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For instance, do the plethora of ways of finding and reporting news, through online forums, blogs, YouTube, etc., available to the average citizen undermine the hegemonic role of traditional news media in this regard? Discuss from a functionalist, Marxist or other sociological perspective.

Introduction

The mass media plays a major role in today’s society. Functionalism emphasises its strength, but warns of the danger of having its power controlled by a few individuals or organisations. That hegemony was threatened with the creation of the World Wide Web. Twenty-first century internet technology now offers any citizen the potential to reach an audience of millions.

The key sociological concepts for analysing the impact of the media are long-established, and later commentators often reinterpret existing theories rather than offering new perspectives. Two macro-theories, both viewing society as a system shaping human behaviour, dominate discussions: the functionalist stance and the Marxist-oriented conflict perspectives. This essay will draw on Parsons, Merton, and Wright to present the classic functionalist viewpoint. Conflict theory offers several interpretations of Marxism, which serves as a critique.

This essay will detail the popularity of the most frequently-accessed mainstream websites and consider social media’s role in news-gathering and dissemination. Examples of traditional and modern media coverage will illustrate changing attitudes and societal mores and the capacity of social media to precipitate change, before using a functional analysis to assess if the sociological function of the mass media has been affected by modern technological developments.

Social theory and the media

Functionalism, a ‘structural’ perspective and a leading sociological stance of the 1940s and 1950s, regards society as an interdependent system that can only be understood by examining how separate structural parts relate to each other and to society as a whole. The traditional mass media, principally newspapers and cinema, reached their zenith during this era so it is unsurprising that sociologists used functionalism to analyse the media and society. Functionalism makes certain assumptions, including the need for stability, and examines ‘the origin and maintenance of order and stability in society’ (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004: xv). Functionalism suggests that the mass media’s common perspective and shared common experience bind society together.

Parsons (1964) argued that societal behaviour is governed by shared values that become societal norms, a value-consensus which enables society to function effectively. Functionalism being value-neutral, disruptive activities are dysfunctional rather than intrinsically bad; defunct values become extinct. Merton (1968), remaining within the functionalist tradition, felt that functional unity was unlikely in complex societies and that all functions, whether of religion, social stratification or even the family itself, could be met elsewhere within society. He distinguished between manifest (intended) and latent (hidden/unintended) functions of the media. A manifest function could be the need to sell goods for profit. The latent functions included supporting the status quo by reinforcing values. (Merton, 1968).

Charles Wright developed what became known as the classic four functions of the media. He stated that media theorists ‘noted three activities of communication specialists: (1) surveillance of the environment, (2) correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment, and (3) transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next (Wright, 1959:16). He also identified a fourth element -entertainment – and distinguished between the intended purpose of the mass media and its consequences.

Whereas functionalists believe that societal norms govern human behaviour, Marxists argue that the controlling factor is the economic system. They offer a conflict perspective where the mass media legitimises the status quo, enabling hegemonic control over the dissemination of information. Marx argued that members of the elite produced the dominant societal ideas to conceal exploitation of the working class while the mass media manipulated information to normalise inequality (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004). Functionalism has also been critiqued on the grounds that the value-sets presumed to characterise Western society have never been conclusively demonstrated, and the ‘content of values rather than value-consensus as such can be seen as the crucial factor with respect to social order’ (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004:943).

Old and New Mass media

The time lag between reporting and printing left newspapers a day behind in publishing events; the visual impact of television was immediate. The Vietnam War was the first ‘televised’ conflict. The iconic image of nine-year-old Kim Phuc running naked down a road outside Saigon following a napalm attack helped to turn public opinion against continued American involvement (Newton and Patterson, 2015).

In the world of the traditional media, the internet’s potential impact was underestimated by commentators such as Clifford Stoll. Writing in Newsweek he said: ‘The truth is no online database will replace your daily newspaper [and] no computer network will change the way government works’ (Stoll, 1995). He was quite clearly wrong on both counts, but at that time few people had access to the new form of media that had been developed by enthusiastic amateurs, academics and students. (Rheingold, 1994). According to Pew Research (2015), Yahoo – the world’s biggest on-line news service – attracted 127,995,000 unique visitors in January 2015. A Google search of the traditional media reveals that the BBC warrants an impressive 793,000,000 Google listings while The Times newspaper has 398,000,000. However, these numbers are dwarfed by social media listings. YouTube has 7,540,000,000 entries, Twitter has 11,350,000,000 and Facebook tops the poll with 15,050,000,000 (Information retrieved 27.8.2015). Furthermore, on Monday 24th August 2015, it was reported that one billion people – one seventh of the world’s population – logged into their Facebook accounts (Zuckerberg, 2015).

Digital communication normalises rapid dissemination of information. Anyone with a smart phone can potentially break a major news story; the first images of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 came from mobile phone footage. ‘Micro-blogging’ is event-driven; Twitter provides users with a regular feed of news and trivia. Stories which are re-tweeted or commented on frequently are said to be ‘trending’. However, with a limit of 140 characters per ‘tweet’, brevity still rules occasionally, just as it did when news of the Crimean War was transmitted to Britain via telegraph.

Discussion

Historically, a comparatively small group of people working for an even smaller and more exclusive group of newspaper, film and broadcasting organisations gathered information. They determined what should be made public and how it should be presented. Deciding what to omit was probably as important as deciding what should be included; stories presenting the establishment in a negative light were often suppressed.

Certain reports, decades apart but linked by a common thread, bridge the gap between traditional media and the digital age and illustrate changing attitudes in Britain. During the 1936 Abdication Crisis, despite it being widely disseminated elsewhere, British media initially ignored the affair between Edward VIII and Mrs. Simpson out of deference to King George V (Rubenstein, 2003:199). However, less deference was shown to Princess Margaret; MP Willie Hamilton, who regularly raised the issue of the royal finances in the House of Commons, described her as ‘a floosie….. a monstrous charge on the public purse.’ (Davies, 2002, np). The rise of celebrity culture also gave rise to the ‘paparazzi’, an independent cohort of photojournalists, who followed and photographed members of the royal family at every opportunity. Earl Spencer’s passionate oration at the funeral of his sister, Princess Diana, blamed the paparazzi for her death, describing Diana as ‘the most hunted person of the modern age’ (Princess Diana 97, 1997). More recently, compromising pictures of Prince Harry on a trip to Las Vegas were circulated on-line by US celebrity website TMZ.com (TMZ, 2012). What used to be news is now entertainment.

There are a number of potential dangers in the functions of the media. Analysis accompanying factual reporting influences public opinion, but unchallenged norms and values can perpetuate injustice; one only has to recall the portrayal of racial minorities in 1950s media. Entertainment may double as propaganda, as in the jingoistic films released during WWII. Nevertheless, deciding what information goes into the public arena may still have hegemonic undertones, as demonstrated by a BBC Newsnight investigation into Jimmy Savile. This was ‘pulled’ shortly before a tribute programme to the late celebrity, believed to have abused hundreds of children, was due for broadcast. Members of the investigation team were sidelined amid allegations of a management cover-up (Jackson, 2015).

Wright’s observation distinguishing between intended and unintended consequences of the media is particularly relevant to the new social media. In late 2010, mass demonstrations against political repression, poverty and corruption swept the Middle East during the short-lived ‘Arab Spring’ uprising. The authorities were unable to suppress the outflow of information via social media. The Tunisian government was the first to fall. The hegemony of their state-approved news agencies had been completely undermined. However, organisations such as ISIS also use social media to spread their message, recruit followers and boast of their horrific accomplishments (Ajbaili, 2014). From the value-neutral functionalist stance (Wright, 1974) this is not ‘evil’ but merely dysfunctional when viewed from the paradigm of Western culture; ISIS is communicating, commenting and sharing its value system to gain wider acceptance of its fundamentalist values.

Contrary to Stoll’s predictions (Stoll, 1995) internet usage proliferated. Some functions of the new media, such as gathering and disseminating information, clearly descend from their traditional forbearers, but news is a globalised and a 24/7 product which has given rise to a cult of celebrity (Hollander, 2010). Gatekeepers cannot determine what constitutes news when a story may ‘go viral’ without warning, although unedited on-line content can be disturbing. Recently, the world was appalled by the murders on live television of a reporter and cameraman, in an attack filmed by the gunman and later circulated by him on social media. Such incidents bring into question the wisdom of facilitating unmediated access to what was once ‘the airwaves’. However, that particular discussion is beyond the scope of this essay.

Social media has been proven to instigate social change. The viral impact of the YouTube video ‘Kodaikanal Won’t’ forced Unilever to clear mercury waste from its disused factory in Tamil Nadu (Kasmin, 2015). Social movements such as anti-globalisation campaigners use social media very effectively to spread their message. Charities and NGOs regularly harness its power and it is said that U.S. President Barack Obama owed his election success to his team’s mastery of social media. Only this week, the image of a lifeless Aylan Kurdi, the three-year old Syrian refugee washed up on a Turkish beach, galvanised public opinion worldwide, although one fears that effective political action to resolve the refugee crisis may take rather longer.

Mainstream broadcasters have embraced social media, routinely incorporating audience participation by inviting comment via Twitter, text or e-mail. They have websites, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages, as do organisations or individuals wishing to raise their public profile. Printed media struggles with falling sales, but on-line services stream news, opinion and entertainment directly into the family home, traditionally seen as the location for the transmission of cultural values. Mesch cautions that: ‘The introduction of new technologies such as the internet into the household can potentially change the quality of family relationships’ (Mesch, 2006:119, cited in McGrath, 2012:9). This impact is particularly strong on children growing up with digital media, quite literally, at their fingertips, and a trend towards individualisation within households is “undermining natural family interaction” (Buckingham 2000:43). Discussion of the functions fulfilled by family life is beyond the scope of this essay, but the issue highlights concerns over whether communications via the new social media have become a substitute for face-to-face interaction and whether social media can in fact, sustain the social fabric of traditional family life – and, by implication, society as we know it – across the generations. Although one would sincerely hope otherwise, Merton’s (1968) analysis suggesting the possible extinction of functional family life could be prophetic.

Conclusion

Functionalists have been criticised for seeing social order in terms of value-consensus on the grounds that consensus is presumed, not proven, to exist. Critics also note that research has not demonstrated widespread commitment to the value-sets assumed to underpin Western society, and suggest that value-content is the crucial factor (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004). Marxism argues that functionalism does not explain social conflict, and sees the mass media as another tool used by the elite to maintain their power and privilege.

Social media news content is clearly not controlled in the conventional sense and posts can disturb the status quo, influencing political and social change. This strength has diminished hegemony, although organisations such as the BBC still exert editorial control over the ‘old’ media. Ideologically-driven campaigns of the ‘left’ such as the anti-globalisation movement have been able to use social media to publicise their activities as never before. The differences between opposing sets of cultural values are brought into sharp focus as social media follows events in the Middle East and elsewhere, bringing our unstable, i.e. dysfunctional world into our homes. McGrath (2012) cautions that social media could have far-reaching impacts on family life; Merton (1968) posited that any function, including that of the family unit itself, was dispensable and that society would always find an alternative. These issues cannot be discussed here but they clearly warrant investigation.

On reflection, news may be trivial or disturbing, the message may travel faster and further and the values transmitted may be radically different from those of previous generations, but despite social media’s impact, its functions – gathering and disseminating news, transmitting culture and entertaining – have remained consistent. It is the changing value-content which is disconcerting, but functional analysis necessitates a distinction between functions and effects so it cannot offer a value judgement.

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Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between two apparently different themes – the essentially postmodern, 20th century “established and outsider” social philosophy expounded by Norbert Elias (Elias and Scotson, 1994) and the distinctly 21st century and essentially economic programme encapsulated in the Post-Washington, Post-Beijing Consensus (PWBC) (Peerenboom, 2014). Every policy, however, has social consequences, and this paper examines the social consequences of the PWBC in an Eliasian context.

This paper begins by explicating Elias’ established and outsider philosophy before moving on to describe the PWBC. The social consequences of the PWBC shall then be analysed within the Eliasian context in order to achieve a deep understanding of what these social consequences are and what they could mean for the people of China should the PWBC come to full fruition.

The paper ends by drawing together the findings in a conclusion that while the PWBC comprehensively addresses China’s economic dilemma, its narrow focus and elision of the need for a free media and democratic representation indicates that social consequences go unaddressed, and that China faces social unrest and dislocation as a result.

Norbert Elias’ established and insider concept

Elias’ research as far as this paper is concerned relates to the distinctions between the established – those who comprise the official establishment and unofficial, socially mediated cliques – and the outsiders – those lacking in connections or social advantage – who are excluded from the power, economic and knowledge structures of the society in which they live (Elias and Scotson, 1994).

Elias’ philosophy found expression in his significant research into the lives of the people of “Winston Parva”; Elias’ Winston Parva was a long-established community, the members of which viewed themselves within structural confines – a quantitatively ordered, dimensional and objectively classified concept (Hofstede, 2001) – something that offended Elias’ postmodern tendencies, where the objective is not to seek prima facie classification, but to search for depth and understanding (McSweeney, 2002). The initial research in Winston Parva was conducted by John Scotson, who was a member of the community and was therefore able to establish the validity of his research that long-term immersion endows (Christians, 1997). Elias took Scotson’s initial research and rewrote it, adding the insight of the philosopher to its original observational validity.

The post-war history of Winston Parva rendered it particularly suitable for sociological enquiry. Pre-1945, Winston Parva had been a community divided on class and economic lines. The powerful “established” included businessmen, officials and professionals (Elias and Scotson, 1994). The disempowered established consisted of the community’s unskilled labour, skilled artisans and shopworkers; these count among the established because they were bonded through family, occupation and society, and found particular identification in these aspects of their lives (Elias and Scotson, 1994). Post-1945, however, a new influx of people arrived in Winston Parva. These comprised primarily people from various large cities, seeking homes to replace those lost as a result of wartime bombing (Elias and Scotson, 1994). These outsiders had little in common with each other, there were few extended familial ties and no social ties to bond them into a community; also, for them, work was often hard to find as their skills were not transferrable (Elias and Scotson, 1994). This influx became the outsiders, viewed by the established as “the minority of the worst” (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 7).

Elias’ concept of the established, characterised by cohesion, self-support, self-praise and self-affirmation and the outsiders, characterised by lack of cohesion, lack of economic power and subject to the blame of others (Elias and Scotson, 1994), is transferrable to many other social settings. It is by this process that the social conditions for people in China undergoing the upheaval of the PWBC shall now be examined.

The Post-Washington, Post-Beijing Consensus within the Eliasian context

China has seen remarkable economic growth in recent decades, although growth that was typically in double figures until 2009 has slowed since then to a still-impressive but markedly reduced level of 7 per cent per annum for 2015 (The Economist, 2015). China’s economy has been predicated upon exporting manufactured goods and high levels of investment from government-controlled financial institutions (Peerenboom, 2014). China’s home-grown variety of post-Mao socialism has facilitated this and has unintentionally led to wide economic disparities among the population; as Chinese former premier Deng Xiaoping said, “let a portion of the population get rich first” (Hilton, 2012: n.p.).

At first sight it appears that post-Mao China has little in common with the Winston Parva of Elias and Scotson (1994). It is important, however, to appreciate that China’s growth has been macro-economic; much has been achieved in terms of headline data, although for the Chinese equivalent of the newcomers to Winston Parva – the migrants to Chinese cities – the situation is markedly similar. As Hilton (2012) explains, the established of China are the main beneficiaries of Chinese economic growth, whereas the outsiders, while achieving the greater economic stability that comes with industrial employment, experience geographical and social dislocation. This bears comparison with the outsiders of Winston Parva; they too experienced geographical and social dislocation (Elias and Scotson, 1994). While the political and economic histories and macro-economic situations of Winston Parva and the Chinese cities may differ, the social experiences of their outsiders are significantly comparable. The question remains, however, whether the history and macro-economic situations of these outsiders is influential in their social condition. With one important qualification it appears not, as contemporaneous literature for both countries suggests that the vision of outsiders is preoccupied by their present and their future, not reflecting on their past (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). The present is the situation described in this paper; the past for China is the Cultural Revolution, and the past for Winston Parva is the Second World War. The important qualification relates to an aspect of China’s past and present that, while interesting, remains outside the remit of this paper – China’s inaccurately named One-Child Policy (Cai, 2010). As China’s migrants to the cities are mostly young and single, the effects of the One-Child Policy can be presently discounted, although this may change as the migrant population matures.

Presently, however, China faces the dilemma of being caught in what is called the middle-income trap – the situation where development stalls due to an inability to adapt its economic model to enable the leap from middle-income to high-income status (Ginsburg, 2014). To enable this leap to high-income status, China needs to radically change its economic model from that of exporting cheaply manufactured goods to one of exporting fewer but more expensive premium products and building a comprehensive and sophisticated service sector – a feature that all high-income countries share.

Other developing countries have followed the Washington Consensus paradigm for economic growth, comprising focus on markets and international co-operation (Williamson, 1989), with limited success (Fofack, 2014). China, however, followed its own path, known as the Beijing Consensus or China Model, comprising the export-led, high-investment programme described above (Peerenboom, 2014). While this may bear little comparison with today’s Britain, it exhibits startling similarities to the investment-led post-war British drive for exports that was underway in the late-1950s when Scotson conducted his initial research (Elias and Scotson, 1994). Unlike British government policy of the 1950s and beyond, however, there is no immediate provision for representative democracy or media freedom within the PWBC (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008). The success of the Beijing Consensus has been remarkable, but with significant adverse social consequences including income disparity, particularly noticeable between rural and urban areas, and a lack of urban social provision and infrastructure (He and Su, 2013). Like Elias’ Winston Parva (Elias and Scotson, 1994), Chinese cities have seen mass inward migration from diverse rural areas; these arrivals are recent and socially diverse, and have little in the way of local familial connections or social power. These are the outsiders who come for employment in the burgeoning Chinese private sector, set in contrast against a largely state-employed long-standing urban establishment. As such they correspond significantly to Elias’ outsiders. Where they differ, however, is that unlike Elias’ outsiders in Winston Parva, they are almost wholly in employment and so have a degree of economic power. Their economic power is, however, at present limited by the middle-income exigency of China’s export-led, high-investment economy, predicated upon mass exports at low production cost (Peerenboom, 2014) – a significant component of which is low remuneration rates. As such, they bear comparison with the outsiders of Winston Parva who also experience economic want due to unemployment (Elias and Scotson, 2014).

The PWBC advocates a combination of the free-market approach of the Washington Consensus and the authoritarianism of the Beijing Consensus (Peerenboom, 2014). It is motivated by the need for China to escape the middle-income trap. Income and social status are interlinked as the outsiders in Winston Parva illustrate, although this is not the only relevant factor. In order for communities to be built – the means by which outsiders can achieve established status – it is necessary for social and material infrastructure to be built (Tanaka, 2015). The PWBC recognises the need for material infrastructure – housing, transport, hospitals and schools – as it is clear that as the migrant population matures, these facilities will be necessary; however the position regarding social infrastructure is less clear. Similarly, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) Winston Parva possessed the necessary material infrastructure. As has been explained, the economic situation of the Chinese cities and Winston Parva bears comparison through, in the Chinese cities’ case, low remuneration rates and, in Winston Parva’s case, unemployment. This, however, is where the similarity ends; while the economic outcomes for each location may be similar, the social effects of low pay and unemployment are very different (Stewart, 2005), although amelioration is possibly in sight through the income-raising measures of the PWBC in China and local training and employment measures in Winston Parva.

The Chinese government appears to be either unclear about or unwilling to address the social infrastructure issue. The migrant population in Chinese cities currently works hard to support families in rural areas but, as the migrant population matures, its priorities and needs will change, and the question to be addressed is whether top-down, unrepresentative government will be able to identify that population’s social needs and adequately address them. The lessons from Winston Parva suggest not; in Winston Parva, building an estate and filling it with unconnected people from disparate backgrounds and locations did not build a community, and while the outsiders of Winston Parva were poor and largely despised by the established, they at least had the benefit of representation at national and local levels. They also had the benefit of a free media, so their voices could be heard.

It appears that the social effects of low pay/unemployment and the presence/absence of representation and a free media crucially distinguish the cities of China from the community of Winston Parva. The established-outsider tension in Winston Parva implicit in the praise and blame associated with unemployment and other facets of social status was maintained from within by the self-supporting established (Scotson and Elias, 1994); however, viewed from outside, such self-affirming practices are regarded as illegitimate, as was the case highlighted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, whereby outsiders’ plight was identified by the media and subsequently resolved through the power of their democratic representatives (Katrina 10, 2015).

Concerning the presence/absence of democratic representation and a free media, in China, unlike in Winston Parva, the voices of the outsiders cannot be heard and, without democratically accountable representation, their social needs cannot be adequately addressed. China faces a social dilemma as serious as its economic one, but one that cannot be mediated due to the lack of representation and media access, and while the PWBC may address the economic problems faced by China, it seems unable to provide any solutions to its incipient social ones.

Conclusion

This paper set out to out to address how, using Norbert Elias’ concept of the established and the outsiders, the social consequences of China’s move towards the PWBC may be explained.

Elias’ established-outsider concept was explained using the illustrative example of Winston Parva – the site of Scotson’s and later Elias’ research. Significant parallels were found between the situations of outsiders in Winston Parva and those in Chinese cities; in both situations, the outsiders were new arrivals from disparate origins, who had no familial or occupational ties to the area or each other. Neither group of outsiders had the means of building a community. There were, however, differences; the Chinese outsiders have a limited degree of economic power whereas their Winston Parva counterparts did not and, while the economic differences are negligible, the social consequences are not, although amelioration in both locations is in prospect; also, the Winston Parva outsiders had access to a free media and democratic representation, whereas the Chinese outsiders do not. The PWBC crucially lacks dimensions in these latter regards, and this is why the social needs of the Chinese outsiders are unlikely to be met by it, and their social future looks bleak and resolvable only through social unrest and dislocation.

Elias’ established-outsider concept was explained using the illustrative example of Winston Parva – the site of Scotson’s and later Elias’ research. Significant parallels were found between the situations of outsiders in Winston Parva and those in Chinese cities; in both situations, the outsiders were new arrivals from disparate origins, who had no familial or occupational ties to the area or each other. Neither group of outsiders had the means of building a community. There were, however, differences; the Chinese outsiders have a limited degree of economic power whereas their Winston Parva counterparts did not and, while the economic differences are negligible, the social consequences are not, although amelioration in both locations is in prospect; also, the Winston Parva outsiders had access to a free media and democratic representation, whereas the Chinese outsiders do not. The PWBC crucially lacks dimensions in these latter regards, and this is why the social needs of the Chinese outsiders are unlikely to be met by it, and their social future looks bleak and resolvable only through social unrest and dislocation.

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Consider recent instances of ‘webcam suicide’ and other cases in which modern digital technology is involved.

By the 1850s, suicide was a growing social problem in Europe. Many people felt that it was related to the huge industrial changes taking place at that time. For Emile Durkheim, studying this phenomenon – which is generally seen to be one of the most private and personal acts – provided the perfect opportunity to show the power of the new science of sociology (Ritzer, 2008). Durkheim developed a theory around four types of suicide which will be outlined below. The affect that Durkheim’s book Le Suicide (1897) has had on the suicide research that came after it will be discussed, including issues with empirical evidence to back up his claims around his four types of suicide and their causes. The need for methodological developments from those used by Durkheim is addressed in order for sociological research on suicide to stay relevant. Finally, the introduction of new dimensions to the issue of suicide with the growth of the internet is discussed.

Emile Durkheim was not the first to study suicide rates in the nineteenth century. However, his contribution to the study of suicide in sociology is without doubt the most influential. Quetelet and Morselli, two moral statisticians who attempted to inductively analyse a large body of suicide statistics, were enthralled by the stability of yearly suicide rates, as well as the overall rise in the rates in the modern era (Quetelet and Morselli, in Wray et al, 2011). Masaryk (in Wray et al, 2011) actually proceeded Durkheim in looking to explain the rise in rates by the forces of modernisation. Tarde disputed these statisticians’ theories by postulating that imitation behaviour could account for geographical and temporal clustering of suicide behaviour (Tarde, in Wray et al, 2011). Durkheim, who outright rejected Tarde’s imitation theory and went to great lengths to discredit it (Ritzer, 2008), wanted to approach the view that modernisation was the root cause of the suicide rate increase in a more analytical way than his contemporaries (Wray et al, 2011). To this end, he formulated a social theory of suicide in which the causes of suicide lie within a framework of society rather than at an individual’s psychological state (Morrison, 1995). What Durkheim was interested in was suicide rates rather than individual causes, in order to explain why one group had a higher rate than another (Ritzer, 2008).

Durkheim’s theory on suicide is based on the two continua of social integration and social regulation, at the ends of which are four independent theories of suicide (Breault, 2001). These four theories are egoistic, altruistic, anomic and fatalistic suicide. For Durkheim, ‘egoistic suicide’ occurs in societies or groups where the individual has a low level of integration into the larger social unit, making them feel as if they are not part of society and likewise, society is not part of them (Ritzer, 2008: 91). According to Durkheim, society is where the best parts of being human come from; our morality, values and sense of purpose. Without these, as well as the general moral support that gets us through our daily troubles, ‘individuals are liable to commit suicide at the smallest frustration’ (Ritzer, 2008: 91). The main protectors against egoistic suicide are, according to Durkheim, membership in well integrated religious groups (for example the Roman Catholic Church), well integrated family units and political or national units. ‘Altruistic suicide’, on the other hand, results when social integration in a society or group is too strong, for example amongst the military or mass suicides following the death of a leader (Davies and Neal, 2000: 38). Suicide in the group is for the greater good or because those who commit suicide this way believe it is their duty to do so (Ritzer, 2008).

The other continuum on which Durkheim bases his theory is that of social regulation. Too little social regulation, results in what he calls ‘anomic suicide’ (Tomasi, 2000: 16). The term anomie can be defined, in simple terms, as the decline in the regulatory powers of society due to the process of industrialisation (Morrison, 1995). It is likely that individuals will be left feeling dissatisfied and frustrated with life as there is little control over their social wants and needs due to these disruptions. Morrison explains how Durkheim believed that this frustration can only happen when:

…individuals constantly aspire to reach ends or goals that are beyond their capacity to obtain. It is important to keep in mind that motives leading individuals to strive for goals which they cannot realistically obtain are due to the failure of the powers of society to set limits and regulate social wants (1995: 184).

The effect on the suicide rate is to be seen in both times of positive disruption (economic boom) and negative disruption (economic depression). These changes put people in ‘new situations in which the old norms no longer apply but new ones have yet to develop’ (Ritzer, 2008: 93). One the other end of this continuum is what Durkheim calls ‘fatalistic suicide’ (Ritzer, 2008: 94). This is the least developed of his theories and in fact, was only discussed as a footnote in his book Le Suicide (1897). Fatalistic suicide is as a result of too much regulation within a society or group. The example that Durkheim cites in support of this is the suicide of slaves who, he argues, take their own lives due to the hopelessness caused by the oppressive regulation over their lives (Ritzer, 2008).

These theories on suicide have influenced many pieces of research on suicide to the present day, but are they still relevant to modern society and the study of suicide? Breault argues, in a critical survey of the empirical literature on Le Suicide, that the hypothesis with the most empirical research to date is that of egoistic suicide. He believes that, although the other theories may seem plausible, it is impossible to say whether Durkheim was right or not in the absence of empirical research on altruistic, anomic and fatalistic suicide (Breault, 2001).

According to Breault (2001), there is a wealth of evidence and empirical research in support of egoistic suicide. However, the issue as he sees it, is whether this research is meaningful. In the research which he cites in his analysis, investigators have controlled for variables such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, demographic variables, economic variables and socioeconomic variables, but not one single psychological variable. However, he believes that Durkheim’s argument against psychological explanations would be considered primitive in the present day in light of considerable research showing that affective disorders, schizophrenia, substance abuse, to name but a few, are consistently related to suicide (Breault,2001). So Breault (2001) questions, what would be the relationship between social integration and suicide controlling for depression? The fundamental issue is that Durkheim omitted psychological factors in part as he believed that there were no psychological regularities in suicide as consistent psychological correlates had yet to be identified in his day. In light of this, Breault notes:

Today, Durkheim would not be satisfied with our failure to control for empirically supported psychological variables. Even though he advocated a sharp division between sociology and psychology, his methodological approach would have precluded the exclusion of psychological explanations if such explanations had been empirically demonstrated (2001: 61).

Wray et al (2011) suggest that in order for sociology to stay relevant in the area of suicide research, which is evolving as a multi-disciplinary investigation of suicide as a social problem, three avenues need to be pursued simultaneously. Firstly, they believe there is a need to reconsider the micro-macro dilemma, both theoretically and methodologically. This should include a consideration of how to assemble a data set complex enough to provide rigorous empirical research on suicide (Wray et al, 2011). Second, Wray et al (2011) suggest, there is a need to incorporate the insights from other disciplines into the multiple factors which affect suicide in individuals and society. Finally, sociologists need to move forward with real-life efforts to reduce suicide through demonstrating and evaluation the usefulness of the robust research in this area Wray et al (2011).

The importance of the inclusion of individual level data in studies of suicide, and not just the suicide rates or aggregate data, as well as the need to incorporate findings from other disciplines, can be demonstrated through the discussion of suicide involving the internet and other digital media. Although Shah (2010) found that the prevalence of internet users was correlated with general population suicide rates, he cautioned against causal relationship attribution due to the ecological study design. In other words, the use of aggregate data rather than individual data when looking for a causal relationship between internet use and suicide (Shah, 2010). Other studies have taken an individual level approach to investigate the association between internet use and suicide. Indeed, Messias et al (2011) analysed a nationally representative survey from the US (Youth Risk Behaviour Survey) and found that teens who reported five hours or more of video games/internet use daily had a significantly higher risk for sadness, suicidal ideation and suicide planning. Furthermore, a study of Taiwan teens aged 12-18 found that web communication is a risk factor in self-injurious thoughts and behaviour in boys but not in girls (Tseng and Yang, 2015). They also found that family support is a protective factor in both genders (Tseng and Yang, 2015). Although these findings do not in any way negate Durkheim’s theories on suicide – and in fact may actually support his claim that egoistic suicide is caused by social isolation – these findings would not have been possible using the methods employed by Durkheim. In essence, just looking at suicide rates, without consideration for individual level data.

The digital age has introduced a new dimension to the study of suicide. Never before have people had access to the range of suicide information as they do now. As Mishara and Weisstub (2007) explain, there are numerous reports of suicides allegedly related to the internet. Examples include the son of a Danish journalist who was encouraged to end his life on a website which gave him information that he used to kill himself (Weisstub, 2007). Moreover, reports of young people who have resorted to suicide after a barrage of cyberbullying and online abuse, and a number of suicides which have taken place live on web cam while others watched, some of whom reportedly egged them on. Furthermore, there is the issue of internet suicide pacts, which are a rising concern in Japan and South Korea. Traditionally, suicide pacts were made between people who knew each other. However, in the internet age, these pacts are formed between complete strangers who meet online (Luxton et al, 2012). The issue at the core of this piece is to assess whether classical sociological theory can explain these newly developing phenomenon? If the person is committing suicide as they no longer feel part of society and society is no longer part of them, then why broadcast it live over the internet for an audience to watch? Is this egoistic suicide or is it a new ‘type’ of suicide unlike those described by Durkheim?

One area that Durkheim outright rejected in his theories on suicide was that of imitation (Thorlindsson and Bjarnason, 1998). However, there are strong arguments against this omission as Abrutyn and Mueller (2014) found that suicides, like other social behaviours, can in fact spread through social relationships. They found that social ties can be conduits of social support in the positive sense, but also anti-social behaviours such as suicide as well. Luxton et al (2012) address this issue of imitation or contagion through the media. These scholars explain how the media’s influence on suicidal behaviour, especially in relation to method used, has been well documented:

A recent study by Dunlop et al. specifically examined possible contagion effects on suicidal behavior via the Internet and social media. Of 719 individuals aged 14 to 24 years, 79% reported being exposed to suicide-related content through family, friends, and traditional news media such as newspapers, and 59% found such content through Internet sources. Additional analysis revealed no link between social networking sites (e.g., Facebook) and suicidal ideation, but it did find a connection between suicidal ideation and suicide-related content found on online forums (Luxton 2012: Para 12).

Indeed, Luxton et al (2012) go on to discuss how social media platforms, for example, chat rooms and discussion forums, may also influence decisions to die by suicide for some vulnerable groups. They argue that these online interactions may foster peer pressure to die by suicide, encourage their user to idolise those who have already completed their suicide or facilitate the making of suicide pacts (Luxton et al, 2012). In the end, these interactions may reduce any doubts or fears of people who are undecided about suicide and thus, act as another social force contributing to the causes of suicide in modern times.

Society is very different today from that at the time of Durkheim’s seminal book Le Suicide (1897). However, suicide is still considered a serious social problem, just as it was in the 1850s. Durkheim believed that suicide could be explained by looking at societal factors and their effect on the suicide rates of particular groups. Yet, this essay has shown that suicide cannot be understood simply as Durkheim theorised it. Although his theory of egoistic suicide has for the most part been supported by empirical research, for sociological research to advance in this area, a methodological and theoretical rethink on the study of suicide is necessary. For example, the inclusion of psychological variables, individual level studies and the relationship between the internet and suicide.

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This essay will attempt to demonstrate how sociological concepts can be used to explain the rise of extremist groups. There are many publications and research papers into the various dimensions of extremism, addressing causation, the process of radicalisation, and consequences. These studies use varying definitions, approaches, epistemologies and theoretical concepts to address the issue of extremism. From this collection of differing studies, two approaches will be examined in this essay to use as examples of how sociology has added to the accumulated knowledge in this area. Conflict theory, or more specifically Collins’ work (1975) on interaction rituals, will be outlined to illustrate how groups form – both those groups in the mainstream and outside it – as well as addressing the way in which these groups can turn violent. Social Movement Theory will provide the second example, looking closely at Framing Theory as a means of understanding the process of radicalisation of individuals into an extremist group. It is important, however, to firstly define what the term ‘extremism’ actually means.

Extremism as a concept is not the easiest to define. It is a subjective term, in that, what is considered extreme by one group or society, may not be considered so by another (Wintrobe, 2006). However, an extremist is generally viewed as ‘someone whose views are outside the mainstream on some issue or dimension’ (Wintrobe, 2006: 6). Extremists are often people on the extreme left or the extreme right of the political spectrum, or hold radical views in relation to nationalism, religion or any other politically important dimension (Wintrobe, 2006). According to Scrunton, political extremism refers to:

…taking a political idea to its limits, regardless of unfortunate repercussions, impracticalities, arguments, and feelings to the contrary, and with the intention not only to confront, but to eliminate opposition…Intolerance towards all views other than one’s own (1982: 164).

Martin (2013: 10-11) explains how both the ‘content’ of a person’s beliefs and the ‘style’ in which one expresses them are the basic elements for defining extremism. Wilcox summed this up by explaining that style is more important than content when it comes to extremism, as many people can hold views that would be considered radical or unorthodox yet still entertain them in a reasonable, rational manner. In contrast, there are other people who have views a lot closer to the political mainstream but present them in a ‘shrill, uncompromising, bullying, and distinctly authoritarian manner (Wilcox, 1996: 54). As well as those with extremist views, the term ‘extremist’ can also refer to a person or group that uses extremist methods, for example resorting to violence or terrorism to achieve its goals (Wintrobe, 2006). It worth noting not all extremists are violent or terrorists. However, Martin (2013) argues that behind every act of terrorist violence is a deeply held belief system, which at its core is extremist and characterised by intolerance. In light of this, one must question how is it that these groups form and garner support when their views are so far outside the mainstream?

Conflict theory can provide a useful theoretical approach that can help to gain insight into how different groups develop, how they grow, and how some groups can turn violent. Conflict theory developed, at least in part, as a reaction against structural functionalism, and has many influences such as Marixism, Weberian theory and Simmel’s work on social conflict (Ritzer, 2008: 264). Elements of conflict theory can be used to explain the formation of groups – for example, extremist groups – as well as the reasons why these groups can turn violent. This theoretical approach seeks to explain scientifically, the general delineations of conflict in society; that is, how conflict starts and varies, and the effect of conflict. At the core of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of power and scarce resources. Where power is situated and who uses it – or does not – are fundamental (Allan, 2006). Randal Collins work on conflict theory ‘represents the most systematic effort undertaken to scientifically explain conflict’ (Allan, 2006: 233). In his book Conflict Society, Collins (1975) advocates forcefully for a sociology grounded in face-to-face interaction. He argues that micro level encounters among individuals ultimately create and sustain macro-level phenomenon. Or, as Turner (2013: 239) describes it, ‘large and long-term social structures are built from interaction rituals that have been strung together over time’.

More recently, Collins has refined and extended his original hypothesis of interaction rituals and used this newer view to develop an explanation of interpersonal violence (Turner, 2013). Turner (2013) explains Collins’ analytical scheme as such: as interaction rituals unfold they build up emotional energy, which acts as the driving force of interaction. Social solidarity increases when positive emotional energy builds up across chains on interaction rituals, leading to the production and reproduction of social structures. The more ecological barriers exist to separate persons from others, the more the individuals will feel co-present; and the more individuals are engaged in common actions or tasks, the more likely they are to have a mutual focus of attention. This makes them more likely to emit stereotypical greeting rituals which generate positive emotions and begin to shape a shared mood, ‘which, in turn increases the common mutual focus of attention’ (Turner, 2013: 250). Individuals fall into ‘rhythmic synchronisation’ as interactions progress, which makes them more likely to become emotionally involved in the group (Turner, 2013: 252). As positive emotions are stimulated, the level of group solidarity increases, likewise, the greater the sense of solidarity the more positive emotions are evoked in subsequent interactions. As the level of solidarity increases, they become more likely to have a need to symbolise the group somehow, for example through words, physical objects or certain behaviours. According to Turner:

As these chains of interaction continue, members develop particularistic capital, or experiences only shared among group members, and this capital can be used in subsequent interactions to reinforce group symbols and the sense of solidarity (2013: 252).

This interaction ritual theory can explain how groups, including extremist groups form and grow. However, Collins goes further to explain how these groups can cross the line into violent behaviour. He explains how violence is not easy for people as it ‘goes against the natural propensity of humans to fall into the phases of interaction rituals that arouse positive emotions’ (Turner, 2013: 254). Most potentially violent situations actually fail to become violent in the end; posturing and threats of violent are more common. Indeed, Collins provides an important explanation of how individuals as a group overcome this propensity to avoid violence and get involved in collective violent behaviour. For this to happen, interaction rituals are actually used as a force to mobilise individuals to commit violent acts:

…the stages of the ritual are unleashed so that individuals gain positive emotional entrainment, effervescence, positive emotional energy, solidarity, group symbols, and particularized culture by engaging in concerted violence against another group’ (Turner, 2013).

Turk (2008) provides a good example of this when he outlines Islamic fundamentalism, which appears to rely on radicalisation through education consisting of religious indoctrination. According to Turk, potential recruits to Islamic extremist groups are sought in Madrassas across the world, through drilling in the most extreme interpretations of Sunni theology, which emphasises the duty of Muslims to engage in Jihad (holy war) against all enemies of true Islam. He notes that The Taliban are a product of this group formation within Madrassas (Turk, 2008).

Another theoretical framework which can be applied to the understanding of radicalisation and violent extremism is Social Movements Theory (SMT). SMT began in the 1940s with the idea that movements arose as a result of ‘irrational processes of collective behaviour occurring under strained environmental conditions’ (Strain Theory), producing a mass feeling of discontent (Borum, 2011: 17). According to this theory, individuals would join a movement because of a passive submission to these overwhelming social forces. However, contemporary SMT has shown that more rational and strategic processes are operating than the SMT understanding of the 1940s (Borum, 2011).

The primary task of any organisation or social movement is its own survival. Therefore, to grow it must form mobilization potential; form and motivate recruitment networks; arouse motivation to participate; and remove barriers to participation (Borum, 2011). Members of the movement operate as ‘rational prospectors’ when they seek to recruit others. So that they are efficient and effective, they look to identify those most likely to agree to act effectively to further the cause. To them, the recruitment process has two stages. Firstly, the ‘rational prospectors’ use information to find likely targets and secondly, once located, recruiters offer information on participatory opportunities, as well as deploying incentives to persuade recruits to say ‘yes’ (Borum, 2001:17).

According to Borum (2011:17):

The strength of social bonds and relationships are central to both tasks, and understanding relationships among potential prospects is therefore, critical to understanding recruitment networks.

A more recent development in this area comes from Framing Theory, which focuses on how meanings are constructed, produced and disseminated by movements and social collectives (Borum, 2011). Unlike the structural theories which focus on socio-demographics and their effect on radicalisation, Framing Theory focuses on the process of radicalisation. Based on the work of Erving Goffman, the concept of a ‘frame’ ‘refers to an individual’s worldview or “schemata of interpretation”, consisting of values (notions about right and wrong) and beliefs (assumptions about the world, attributes of things, and mechanisms of causation). This scheme helps an individual make sense of and organize his or her experience, and guide his or her action’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008: 6). The success of a movement therefore, is related to its ability to create and disseminate frames which will attract devotees, Central to its success in mobilising participants, is whether the movement’s version of ‘reality’ resonates with potential supporters or whether they can manipulate the values and beliefs of potential supporters to a smaller or larger extent (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2011). Using this theory then, how is it that activists evolve into terrorists?:

Framing Theory would emphasize how social and intersubjective processes create the motivation. In other words, Framing Theory would seek to explain violent radicalisation and terrorism through the distinct constructed reality, shared by members of violent groups – a constructed reality or world view, which frames problems as not just misfortunes, but injustices, attributes responsibility for these “injustices”, and constructs an argument for the efficacy and/or moral justification of using violence against civilians to right the perceived wrong’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2011: 9).

Although Critical Theory and Social Movements Theory provide useful frameworks for examining the reasons why extremist groups form and grow, it is important to note that they are only two of a number of theoretical approaches within sociology that can be used to conceptualise this phenomenon. Other approaches include, but are in no way limited to, Gurr’s (1970) publication Why Men Rebel, in which he outlines his hypothesis that it is feelings of deprivation and frustration that motivate an individual to engage in collective action; Veugelers research into the rise of right wing extremist groups in France, to test Postmaterialist Theorists assertion that ‘conflict over non-economic values are transforming the political sociology of advanced industrial societies’ (2000: 19); and a study by Gelfand and LaFree (2013) examining cultural factors and their relationship to prevalence and severity of extremist violence. The study of extremism crosses not only within-discipline parameters, but has been widely studied across other disciplines as well such as international relations, politics and psychology. For these reasons, Cable et al feel that (1988: 966):

Rather than seek some single model of activist recruitment and commitment, consisting of structural and/or social psychology variables…analysts should assume that there are multiple models and then get on with the more useful work of specifying the conditions under which one or more is appropriate.

This essay has outlined some ways in which sociological concepts can be used to explain the rise of extremist groups. Extremist groups were taken to mean groups which have views that are considered outside the mainstream of society on particular issues or dimensions. There are many sociological concepts which have been applied to the study of extremism. However, this essay looked at two examples; Conflict Theory, namely Collin’s (1975) work on interaction rituals and violence, and Social Movements Theory. Collin’s research has shown how groups form and are given symbolic meaning, which in turn strengthens the group (1975). In applying this to extremism, it sheds some light on how groups of individuals with extremist views become bound together, as well as explaining how these groups can become violent despite the human propensity to avoid violence. Social Movements Theory was used as an example to illustrate how extremist movements grow, as well as outlining the process of radicalisation. In order for movements to survive, they must form mobilisation potential and recruitment networks, motivate participation, and remove any barriers to participation. The strength of social bonds and relationships within the group is key. The process of radicalisation is explained through the ‘constructed reality’ or world-view shared by members of extremist groups which, justifies the use of violence as a means to right a perceived wrong. Although these frameworks are useful for examining extremism, they only provide a marginal assessment of the sociological work that has been undertaken on the rise of extremist groups to date.

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Critically discuss this statement

Throughout time there has been a fascination with constructing the ‘perfect’ human form. In Ancient Greece, the perfect muscular body was associated with an individual being a hero, a warrior and an athlete and was symbolic of one’s sense of arete or ‘full potential’ (Chaline, 2015). Within the Renaissance period, as demonstrated by Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, emphasis centred on physical beauty and symmetry as signifiers as the embodiment of purity, virtue and morality. The rise of imperialism in Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries increased the importance of the fit and healthy body has as a reflection of a nation’s power and military preparedness. As Synnott (1993) elucidates therefore, the body has long been seen as the “prime symbol of the self” and how ‘it’ is thought of is historically, socially, sensually, politically and ideologically constructed:

[The body may be seen as]…a tomb of the soul, a temple, a machine, and the self and much more; it has also been treated accordingly. Bodies may be caressed or indeed killed, they may be loved or hated, and thought beautiful or ugly, scared or profane (p.7-8).

In late or post modern society, there are multiple pressures for creating and maintaining a sense of physical perfectionism with contemporary cultures relentlessly promoting the body beautiful (Thomas, 2007). We are constantly presented with images of perfectly formed models, celebrities, athletes and film and television stars (e.g. Grogan, 2008; Orbach, 2010) and social media forums such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are saturated with visions of individuals finely tuned bodies and versions of themselves they wish to present. For men, current ideals of physical perfectionism are best understood as ‘muscularity in moderation’ where muscle size and visibility as signs of health, independence and athleticism are paramount but within given parameters of normalcy. For example, the hyper-muscled body that competitive male bodybuilders develop is deemed ‘freakish’ (Fussell, 1991; Klein, 1993; Monaghan, 2001). For women, the ‘perfect’ body is more complex to distinguish and is further oppressed by patriarchal ideologies. Feminist scholars have addressed how women’s perceptions of their bodies and what is deemed attractive or imperfect are often informed by the male gaze for the purposes of gaining pleasure (e.g. Shildrick, 2002; Garland- Thomson, 2009). Certain forms of embodiment such as being slender, toned, petite and sexy are idealised in contemporary Western culture, but how a woman manages her sense of being in a body is problematic. As Markula (2001: 237) highlights, women are presented with the task of managing a host of contradictory continuums which dictates the female body should be “firm but shapely, fit but sexy, strong but thin”. This negotiation is made more problematic as women have historically been more defined by their bodies, and as a result, objectified in a number of ways. For example, female athletes are often infantilised or sexualised based on their physical appearance regardless of their sporting accomplishments (Hargreaves, 1994).

For both men and women therefore, the body is not only viewed as a sign of physical capability allowing us to perform our everyday roles and routines, but is increasingly associated with, and symbolic of, our attractiveness, successfulness and virility (Bauman, 1990). According to Bourdieu (1991), developing a body that relates well amongst contemporary ideologies of physical perfectionism imbues the owner with ‘physical capital’ which in turn can be transferred into ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ capital enhancing one’s status and distinction in a given ‘social field’ (i.e. sets of localised social relations):

The production of physical capital refers to the development of bodies in ways which are recognised as possessing value in social fields, while the conversion of physical capital refers to the translation of bodily participation in work, leisure and other fields into different forms of capital. Physical capital is most usually converted into economic capital (money, goods and services), cultural capital (for example, education) and social capital (social networks which enable reciprocal calls to be made on the goods and services of its members) (p.127).

As a result, inhabiting a typically gendered, young, muscular, athletic, virile and able body is valued and brings rewards in a society that values perfectionism. For example, Monaghan (2002) explores how his muscled body assisted in him in gaining a position as a nightclub doorman which in turn opened up avenues of (hetero)sexual experience. These norms of perfectionism are now so engrained in Western society that the term “body fascism” has arisen in popular culture to express “the oppressiveness inherent in the narrowing of norms about the ideal body” (Hughes, 1999: 155). These strict bodily boundaries limit how the body may be imagined and experienced at the expense of alternative expressions of embodiment. According to Pronger (2002) the ubiquity of the fit, slender, muscular body creates a ‘panoptic effect’ as individuals watch over themselves for any deviations from these norms. Non-normative or less valued bodies such as ‘old’, ‘fat’, ‘disabled’, ‘short’, ‘tall’ bodies or bodies that transgress accepted norms (e.g. female bodybuilders who transgress traditional ideals of femininity) are therefore oppressed or excluded altogether. As Sparkes (1997: 88) iterates “some constructions (of embodiment) come to be more equal than others, some come to be more legitimate than others, and some get to be promoted over others”. Indeed, as Hughes (1999) points out some bodies, for example the disabled body, is placed as a binary opposite to fascist ideologies of body perfectionism and is used for the very construction of the ‘perfect’ body.

As pressure exists to live up to certain levels of perfectionism there is increasing awareness that the body itself is perfectible through various bodily regimens and modifications. This has resulted in the body being increasingly seen as an object of consumption creating further pressures for individuals to work on their bodies as part of a “self-reflexive project” (Giddens, 1991; Shilling, 1993; 2003). According to Shilling (2003), engaging in body projects allows people to make strong, public and personal statements about who and what they are within a multitude of social contexts:

In the affluent West, there is a tendency for the body to be seen as an entity which is in the process of becoming; a project which should be worked at and accomplished as part of an individual’s self-identity. Body projects still vary along social lines, especially in the case of gender, but there has in recent years been a proliferation of the ways in which both women and men have developed their bodies. Recognising that the body has become a project for many modern persons entails accepting that its appearance, size, shape and even its contents, are potentially open to reconstruction in line with the designs of its owner (p.4; emphasis added).

Modifying one’s body in line with socially and culturally constructed norms therefore promises control and security and creates space for an individual to situate oneself in the world. As Shilling (2003) suggests, not only can individuals create their own identity through altering the appearance of the body amongst an array of choices but it is their responsibility to do so through engaging in modifications and everyday bodily maintenance as a demonstration of diligence and labour. People may therefore choose, and indeed feel pressured, to undertake bodily modifications such as committing to regimes of physical training, disciplining nutritional intake, undertaking plastic surgery and botox, having teeth whitened or piercing, tattooing and scarifying the skin at the body’s surface (e.g. Featherstone, 2000). These modifications are supplemented by daily routines of bodily maintenance such as washing and cleaning, adorning the body with clothing, brushing our teeth, applying makeup and moisturisers, having our haircut in particular ways and undertaking techniques that remove hair from certain body parts.

Such pressures perhaps contribute to the continual obsession with gym culture in contemporary society. The gym offers a space where physical labour (which is constantly declining in an increasingly technological world) is reproduced promising the construction of a strong, powerful, functional, independent, desirable body and offering potential for the transformation of the self. As Fussell (1994) observes, the built body in contemporary, capitalist, visual, aesthetic society has more symbolic and cultural importance than it is has usefulness in the production of labour:

The bodybuilder is a perversion of puritanism, and utilitarianism. He doesn’t use his muscles to build bridges, but to raise eyebrows. They are at once functionless, yet highly functional (p.45).

Gyms are thus important social spaces where individuals are encouraged to work their bodies like a project through which they can transform or maintain their body-self identities. As Fussell (1994: 57) continues of bodybuilders “the muscular body, the picture of eternal adolescence, is their dominant dream, and the gym their nightly launching pad”.

In affluent Western society of course individuals are presented with an ever increasing choice of health and fitness regimes, diets, and bodily practices which they may engage in. However, it is important to critique the ‘freedom’ to which individuals are really afforded in these practices. For Foucault (1981), there is less choice of what we do with our bodies than we are conscious of as we are placed under multiple cultural confines and constructs of perfectionism and normalcy. Engaging in a ‘body project’ is therefore not exclusively an expression of individual agency, but is policed through the adherence, or docility as Foucault called it, to dominant cultural discourses. As Bourdieu (1990: 63) asserts, there is a causal relationship between the social and the corporeal, and so accordingly we must see “society written into the body, into the biological individual” and vice versa.

The increasing pressures to conform to and commit to achieving the ‘perfect’ body have been highlighted as contributory factors to compulsory and obsessive behavioural disorders such as anorexia nervosa, bulimia and most recently the phenomena of ‘bigorexia’ amongst men (Ahmad, Rotherham & Talwar, 2015). Increased consciousness of the body and perceived inability to embody ideals of perfectionism has also been linked with self-dissatisfaction, anxiety, depression and negative wellbeing (Grogan, 2008). There is also increasing suggestion that people are taking more risks to achieve ‘perfect’ bodies including taking supplements, steroids and dietary pharmaceuticals (Monaghan, 2001). Embarking on a body project as an attempt to transform the self into socially and culturally constructed visions of perfectionism therefore problematic. Furthermore, as Shilling (2003: 5) reminds us, bodies are doomed to fail as they inevitably age and decay, become sick and injured, and are not always malleable in the ways that we desire – “bodies are limited not only in the sense that they ultimately die, but in their frequent refusal to be moulded in accordance with our intentions”.

Offering some reflections, it is evident that within late or post modern society that is “aggressively aestheticised” (Featherstone, 1991) the vision of the ‘perfect’ body takes centre stage. As a result, pressures exist for people to embody perfected physical forms. Although there are plenty of examples of people who reject these norms and take measures to differentiate or individualise themselves in alternative ways (e.g. through non-normative tattoos) in general there are demands for us to present and perform our bodies in particular ways. The ‘perfect’ body is of course mythical. Participants in numerous studies in a variety of contexts have reported how they are never happy with their bodies no matter how much work they undertake on them (e.g. Monaghan, 1999). Bodily perfectionism should therefore be better conceptualised as a socially constructed ideology dependent on time, culture, space and an individual’s biography and subjectivities and is ultimately impossible to ‘achieve’. Perhaps promoting this understanding and how the ‘perfect’ body does not exist in a fixed, essentialist, homogeneous way but rather is better seen as fluid, constructed and heterogeneous could offer a number of benefits and ways to ease the pressures that people experience with regards to anxiety with their bodies. For example, recognising the impossibilities and constructions of physical perfectionism may allow people real freedom to create unique self-reflexive body projects where multiple versions of perfectionism may be imagined. Promoting these ‘variable body projects’ (Monaghan, 2001) promises more fulfilling body-self relationships, less risky bodily practices, opportunity for empowerment and increases in overall embodied wellbeing.

References

Ahmad, A., Rotherham, N. & Talwar, D. (2015) Muscle dysmorphia: One in 10 men in gyms believed to have ‘bigorexia’. BBC Newsbeat. Online article (accessed 22nd October 2015): http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34307044/muscle-dysmorphia-one-in-10-men-in-gyms-believed-to-have-bigorexia

Chaline, E. (2015) The Temple of Perfection: A History of the Gym. London: Reaktion Books.

Bauman, Z. (1990) Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Featherstone, M. (1991) Postmodernism and Consumer Culture. London: Sage.

Featherstone, M. (2000) Body Modification: An Introduction. In: Featherstone, M. ed. Body Modification. London: Sage.

Foucault, M. (1981) The History of Sexuality (Volume 1). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fussell, S.W. (1991). Muscle: Confessions of an Unlikely Bodybuilder. Poseidon Press.

Fussell, S. (1994) Bodybuilder Americanus. In: Goldstein, L. ed. The Male Body: Features, Destinies, Exposures. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 43-60.

Garland-Thomson, R. (2009). Starring: How We Look. New York: Oxford University Press.

Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Grogan, S. (2008) Body Image: Understanding Body Dissatisfaction in Men, Women and Children. Hove & New York: Routledge.

Hargreaves, J.A. (1994) Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women’s Sports. London: Routledge.

Hughes, B. (1999) The constitution of impairment: modernity and the aesthetic of oppression. Disability and Society, 14 (2), pp. 155-172.

Klein, A. (1993) Little Big Men: Bodybuilding Subculture and Gender Construction. New York: SUNY Press.

Markula, P. (2001). Firm but shapely, fit but sexy, strong but thin: the postmodern aerobicizing female bodies. In: A. Yiannakis & M.J. Melnick (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Sociology of Sport. Champaign: IL: Human Kinetics, pp. 237-258.

Monaghan, L. (1999) Creating ‘The Perfect Body’: A Variable Project. Body & Society 5 (2-3), pp. 267-90.

Monaghan, L. (2001) Bodybuilding, Drugs and Risk. London: Routledge.

Monaghan, L. (2002) Opportunity, Pleasure and Risk: An Ethnography of Urban Male Heterosexualities. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 31 (4):440-477.

Orbach, S. (2010). Bodies. London: Profile Books

Pronger, B. (2002) Body Fascism: Salvation in the Technology of Physical Fitness. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Shilling, C. (1993) The Body and Social Theory: 1st Ed. London: Sage.

Shilling, C. (2003) The Body and Social Theory: 2nd Ed. London: Sage.

Sparkes, A.C. (1997) Reflections on the socially constructed physical self. In: Fox, K. ed. The Physical Self: From Motivation to Wellbeing. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, pp. 83-110.

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What impact has social policy in Britain had on minority ethnic groups?

One of the greatest challenges for social policy in Britain has been to encompass minority ethnic groups, and in many ways it has failed to achieve this. Bochel points out that for many years social policy has been reluctant to recognize ethnic diversity, intending to be universal in character, so the issue of race has long been overlooked. This has had a significant impact on minority ethnic groups as the discrimination that they most definitely suffer in the labour market and in the community has not been properly addressed. Research has shown that men and women from ethnic minority groups are twice as likely to be unemployed as white Britons, and other social indicators echo this pattern. Ethnic minorities are also more likely to undertake low-paid, low-skilled work, and the vicious circle that stems from this – inferior housing, poorer living standards, and substandard schools in deprived areas – is actually partly caused by the welfare state system, which institutionalises this discrimination. The unique problems faced by ethnic minorities must be addressed individually, and until recently social policy has failed to do this. Furthermore, the emphasis on tackling crime that has underpinned New Labour’s social policy and that of the previous Conservative governments has impacted on ethnic minorities due to the often discriminatory nature of initiatives to cut crime. The ‘stop and search’ programme is unfairly targeted toward black youths, to the extent that many believe being black is tantamount to a social problem (McGhee, 2005). Such flaws in British social policy have undoubtedly contributed to a growing sense of isolation amongst ethnic minority groups, and thus it could be argued that social policy is often more harmful than beneficial.

What are the essential characteristics of ‘conservative’ welfare states?

Given that welfare states are normally associated with left of centre governments, and the supposed hostility of conservative right wing parties toward high levels of state intervention, the term ‘conservative welfare states’ seems somewhat of an anomaly. Nonetheless, there are definite examples of conservative states that not only refrain from fighting the welfare state but actually encourage the dependence of citizens on the government. This can be traced back to the Bismarckian ‘corporatist’ system of 19th century Germany, in which it was seen as in the interests of the state to look after the welfare of its citizens. This type of welfare state (in its extreme form) is less about reducing inequality and improving citizens lives than it is maintaining the status quo – a hierarchical system based on a culture of dependence (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Conservative welfare states are often religious and/or nationalist in nature, with a strong emphasis on family values. Epitomising such characteristics is arguably George Bush’s current reign. Despite initial cuts in public expenditure, government spending has actually increased faster under Bush than it did under Bill Clinton, with an increase of almost 33%. The religious aspect of Bush’s conservative system is illustrated with reference to his 2001 pledge to give billions of dollars to faith-based charities. Accepting the inevitability of ‘big government’ (and thus the end of Conservative emphasis on cutting spending), the republican government under Bush has prioritised public spending partly according to religious preferences. Therefore, a ‘conservative’ welfare state is one which uses welfare as a control mechanism, to advance a particular way of thinking – for instance religion, nationalism – on its citizens.

What have been the most significant changes in the size and use of public social expenditure in the UK in the past 30 years?

The 1970s certainly marked a watershed in British history with regard to the welfare state; however, to claim that the past 30 years has witnessed a roll-back of the state and a decline in public spending is at best too simplistic and at worst incorrect. In fact, research has shown that from the late 1970s, public spending as a proportion of GDP has remained fairly stable. Thatcher certainly espoused the merits of small government and individualism and bemoaned the high levels of government spending associated with the economic crises of the 1970s, but the welfare state had become entrenched in British society, practically to the point of no return. There have, though, been significant changes in the use of public spending, as governments have been forced to re-prioritise spending (Alcock et al). For example, spending on education has increased in the past 30 years, whereas the Conservative and New Labour governments have attempted to tighten their budgets in the area of income support through an increase in means testing for benefits. NHS spending has also increased significantly under Labour following the 1999 Comprehensive Spending Review, by approximately 4.7% annually (Alcock et al). Ultimately, governments in the past 30 years have strived to improve the efficiency of public services, and this has accounted for the changes in the use of public social expenditure.

What was distinctive about the ‘classic welfare state’ in Britain from the 1940s to the 1970s?

Although it is important not to overlook the pre-1940 foundations upon which the welfare state was built, one cannot deny that the concept of the welfare state was most fully realized in Britain between 1940 and 1970. Building on the strong sense of collectivism that characterized the war years, the public and the government alike reached the consensus that state intervention was necessary to ensure that Britain would meet its full economic potential. It is widely regarded that the subsequent policies stemmed from a combination of the economic philosophy of John Maynard Keynes and the social philosophy of William Beveridge. The fact that a basic framework of social policy emerged for the first time was distinctive because it complemented the political and economic rights afforded to citizens from the turn of the century. Moreover, it represented the beginning of a rights-based citizenship in Britain (Alcock et al). It was also effectively the first time since the development of political parties that the common good of the nation prevailed over partisan differences. Asa Briggs’ classic essay identified three principal elements of the welfare state which were distinctive from the pre-war period. The aim was to ensure the guarantee of minimum standards (including income), social protection by the state at times of need and the provision of services at a maximum level (Briggs, 1985). Another distinctive factor was that this protection was to be universal – unlike the poor laws of the Victorian times, access to welfare was to be ‘free at the point of delivery’ for all, without the stigma previously attached to welfare support. Of course, the ideal of the welfare state was never truly realized and disagreements regarding policy were common, but the consensus that emerged from the Second World War undoubtedly marked a major turning point in British history regarding the development of social policy.

References

Alcock, C. Introducing Social Policy, Harlow: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004.

Bochel, H. Social Policy: Issues and Development, Oxford University Press, 2005

Briggs, A. The Collected Essays of Asa Briggs, Harvester Press, 1985

Esping-Anderson, G. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, 1990

McGhee, D. Intolerant Britain, Open University Press, 2005

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It may be argued that sociology is of activist origins, propelled by a desire to comprehend, diagnose and ultimately administer solutions to societal ailments. However, with the advent of scientific discourse, especially the rise of so-called hard sciences, the discipline has been absorbed into the pedagogic realm of social-science which seeks to emulate its empirical cousin and take residence within the ivory tower of academia, virtuous in its efforts to seek objectivism, value-freedom and political abstinence. The purpose of this essay is to explore the proposition that sociology should reclaim its identity, expanding its imagination (Mills 1959) as a politically engaged agent tasked with improving society through a critical dialogue with various institutions and actors. This essay will consider the contention offered by some of sociology’s founding fathers, particularly Marx and Engels (1848) and Durkheim (1972), that sociology should be at the vanguard of social engagement and change – a citadel of moral and intellectual purity, a ‘philosopher king’ (Plato 1993: 109). By extension, this essay will include a critique of the academic milieu in which sociology resides, addressing the dispute that it has become colonised and thus compromised by wider market and political forces and thus incapable of functioning as an independent agent of knowledge and change.

The proposition of a Public Sociology is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, the founding progenitors envisaged a discipline actively engaged with the political milieu and public lifeworld. Indeed, Durkheim (1972), conceiving of a social world underpinned by tangible laws – reiterating Comte’s (1988: 33) ‘science of society’ – predicted that sociologists would become aides-de-camp to the state, revered intellects who would influence policy and legislature. By contrast, Marx and Engels (1848) were interested in the dissemination of knowledge to the grass-roots or proletariat – to reawaken their collective consciousness and engender a rebellious will-to-power (Nietzsche 2014) against the prevailing capitalist system. Importantly, despite its definition, sociology was less interested in the comprehension of social life per se: rather it was obsessed with the noxious configurations that comprised society, mournful of the crippling and incarcerating effects these had on humanity’s potential and species-being (Marx and Engels 1991). This remains a dominating theme within sociology today: the field of critical theory has almost reached a level of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Bryman 2004:544) inasmuch as abuses against civilisation on grounds of (for example) gender, class, race and creed have been researched and articulated repeatedly in pedagogic discourse, simply restructured in linguistic hyperbole to pass as authentic. By contrast, Weber (1989) was concerned with maintaining abstinence from the political arena, endorsing scientific mastery and the conduct of research for its own virtue i.e. ‘as a vocation’ (78); sociology held no greater esteem over the value-laden judgements of social-political discourse and must thereforelimit public discussion to the classrooms.

The debate regarding sociology’s public face was again revitalised by Mills (1959) who, acknowledging a gross depreciation in the social lifeworld, offered a critical assessment of his field, which had abandoned its public calling, instead becoming captivated by the power and prestige (including resources) offered by academia. The discipline had succumbed to institutionalisation, a servant of the university and its preoccupation with quantifiable (profitable) results, professionalism and its self-image as a reputable organisation. By extension, as a business, academia pandered to powerful organisations (purse holders) like the state and private shareholders; exploration was only authorised and noteworthy if it aligned with the demands and/or values of a minority who possess the architectural means of production (Zsolnai and Gasparski 2002). Also, Parker and Jary (1995) allude to the notion that sociology is subject to the McUniversity, whereby the fixation of budgets, time restraints and production of (quantifiable) articles, books and graduates has a detrimental effect on the vibrancy and eclecticism of its sociological imagination (Mills 1959), thereby crippling any possibility for politicking – scientific absence is the prevailing episteme or ideology (Gouldner 1971). Thus, sociology is not only accused of abandonment but also of participating in a form of symbolic violence inasmuch as it retains potentially empowering or life-giving knowledge, which it retrieves from an ailing world, to secure its own somewhat tentative (albeit profitable) status as a soft ad-hoc science. As Luck (2007) ably posits, this negative label cast on the back of sociology is based on ‘not so much its actions but failing to act’ (140). In addition, Gouldner (1971) had contended that, awkwardly aware of it betrayal and desperately seeking to generate a credible facade, sociology provides lip-service or commiseration and an imitated gesture of desire for social change.

Yet some have argued that sociology has required time to solidify itself and create a scholarly community based not only on substantive research but also camaraderie, interdependency and trust (Adair-Toteff 1995) from which a new breed of intellect could arise, unfettered by self-interest, and rather concerned with improving society and seeking to reinvigorate and enhance its intellectual flare through public engagement. As Marx and Engels (1848: 3) asserted: ‘philosophers have interpreted the world […] the point however is to change it!’. Therefore, sociology should be less concerned with holding onto the tailcoats of so-called hard sciences, and focus on harnessing its own methodology to irradiate, disseminate and help transform the social milieu – to become a participatory agent in the (re)creation of society. Indeed, the political life of Boudieu (1993) is often regarded as a prime example of the kinds of dirty work sociologists should be engaged in; having witnessed the venomous social disparities of a failing and unjust French society, he took to the streets in numerous political protests. This constitutes a form of academic bricolage (Hebdige 1988) whereby normative procedures and forms of professionalism prolific within the pedagogic milieu – designed to confine scholars to specific predefined scripts of conduct – are broken or otherwise inverted. His actions as a scholarly activist serve as a template for today’s sociologists; a reminded of their role involves dirty work or aligning themselves with ordinary people in a bid to better understand social angsts – thereby enhancing epistemologies and methodologies – and subsequently improve society. As a result, Bourdieu (1993) suggested that, only through public engagement could sociology develop an augmented, rich and powerful knowledge-base, otherwise it would simply be masquerading as a social-scientific field.

Thus, Chomsky and Otero (2004) denote that we must fashion a more reflexive sociology (third-order understanding) – to analyse and remodify the pedagogic habitus – capable of comprehending often subtle and taken-for-granted interconnections, like the asymmetrical interplay of power, capital and playing fields within academia, that affect and hinder the discipline. Sociology must be aware of its own metaphorical blind spot – its arrogances and handicaps – and critically engage in reciprocated policing within its various subfields and other interdependent social-sciences. As Bourdieu (1988) advocated, being self-critical will facilitate a comfortability in one’s own skin and ultimately strengthen the field’s core. Indeed, as Murji (2007) argues, sociology remains a host to external asymmetries such that a white middle-class male continues to demarcate the archetypal modern-day sociologist. In a similar vein, as Ossewaarde (2007) alludes, sociological productions are overwhelmingly driven by and imbued with Westernised ideals, values and perspectives, specifically those fashioned in the United States: this is obviously indicative of wider societal inequalities that belittle or otherwise disadvantage other countries not befitting first-world status. Also, as Parenti (1995) suggests, the types of research revered most are typically those aligned with empiricism (e.g. statistics, quantification, reports) and policy-centred. As a result, somewhat idealistically, Burawoy (2005) advocates an academic revolution within sociology to generate a more equitable playing field.

Despite the criticism inferred on sociology, concerning its diminished public identity and seeing it as a hotbed of malignance, many have come to its defence. For example, Hossfeld and Nyden (2005) have contended that an ASA Task Force has been created to reclaim sociological presence within the political, offering incentives and promotional positions to eligible scholars interested in disseminating the sociological imagination to wider audiences. Also, Kalleberg (2005) recognises the existing efforts made to produce jargon-free literature and broadcasts that pertain to parochial as well as (inter)national issues. Similarly, as Skeggs and Deem (2003) note, especially following the cultural turn, face-to-face and in-depth engagements with the public, including those disadvantaged groups such as women, the working-class and ethnic minorities, have intensified with the rise of qualitative methodologies. Hence, there remains active engagement and participation by sociologists with extra-academic cohorts, alluding to the fact that sociology can synthesise professionalism with public involvement; a by-product of this is the emancipatory and empowering effects such engagements can generate. However, proclaiming that sociologists should uproot and become heretical scholars is a monumental ask; one that threatens their very ontological wellbeing i.e. their reputation, financial security, friendships and way of life could be jeopardised in the process of transgression – one might even envisage a social death for those daring to try (Shilling 2003). By extension, such an act would invariably compromise the already fragile reputation of sociology; opening its doors to the public would risk its credibility and entice the stigmatised label (Goffman 1990) of just another fanatical ‘ism’ to be discarded alongside the other failed idealistic enterprises, such as Marxism and Feminism (Brady 2004).

In addition, given the fact that sociology is inhabited by a diverse and deeply opinionated cohort of intellects who occupy a range of paradigms, it is unlikely that (in the near future anyway) such individuals will collectively march in unison under the banner of a Public Sociology. Yet it might be plausible for sociology to formulate a democratically charged governing body that could represent the standpoints of a majority force; elected representatives may perhaps serve as champions charged with proliferating ideas and findings and leaving society to decide what, if anything, should be done with them. That said, Nielson (2004) makes the important point that there is a massive incongruence between the ideal and somewhat advanced heuristic devices and ideas generated within the pedagogic milieu and the realities of the social lifeworld; the latter remains a comparatively primitive figuration of ideologies and values incapable or unready to assimilate the ideas of the former. The mind is a cursed thing, it permits us to envisage infinitely wonderful (utopian) worlds where societal processes operate as a beautiful symphony unchecked by toxic social phenomena, histories, idiosyncrasies and other variants that make reality a constant work-in-progress of ebbs and flows, of civility and barbarism, of progress and regression (Parenti 1995). As a result, in true Weberian tradition, Nielson (2004) contends that sociology has no superior ‘right of way’ (33) in public-political affairs. Instead, we should concern ourselves with aiding the present or aligning ourselves with the spirit of the times (zeitgeist). In the end, the question of sociology’s public identity continues to be a hotly debated concept, its actual realisation requires a level of faith and risk and remains (in large) something to behold.

This essay has sought to detail the various arguments for and against a politically engaged Public Sociology – a controversy that has reigned since the subject’s inception and one that continues in a somewhat recurring pattern throughout its development. Indeed, as sociology becomes increasingly self-reflexive and more substantiated in its understanding of social processes, the urge for argumentation regarding its identity and role within society becomes greater. As this essay shows, there is certainly a moral imperative or compulsion within sociology to irradiate asymmetrical discourses that cripple humanity’s potential and subsequently assist in emancipating ourselves from them; this urge is expected given that we are sentient and empathic beings. However, this essay has also acknowledged the possible detriment that may befall sociology in such a venture. Moreover, we have explored the various external forces that contribute to the overall condition of the sociological paradigm; the discipline is imprinted with numerous inequalities and is persuaded greatly by market and political demands to the disadvantage of forming a Public Sociology. Finally, the issue of individual differences, whilst not extensively explored, will remain a long-lasting dilemma as we attempt to reconcile our differences, and harness our collective research and experiences to develop a legitimate and democratically-orientated discipline suitably equipped, confident and competent in participating within wider society.

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‘Prison Works.’ Discuss.

Websters dictionary defines prison as ‘a place of confinement especially for lawbreakers; specifically: an institution (as one under state jurisdiction) for confinement of persons convicted of serious crimes.’ The idea and reasoning behind prison has been an issue of great controversy especially in the 20^th century. It has been greatly criticised due to its apparent lack of rehabilitation and early releases of paedophiles and rapists, especially in recent news with the release and re-offence of known paedophile Craig Sweeny.

However recent data and statistics have shown a significant decrease in levels of crime both in the UK and US. This paper will attempt to give a balanced argument both in support and against the imprisonment system and attempt to answer whether or not prison does in fact work. Prison systems across the world will be looked at and a comparison will be made between systems in the UK and those in other countries.

There is a lot of evidence in the form of statistics which shows a decrease in levels of crime and re-offending. Evidence from the US shows that as the likelihood of going to prison increases crime decreases. In the UK statistics show that increasing likelihood of getting caught and being put in prison reduces crime. However there is also the issue of there being serious flaws in statistics offered by the British Crime Survey (BCS).

The BCS focuses on crime against an individual, thus eliminating all crime against a business or organisation, including fraud. It fails to take into account “victimless” crimes such as drug offences and crimes such as murder where the victim cannot, for obvious reasons, be interviewed. Rape and other sexual offences are not included, an acknowledgement that many respondents would be unwilling to disclose this information. Crimes against people under the age of 16 are also excluded – removing large numbers of crimes that are common among this age group, such as mobile phone theft and child abuse.

There was also a significant change in the way methodology was carried out as new offences were added to categories of crime in April 1998. No distinction was made between new and old offences which made comparing new statistics to old rather difficult. This shows statistics and figures referring to crime should be taken in to account rather carefully as it is difficult to see whether this data is accurate.

The Government has set out to reduce crime, but the evidence from a study comparing the policies pursued in the USA with those in England and Wales suggests it has adopted the wrong policies. From the early 1980s until the mid-1990s the risk of imprisonment increased in the USA and the crime rate fell; while in England and Wales the opposite happened: the risk of imprisonment fell and the crime rate increased. Then, from 1993, policy in England and Wales was reversed and the risk of imprisonment increased, though it remained historically low. Even this relatively small increase in the use of prison was followed by a reduction in crime.

How do we compare with Europe?

During 2002, concern about prison overcrowding led Britain’s senior judge, Lord Woolf, to discourage judges and magistrates from sending criminals to jail. When he made his statement the BBC television news announced that the prison population was rising when crime was falling and Britain already had more people in jail per head of population than the rest of Europe. The implication is that judges and magistrates are deploying a rather barbaric instrument when everyone else in Europe prefers a more gentle approach.

But a closer look at the figures suggests a different interpretation. The proper comparison is not between the number of prison inmates and the total population, but between the number of prisoners and the volume of crime. A country with a high level of crime would expect to have to put more people in jail. And England and Wales have one of the highest crime rates among industrialised countries. (See above.)

In the EU the average number of prisoners per 100,000 population (unweighted) in 2001 was 87, compared with 129 in England and Wales. But if we compare the number of prisoners to the number of recorded crimes the EU average was 16.9 and the figure for England and Wales was 12.1. In fact, 8 out of 15 EU countries had rates of imprisonment for every 1,000 crimes that were the same or higher.

Comparison with countries outside Europe reveals a similar pattern. In 1999, Canada had 123 prisoners per 100,000 population compared with England and Wales, but 15.9 prisoners per 1,000 recorded crimes. Japan had only 43 prisoners per 100,000 population but 25.3 per 1,000 recorded crimes. Australia, which had the worst crime victimisation rate out of the 17 countries in the International Victims of Crime Survey, had 108 prisoners per 100,000 population and 15.4 per 1,000 crimes.

On this evidence prison in England and Wales is under-used. But does overseas experience suggest that greater use of prison would reduce crime? The best available evidence compares England and Wales with the United States, below.

The Government Line

The Government claims to be cracking down on crime. In the foreword to the white paper, Justice for All (July 2002), authored by the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, and the Attorney General, tough language was used to back up this claim:

“Too few criminals are caught or convicted or prevented from reoffending. Justice denied is justice derided. This White Paper is designed to send the strongest possible message to those who commit crimes that the system will be effective in detecting, convicting and properly punishing them.”

But does the evidence suggest that the Government has adopted the best methods for reducing crime?

For at least 20 years until 1993 the Home Office was strongly opposed to the use of prison, but when Michael Howard became Home Secretary the use of prison was increased for a time against the wishes of officials. Subsequently this policy reversal was weakened and the long-standing bias against prison continues to influence policy today.

Custody, in the words of Justice for All, has an important role in punishing offenders and protecting the public, but it is expensive and should be limited to ‘dangerous, serious and seriously persistent offenders and those who have consistently breached community sentences’.⁽¹⁾

However, the old Home Office policy of reducing the use of prison has been tempered by acknowledgement that community sentences do not adequately protect the public. This realism has led the Government to the search for ‘tough community sentences’ that are a ‘credible alternative to custody’, including community sentences with multiple conditions like tagging, reparation and drug treatment and testing.

It is imperative, according to the Government, that ‘we have a correctional system which punishes but also reduces reoffending through the rehabilitation of the offender’.⁽²⁾ Consequently, a genuine third option is also needed in addition to custody and community punishment.

The planned new sentences combine community and custodial sentences. The list includes a modified suspended sentence called Custody Minus, under which offenders will be automatically imprisoned if they fail to comply with the conditions of the sentence. Custody Plus involves closer supervision by the Probation Service on release for those sentenced to up to three months in prison. The period of custody and supervision combined will be not more than 12 months in total. Intermittent custody is designed for low-risk offenders and involves serving time at weekends or overnight, but working or training during the day.

Seven aims of sentencing are listed in the white paper: to protect the public, to punish, to reduce crime, to deter (others as well as the criminal), to incapacitate, to reform and rehabilitate, and to promote reparation. In the heyday of the anti-prison consensus at the Home Office, ‘incapacitation’ and ‘punishment’ were very much out of favour. Some even denied that prison had a deterrent effect, preferring to regard all criminals as victims of social forces. The list shows how opinion at the Home Office has progressed. But has it absorbed all the lessons revealed by the evidence from overseas?

If the Government really thinks that ‘too few criminals are caught or convicted or prevented from reoffending’ and, if the real aim of policy is to ‘send the strongest possible message to those who commit crimes that the system will be effective in detecting, convicting and properly punishing them’, would an independent and rational person choose the policies set out in Justice for All?

What evidence is available? If we increase the rate at which criminals are caught, convicted and imprisoned, can we expect crime to fall? Two kinds of experiment would allow this theory to be tested. First, two countries would need to pursue opposite policies: one would need to reduce the risk of punishment and another to increase it.

If it is true that crime falls when the risk of punishment increases, then crime will rise in the country that reduces the risk of being caught, convicted and imprisoned. Or, second, a single country would need to reverse its policy, either by increasing or decreasing the risk of punishment, to allow an historical comparison of the impact on crime to be made.

In the social sciences opportunities for such experiments are rare, but for once we are lucky and both an international comparison and a single-country historical comparison are possible. We can compare the USA with England and Wales from 1981-1996 and we can contrast the impact of the anti-prison policy in England and Wales up to 1993 with the effects of the increased use of prison thereafter.

The policies pursued in England and Wales were very different from those adopted in America during the 1980s and 1990s. In America over the whole period, a vigorous effort was made to incarcerate more criminals. As a result crime fell dramatically. In England and Wales, however, the Home Office pursued an anti-prison policy up to 1993, preferring ‘community sentences’. During this period crime increased dramatically. After that date, criminals faced an increase risk of imprisonment. Crime subsequently fell.

Ann Widdecombe – undisputedly a conviction politician – answered the question posed on law and order by the Howard League for Penal Reform with characteristic speed. Speaking on the Tory party conference fringe, the shadow home secretary said simply “Yes” to the question ‘Does prison work?’ “Of course it does,” she continued speaking in a packed hotel function room in sunny Bournemouth. “When people are locked up they can’t commit any further crime,” she said.

By taking the persistent offenders off the streets the one-time Home Office minister said a significant dint could be made in the crime figures. But enough of incarceration. Miss Widdecombe quickly changed tack. “Prison does not do anything like as much as it should to prevent crime. “It only defers crime, it does not solve it.” Rehabilitating offenders was not, she said some “wet liberal extra, it is necessary.” “If people spend any length of time in prison they should not leave without being able to read and write.” Self financing prison workshops were the way forward, she said.

Something had to be done, said Miss Widdecombe, to change a situation where prisoners were set to work to produce 1.4m pairs of socks for a prison population of 67,000 people. Speaking for the National Association of Prison Officers, Harry Fletcher said that if model prisons run to rehabilitate prisoners and reduce re-offending could be shown to work then they should be taken up nationwide. But he said that the present size of the prison population made him “pessimistic” that the system could be made to work in such a way.

Speaking for the Howard League itself was David Faulkner. Although welcoming Miss Widdecombe’s words, he said he had heard similar speeches made by ministers and prison officials for the last 40 years. He then attempted to answer the question his organisation had posed. “Tackling crime requires so much more than incarceration.” Policies should be framed within a sound respect for human rights and framed on “evidence and experience” and not constructed by following populist cries for action, he said.

In the past three financial years, however, the three main types of rehabilitation scheme – psychological ‘offending behaviour programmes’, drug treatment and basic skills education – have been funded to the tune of ?213 million, and are set to expand substantially again. Last year, 6,127 inmates completed offending behaviour programmes, more than 11 times as many as in 1994. That figure will rise to 9,000 in 2002.

Another 16,000 are being taught numeracy and literacy – the basic skills of more than two-thirds of prisoners are so poor they are automatically excluded from 94 per cent of jobs. Research shows that nothing succeeds in preventing recidivism more effectively than employment. ETS is now in use in 79 jails and a similar programme adopted from Canada at another 24. Peer-reviewed research by Caroline Friendship, a Prison Service psychologist, compares 670 inmates who went through these courses with 1,801 offenders matched by offence and social categories who did not attend a programme.

All types of offender who had the treatment were significantly less likely to be reconvicted within two years. Among those judged ‘medium-low risk’, for example, only 18 per cent were reconvicted, against 32 per cent in the comparison group. The research concludes that prisoners who take the courses in 2002 can be expected to commit 21,000 fewer crimes. The effects of rejecting the bleak ‘nothing works’ philosophy go beyond the courses themselves, to prison culture as a whole. The rapid spread of offending behaviour, drugs and education programmes, and the increasing involvement of ordinary prison officers in running them, means the old, militaristic ethos is breaking down in many prisons.

Small signs point up deeper changes – most prisoners address their officer tutors by their first names, for example. From the staff’s point of view, convicts struggling to overcome dyslexia, or to analyse their worst past actions, are less easily dehumanised. To use a word from a previous era which believed in rehabilitation, albeit through religion, they have begun to appear redeemable. At the same time, as research from Canada has long suggested (see box below), prisoners on programmes are less violent, more sociable, and easier to work with. ‘I’m more outgoing, more relaxed,’ says Dave from the CSCP. ‘And if someone calls me a wanker now, I’m OK with it. That’s their opinion, that’s all. It doesn’t mean everyone thinks that.’

At Pentonville, all staff, not only those running programmes, attend an ‘awareness course’ to learn what they entail. ‘You see a prisoner develop, so your attitude to him changes,’ says officer Steve Oliver after one such session. ‘He’s no longer the prat he was, so you treat him better. When you see a prisoner doing something you never thought he would, it’s an incredible buzz.’ ‘There have always been people in the service prepared to treat prisoners decently,’ Narey says. ‘But sometimes they might have felt they had to treat prisoners decently by stealth.

Recently I took a guy into Wormwood Scrubs who had worked with Lord Woolf on his report into the [1990] Strangeways riot. He was astonished at the change.’ The best testimony comes from prisoners themselves. After 16 years inside, Dave says the changes are palpable. ‘It’s much less hostile. The media’s constantly saying that society has got so much more violent. The funny thing is, it’s got less violent in here.’ Politicians and police officers complain about dropped cases and acquittals in court, but the facts remain that judges and magistrates are much more likely than they were a decade ago to send convicted criminals to prison, and they are awarding longer sentences.

The stresses on the prisons are immense and they may, in the end, obliterate the good Narey and his staff are trying to do. The effects on the programmes are already being felt. Peter is on his third attempt to settle into the CSCP – far from ideal for such a demanding programme. At Ranby, near Nottingham, where he started, the course has been closed altogether; he then moved to Dartmoor, where it met the same fate.

He says he knows the course is valuable to him and may indeed be essential for release. But he is being forced to spend a year hundreds of miles from his family in the North. ‘They can’t visit me. And believe me, doing this, I could really do with their support.’ In other jails, overcrowding means prisoners are disappearing from courses just as they get into their stride.

This first concern is substantive, that is, whether deterrence-based programmes are effective in reducing crime. Current scientific opinion on an international basis is that punishment through imprisonment does not reduce crime rates and, in some instances, even worsens crime rates. For example, in a recent review of 29 evaluation studies of boot camps, this approach was considered ineffective in reducing crime.1 Analysis2 of 50 studies from 1958, involving nearly 350,000 offenders, showed that prison slightly elevated the risk for recidivism. Also, lower risk offenders tended to be more negatively affected by the prison experience. Therefore, recent research has failed to establish a link between length of prison sentence and recidivism as predicted by deterrence theory.

As a product of numerous factors, crime requires varying interventions targeting problem-specific areas. Best practice rehabilitation programmes are those that target factors empirically linked to the risk for re-offending. These include pro-criminal attitudes, problem-solving deficits and creating opportunities for education and employment. Evidence from a wealth of studies shows that the risk for re-offending is modifiable when such programmes are delivered. For example, recidivism rates in serious or persistent young offenders can be reduced by 40% in community treatment and 30% in institutional treatment.3

A second concern is methodological, that is, whether the right measures have been used. Incarceration rates should have been computed as the ratio of persons admitted to prison for a particular offence in a given year to the number of persons arrested for that offence in the same year. In this way, the likelihood of the results accurately capturing cross-national differences in the willingness to incarcerate is enhanced. By using number of prisoners in custody on a given day (stock data), the authors have confounded sentence length with imprisonment rates. Stock data often over-represent more serious offenders with longer sentences, with the potential for over-estimation of the propensity to incarcerate in those countries with higher serious crime rates.

By contrast, the number of admissions to prison (flow data) is not affected by the accumulation of more serious offenders, thereby allowing the separation of the propensity to incarcerate from the length of sentence served. For instance, in a comparison of the use of incarceration in US, Canada, Germany and England, Lynch4 found that, in terms of either population-based stock rates or population-based flow rates, the US was several times more likely than any of the countries to incarcerate for homicide, robbery, burglary, and larceny. For homicide, the US was incarcerating 7.5 times and 5.3 times more frequently than England and Germany, respectively. Flow rates based on police arrests revealed a different pattern, showing a broad similarity in the probability of incarceration for the offences.

It appears that Saunders and Billante have not adjusted for variations in size of unsentenced prisoners. Failure to make a distinction can affect comparisons of stock-based incarceration rates since not all those held in a prison have been convicted of an offence.5

To minimise bias in comparative studies, police arrests, rather than crimes reported to police, seem to be the most appropriate data to use. One of the reasons for establishing the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) was to provide an alternative mechanism to inaccurate police records on crime. The trends reported have not controlled for differences in the seriousness of crime across the countries compared.

Countries could have similar crime rates but the nature of the crimes committed could vary. The ICVS (the fourth round, 2000) reported that ‘there was a higher than average use of weapons in the US, Spain, Scotland and Portugal’.6 Guns were used more often in the US and Spain. Without standardising for such variations, it is incorrect to attribute differences in incarceration rates to punitiveness. Therefore, offence-specific analyses provide a better approach.

Correlation between crime rates and imprisonment rates

A third concern is largely empirical, that is, whether crime rates can necessarily predict imprisonment rates. Simple correlation analyses are insufficient for exploring the complex and multi-dimensional association between crime and incarceration propensity.7,8 Several studies have shown the influence of crime rates on imprisonment rates to be limited.7,9,10

In Canada, where the criminal law is the same across the country but administered provincially, Sprott and Doob 11 found that crime rates did not predict incarceration counts. Numerous and complex factors, such as the organisation of the criminal justice system and reward structure, need to be examined. More detailed analyses are required to substantiate Saunders’ and Billante’s claim that ‘the rate of crime and incidence of punishment are closely associated’.

Conclusion

The observed differences reported by Saunders and Billante in the propensity to incarcerate cross-nationally have been made in terms that are too general to serve as a useful and valid basis for policy guidance. Stringent requirements focusing on more sensitive measures and specific crime categories are critical. Analyses of comparable crimes minimise the effects of variations in crime seriousness cross-nationally, thereby yielding more credible results.

Well-designed studies show that deterrence-based programmes are ineffective in reducing crime and the focus should be on developing rehabilitation programmes that do reduce the likelihood of recidivism. The case for Australia adopting the US approach to crime reduction through the use of imprisonment has not been established.

It is common sense that the only guarantee of protecting the community from an offender during the period of a sentence is a custodial sentence. It has been calculated that over a quarter of offenders serving community sentences will have re-offended at least once by the time an offender has served an average length sentence.

The majority of offences are minor ones. For offenders who present a risk of serious harm, prison is quite properly used. Prison provides absolute protection from an individual only for the duration of the sentence. This will not always mean protection from crime. It was suggested to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 1998 that demands for drugs from people inside prison results in crime outside.

The Home Office collects information on serious offences allegedly committed by offenders under supervision by the Probation service. In 2000, among those serving community sentences 103 convictions for very serious crimes were reported-about one in sixteen hundred of those starting sentences in that year. Better longer- term protection may be provided by community supervision.

If prison has not done anything to change offending behaviour, it cannot be said in the long term, to protect the public. If community sentences are effective at weaning offenders away from a criminal lifestyle, they may, in many cases offer the most effective long-term protection of the public. It has been shown that even allowing for selection effects, prisoners released early under parole supervision are reconvicted less than those serving the whole sentence.

For the Lord Chief Justice “many things can be done as far as offenders are concerned without sending them to prison which actually provides better safeguards for the public”. Lord Chief Justice Woolf 27.12.2000. Some community sentences offer more intensive supervision than others. Probation hostels can offer 24 hour monitoring at 50-66%% of the cost of prison. There are just over 100 hostels providing 2,200 places.

ISSP for under 18’s combines intensive supervision with close monitoring. The community surveillance element of the programme aims to ensure the young offender know that their behaviour is being monitored and demonstrate to the wider community that their behaviour is being gripped. ISSP schemes tailor individual packages of surveillance to the risks posed by each offender. They have available either:

Tracking by staff members
Tagging
Voice Verification
Intelligence led policing
– 12 –
We know from research and statistics that

There is no clear relationship between the use of imprisonment and the rate of crime in the UK or internationally. The 12% increase in recorded crime in France between 1987 and 1996 was similar to that in Holland although the percentage rise in the Dutch prison population (143%) was twenty times greater than the French

Incapacitation has only a modest effect. If a drug dealer is locked up, another will enter the market. If one of a gang of burglars is locked up the others may well carry on regardless. The Home office estimates that a 15% increase in the prison population produces only a 1% reduction in recorded crime. (Home Office)

Properly designed community measures or early interventions are a more cost-effective route to prevention than imprisonment. The

American Rand Research Institute found that graduation incentive programmes and community supervision were considerably more cost effective than prison building in reducing crime.

People subject to community alternatives commit no more crimes afterwards than people who have been to prison and in some cases the results are even better.

The Home Office say there is no discernible difference between reconviction rates for custody and community penalties. 56% of prisoners discharged from prison and commencing community penalties in 1995 were reconvicted within two years.

Reconviction rates do vary by type of order. 2 year rates for probation and combination orders were 59% and 60% respectively considerably higher than the 52% for community service. Reconviction rates for prisoners released after short sentences of up to 12 months were higher (60%) than those for longer term prisoners.

Actual re-offending may be higher than that which is measured by reconviction rates. Crude measures of reconviction do not allow distinctions to be made between the seriousness of types of offence. Some individual projects report markedly better rates. The HASC concluded that “some evidence suggests that the most successful forms of community sentence can reduce re-offending more effectively than prison.” HASC 1998. Since then, the most effective community supervision programmes have been shown to reduce offending 15% more than a prison sentence.

The Wiltshire aggression replacement training programme achieved a 14% difference and the West Midlands sex offender programme reduced overall offending by 22%. Among the individual projects which report better results are Sherborne House and the Ilderton Motor Project in London; C-Far in Devon and two Scottish projects, the Airborne Initiative and Freagaarach. The Home Affairs Select Committee in 1998 found “the absence of rigorous assessment astonishing”. While the position is getting better, we still do not know as much as we might about effectiveness. As the then Home

Secretary Jack Straw said in 1997: “We know that community sentences can be effective. But we need to ensure that they are consistently effective”. Research has confirmed the common sense view that offenders with no legitimate source of income, no settled place to live and or addiction problems are particularly likely to re-offend. Studies (e.g.) have found that a number of social factors affect the likelihood of re-offending. These suggest that successful approaches need to;

Get offenders into work. In a comprehensive North American study getting young offenders into work was by some way the most effective way of reducing recidivism (Lipsey et al)

Solve accommodation problems. A Home office study found that in Nottinghamshire 44% of those with stable accommodation were reconvicted compared to 62% with unstable accommodation (May 1999)

Address and treat drug use. A Home office study found that drug use was highly related to reconviction in all areas; offenders with drug problems were more likely to predict that they would re-offend (ibid)

Help with financial problems Research has found some relationship between debt and reconviction (ibid)

For some offenders, approaches are needed which deal with relationship problems and engage the question of peer pressure (ibid)

All of these factors are capable of positive resolution through community intervention and likely to be made more problematic by imprisonment.

“Evidence certainly exists to show that imprisonment creates additional challenges when prisoners are released- for example through loss of job or accommodation, or reduced prospects of obtaining either or both. (Home Office 2001). A research study from Scotland found that “the supervision of offenders in the community can bring about positive changes in behaviour”. (McCivor and Barry 2000). Reconviction rates were lower following the imposition of a probation order than before, the majority of probationers believed that their circumstances had improved since they were on supervision. In the literature on effectiveness, community based programmes have shown more positive results than those in custodial settings. (Vennard) This is not surprising given the then Prison Commissioner’s insight 80 years ago that “it is impossible to train men for freedom in conditions of captivity”.

References

1. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General, Justice for All, Cm 5563, London: 2000, p. 87.

2. Justice for All, p. 87.

3. BBC News: Does Prison Work? “yes”. Monday, 2 October, 2000, 14:15 GMT 15:15 UK

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2000/conferences/conservatives/953257.stm

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Introduction

A significant proportion of the British electorate has become disengaged from both politics and the political process (Flinders, 2015; Norris, 2011). Evidence of this is reflected in the low turnout in the 2015 General Election whereby only two-thirds of the electorate used their democratic right to vote (NatCen, 2014). Concerns about this withdrawal of British citizens from political participation has been mounting across the last twenty-five years (Flinders, 2015). Myriad reasons underpin this growth in collective apathy. Negative attitudes and opinions underpin how election candidates are out of touch; do not listen to the people; are self-interested and do not keep their promises (Flinders, 2015; NatCen, 2014). In sociological terms, the reasons for non-participation has been linked to ideas of ‘habitus’ and the ‘charismatic leader’ (Weber, 1968: 212; Bourdieu, 1977: 90). These debates will be evaluated to illustrate how and why democracy is under threat. The conclusion will find that the absence of political motivation is most acute within the young adult population particularly where age intersects with class, a lack of political knowledge and social capital (Phelps, 2006)..

Participation

Political participation comprises numerous activities from engaging with the local MP to canvassing for a party and taking part in opinion polls to debating politics in the pub (NatCen, 2014). Similarly, signing a petition, lobbying for a cause and marching in protest against a government policy is also political participation [See (Appendix A.] (Scottish Executive, 2005). However, those who participate in this way, do so in addition to, and not instead of voting in General Elections (Marsh et al., 2007). Voting remains the most commonly used form of political participation within the EU15 (Sloam, 2015). Participation is crucial because ‘citizen involvement in the political process is essential for democracy to be viable and meaningful’ (Dalton, 1988: 35). However, some argue that if voter turnout drops below 50% then whoever gains power cannot claim legitimacy within a democratic system as the results would not reflect the choice of the majority of the electorate (Marsh et al., 2007). The British government is concerned that this is generational and that the subsequent generations will mobilise a greater democratic deficit to the point whereby the legitimacy of the incoming government is called into question; or where democracy ceases to exist (Marsh et al., 2007).

Numerous theories exist as to why voters are disengaged (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). For example, voting is a rational choice which is made following the evaluation of the benefits against the costs of voting (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). Crewe et al., (1992) dismiss this model as too weak but, given the politically illiterate young adult coupled with a sense of apathy and/or alienation; the party they elect could contain policies that are detrimental to them (O’Toole, 2015).

Habitus

The sociological model identifies issues of class, gender, race, ethnicity and age starting with middle age onwards (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). The middle class electorate possess the ‘habitus’; a ‘lasting disposition’ that informs a lifestyle which is enabled by their cultural, social, symbolic and economic capital (Bourdieu, 2015: 15). Habitus is described as the ‘permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body’ and as such, it cannot be learned; it emerges through socialisation (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 190; Bourdieu 1990; Costa and Murphy, 2015: 4). Habitus provides the means to decipher the cultural codes to which less privileged voters are oblivious (Gerwitz et al., 1995). This elite group is more likely to stand for election or lobby parliament for policy shifts that reinforce middle class values (Bourdieu, 1977). Such policies are out-of-touch with working class lives thereby discursively excluding poor, black and minority ethnic groups (Bourdieu, 1977; Kolovos and Harris, 2005).

Political efficacy, by contrast, draws a distinction between political apathy and political alienation (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). Political apathy is rooted in political passivity and indifference (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). Apathetic citizens do not feel obligated to vote whereas, political alienation involves a conscious decision not to participate in voting because it views such participation as negative (Kolovos and Harris, 2005). Russell Brand is politically alienated as marked by tweet to his two million followers that they should not vote in the 2015 General Election if they could not distinguish the differences between the parties (Brand, 2015; Dunt, 2015).

O’Toole (2015) focused on the crisis of political participation in young adults as they are the least participatory group local and global. One exception to this rule could be found in the 86% turnout for the Scottish Independence Referendum which allowed sixteen and seventeen year-olds to vote; this propelled Scottish youths to participate with a hitherto unseen enthusiasm (Electoral Commission, 2014). However the referendum was driven by issues of identity and not leadership. In contrast however, 66% of Americans under 30 voted for Obama in 2008 revealing a racial, gendered and generational shift towards a ‘new class of interested citizens’ (Ting and Rundle, 2012). It was charisma that overwhelmed the hitherto inconceivable notion that an African American could govern America.

Charismatic Leader

While this was However, Obama epitomises what Weber defined as the ‘charismatic leader’ (1920[1968]: 212). The charismatic leader denotes an individual who possesses unique qualities that are beyond the scope of ordinary individuals (Weber, 1920[1968]: 241). Charismatic authority is one of three classifications of authority or ‘legitimate domination’ (Weber, 1920[1968]: 212). However, unlike ‘rational-legal’ and ‘traditional’ authority, ‘charismatic’ domination does not rely on the structural norms to achieve success (1920 [1968]: 212). Rather, charismatic authority is non-coercive; it rests on a ‘devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’, (Weber, 1920[1968]: 213). In a pre-modern context, the charismatic leader was perceived as ‘superhuman’, ‘divine’ or ‘supernatural’ (Weber, 1920[1968]: 241).

Charismatic leaders also demarcate the highest and lowest turnout to UK General Elections (See Appendix B.). The first was Winston Churchill who led Britain through WWII against the NAZI regime (Dubrin et al., 1998). In this context his leadership style was ‘charismatic’ insofar as he was trusted and adored by the nation which felt assured by his speeches via the radio (Dubrin et al., 1998: 55). While, the Beveridgean vision of the welfare state overpowered the electorate in 1945, Churchill regained power in1951 by an 82% turnout (UK Political Info, 2015).

In stark contrast, the lowest turnout was 59.4 per cent in the 2001 re-election of New Labour’s Tony Blair (UK Political Info, 2015). Blair perceived as a ‘new kind of politician with enormous charisma’ (Gov UK: 2015: [Online]). Riddle asserts that ‘Mr Cameron … has long aspired to capture some of the Blair charisma’ (2015: [Online]). Since then there has been a gradual rise in voter turnout; 66.1 per cent of the electorate voted in the 2015 General Election (UK Political Info, 2015).

Elements of the charismatic leader can be found from a poststructural perspective. Numerous sociologists have adopted the Foucauldian approach to explain how the bio-power of governments produce passive and docile subjects who are easy to control without coercion (Foucault, 1977; Galston, 2001;). Docile societies are self-regulating and see only the positive power of the government; as such, docile subjects trust their politicians and the institutions from which governmental power emanates and circulates (Foucault, 1977). As such, bio-power underpinned the reason why 46,425,386 people chose to vote in the 2015 General Election (Foucault, 1977). However, wherever possible, docile subjects tend to elect the most charismatic leader (Galston, 2001).

UK 2015 General Election

The Labour manifesto was carved on to twenty foot high stone slab costing ?30,000 (BBC News, 2015b: [Online]). Cameron just wanted to be ‘pumped up’ and then pulled the ‘right to buy’ out of the bag at the eleventh hour (BBC News, 2015a: [Online]). Neither possess charismatic authority and only 17% of the nation trusted them (NatCen, 2014). Few people felt any allegiance to a particular party and just 57% felt obliged to vote including academics and those located in London and the South East (NatCen, 2014). 76 % felt an obligation to vote in 1986 compared with 57% in 2015 (NatCen, 2014). Other variables impact the results in terms of a duty to vote such as the This appears supports the notion of habitus which middle class can decipher the cultural codes of the party’s manifesto and policies (Bourdieu, 1977). Interest in politics remains unchanged (29%) as does the belief that democracy works in the UK (57%) (NatCen, 2014).

Election Results and Non-Voters

Despite a slight rise in voting, it is argued that if all the non-voters in the 2015 General Election formed the ‘Apathy Party’, the Apathy Party would have won the majority vote (Dore, 2015: [Online]). This is based upon the number of non-voters outweighing the number of votes received by the winning party within each constituency (Dore, 2015: [Online]). While the election results in terms of seats and percentages looked like Figure 1 if the non-voters formed the Apathy Party it would have won the majority vote winning 345 seats (Dore, 2015: [Online]). Clearly, there has to be a shift in British attitudes to engage the electorate in politics.

Youth Participation

One of the reasons for the apathy of young adults however is linked to another charismatic personality informing his 2 million-strong Twitter followers or ‘disciples’ not to vote (Weber, 1920[1968]; 241). Russell Brand was actually stating that they should not vote if they were unable to distinguish between the parties (Dunt, 2015;, Sloam, 2015). Nevertheless, it was harmful insofar as the media and young adults misinterpreted this as do not vote at all; the youth vote generally goes to Labour thus the outcome could have been different (Dunt, 2015). However, Brand (2015) retracted this assertion having realised that Labour must win to oust the Conservatives.

Diverse Political Participation

Contrary to popular belief, almost two-thirds of young adults take interest in political issues generally (Mycock and Tonge, 2014). However, 75 per cent of young adults felt they did not have the power to influence political decision-making and just over half were politically illiterate (Mycock and Tonge, 2014). Political activism manifests in numerous ways ranging from signing a petition to embarking on active protest against polices (Rusbridger and Rees, 2012). The student protests and the UK riots in 2011 are key responses to the Coalition government’s spending cuts as part of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 which blocked routes to further education and social mobility for many working class youths (Rusbridger and Rees, 2012). In addition, it should also be noted that Russell Brand is not the sole reason for the lack of voting by youths (O’Toole, 2015).

Table 1 illustrates that the political participation of young adults has continued to fall steadily since 1992 and that the percentage of their participation is far lower than the total turnout up until 2010 when it rose slightly. Labour captured the majority of 18-34 year-olds voters who were classified as social class DE which encompasses: the ‘semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations’; the unemployed and ‘lowest grade occupations’; ‘private and social tenants’ and; ‘Black and minority ethnic groups’ (Nardelli, 2015: [Online]).These labour supporters would have felt the full force of the Coalition government’s Welfare Reform Act 2012 which supports the sociological model of voting by Kolovos and Harris (2005). The most loyal group with the highest turnout to vote for the Conservatives was the 65’s and over (Nardelli, 2015). This is due to the fact that this age group has been spared from the welfare reforms and are exempt from sharing the burden of the deficit to maintain and secure the ‘grey vote’ (Livesey and Price, 2013:21).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is evident following the debates above that the decrease in the turnout of voters in the British General Elections is contingent upon numerous shifting variables in accordance with the political, social and economic landscape; these are then impacted in terms of social divisions such as gender, class, disability race and minority ethnic groups all of whom experience governments and policies differently. These groups have yet to witness any evidence of the positive social change that sends the elderly to the booth in droves to vote. What does not work includes young working class adults who are politically illiterate illustrates a need to teach politics at school is one solution. The middle class habitus that informs future policies by lobbying banishes the less privileged into oblivion. Cross-Class lobbying is required to counter this issue because as long as middle class values are being imposed, the working class will remain disaffected. The elderly turnout illustrates that voting turnouts will rise if the policies are appropriate. Leaders must have charismatic authority to promote inclusion; traditional top-down power, promotes political disengagement and alienation, which will fester as long as habitus informs policies. Disengagement from politics also explains the political alienation of non-political revolutionaries such as Russell Brand who could his influence his followers by charisma alone. Similarly, charisma informed Obama’s presidency in a racist nation. Furthermore, the highest and lowest ever turnouts for Churchill and Blair’s leaderships were both determined by charisma based upon trust.

Word Count: 2,195

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Appendix A
Participation by citizens over the last 12 months: Europe and UK compared

Table 2. Participation by citizens over the last 12 months: Europe and UK compared

Country

UK

Europe

High

Low

Signed petition

35.54%

24.5%

Iceland 48.76%

Greece 2.95%

Boycotted certain products

20.58%

16.2%

Sweden 34.75%

Ukraine 1.79%

Contacted politician or official

14.94%

12.5%

Iceland 30.30%

Portugal 5.46%

Worked in another association

7.98%

13.1%

Iceland 49.47%

Slovenia 1.68%

Worn campaign badge/sticker

7.5%

8.1%

Iceland 34.4%

Hungary 1.34%

Taken part in a lawful demonstration

3.75%

10.8%

Ukraine 21.69%

Hungary Slovenia, 1.61%

Worked in political party/action group

2.22%

4.0%

Iceland 14.24%

0.94% Hungary

Source: Scottish Executive – FCSD – Analytical Services using European Social Survey 2004/2005

Appendix B

Table 1. Prime Ministers by Turnout and Party since 1945

Year

Turnout %

Prime Minister

Party

1945

72.80

– –

Atlee

Labour

1951

82.60

^

Churchill

Cons (Highest Turnout)

1955

76.80

v

Eden

Cons

1959

78.90

^

MacMillan

Cons

1964

77.10

v

Wilson

Labour

1966

75.80

v

Wilson

Labour

1970

72

v

Heath

Cons

1974

78.80

^

Wilson

Labour

1979

76

v

Thatcher

Cons

1983

72.70

v

Thatcher

Cons

1987

75.30

^

Thatcher

Cons

1992

77.70

^

Major

Cons

1997

71.40

v

Blair

Labour

2001

59.40

v

Blair

Labour (Lowest Turnout)

2005

61.40

^

Blair

Labour

2010

65.10

^

Cameron

Cons

2011

66.1

^

Cameron

Cons

Source: Modified from data collated by UK Political Info, 2015: [Online]

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

One thing that is clearly evident is that human beings have consistently developed new forms of solidarity as we have evolved from roaming bands of hunters and gatherers to a digital society with swiftly eroding national borders. Organisations such as Medecins sans Frontieres, The Red Cross, and Amnesty international were created as platforms of international solidarity (Baglioni 2001, p. 224). For these organisations, all that mattered was helping people in need, wherever they were and utilising individual expertise for global benefit (Baglioni 2001, p. 227). Today, the primary basis of solidarity is nationalism—i.e. the recognition of a special duty to one’s own nation, although this notion is eroding in Europe and Asia. Although there are certainly extremists for nationalism, most support for these movements is moderate, and moderate nationalists would say that the individual does have a moral duty to treat others fairly (Wilde 2004, p. 137). Nevertheless, nationalist sentiments preclude global identification as prioritising one’s national group still allows discrimination to flourish. Of course, the next logical step of human solidarity is that of the global level—where through the creation of international bodies, people strive to articulate universal values that are common to all cultures and come together on that basis. The aforementioned organisations do play a role in helping us advance to that point, but there are still many things that need to happen before the cosmopolitan ideal can be put in place. For instance, there needs to be a development of a universal system of ethics, a common language for business, science, and politics, and a change in consciousness from being a citizen of Nation A to citizen of the world. In a sense, this has happened as local movements for equal rights have influenced other people around the world to campaign for their own interests as well. As more organisations and governmental bodies are recognising the inherent worth of the individual, it is reasonable to expect that the development of a broader form of solidarity will emerge.

In the scholarship of international relations, an increasing number of writers agree that the ‘old international order’ is insufficient for dealing with the current threats to human survival, such as resource shortages (oil and potable water), increased population growth, and chaotic climate patterns (Wilde 2004, p. 137). Therefore, it is recommended that a form of global governance and stewardship should emerge (Hardt & Negri 2005, p. 161). Now, more than ever, the primacy of the nation-state is in question, especially as new ways of identification continue to be explored. While some lean to embracing a more local identification—with one’s city or cultural group, others believe that identification on the continental or global level would be more relevant (Waterman 2001, p. 200). In the mid-twentieth century, there has been some movement to creating bodies that possess international oversight such as the International Criminal Court to try war crimes, the Geneva Convention, which dictates international provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war, and the United Nations which dictate standards and prohibitions for weapons proliferation and international trade agreement (Tarrow 2011, p. 2). Although this does present a positive advance toward a system that promotes global accountability and global collaboration on certain commercial and environmental issues—there is still a strong tendency to identify nationality before anything else, and in some circles, tribal identity is most important. Social change toward a more global perspective will likely be slow and painful because of the tendency of the ruling class to view all collective action with suspicion—i.e. as a conspiracy or an infection that must be extracted (Melucci 1996, p. 42).

One piece of evidence that supports the conclusion of social change as a contagion was the opposition’s past reliance on terrorism or guerilla warfare to achieve particular ends (Clark 2009, p. 1). In 1605, Guy Fawkes and his compatriots sought to blow up Parliament in order to kill the king and restore England to Catholicism. On September 11, nineteen hijackers seized control of four US planes and killed more than 3,000 people in order to force Americans from Muslim lands and decrease support for Israel. In both cases, that led to increased persecution of English Catholics and American Muslims and in the latter case, an even larger American presence in the Middle East. This was especially true of governments where any form of verbal dissent meant exile to a prison colony or execution. As violent reactions often backfire, nonviolent protests may succeed where armed resistance has failed in the past. Even though nonviolent protest was always an option as a tool of social change, it was not until the 1940s that it had been thrust into global consciousness (Tarrow 2011, p. 102). Since the movement for Indian Independence in the 1940s, the concept of the nonviolent protest has gained ground, and the results have been astonishing. To those on the outside, the protestors look like champions of social justice while the government looks repressive for violently putting down the protests rather than simply letting them make a statement. This has worked not only to successfully ensure Indian independence in 1947, but also helped to pass Civil Rights laws in the United States in 1965 and ultimately end the state of apartheid in South Africa (Tarrow 2011, p. 216). The world was moving toward a stance of inclusion and tolerance, stressing an appreciation of all cultures. Thus, governments could no longer maintain a racist status quo without global condemnation, nor could it inflict acts of cruelty on its own citizenry without censure (Tarrow 2011, p. 217). ‘The point here, however, is that global politics will slowly penetrate the domestic agendas and there will be a need for articulation of old and new politics’ (Wilde 2004, p. 150). Several movements from women’s rights to anti-war movements and other independence movements have used nonviolent protests to gain their objectives and the current democratic movements in the Middle East and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US shows that it continues to be seen as a viable tool.

One critique of the global mindset is that it would, on the micro-level lead to increased unhappiness, mental ill health, and distrust of others. This was especially true as the demands of an industrial society had split up neighbourhoods and created a world where people did not automatically know what their ‘place’ was (Spencer & Pahl 2006, p. 10). Yes, there are more options than ever as people are more free to emigrate to whichever nation would suit them best, but the discontent would more likely be attributed to the consumer-capitalist ideal of defining the individual by the sum of their purchases. This mindset has also been exported around the globe, which makes it difficult to form communities along anything other than product lines. Yet Spencer and Pahl are optimistic that the old communities can be re-established through the virtual communities of the Internet. While the old cities and towns were grouped around people performing a particular occupation, today, a teacher can go online and correspond with other teachers to discuss the challenges of moulding young minds. A doctor could contact other doctors to learn about treatment modalities they have not tried yet. Only in this case, the community of like-minded people is global rather than local in nature. ‘First, while rightly crediting communities for developing our sense of right and wrong, a universal moral sense, it overturns the universality of the moral sense by asserting the priority of a particular communal obligation’ (Wilde 2004, p. 137).

One defining characteristic of the modern Western state is that it is rich in racial, religious, and cultural diversity. Another is that many of these states are relatively peaceful in spite of this heterogeneity. Part of the reason for this is that states have begun to protect the rights of those historically considered to be an Other based on race, religion or gender. One critique of the liberal policies of cooperation is that it encourages people to think of themselves first as members of religious or ethnic groups rather than members of a society. According to Touraine & Macey (2000): ‘What the liberal conception lacks is a principle of unity that can facilitate communication between different actors. This is why we see so many individuals fleeing into communities, which ensure a high level of communication but also enforce a homogeneity that is potentially intolerant and authoritarian’ (p. 137). One way to avoid this kind of self-segregation is to ensure that society recognises and appreciates the contributions of all member cultures and teaches a mutual valuing of cultures within its educational system (Mason 2000, p. 149). If the dominant society insists that only its own contributions are relevant, minorities would not feel as though they belong to that nation and would continue to behave as strangers in a strange land. If the dominant society is not prepared to acknowledge the needs and interests of minorities, then change often comes slowly through local action. Even though movements such as the one for African American Civil Rights and the one to expel the Chinese from Tibet started out on a local level, they would eventually be able to exert influence on an international level (Pleyers 2011, p. 41). Another example of this is the women’s movements. Starting primarily in Western nations, the quest for the rights of women had taken on global significance when taken to nations that had allowed women little to no agency over their lives (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan). While there was some success in the sense that women around the world were able to gain increased agency over their lives, they still remain entrenched in inequalities (Lyons 2010, p. 101).

Although Eric Fromm wrote with the intention of recognising the tenets of authoritarian regimes and analysing the tendency to get caught up in mass movements, he was pessimistic in the human capacity to establish a global society of peace and love because even as they adopt new ways of thought, the social structures still support the old ways. In this, he uses the example of the European conversion to Christianity. While the old pagan myths showed a strong male protagonist conquering adversaries, Christianity advocates turning the other cheek and practicing love for one’s neighbour. However, the history of Europe for the past five hundred years has been steeped in war, conquest, and greed. As Fromm (2007) says: “European-North American history, in spite of the conversion to the church, is a history of conquest, pride, greed; our highest values are: to be stronger than others, to be victorious, to conquer others and exploit them” (p. 116). This shows that even though a society may choose to embrace certain values, there is a problem of human nature and its slowness to align with their philosophical ideals. However, adaptation does take place because even though racism and sexism are still problematic, the Western world is significantly less sexist and racist than it was one hundred years ago. Progress is slow, but it is inevitable. Global solidarity is possible, but it would be a long time in coming. Curiously, the national socialist movements that were quite prominent in the twentieth century had drawn society together with the premise that they faced a common enemy in the existing social structure (Wallerstein 2002). For some nations, it involved becoming independent of a colonial ruler—for others, it was a war of the working class (proletarians) with the middle classes and aristocracy (the bourgeoisie). Usually, the existing structure only served the interests of a very small, wealthy minority and those in charge of the movements sought to create a society where almost every citizen stood to benefit. State governments, such as the People’s Republic of China and Soviet Russia had taken the position that religion was to blame for widespread inequity and rendered the practice of any faith illegal, even though it provided a sense of community among groups of people. In any case, Wallerstein described the socialist movement in two steps: the revolutionary phase, where the existing government would be overthrown and the transformation phase, where the former revolutionaries are now members of the legitimate government. Wallerstein (2002) argued that this two-part movement was problematic because the government would now have to contend with the fact that they are members of a wider international community whose requirements may get in the way of a particular agenda. On the left, there was also the problem of balancing the interests of women and minorities, as movement leaders have often promised that they would be solved ‘after the revolution.’ Working to restore most inequities may be a viable first step for socialist revolutions, but the needs of each supporting group need to be considered.

In summation, there is evidence that we are heading toward an expanding view of solidarity. While some European nations were caught in the grasp of nationalism during and after World War II, in 1958, six states established what would become the European Union—which would create a larger economic community and dismantle obstacles to travelling between member states. While member states have more autonomy than members of a federation (e.g. the US) with respect to the maintenance of the military or foreign policy, all member states must agree to support a democratic free market and the rule of law. Considering the sheer diversity of language, religion and culture, this was a remarkable achievement. This was what Honneth (1996) had in mind when he said that genuine solidarity was created not out of passive tolerance for one another, but with active concern for each citizen on to a degree, which encourages them to contribute their gifts and talents to abstract societal goals (p. 129). This does not mean that people should have a symmetrical level of esteem on a personal level, but instead cultivate a desire for people to develop their best positive attributes, even if it seems foreign. Yes, progress has indeed been made but the global community still has a long way to go before it reaches the point where the vast majority of people consider themselves to be citizens of the world rather than a member of a certain nation or race. According to Wilde (2004): ‘there needs to be a “more heroic” version of universalism that attaches no intrinsic significance to national boundaries… Cosmopolitanism [should be] the “ideal of the future”, which could not yet be realised because of the strength of national sentiments was too great’ (p. 138). Given the level of existential issues such as food and water shortages in a time of unchecked population growth, humanity can only travel one of two paths: global warfare or cooperative management of resources. Since humanity now has the capability to destroy itself, cooperation and global citizenship is the only realistic solution to these problems, otherwise the scope of felt solidarity would once more degenerate to the level of nation, race, religion, or social class. Perhaps Fromm is right in that while human beings can adapt to the reality of a new situation, the fundamentals of human nature can never change enough to ensure the development of a peaceful global society.

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