tumble play, playing with blocks and manipulating objects. It was also found that girls were not encouraged to undertake tasks that involved manipulating objects while the boys were discouraged from playing with dolls (Fagot, 1978). The study demonstrates that parents have different approaches towards their children and gender specific play.

Using pictures of toys, Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen and Eichstedt (2001) found that children of 12-, 18- and 24-months preferred stereotypically gender specific toys such as boys preferred trucks and girls preferred dolls. Wong and Hines (2015) undertook a study with boys and girls at two different ages; firstly at 20-40 months and then at 26-47 months. The study used two stereotypical gender-specific toys (a train and a doll) and colour coded a-typical toys in either pink or blue. The findings were predictable as the girls played with the doll and the boys played with the train. However, for the colour-coded a-typical toys the results showed that children were strongly influenced by the colour (for example, the boys avoided playing with anything coded pink). The authors conclude that colour coding toys should be avoided as it may allow all children to develop different skills by playing with different types of stereotypical gender-specific toys, particularly if the colour was more neutral.

Miller (1987) reports that stereotypical gender specific toys have an effect on cognitive and social development of boys and girls, and that it is difficult to find similarities in either the toys or the play of boys and girls. This perspective is supported by a study undertaken by Cherney, Kelly-Vance, Glover, Ruane and Ryalls (2003). The study investigated how stereotypical gender specific toys influenced cognitive development on children aged 18-47 months. The children were observed in a playroom for complex play activities. According to Cherney et al. play is an appropriate way to assess children’s cognitive development, for example the change to symbolic play from exploratory play. Such changes may also help identify children at risk from developmental delay. However, it is reported that very young children (18-months) show different abilities depending on the toys they are playing with. The findings of this study are relevant because children are assessed for their cognitive development at an early age and therefore may not show their potential if given atypical toys that are not gender specific. The findings showed a larger effect for girls in comparison to boys, in that a higher degree of complexity of play was shown when the girls played with stereotypical girl’s toys such as a kitchen and dolls. Thus a selection of toys need to be used when assessing children in formal standardised test situations. However, the study does not mention cultural differences in play and whether the findings would apply to different cultures and ethnic groups.

Conclusion

The evidence presented indicates that both nature, nurture and the wider society perpetuate and emphasise gender stereotypes in childhood. The differences between males and female involve biological differences and in Money’s (1975) longitudinal study of David Reimer showed that nature was dominant over nurture (Diamond and Sigmundson, 1997). This appears to support the idea that gender is a socially constructed concept that identifies two groups (Gergen, 2009) although it is argued that there are more facets to gender than the dominant male/female dichotomy (Diamond and Butterworth, 2008)

Gender is learnt from an early age and SLT (Bandura, 1977) has a role in determining gender with parents reinforcing what society considers appropriate behaviour for boys and girls (Fagot, 1978) Children develop a mental framework or schema of behaviours that are appropriate for either male or female children. The schema appears to be reflected very strongly in the way children play and the type of toys they play with from an early age. Toys can be classified as being stereotypical for either boys or girls and this is particularly the case if toys are coloured pink or blue (Wong and Hines, 2015). The problem with gender specific toys is that they result in gender stereotypical behaviours, roles and activities (Cherney et al. 2003). A further problem is that because children show a strong preference for stereotypical gender-related toys, if such toys are not used in formal standardised tests, the child’s full ability may be incorrectly recorded (Cherney et al. 2003). One omission from many studies is the play of children from different cultures and ethnic groups and how their play affects gender stereotypes. This would appear to be very relevant in contemporary society although this does not appear to be mentioned in the Wong and Hines (2015) study.

References

Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bussey, K. and Bandura, (1999). Social cognitive theory of gender development and differentiation. Psychological Review, 106, pp.676-713.

Cherney, I.D., Kelly-Vance, L., Glover, K.G., Ruane, A. and Ryalls, B.O. (2003). The effects of stereotyped toys and gender on play assessment in children aged 18-47 months. Educational Psychology, 23(1), 95-106

Diamond, M. and Sigmundson H.K. (1997). Sex reassignment at birth: Long-term review and clinical implications. Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, 151(3), 298-304.

Diamond, L.M. and Butterworth, M. (2008). Questioning gender and sexual identity: dynamic links over time. Sex Roles, 59, 365-376.

Fagot, B.I. (1978). The influence of sex of child on parental reactions to toddler children. Child Development, 49, 459-465.

Fagot, B.I. (1985). Beyond the reinforcement principle: Another step to understanding sex role development. Developmental Psychology, 21(6), 1097-1104.

Gergen, K.J. (2009). An Invitation to Social Construction, 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Goldwyn, E. (1979). The fight to be male. The Listener, May, 709-712

Kohlberg, L. (1966). A cognitive-developmental analysis of children’s sex-role concepts and attitudes. In E.E. Maccoby (Ed.) The Development of Sex Differences. Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press.

Koles, Z.J., Lind, J.C. and Flor-Henry, P. (2010). Gender differences in brain functional organization during verbal and spatial cognitive challenges. Brain Topography, 23(2), 199-204.

Martin, C.L. and Halverson, C.F. Jr. (1981). A schematic processing model of sex typing and stereotyping in children. Child Development, 54, 563-574

Miller, C.L. (1987). Qualitative differences among gender-stereotyped toys: implications for cognitive and social development in girls and boys. Sex Roles 16(9/10), 473-487

Money, J. (1975). Ablatio penis: Normal male infant sex-reassigned as a girl. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 4(1) pp.65-71.

Serbin, L.A., Poulin-Dubois, D., Colburne, K.A., Sen, M.G. and Eichstedt, J.A. (2001). Gender stereotyping in infancy: visual preferences for and knowledge of gender stereotyped toys in the second year. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 25(1), pp.7-15.

Unger, R.K. (1979). Toward a redefinition of sex and gender. American Psychologist, 34(11), 1085-1094

Wong, W. and Hines, M. (2015). Effects of gender color-coding on toddlers’ gender-typical toy play. Archives of Sexual Behaviour, 44(5), 1233-1242

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Introduction

The objective of this paper is to explore why the outcomes of the work of the Goethe Institute of Germany and the Confucius Institute of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been so contrasting in terms of establishing cultural and social influence. The paper begins by examining the origins of both institutes and their aims in the context of soft power. Soft power is critically examined as a governmental imperative in a globalised world, and it will be shown how cultural institutes have a role in its formulation and exercise. The next section examines the institutes’ structure and governance, and how these have been crucial determinants of their success. Finally, the findings reported in this paper are drawn together and summarised in the Conclusion.

The origins and aims of the Goethe Institute and the Confucius Institute

The Goethe Institute was established in 1951 in what was then West Germany, with the aim of rebuilding respect for and the reputation of the German language and culture following the Second World War. It originated primarily as a language-learning organisation, for which purpose it established dedicated “reading rooms”, but as it developed it expanded its remit to encompass the propagation of German culture and the holding of social events. By 2015, the Goethe Institute had 159 centres worldwide (Goethe Institute, 2015a).

The aims of the Confucius Institute are remarkably similar to those of the Goethe Institute, although emergent from contrasting origins. It was established in 2004 with the aim of ameliorating concerns felt around the world outside the PRC about the country’s headlong economic growth and rapidly increasing military power. Like the Goethe Institute, the Confucius Institute aimed to facilitate language learning, but expanded its activities into the cultural and social sphere. By 2015, the Confucius Institute operated in more than 480 locations worldwide, using facilities on university campuses (UCLA Confucius Institute, 2015).

Both institutes began with difficult yet auspicious origins; both Germany and the PRC had reputations to build from a low base, but both Germany and the PRC are countries with rich cultural heritages capable of attracting significant degrees of interest from people in the outside world.

The approach of both institutes, however, is essentially top-down, with a strategy of imparting knowledge about their cultures in their subject locations as something differentiated and separate, rather than attempting what is conventionally regarded to be meaningful cultural influence through immersion and integration (Christians, 1997), calling into question the likely effectiveness of the institutes in achieving their stated aims. Given those aims, it is appropriate to conceptualise them as agencies of government, which is essentially concerned with the exercise of power (Dowding, 1996).

Historically, governments have achieved their aims through “hard” power; typically the maintenance of armed forces and commercial strength underpinned their diplomacy (Dowding, 1996). Nye (1990) notes, however, that advancing globalisation has increased the financial cost and political consequences of the use of hard power, as exemplified by the PRC, whose military strength and commercial influence have had increasingly negative consequences in terms of international relations and trust. Military and commercial strength are, in themselves, insufficient in assuring international influence in an age where societal opinion matters, and such opinion is instantaneously shared through social media which frequently imports environmental, social and moral considerations (Nye, 2004). In response to the reduced influence of hard power, governments have turned to “soft” power – the use of co-option rather than coercion (Nye, 2004) – in order to achieve their strategic aims. An important means of exerting soft power is through the use of culture. However, while a country may possess attractive cultural features, they will not be influential if those features are not widely known or appreciated (Mattern, 2005), and cultural institutes are seen as a means by which such knowledge and appreciation may be established and international trade enhanced. There are drawbacks to this approach; Ferguson (2003) notes that soft power has its contradictions. It is, for example, quite possible for a section of society to be unproblematically using Microsoft software to write anti-US campaign material while drinking Coca Cola in a Macdonald’s restaurant. Soft power also has its limitations; Blechman (2004) notes that it cannot be mobilised to achieve specific policy goals, although a core strength of soft power lies it its essential organically democratic nature, in that individuals and groups can influence the policy it sets out to achieve (Van Ham, 2005; Moravcsik, 1997). It is also the case that the attractiveness of a culture is determined not by its purveyor, but rather by its recipients (Fan, 2008).

It is, therefore, the case that soft power is not a direct replacement for hard power, although it does have value in forming and legitimising policy, and in establishing the environment in which policy may be pursued. Given that policy is mediated through the essentially top-down phenomenon of government, it is not unreasonable to posit that, counter to Christians’ (1997) thesis of social influence, the top-down nature of the institutes does not render them unfit for purpose, but they rather have a model of influence that reflects the approach of the state governments that are their ultimate sponsors.

The relative success of the Goethe Institute and the Confucius Institute, and the effect of their structure and governance

Having established the criteria by which the institutes’ success may be measured – that of the establishment and exercise of state soft power, and what the limitations of that soft power are – this section explores how successful the Goethe Institute and the Confucius Institute have been in achieving their aims.

There is considerable evidence to support the contention that the Goethe Institute has been generally successful in achieving its aims. The reputation of Germany has been significantly rehabilitated from its low point at the end of the Second World War, and that country is today widely respected and admired. This may be as much to do with, inter alia, the harmless jollity of the Munich Oktoberfest, the international popularity of German Christmas markets and Germany’s high-quality industrial products as the effect of the Goethe Institute, although the evidence for the influence of the Goethe Institute is clear in data that shows that people outside Germany who come into contact with the institute hold a higher opinion of Germany than those who do not (The Economist, 2015). It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that the Goethe Institute has achieved the aim of being of some influence in the favourable propagation of German culture.

The same cannot be said, however, for the international reputation of the PRC. Comparing the reputation of the PRC to that of Japan (Germany’s Far-Eastern equivalent in respect of post-Second World War reputation), it can be seen from the Chicago Council study (2009) that Japan has been successfully rehabilitated and has managed to withstand the concerns ensuing from economic success that the PRC is clearly failing to ameliorate. This contrast in outcomes is difficult to explain, given the similarities in the international interest in the rich cultural heritages of Germany and the PRC. Chinese culture, like that of Germany, has much to offer; Chinese food is popular throughout the world, as are Tai Chi, Sun Tsu’s The Art of War (in a business context) and Confucian wisdom, yet the PRC is stubbornly perceived to be an economic threat around the world, and a military threat in East Asia (Paradise, 2009) – something that the Confucius Institute has apparently failed to counter.

Examination of the structure of these institutes offers insight into their contrasting success. A clear indication lies in their developmental histories; since 1951, the Goethe Institute has established 159 centres throughout the world (Goethe Institute, 2015a), while since only 2004 the Confucius Institute has established over 480 (UCLA Confucius Institute, 2015). Such comparatively headlong expansion on the part of the Confucius Institute unfortunately mirrors the rapid economic growth of its home country that causes so much international concern. Also, the name “Confucius Institute” implicitly suggests the copying of something that worked elsewhere – naming the institute after the country’s internationally famous philosopher, a strategy that worked for Germany and so (it is thought) ought to work for the PRC. This strategy, however, also mirrors an important aspect of the PRC’s economic success – the copying of products designed and developed elsewhere that has led to many intellectual property disputes around the world (Gregory, 2003). It thus appears that the structural paradigm of the Confucius Institute may be a contributory factor to its lack of success.

Further examination of the governance of these institutes offers insight with respect to their success. The Goethe Institute, while being a government-sponsored institution, is able to raise its own funds and is governed at arm’s length, a status guaranteed in its constitution (Goethe Institute, 2015b). This arm’s-length principle ensures that it is not controlled by government, but by a body of independent and trustworthy people who have the aims and interests of the institute, not the government, at heart (Cavaliero, 1986). By being governed in this way, the Goethe Institute is able to assert, transparently, its credentials and the authenticity of its objectives.

The Confucius Institute, however, is ultimately administered by and accountable to Kanban, the PRC government body responsible for the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language. This need not necessarily be fatal to the Confucius Institute’s international credentials, although significant damage in this respect is evident in that Kanban only sanctions the use of simplified Chinese character writing within the Confucius Institute, which is widely interpreted to be an attempt to limit Taiwanese cultural influence, as within Taiwan writing using traditional Chinese characters is the norm (Ding and Saunders, 2006).

It may be possible to rationalise this Chinese written character dilemma on grounds of expediency, as Chinese writing is difficult to master and, if the use of both forms were to be employed, the result would be unnecessarily confusing for students. Clearly the Confucius Institute had to make a decision in this regard, and it is not unreasonable to expect that, as it is an organisation that originates within the PRC, it would select the predominant Chinese character style of that country. Other concerns come into play, however; the Confucius Institute has no independent control over the choice of textbooks and educational materials that it uses in its cultural activities; Kanban has complete control in this regard, leading some host schools and universities to express concern about the Chinese history propagated by the Confucius Institute differing from that taught in regular classes (Patty, 2011).

Apologists for the Confucius Institute may find rationalisations for these concerns, but the factors concerning its structure and governance have been sufficient in combination to endow it with the status of a PRC-government overseas ‘stooge’. Such concerns have resulted in the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University expelling the Confucius Institute from their campuses (Foster, 2014).

The work of the Goethe Institute is not the only cause of Germany’s post-war rehabilitation, but its positive influence is determinable, and has been facilitated by its measured growth and arm’s-length governance. Any positive influence that the Confucius Institute may have had is more difficult to establish; despite its rapid growth, its apparent attempt to reproduce the success of others elsewhere and the negative aspects of its structure and governance appear to act in its detriment.

Conclusion

This paper has set the limits of what the success of cultural institutes looks like within the context and limitations of soft power. The top-down nature of the institutes has been examined as a possible drawback when set against the immersive qualities that typically lead to meaningful cultural influence; however, this was found to be less of a disadvantage in terms of cultural theory than an honest approach taken by bodies that are essentially agencies of government.

This paper set out to examine why the outcomes of the work of the Goethe Institute of Germany and the Confucius Institute of the PRC have been so contrasting in terms of establishing cultural and social influence. It has been established that the Goethe Institute has been successful in its contribution to meeting Germany’s soft-power aims, while the Confucius Institute has had indeterminate positive influence and its negative influence has been made clear. The reasons for these contrasting outcomes can be summarised as follows. The Goethe Institute’s growth has been evolutionary whereas the growth of the Confucius Institute has been explosive, mirroring the economic growth of its home country which is in itself a cause of the PRC’s reputational difficulties that the institute is ostensibly attempting to ameliorate. Similarly, the Confucius Institute’s name appears to represent and attempt to reproduce that which worked elsewhere, mirroring a concerning facet of the PRC’s problematic intellectual property issues within its industrial sector. Finally, the Goethe Institute is governed at arm’s length, whereas the PRC has direct control over the governance of the Confucius Institute, a significant factor in its loss of reputation and fundamental incompatibility with the principles of academic freedom and independence that are so valued by its host universities.

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