Category: Free Essays

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

Introduction

Described as Scotland’s “biggest choice since 1707” (McLean et al, 2013, p. ix), the upcoming referendum on Scottish independence will provide a pivotal event for the current and future populations of Scotland as voters get the opportunity to decide whether or not they are to remain a part of Great Britain or become an independent nation. As McLean et al (2013) have referenced, 1707 was a year of major importance in Scottish history because it saw the passage of the Union with England Act by the Parliament of Scotland, thus legitimising the reciprocal Union with Scotland Act which was passed by its English counterpart the previous year (Davis, 1998). The Acts of Union have now stood for more than three centuries and, although there have been proposals to challenge it in recent years, this is the first time that the Scottish public have been given the opportunity to vote on the issue in a formal referendum. This essay will examine the issue of Scottish independence by providing an insight into the historical and political events that have led to the 2013 proposal to hold a referendum on the issue. It will also look in depth at the campaigns for and against Scottish independence in order to assess the approaches that each one has taken in order to sway voters towards their individual cause. This will ultimately facilitate the drawing of the conclusion that Scottish independence has the propensity to fundamentally alter the political landscape of the entire international community rather than being limited to a British and European context. However, although both campaigns relating to the referendum are fundamentally flawed, the choice made by the Scottish people will decide the nation’s fate for the foreseeable future.

Historical Background

Although this referendum is the first in/out vote to be held in relation to Scottish independence in the 21^st century, votes have previously been held over the issue of devolution. In both 1979 and 1997, Scottish devolution referendums were held with varying outcomes (Deacon, 2012). In the 1979 case, the yes vote did gain a majority but failed to attract 40% of the total electorate and therefore failed to achieve change (Dardanelli, 2006). However, in the 1997 referendum, there was clear majority support for both devolution of the Scottish Parliament, which was achieved in the Scotland Act 1998, and Parliament establishing the base rate of income tax (Dardanelli, 2006). In both instances then, there was significant support for the devolution of Scotland and important powers. As such, sovereignty has been an issue for some time, which is further reinforced by a study of cultural identity by Bechhofer and McCrone (2007). The study suggests that the Scottish people have come to feel more comfortable with the Scottish identity, with the British collective identity being weakened as a result, although it also noted that the “…relatively weak association between national identity, party support and views on constitutional change suggests that being Scottish is more cultural than political” (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007, p. 251). According to the study, the sense of Scottishness has been growing exponentially in recent years and therefore the perceived demand for the referendum that the Scottish National Party (SNP) promised in its 2011 election manifesto (Leyland, 2013) has created a climate that is conducive to promoting and holding a vote that will decide the future of Scotland and, by extension, the UK as a whole.

The immediate events that led to the referendum are established in a House of Commons (2013) report that states that the formation of the SNP majority government following elections in 2011 led to a climate that was conducive to negotiating a referendum for independence with the UK government, thus leading to the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement. The binding referendum that was introduced in the Agreement was then introduced formally in the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill on 21^st March 2013 and the date for the vote was established as 18^th September 2014 (House of Commons, 2013). It was subsequently passed on 14^th November 2013 after it was agreed that the question of independence would be framed as “Should Scotland be an independent country?” (House of Commons, 2013, p. 5). Should the result ultimately be a yes vote then independence will occur on 24 ^th March 2016 (House of Commons, 2013). Although this brief timeline is heavily fact based, it provides an outline of the process that underpins the referendum at the present time and introduces a timescale for the process of achieving independence should the outcome of the referendum be a yes vote. This is of vital importance because it provides more than a year to establish the practicalities of independence and secure political links and alliances in order to create a stable nation. However, there are no official provisions in place for independence at the present time, thus rendering the political landscape an important element for analysis in a general overview of the referendum.

The Political Landscape

The political complexities that are attached to the referendum and indeed Scottish independence should the majority of the electorate vote yes to the established question are extensive. For example, Maxwell (2012, p. 13) raised the following political issues that would, by necessity, be asked of the government: “How could Scotland’s credit rating absorb the weight of Scotland’s debt legacy from the United Kingdom? How could Scotland be sure it would be admitted to the European Union? How could Scotland afford to start an Oil Fund when its budget would be in net fiscal deficit?” Of course, asking such questions immediately after the SNP was able to gain a majority government made it virtually impossible to offer coherent and accurate answers to these issues. However, there are certainly major concerns with the political implications of a complete Scottish divorce from Great Britain: “The Scottish vote is of almost equal importance to people in the rest of the UK and to the UK’s trading and treaty partners including the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and NATO” (McLean et al, 2013, p. ix). Although there is no suggestion that Scotland will not seek to move forward without treaties in place with any of these wider political entities, the issue is one of sovereignty and somewhat ironically mirrors the UK’s wider struggle for British sovereignty with the European Union (Gifford, 2010). As such, it may provide an opportunity to negotiate and redefine boundaries with the EU but, regardless of whether that opportunity does present itself, ministers will negotiate for an independent Scotland and therefore will be doing so with a view to achieving the best agreement for the individual country.

Leading on from the issue of sovereignty, there have been political moves towards preparing for an independent political nation within Scotland. For example, on 16^th June 2014 a draft Constitution has been released by the SNP so as to establish the parameters of sovereignty. The drafting of a Constitution for an independent Scotland has also gone some way to addressing some of the political issues that surround the referendum. For example, upon its release to the media, ministers highlighted its nationalist sentiment: “Sturgeon said enshrining the sovereign will of the people gave legal meaning to the nationalists’ major complaint about the structure of the UK, where parties without a mandate from Scottish voters could make laws which affected them” (Carrell, 2014). However, the draft Constitution also stressed its adherence to both European and international law (Carrell, 2014), thus suggesting that the SNP are committed to ensuring that political links are formed with the European Union in order to prevent its isolation in the wake of independence from the Westminster political structures. Indeed, the Yes Campaign has addressed this issue on its website, stating that “Scotland already is part of the EU – so there is no doubt that we meet all the requirements for membership, and with our energy and fishing resources it is clearly common sense, and in the interests of the EU, that Scotland’s place in the EU continues seamlessly” (Yes Scotland, 2013). This anticipated seamless transition into an independent member state of the EU is highly complex with further facets addressed by the Yes Campaign in its white paper for an independent Scotland. As such, it is necessary to take a closer look at the campaign and the arguments made within it.

The Yes Campaign

The Yes Campaign, which is also known as Yes Scotland, is the campaign established to project the side of the argument in favour of independence and is therefore promoting issues that suggest that Scotland would be better off as a sovereign nation. For example, a recent article that appeared on the campaign’s website stressed the importance of Scottish sovereignty for the future of the nation. Gilmartin (2014) stated that “Scotland’s young people want to secure the best possible prospects for the future, but we don’t yet have the powers we need in Scotland to create more jobs and opportunities for the younger generation here.” This taps into the general belief that the Westminster government is removed from the people of Scotland, is unelected by them and therefore does not represent their best interests (McLean et al, 2013). In establishing a statement of need, this is designed to appeal to the generation of voters who would essentially have to endure the consequences of the outcome and would therefore underscore the need to cater for their own futures. The campaign is not just limited to targeting specific groups of voters who are likely to turn out though. Instead, it provides a multifaceted appeal that covers a whole range of interests and specifically Scottish issues. For example, the draft Constitution incorporates environmental protection issues, the needs of the Scottish islands, the safeguarding of children and the determination of income tax levels (Carrell, 2014). As such, it has been founded upon issues that are important to the Scottish people and therefore stresses the best interests of the nation.

However, the Yes Campaign has been the target of extensive criticism as a direct result of its links to the SNP, with Jacobs (2012) highlighting fears within other Scottish political parties that suggested that the Yes Campaign would be an SNP vehicle and therefore a political tool to secure power. Although this is based upon speculation and perception rather than fact, the SNP rhetoric is inextricably linked to the campaign as a direct result of its 2011 manifesto and commitment to holding the referendum so as to achieve Scottish independence. As such, this criticism has remained salient throughout. In addition, there has been criticism of some of the claims made by the campaign and politicians who support it. For example, Riley-Smith (2014) drew attention to criticism of the claims that Scotland would be wealthier than the UK after independence:

Prof John Kay, formerly on the First Minister’s Council of Economic Advisers, said it was a “mistake” for voters to think claims of an independent Scotland being one of the world’s wealthiest nations would mean more cash in their pockets. He warned that using GDP as a measure fails to reveal how much money bypasses locals by going straight to foreign companies…

Such sweeping statements are misleading and would provide a false premise for economic conditions after independence should the electorate choose to favour the yes vote. It also provides an inaccurate view of the state of the Scottish economy at the present time and how it would benefit the population. However, this is one of many issues that have been addressed by the No Campaign.

The No Campaign

The No Campaign, which is also known as the Better Together campaign, has largely been based upon the premise that Scotland enjoys major advantages because it is a part of the UK and it is likely to lose them should it choose independence. For example, the campaign points to the UK’s rebate, which is worth ?135 per household, as a major benefit of membership of the UK that would be lost should it seek to renegotiate with the EU’s leadership in the wake of the referendum (Better Together, 2013). It has also raised questions about the principles behind the Yes Campaign, such as its determination to retain Sterling as the currency of choice rather than joining the Euro (Scottish Government, 2013). For example, it has pointed out that there is no guarantee that Scotland will be able to remain a member of the EU if independent and neither can the government guarantee that it would not have to adopt the Euro should negotiations prove successful (Darling, 2014). As such, it challenges the hypothetical measures that the Yes Campaign has drawn attention to. It also questions the assertion that Scotland would be economically better off alone, with notable pro-UK figures highlighting that Scotland is still in economic recovery and is ill-equipped to compete in global markets on an equal footing with the UK let alone other nations (Scotland Now, 2014). However, Maxwell (2012) undermines the credibility of the figures used to draw such conclusions, stating that the data on which the No Campaign has assessed the prospects for the Scottish economy is fundamentally flawed. He states that the GERS (Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland) reports on which figures are based often utilise data that is two years old and therefore carries a warning about its accuracy in order to highlight the fact that major discrepancies may exist. Similarly, the Better Together campaign has been accused of failing to appeal to working people, who are now switching their votes to the Yes Campaign, in recent months (McAngus, 2014) and so will need to strategically rethink their appeal if it is to succeed in ensuring that Scotland remains a part of the UK.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this detailed but general overview of the Scottish independence referendum that is to be held in September 2014 effectively highlights the historical and political background to the vote, the political implications that could arise from a vote for independence and the nature of the campaigns that have been launched for both sides of the argument. Taking the political landscape first, the analysis does identify significant issues that must be resolved if there is ultimately a yes vote, particularly the nation’s membership of the European Union and international organisations like NATO. However, it is impossible for the government to be able to answer all questions related to these issues while the advent of independence is still hypothetical. No agreements can be put in place until after the referendum and so, although these problems must be considered in advance and proposals and contingency plans put forward, no negotiations can take place until afterwards. This also goes some way to explaining why the campaigns for and against Scottish independence are flawed to a degree. The debate is currently based upon perceptions, opinions and data that is several years old so it is no wonder that the issues being discussed are so contentious and spark strong feelings from both sides. Both campaigns are well organised and offer salient points but their ability to influence the vote will only be measured following the referendum. In short, the general overview of the referendum for Scottish independence to date is multifaceted and highly complex but it is also able to conclude that it will alter the political landscape of the entire international community rather than being limited to a British and European context. Relations with Scotland will change based on its own sovereignty rather than its dependence on Westminster if the electorate votes for independence. However, no matter what the outcome, the likelihood is it will be this generation’s final opportunity to determine Scotland’s future and so no vote should be taken lightly.

Bibliography

Bechhofer, F. & McCrone, D., (2007). Being British: A Crisis of Identity? The Political Quarterly, 78:2, pp. 251-260.

Better Together, (2013). The EU. Better Together. [Online] Available at: http://bettertogether.net/the-facts/entry/eu-membership [Accessed 17 June 2014].

Carrell, S., (2014). SP Publishes Draft of First Constitution for an Independent Scotland. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/16/scottish-constitution-first-draft-issued-nicola-sturgeon [Accessed 16 June 2014].

Dardanelli, P., (2006). Devolution: Between Two Unions. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Darling, A., (2014). Leave the UK, Leave the UK Pound. Better Together. [Online] Available at: http://www.bettertogether.net/blog/entry/leave-the-uk-leave-the-uk-pound . [Accessed 17 June 2014].

Davis, L., (1998). Acts of Union: Scotland and the Literary Negotiation of the British Nation, 1707-1830. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Deacon, R., (2012). Devolution in the United Kingdom. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Gifford, C., (2010). The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problems of Eurosceptic Britishness. Parliamentary Affairs, 63:2, pp. 321-338.

Gilmartin, K., (2014). Young People Have the Most to Gain From Independence. Yes Scotland. [Online] Available at: http://www.yesscotland.net/news/young-people-have-most-gain-independence [Accessed 17 June 2014].

House of Commons (2013). International Development Committee: Implications for Development in the Event of Scotland Becoming an Independent Country. London: The Stationary Office.

Jacobs, E., (2012). “Yes Scotland” Campaign in Chaos as Fears Spread of an SNP Hijack. Left Foot Forward. [Online] Available at: http://www.leftfootforward.org/2012/06/yes-scotland-campaign-in-chaos-as-fears-spread-of-an-snp-hijack . [Accessed 15 June 2014].

Leyland, P., (2013). Referendums, Popular Sovereignty and the Territorial Constitution. In R. Rawlings, P. Leyland & A. Young eds. Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145-164.

Maxwell, S., (2012). Arguing for Independence: Evidence, Risk and the Wicked Issues. Berwick: Luath Press.

McAngus, C., (2014). Better Together Campaign Creates a Strategic Dilemma for Scottish Labour. London School of Economics and Political Science. [Online] Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/better-togethers-create-a-strategic-dilemma-for-scottish-labour . [Accessed 17 June 2014].

McLean, I., Gallagher, J. & Lodge, G., (2013). Scotland’s Choices: The Referendum and What Happens Afterwards. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Riley-Smith, B., (2014). Alex Salmond’s Ex-Economic Adviser Criticises Claim at Heart of Poster Campaign. The Telegraph. [Online] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/10771192/Alex-Salmonds-ex-economic-adviser-criticises-claim-at-heart-of-poster-campaign.html [Accessed 17 June 2014]

Scottish Government, (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Edinburgh: The Scottish Government.

Scotland Now, (2014). Independence Referendum: Harry Potter Author JK Rowling Shows Her Support for Better Together Campaign. Scotland Now. [Online] Available at: http://www.scotlandnow.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/harry-potter-author-jk-rowling-3673783 [Accessed 17 June 2014].

Yes Scotland, (2013). Will Scotland be in the European Union? Yes Scotland. [Online] Available at: http://www.yesscotland.net/answers/will-scotland-be-european-union [Accessed 17 June 2014].

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

To what extent, if any, is the Marxist distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘utopian’ socialism justified?

This essay will return to the writings of Marx to assess to what extent he drew a distinction between “scientific” and “utopian” socialism. The essay will construct a reading of Marx that suggests he did not draw a distinction between scientific socialism and utopian socialism. Marx and Engels adopted a scientific methodology and thus, they did not believe that a socialist/communist society is utopian. However, the scientific method objected to elements of utopian socialism, which assumed “socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man” (Engels, on-line). In contrast, Marxists base their socialism on a dialectical process, where a socialist/communist society is the natural culmination of the historical process. The dialectical process, Engels argues, is scientific: “Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily” (Engels, on-line). Thus, Marxists view history as a universal, teleological and pre-destined process, where history is the process by which “the spectre of communism” is made actual.

To understand Marx’s theory of history, and why he did not see a socialist/communist future as utopian but the culmination of a scientific process, it is important to elucidate Marx’s philosophy of science. The most important aspect of Marx’s philosophy of science for the purpose of this essay is to realise that “Marx thought that the human sciences and the natural sciences are governed by essentially the same methods” (Miller, 2000, p. 532). This means that the human sciences are predictable, measurable and observable in the same way as the natural sciences. However, in contrast, to traditional empiricists, Marx did not base prediction on clearly observable phenomenon; instead, he sought prediction by locating underlying causal structures (Miller, 2000, p. 532). This understanding of the human sciences and natural sciences led Marx to produce a theory of historical determinism, based on a dialectical historical materialism that constructed a communist society as both a scientific and utopian future.

Marx’s theory of history is derived from Hegel since he employs Hegel’s notion of history as a dialectical process. Goodwin argues that “Marx used the dialectical less technically and less insistently than Hegel, but [the dialectical] forms the basis of his conception of capitalism as ‘contradictory’ and ridden with class conflict” (Goodwin, 1997, p. 68). Therefore, the Hegelian influence on Marx cannot be overstated. However, as Hampsher-Monk notes there were two Hegelian outlooks at the time Marx was writing. One was conservative and attempted to show that the social/political status quo was rational and the historical process had been achieved; or, as Marx put it, it attempted to “turn philosophy inward” (Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 484). The second Hegelian outlook aimed to “turn philosophy outward” – that is to make what is currently an imperfect and irrational social reality conform to rationality (Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 484). Employing a dialectical understanding of history, Marx argued that capitalism possessed contradictions, and history was a process that would turn this irrational society into a rational society. Marx argued that a communist society would resolve contradiction and thus the dialectical produces a pre-determined historical future in a communist society.

Thus far, this essay has set out the dialectical process of history upon which Marx’s philosophy rests. It will now, explore the historical materialism that Marx argues drives the dialectical process. By marrying together a theory of historical materialism and dialectical determinism, it is possible to see how Marx understands how history would unfold, scientifically, into a communist society.

Marx takes a scientific study of history and society, but rather than basing his conclusions on empirical and measurable findings, he premises his theory of history on causal structures. For Marx, “every form of society has been based… on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 93). This theory of history links up to the Hegelian idea of a dialectical process that resolves contradiction by making the rational actual. First, though, this essay will sketch out Marx’s analysis of history up to the point he was writing, and how historical materialism had proceeded through various stages in world history.

Marx constructs a history that is a narrative based on a structure, rather than a series of random events. For Marx, class is the structure upon which the narrative of history rests, “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 79). Marx argues that in previous stages of history, class was a complicated arrangement, but as the feudal system gave way to the capitalist system, the antagonism of the class system simplified. The capitalist system, for Marx, had led to society “splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 80). The Communist Manifesto, as Hampsher-Monk illustrates, is an “account of economic-historical development” (Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 515) which argues that revolutionary politics is necessary to complete the process..

According to Goodwin, Marx saw economic and technical innovation as the originator of all historical change, with the most recent example being the replacing of a feudal society with a capitalist society (Goodwin, 1997, p. 76). Marx’s theory is undoubtedly economic, with Hampsher-Monk arguing that Marx drew an analogy between economics and religion, where money was seen as a ‘jealous god’ (Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 496). This prioritising of money and economics explains why it is economic relations that are the base structure in Marx’s philosophy. Thus, when economic relations change, it “entails a transformation of the socio-political superstructure” (Goodwin, 1997, p. 76). In essence, historical materialism is the idea that economics constitutes the base structure of society, and a transformation in the economic structure is a part of the dialectical process of history, where contradictions in economic and social relations clash, and a new society emerges.

For the purposes of this paper, the most important point to draw out is that both historical materialism and the historical determinism of the dialectical process of history constitute a scientific theory in Marx’s philosophy. Marx argues that a socialist-communist society is not utopian, but part of the revolutionary process of the dialectical. It is now necessary to outline the “scientific” process by which capitalist society would collapse under its own contradictions, and be replaced by a socialist-communist society.

For Marx, the dialectical process behind history saw the bourgeois/capitalist system as the “last major stage before a fundamentally new political and economic order” (Held, 1996, p. 126). Marx’s scientific theory of history saw the capitalist order as, ultimately, succumbing to the socialist-communist order. Marx details how this would come about, and to understand this it is necessary to once again return to the idea of the dialectical process and contradictions. Held summarises Marx’s theory of the inevitability of revolutionary politics, by arguing that for Marx, capitalism was not a harmonious social order and the foundations of capitalism are undermined from within (Held, 1996, pp. 126-129). Thus, Marx argues that capitalism is undermined because of its contradictions, and the dialectical process requires the overthrow of the capitalist system.

Marx’s theory of contradiction within capitalism is based on his assertion of historical materialism, and his notion of exploitation. Marx argues that history has always been a struggle between oppressed and oppressor; thus, if it possible to observe exploitation, an oppressor and an oppressed class within capitalism, then it follows that history has not resolved the dialectical process. Marx argues that capitalism does possess such a contradiction, since “property… is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 97). Marx is, essentially, taking an objective, scientific look at the social-economic structure, arguing that it has not resolved class antagonism and therefore, the dialectical process is incomplete. Thus, for Marx, a socialist-communist revolution is not utopian, but a scientific ‘working-out’ of contradiction.

To conclude Marx’s theory of history, it is necessary to now look at how he saw revolutionary politics overturning the capitalist order, and how he thought a socialist-communist economic and social order would resolve the contradictions inherent in the capitalist order in order to produce a rational solution to the dialectical process. For Marx, revolution was inevitable, because revolution was the result of an antagonistic polarisation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The worsening conditions of the proletariat would automatically propel them into a revolutionary mind-set and into war with the bourgeoisie/capitalist class. This would lead to the proletariat revolution, which would wrestle power from one class to another. However, this final stage would require two phases. Firstly, revolution would lead to the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat”, and then the second phase would lead to “Proper Communism”. Taylor picks up on the homogenising and authoritarian streak in Marx’s communist vision. He wryly observes that Marx is claiming that he and The Communists were the ones who understood what was happening in the world, and when The Communists say they have no interests apart from those of the proletariat, they are assuming that “the proletariat would agree to have only the interests which Marx said it ought to have” (Taylor, 1985, p. 31). Marx concludes that the antagonism within the capitalist order is the result of the bourgeoisie’s exploitation of the capital of the proletariat; and, thus, the key to “The Communist programme was the abolition of private property” (Taylor, 1985, p. 31). This is critical to understanding that, for Marx, a socialist-communist society is not so much a Utopia, as a ‘working–out’ of the dialectical process. Marx’s scientific method to history rests on the notion that private property constitutes a contradiction within the capitalist order, and that the dialectical process will result in revolution to overthrow the capitalist order; therefore, a communist society is a scientific resolution necessity, rather than being a utopian ideal.

Goodwin argues that Marx was “reluctant to offer any detailed picture of the communist utopia” (Goodwin, 1997, p.81). However, Marx had identified the contradiction within capitalism that would lead to its overthrow, namely the antagonism between capitalists and workers and the exploitation that lay at the heart of this. Therefore, the implication of Marx’s thought is that a socialist-communist utopia would find a means to eradicate class exploitation. As Goodwin says, Marx may not have laid down a “blueprint”, but “the formal characteristics of communist society are made clear in his works, as are the particular principles on which it would operate” (Goodwin, 1997, p.81). As indicated earlier, Marx argued that all history was the history of class struggles; therefore, a socialist-communist society would be classless. By eliminating the antagonisms of class, the contradictions of capitalism would be resolved, and the dialectical process of history would be rationally worked through.

The elimination of class rests on the elimination of the capitalist means of production. Thus, “communism connotes the abolition of private property” (Goodwin, 1997, p.81). The “utopia” of communism-socialism is a classless society that has abolished private property. However, because of the historical materialism and dialectical process that underpins Marx’s theory, the communist “utopia” is also a scientific resolution to the contradictions within capitalism. It is the contradictions Engels within capitalism that will lead the dialectical process of history to produce a revolution that will usher in communism.

Taylor puts this succinctly “dialectical materialism would compel men to live in Utopia whatever the promptings of their heart” (Taylor, 1985, p. 10). Despite arguing that Marx saw a socialist-communist society as the inevitable result of a scientific process, it should not be underestimated how revolutionary his vision was. Marx was a revolutionary thinker, and he was calling for an overturning of the capitalist system. This was not utopian, as it was not the dreams of a “good place”, a utopia. Instead, Marx saw a socialist-communist society, based on the abolition of private property, as the rational solution to the dialectical process of history. His work is polemical, and he does not conceal the radical and revolutionary aspects of his political thought. He argues that The Communists “openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible and overthrow of all existing social conditions” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 120). He goes on to say that “the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p. 120). Given that Marx is unequivocally envisaging the ordering of an entirely different economic, social and political structure, his vision has a utopian element. However, Marx, himself, denied that his vision was utopian. Instead, he saw a communist society, as the scientifically determined and rational culmination of the dialectical. Engels argued that utopian socialists did not look to history and science: “not one of them appears as a representative of the interests of that proletariat which historical development had, in the meantime, produced” (Engels, on-line). However, the drawing of this distinction has limited value, since the scientific method is designed to construct a dialectical logic that argues that the socialist-communist “utopia” is something that must be realized.

?

Bibliography

Engels, Friedrich. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Retrieved March 6, 2015, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm

Goodwin, Barbara (1997) Using Political Ideas (4th edition), John Wiley & Sons, Chichester pp. 65 – 97.

Hampsher-Monk, (1992). “Karl Marx” in A history of modern political thought: Major political thinkers from Hobbes to Marx, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford pp. 483 – 563.

Held, David (1996) Models of Democracy (2nd edition), Polity Press, Cambridge pp. 121 – 154.

Marx, Karl, & Engels, Friedrich (1985) The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Classics, London.

Miller, Richard W. (2000) “Marxist Philosophy of Science” in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London p. 532.

Taylor, A. J. P. (1985) “Introduction” in The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Classics, London pp. 7 – 47.

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that liberal democracy is a system with a representative and limited government that operates within an accepted framework for political competition between different political parties. Regular elections are based on universal suffrage and are free and fair where individual rights are respected (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Based on this definition, this essay will argue that Russia has the potential to become a true democracy, but in recent years it has become an illiberal democracy or a competitive authoritarian regime. Levitsky and Way (2010) suggest competitive authoritarian regimes, or illiberal democracies, were competitive in the sense that they use competitive institutions to gain power. However, they use electoral manipulation and abuse state resources in favour of the incumbent regime (Levitsky and Way, 2010). This essay will explore how Russia has reached this stage from the formation of the 1993 constitution under Boris Yeltsin’s rule and how Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into an illiberal democracy.

Under Yeltsin’s rule (1991-99), Russia adopted a new constitution following a referendum in 1993 (Darlington, 1995). This is the constitution that Russia still uses to this day, though it has been amended since. Under this constitution, Russia has a bicameral legislature with a Federal Assembly, a Constitutional Court and a Duma, the latter being the lower chamber of their legislature (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The president is subject to impeachment to a great degree under the Russian constitution, as the president needs a two-thirds majority in both parliamentary chambers plus confirmation by the courts, to ensure laws are passed (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Donaldson (2004) suggests that this was a time when Russia was strengthening its parliamentary and legal system. This constitution ensures that laws take precedence over presidential decrees, and the Duma played a significant part during the 1990s of resisting Yeltsin’s reforms (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Hague and Harrop (2013) praise Yeltsin’s rule as a time when Russia achieved substantial decentralisation of power. Hague and Harrop (2013) suggest that even under the changes to the Russian constitution Putin has brought in since the end of Yeltsin’s rule, Russia still has a more effective system of rule of law when compared to authoritarian China. Smith (2010) praises the 1993 constitution for ensuring that substantial legal reforms and new laws were passed to improve the legal system in Russia. The 1990s seemed like a decade where Russia could achieve true democracy because they established a constitution that allows the government to operate within a framework of limited government like in a liberal democracy.

Following the election of Putin in 2000 to the present day, the situation in Russia has changed dramatically. Firstly, Putin successfully centralised power by acquiring the appointments of regional governments throughout Russia and he created, in 2000, seven extra-constitutional federal okrugs (districts) to oversee lower level units (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Though the 1993 Russian constitution has received praise for moving Russia towards a parliamentary and legal system, the constitution has an inherent flaw of allowing the president too much power as a guarantor of the constitution (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This flaw allows the president to be able to override legislation through decrees and dismiss ministers (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The purpose behind this centralisation was to ensure that these branches of the federal government remain loyal to Moscow and allowed the state to reduce dissent (Hague and Harrop, 2013). It seemed like Russia was now losing its potential to become a true democracy as Putin was beginning the process of strengthening the president’s power over Russia. This has led to Russia becoming a competitive authoritarian regime. This was only the beginning of things to come. Ross’ (2010) suggestion that Russia is a ‘unitary state masquerading as a federation’ (p.170) seems a more accurate way to describe Russia under Putin.

Despite the work that Yeltsin made in the 1990s to ensure that the Russian constitution remained decentralised, Sharlet (2005) argues that there is now a gap between individual rights on paper and their realisation in practice since Putin came to power. Respect for individual rights are fundamental for a true democracy to exist, and this lack of respect for individual rights shows how much further away from a true democracy Russia has become under Putin to become a competitive authoritarian state. Throughout Putin’s time, the public have increasingly lost faith in the legal system and legal adjustments against the state have become increasingly difficult to enforce, particularly in the case of Russia’s richest oil oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Sharlet, 2005). Khodorkovsky was arrested in 2003 for fraud, and again in 2010 for money laundering (Donaldosn, 2015). His trials received international condemnation for being politically motivated and for its lack of due process (Donaldson, 2015).

Yet another distinguishing factor that contributes towards the growth of a competitive authoritarian regime in Russia under Putin is the lack of separation between the public and private sphere. Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that it is quite common in Russia for gangsters to participate in ‘free-for-all deals with the state’ and that ‘individual financiers pull the strings to fill their own pockets’ (p. 167). Putin even stated himself that he wants to decrease the degree of pluralism in Russia and how he wants ‘civil society to be adjunct to a strong state’ (Evans, 2005: p.112). For this reason, few promotional groups in Russia possess a mass membership (Evans, 2005). Despite this, Russia still has the potential to become a true democracy in allowing the promotion of business interests to the state and increase the amount of pluralism in Russia. As Peregudov (2011) argues, a network of business organisations has been established, and it is up and running. Yet, as Peregudov (2011) also highlights, the problem with this system is that it has received very little interest from Putin. It is little wonder that promotional groups in Russia do not possess a mass membership as they feel they have little influence under Putin, which demonstrates a further lack of true democracy in Russia.

It is not just business interests that are penalised under Putin’s Russia. It is also opposition parties that receive barely any attention from the media and are put at a disadvantage by the state. As Hague and Harrop (2013) suggest, in a liberal democracy, there has to be a framework for competition between different political parties. Yet in recent years, this has not happened under Putin, which shows that true democracy is not prevailing. As McFaul (2005) argues, in Russia there is an absence of independence within the media as oligarchic ranks and regional elites reduced the freedom of manoeuvre for opposition parties and political candidates. A 2004 survey showed that eighty-two per cent of Russians watched television and twenty-two per cent read newspapers, which demonstrates the scope to which Putin can reach out to people (Oates, 2005). The significant problem with Russia’s media is that there are one-hundred laws governing media conduct and many journalists fear that whatever they publish, will ultimately lead to their deaths (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This proved to be the case when journalist Anna Piltkovskaya was murdered under suspicious circumstances in 2006 (Donaldson, 2015). The 2012 presidential elections, where Putin was re-elected, despite already serving two terms, demonstrated the fundamental weaknesses behind the Russian constitution (Donaldson, 2015). Putin received considerable protest after the count was manipulated to ensure Putin was re-elected (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This is what Levitsky and Way (2010) describe as ‘electoral manipulation in a competitive authoritarian regime’ (p. 3). This move has brought Russia closer to becoming a competitive authoritarian regime. Putin reacted to the growth in protest to his rule in 2012 from feminist punk band, the Pussy Riot, by imprisoning them and he restricted the amount of protests people are allowed to hold in Russia (Hague and Harrop, 2013).

It is little wonder that people have little faith in political parties in Russia. As Huggins (2002) argues, crucial to a true democracy is that there is no limit to political participation. Russia has the worst levels of political participation amongst European nations with only one per cent of people in Russia members of political parties (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The 2011 parliamentary elections and 2012 presidential elections saw higher numbers of young people voting than in previous elections (Hague and Harrop, 2013). As White (2007) suggests, political parties seem to ‘come and go’ in Russia and this creates ‘a lack of party identification’ when compared to most parliamentary democracies (p. 27). The United Russia Party, founded by Putin in 2001, has dominated the Duma and the Federation Council since and won forty-nine per cent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections (Donaldson, 2015). Levitsky and Way (2010) suggest that in competitive authoritarian regimes, the state abuses its power. The Kremlin used threats and bribes to ensure that this party was supported by Russia’s most powerful companies and regional governors (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This incident demonstrated that Russia possesses the characteristic features of a competitive authoritarian regime.

In 2008, Putin stood down as president so that Dimitry Medvedev could take over as president (Donaldson, 2015). In a cynical move, the constitution was extended so that the president could serve for six years and decided to become president again in March 2012 (Donaldson, 2015). Vladimir Rhyzkov, a Kremlin opponent and former Duma deputy who lost his seat in 2007, said of the extension terms of 2008: ‘This is very negative. Today, the president controls parliament, senate, the regions, and the bureaucracy’ (Donaldson, 2015). Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that Russia cannot achieve what is close to a liberal democracy because real change cannot occur until Putin resigns. As Donaldson (2015) argues, Russia has become ‘influenced by the power and personality of one man; Putin.’ As Levitsky and Way (2010) argue, rulers tend to make the results in a competitive authoritarian regime. Twigg (2005) praises the improvements in policy-making made by Putin in 2005 that replaced the era of Soviet privileges (free or subsidised housing, transportation, medicine for students and patients) with cash payments. Despite this, policy-making in post-communist Russia remains subject to the requirements of the political elite and industrialists who pose a threat to the president find regulations invoked against them (Hague and Harrop, 2013). For example, in 2006, Putin provided his allies from state-owned oil companies with a greater share of the Sakhalin-2 oil field by rewriting the contract with Royal Dutch Shell (Hague and Harrop, 2013: p. 359). Therefore, true democracy does not exist in Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, summed up his views of the current situation in Russia in 2011: ‘We have everything- a president, a prime minister, courts and a parliament- but it’s more of an imitation’ (Donaldson, 2015). The culmination of these events has inevitably led Putin to distract attention from home by trying to restore ‘prestige and glory’ to the Russian nation through occupying Ukraine and the Baltic states to expand Russia’s territory (Donaldson, 2015).

Therefore, true democracy will not exist under Russia whilst Putin is still in charge. Russia has moved towards a competitive authoritarian regime instead. The potential for Russia to become a true democracy certainly existed under Yeltsin with the construction of the 1993 constitution which laid out the powers of the Duma, the Constitutional Court, the Federal Council and the president. The Duma played a leading part in blocking many of Yeltsin’s reforms and Russia moved towards establishing an effective parliamentary and legal system at this time. However, since the arrival of Putin, the state has centralised power to a large extent. The problem with the 1993 constitution was that it allowed the president too much power as both head of state and guarantor of the constitution. Putin has abused this clause by acquiring appointments for regional governments. Putin has ensured that the media plays a significant part in guaranteeing his re-election through electoral manipulation and giving less air time to his opponents. It may not be until 2024 that the potential for true democracy to exist in Russia re-emerges.

Bibliography

Darlington, R. (2015) Roger Darlington. Available at: http://www.rogerdarlington.me.uk/Russianpoliticalsystem.html. (Accessed: 20th January 2015).

Donaldson (2004) ‘Russia’, Journal of Legislative Studies (10) pp. 230-49.

Evans, A. (2005) A Russian Civil Society. In: White, S., Gitelman, Z. and Sakwa, R. (eds.) Developments in Russian Politics. 6th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 96-113.

Hague, R. and Harrop, M. (2013) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 9th edition Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huggins, R. (2002) Democracy and Democratisation. In: Axford, B., Browning, G.K., Huggins, R. and Rosamond B. (eds.) Politics: An Introduction. Abingdon: Routledge.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McFaul, M. (2005) The Electoral System. In: White, S., Gitelman, Z. and Sakwa, R. (eds.) Developments in Russian Politics. 6th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 61-79.

Oates, S. (2005) Media and Political Communication. In White, S., Gitelman, Z. and Sakwa, R. (eds.) Developments in Russian politics. 6th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.114-29.

Peregudov, S. (2001) The Oligarchical Model of Russian Capitalism. In: Brown, A. (ed.) Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, pp.259-68.

Ross, C. (2010) Reforming the Federation in Developments. In: White, S., Sakwa, R., and Hale, H. (eds.) Developments in Russian politics. 7th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.152-170.

Sharlet, R. (2005) In Search of the Rule of Law in Developments. In: White, S., Gitelman, Z. and Sakwa, R. (eds.) Developments in Russian Politics. 6th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 130-47.

Smith, A. (2010) Nationalism. 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity.

Twigg, J. (2005) Social Policy in Post-Soviet Russia. In: White, S., Gitelman, Z. and Sakwa, R. (eds.) Developments in Russian Politics. 6th edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 204-20.

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

“No commentator has seriously doubted the central importance of the theory of class for [Marx’s] work…it is as essential for his theory of history as it is for his analysis of the dynamics of capitalist society.” (Dahrendorf, 1959, 8) This essay examines this assertion and looks at where and how class operates within Marx’s comprehensive socio-economic theory. It analyses class as both a description and concept, and as a motor of social change – as both a structural, static element and as a dynamic, transformational one.

“The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles” are the opening words of The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels, 1967, 79). The entire first section of the tract is devoted to a description of classes throughout the history of humankind and how, in his own age, the emergence of two dominant classes – bourgeoisie and proletariat – was simplifying the social structure and making it ripe for revolutionary, emancipatory social change. Although Marx’s motivation for his wish to see social transformation was morally driven in the first instance, all his works eschew arguments based upon morality (Wheen, 1999). Instead, the emphasis is upon political imperatives and economic determinism, attempting to make his arguments and theories scientific and rational rather than appealing to a more intangible sense of justice and fairness.

For Marx, historical progress itself was the driver of social change, while social classes were the agents of transformation. Class definition is determined not by income or status, but by property relations which, in turn, are the result of the production process structure (Parkin, 1979). By presenting his social theories and his view of history in terms of class, such an epistemological and methodological model supported not only his analysis of society, but also his assertion that the proletariat would be the ultimate agent of human liberation ushering in a better world. Friedrich Engels claimed that Marx’s exposition of Scientific Socialism or Historic Materialism revealed immutable laws similar to the contemporaneous theories of Charles Darwin in the field of evolutionary biology (Bullock & Stalybrass, 1983). However, in claiming to discern scientific laws governing the workings and development of human society, Marx’s analysis ran the risk of becoming a predeterminist philosophy, or a form of historicism (Honderich, 1995).

Engels argued that in order “to make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” (Engels, 1970, 43) The “realness” or authenticity elaborated by Marx and Engel placed the concept of class at the heart of subsequent Marxist philosophy. This centrality emerged from a conflict within the political left in the mid-19th century. Marx embarked upon a sustained campaign of argument and vilification against those he labelled “utopian socialists”, notably Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre Proudhon, Francois Fourier, Eugen Duhring and Robert Owen. Although he conceded that these individuals were well-meaning, genuine believers in the principles of socialism, and successful in demonstrating through their works the ethical essence of socialism, nonetheless their paternalistic ideas were insufficient to produce comprehensive human emancipation (Wheen, 1999). They gave too little heed to the importance of class antagonism as the fundamental driver of the struggle for liberation.

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx argued that the utopian socialists committed their mistakes because the urban working class had not yet developed sufficiently for the significance of class conflict to be recognised (1848). However, this mild rebuke was followed by much more acerbic criticism. He asserted that setting up idealistic experimental communities aimed at showing there was an alternative to the exploitative nature of the capitalist mode of production removed the participants from the wider society and made them irrelevant. Furthermore, the utopians’ writings, theories and actions demonstrated not just an ignorance of, but also a denial of, the central importance of class struggle. Consequently, in seeking reconciliation between bourgeoisie and worker, such collusion made them class traitors (Marx & Engels, 1967). By adopting such an uncompromising position, Marx had committed himself to an analysis that relied upon class and class conflict to explain the past and predict the future. Other social divisions, such as race, gender, ethnicity and religion were thereafter relegated to being largely the products of economic relations – part of the superstructure of society rather than the more powerful base comprising productive forces and the relations of production (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

Marx argued that throughout history successive waves of dominant classes, such as patricians, feudal lords and aristocrats, had merely replaced each other as exploiters of similarly successive underclasses, such as slaves, plebeians and serfs. The bourgeoisie were just the latest in a line of oppressors, but Marx asserted that they were both the apogee and the last of the exploiters (Muravchik, 2002). The emergence of the bourgeoisie superseding the aristocracy as the ruling elite was the result of the replacement of feudalism by capitalism and was characterised by industrialisation. Industrialisation was founded on the factory system which produced a new class – the proletariat. When this increasingly impoverished hired-hand sector with no part in the ownership of the means of production finally rose up in revolt against their masters, their subsequent rule would not, indeed could not, be oppressive because, consisting of almost everyone, they would have no one to exploit (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

While the proletariat would eventually usher in socialism and eventually communism, this would not happen until they were organised. Furthermore, such organisation could not occur before the working class became aware of the nature of their oppression – namely that it was one class dividing and exploiting another rather than the moral failures of powerful individuals. This would be difficult because, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” (Marx, 2014, 11-12) If their consciousness was rooted in their class position, how could this chicken-and-egg scenario be resolved?

This was where the concept of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat became such a useful tool for later actual parties of government which claimed to be Marxist, in particular the regime of Stalin. Asserting that the Bolshevik/Communist Party was the vanguard of the proletariat and imbued with a consciousness somehow not beholden to their social existence, this served the purposes of allowing an elite to claim to be part of the emancipationist class, provided a useful scapegoating catch-all category of “bourgeois” for condemning and liquidating opposition, and created a reservoir of willing, obedient lower-level-leadership acolytes from the actual working class who were dependent upon accepting the ideology and direction of that elite for their accession to, and continued holding of, their privileged positions (Daniels, 2007).

However, in Marxist theory this was not how it was supposed to develop. Class consciousness, or the self-awareness of a shared, unified and unifying experience, was to be the mechanism by which revolutionary consciousness developed as workers became properly aware of the locus of their grievances rather than merely experiencing untargeted, unfocused discontent. It was the very struggle against exploitation which would produce the conditions where workers were forced to organise collectively and behave as a class, a process which would create the awareness of class and distinct class interests (Callinicos, 2010). Marx argued that keeping workers separate from each other, part of a wider phenomenon of alienation experienced by wage labourers, was an essential component of the capitalist/bourgeois system of control (Hampsher-Monk, 1992). However, just as factory-based capitalism produced the industrial proletariat, so too did it produce shared ideas which inclined the working class towards socialist solutions to their unjust existence. “What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” (Marx & Engels, 1967, 94)

Marxism sees the bourgeoisie as naturally taking measures to defend their class interests as well as their individual interests. Their most potent weapon is the state, Marx claiming that “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” (Marx & Engels, 1967, 82) Marx viewed the state negatively and did not see it as a forum through which human emancipation and social justice could be achieved. The state was neither natural, neutral nor eternal, but simply a product of the era in which capitalism held sway. It was part of society’s superstructure, a view reinforced and elaborated upon by Lenin in 1917 in The State and Revolution: “The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable”. (Lenin, 1917, 9)

Analysis of the state as the servant of capitalist vested interests demonstrates further the central and fundamental role class plays in Marxist theory. It effectively argues that there is a cohesive ruling class running capitalist societies. Despite frequent conflicts of interest among themselves, its constituent parts are ultimately united in defence of an economic and social system which works to their benefit. This dominant class, in contemporary Marxist theory, comprises not just the owners of capital, property and land, but includes senior management in large corporations, the top layers of the civil service, the judiciary, the diplomatic corps, military leaders and most of the leading figures in right-wing political parties, particularly conservative ones, although increasingly also figuring within “centrist” parties which have accepted the current neoliberal orthodoxy. While the owners of the means of production rarely hold any of the reins of political power, they are part of the same elite which provides the political leadership. The state is almost permanently under the control of the ruling class of the age, while parliamentary politics and democratic elections are in large measure facades concealing the self-interest and ultimate control of this powerful class-based elite (Coxall & Roberts, 1990).

Among more recent strains of Marxian theory, Structuralist Marxists have contributed most substance to modern class analysis. Among their most salient arguments is the assertion that contemporary liberal-democratic states steer popular perceptions of political struggle away from class-conflict interpretations and towards discourses framed in terms of rights and justice. Although the state colludes in upholding and promoting a social and economic hierarchical class system, it successfully blinds the exploited to their exploitation (Resch, 1992). Furthermore, the contemporary ruling class prefers a state which does not overtly promote their material interests, but quietly upholds their political interests. Among other activities, it does this in democratic states by redefining workers, who are in reality a class of people, as political subjects and autonomous citizens, thus isolating them from each other under the guise of upholding the rights of the individual. The aim is to hide the fact of class relationships between and among classes, and to persuade people into accepting that their interests are part of a fictional “national interest” and that the state is the surest and most legitimate defender of their freedoms and material interests (Poulantzas, 1973).

This study agrees with the opening quotation’s assertion about the centrality of class to Marxist thought, and would add that it was also critical for the (overly) optimistic predictions of imminent proletarian revolution in The Communist Manifesto. The decision to use class as the epistemological prism through which to analyse socio-economic dynamics was essential for a theory which sought to explain almost all of human history’s trajectory towards the contemporary situation of the mid 19th century – then project it forward as a teleological theory with an endpoint in the fairly near future. Class was the unifier of the theory, the motor of change and the provider of agency. Originally embarked upon to explain how the European transition from feudalism to capitalism occurred, it gradually transmuted into a metahistory of humankind (Hampsher-Monk, 1992). However, Marx’s knowledge of history was selective and sketchy, and the further back in time that he went, the more speculative it became (Hobsbawm, 2011). Critically too, his analysis was Eurocentric, dismissed religion too easily, omitted gender relations, and was surprisingly dismissive of the power of ideas vis-a-vis economic developments (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

As an explanatory tool, as a justification for revolution, as a motivator, and as a call to action – “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it”, (Marx, 1994, 98) – the concept of class has proved a vital, useful and enduring tool. Although global socio-economic structures have moved on immeasurably since Marx was writing a century-and-a-half ago, not only the concept of class, but also the very terminologies used by him (proletariat, bourgeoisie, relations of production) are still the coinage of discourse in much Marxist writing. Depending upon one one’s point of view, this is either an attestation of the enduring truths contained within his perceptive writings, or else a dogmatic adherence to semi-sacred texts akin to biblical fundamentalists refusing to accept that the Old Testament is anything other than literal truth.

Word Count: 2141

Bibliography

Bullock, A. & Stallybrass, O., 1977. The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought. London: Fontana.

Callinicos, A., 2010. The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx. 2nd Edition ed. London: Bookmarks.

Coxall, B. & Roberts, Lynton, 1990. Contemporary British Politics. London: Macmillan.

Dahrendorf, R., 1959. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Daniels, R. V., 2007. The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia. New haven: Yale University Press.

Engels, F., 1970. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880). New York: Mondial.

Hampsher-Monk, I., 1992. Modern Political Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hobsbawm, E., 2011. How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism. London: Abacus.

Honderich, T., ed., 1995. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hughes-Warrington, M., 2000. Fifty Key Thinkers on History. London: Routledge.

Lenin, V., 1917. The State and Revolution. London: Central Books.

Marx, K., 1994. Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Marx, K., 2014. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). London: Forgotten Books.

Marx, K. & Engels, F., 1967. The Communist Manifesto (1848). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Muravchik, J., 2002. Marxism. Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec, Issue 133, pp. 36-38.

Parkin, F., 1979. Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. New York: Columbia University Press.

Poulantzas, N., 1973. Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left.

Resch, R. P., 1992. Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wheen, F., 1999. Karl Marx. London: Fourth Estate.

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

The phenomenon of globalisation has sparked debate in recent years that a ‘new world order’ is upon us; that the world – its nation-states, citizens, economies, cultures, and political systems, among many others – are under pressure to ‘evolve’ or perish (Evans and Mooney, 2007; Keohane, 2002; Waters, 2001). Some fears are likely justified; others are perhaps exaggerated. Further, the character, qualities, and elements of ‘globalisation’ itself continue to be highly contested among scholars from a wide variety of disciplines (Munck, 2006; Prakash and Hart, 1999; Drezner, 2008; Held, 2004; Martens, Gaston and Dreher, 2008).

Some of those observing the rapid and often dramatic changes in social, economic, and political arenas have concluded that “…both the world arena and the study of world politics have been transformed.” (Little and Smith, 2005:135). If true, the transformative processes we have been witnessing in recent years may suggest that our methods and abilities for observing and characterizing world politics are no longer useful as tools to make sense of this ‘new world order'(Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, 2003). Such concerns give rise to a question that is fundamental to the study of world politics in the future: “Has globalisation changed the basic character of world politics?”

While limitations of time and space here preclude us from considering a comprehensive definition of ‘globalisation’ or from discussing all the elements contributing to its existence and multivariate effects, this paper more modestly seeks to respond to the above question. By concentrating on the transforming challenges to nation-states, economic trade and interdependence, and the environment, the paper expects to conclude that while the basic character of world politics may not have yet been changed by globalisation in the present, the increasing effects of globalisation certainly do pose challenges for this and other disciplines in the near future.

Nation-States:

Nation-states, understood as the fundamental units of analysis in world politics for many years, have more recently been challenged by assertions that they ought not to be conceptualized as discrete ‘players’ in world affairs, but rather more porous and dependant entities which no longer act autonomously. Increasingly, arguments are forwarded that a focus on the nation-state itself is no longer useful or informative as a way of understanding politics on a global scale (Held, 2004; Brennan, T 2002; Patomaki, 2001; Crawford, 2002). Much recent literature has focused on what is perceived to be a decline in sovereignty of nation-states; owing to a significant increase in international interdependence, multinational governing bodies, and human and environmental migrations which, combined with a multitude of other factors, reduce nation-states’ autonomy in domestic affairs. (Lemert and Elliot, 2005; Hoffmann and Ba, 2005; Najam et al., 2007).

The sovereignty (i.e. the ability of individual nation-states to act autonomously in domestic affairs and assert themselves unilaterally in international affairs) of nation-states is eroded by globalisation, it is argued, due to the increasing interdependence between state actors on a global scale. The argument continues that this interdependence weakens the sovereignty of nation-states since international and particularly domestic policy decisions, can no longer be made without the consent and cooperation of other state or supra-state actors (Muppidi, 2004; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang, 2007). The necessity to consider other states, international agreements, and the influence of multinational institutions can often limit the domestic policy options of national and sub-national governments; thereby reducing the sovereignty policy- makers once more fully enjoyed.

Some of those critical to the continued focus on ‘the state’ as an independent, autonomous actor whose actions and interplay with other states shape and define world politics have suggested students of global politics consider the increasing relevance of multinational organizations as the key ‘players’ in the world today (Hoffmann and Ba, 2005; Laidi, 1998; Crawford, 2002). Some of these institutions and organizations would include the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, the International Court of Justice, and the various and sundry economic programmes and agreements that are administered internationally (Muppidi, 2004; Nye, 2004; Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler, 1999). All of these institutions and organizations, among many more, have the ability to influence the actions and policies of individual states and, in some cases, prevent certain public policies from being enacted or administered.

As the numbers of new trade agreements, treaties, and multinational conferences rise, so too does speculation that the individual nation-state has lost much of its power to singularly influence world politics or act autonomously and rather, is subject to the necessity of acting in compliance to and conformance with international partnerships (Keohane, 2002; Lentner, 2004; Held, 2004). Such arguments increase support for the notion that the nation-state is being supplanted by multi-level governance and international institutions. These views lead some to conclude that the nation-state will eventually become extinct; supplanted by multinational or even global governance (Keohane, 2002; Held, 2004).

However, others are less convinced that the nation-state is becoming unimportant or even obsolete. They remind us that it is still nation-states that forge alliances and agreements and that such relations are rarely, if ever, imposed from above by some international institution or organization (Rupert, 2000; Holden, 1999; Little and Smith, 2005). Nation-states, they argue, are still relatively sovereign in their ability to create and implement domestic policies while advancing their influence internationally through various exchanges and alliances. Moreover, they argue, the international agreements to which states become signatories are ones that they have carefully negotiated and view as net benefits for themselves. Similarly, the international organizations to which states belong have been voluntarily joined and in which they can assert influence in international affairs are generally viewed as beneficial to the states’ interests.

On the whole, it appears that individual nation-states are still useful entities of focus for students of world politics. They continue to be dominant actors on the global stage while maintaining relative sovereignty within their political borders. Never the less, those who study and observe world politics into the twenty-first century would be well-advised to note the increasing interdependence of nations-states to one another and to global institutions.

Economic Trade and Interdependence:

A related but further ‘threat’ to understanding world politics in terms of sovereign nation-states acting relatively autonomously is the rapidly increasing phenomenon of economic trade and interdependence between countries globally. Within the past two decades, a plethora of new trade agreements and various economic associations have been formed internationally between a large number of nation-states (Cameron and Zinn, 2006; Mittelman, 2000; Lachapelle and Paquin, 2005). These new economic relationships have often been experienced both as new ways of increasing economic prosperity and decreasing economic flexibility at home. As states agree to join these new economic associations, they increase their potential to ‘tap into new markets’ and increase trade; but they can also find that they are bound by certain restrictions within these agreements. GATT, NAFTA, European Union Monetary Policy, and even the most recent agreement, the PTT, to name but a few, all advance in various ways the amount and types of trade between nation-states and simultaneously restrict or eliminate such things as tariffs and domestic environmental policies (Brysk, 2002; Reitan, 2006; Kahler and Walter 2006).

State and business leaders commonly refer to the ‘pressure’ or ‘need’ to join ever-expanding and deepening international trade agreements in order to ‘remain competitive’ in global markets (Acocella, 2005). However, new trade and economic agreements can often cost jobs, economic security, and environmental degradation within the signatory countries (Labonte, et al, 2005; Brennan, 2002). For some, the inability of state leaders to protect domestic social, economic, and environmental concerns after entering international economic agreements is an indication that such arrangements erode sovereignty and threaten individuals and groups within the nation-state (Weiss, 2003). Conversely, those who are ‘pro-trade’ and value such agreements and treaties counter that domestic markets and economies tend to prosper from trade deals with other states through increased demand for products and services.

The Environment:

While globalisation is often understood to refer to the increased interconnectedness of nation-states and regions globally, and to the expansion of trade and markets throughout the world, a broader definition might also consider the existence and impact of environmental effects due – directly or indirectly – to the growth of neo-liberal economic activities in the world (Najam et al, 2007). Environmental scientists and activist groups have been warning global populations for a generation of the effects of large-scale, industrial operations and trade (Brennan, 2002; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang, 2007; Lemert and Elliot, 2005; Reitan, 2006). The consequences of such environmentally detrimental activities, they argue, may even threaten the continued existence of human and other life on the planet in the decades and centuries to come (Labonte, 2003; Mazlish, 2006).

Perhaps most alarming of all is the growing volume of evidence that environmental destruction and pollution is not limited to areas of heavy industrialization or large-scale commercial operations alone. Increasingly, scientists and others are observing how deforestation, toxic waste, air and water pollution, as well as human and animal transmitted diseases are impervious to the political boundaries of nation-states (Martens, Gaston, and Dreher, 2008; Munck, 2006; Rosenau, 2005). How does a consideration of the environmental impacts of globalised activities bear upon the question of whether or not globalisation has changed the basic character of world politics? Perhaps it is simply this: The future (and perhaps present) study of world politics will need to consider a more complex and elusive set of variables and elements than previously. The changing environment and its consequences for the health of the planet are highly likely to also impact not only how world politics is practiced in the future, but how it must be studied and understood (Meckling, 2001). Given the potentially catastrophic impacts of global warming, habitat destruction, environmental degradation, and loss of species, a wide variety of hazardous variables could foreseeably alter politics throughout the world in the near future. Taking account of these variables may be essential to understanding how nation-states manage (or not) the new challenges posed by environmental changes.

Conclusions:

By most accounts, it seems clear that globalisation – understood here as a sharp upshift in a wide variety of global interactions between nation-states, various institutions and organizations – is having an impact upon both how world politics will need to be studied and understood as well as how its primary unit, the nation-state, may be forced to ‘evolve’ or perish due to the transforming pressures of globalisation itself (Whitman, 2005). In brief, the answer to the question of whether globalisation will change the basic character of world politics, is a tentative “No” – for now. However, there appears to be little question that world politics will be severely challenged in the years ahead. It will be confronted by the need to observe and explain the complexities of globalisation and their impact on the nation-state itself as well as a need, perhaps, to reconsider this fundamental unit of analysis in light of an increasing propensity towards ‘global governance’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Held, 2004).

The modern nation-state has served the purpose of representing and asserting the interests of national groups for centuries. In this capacity, nation-states have created international and even global institutions and organizations in order, in part, to develop avenues of trade, mutual cooperation, and even international laws. In the twentieth century, the League of Nations and the United Nations were formed as vehicles for international negotiation and cooperative efforts towards security and economic trade (Cameron et al, 2006; Drezner, 2008). More recently, some observers have viewed such institutions as the genesis of a new global governance system which may make nation-states unnecessary or even obsolete. If these prediction are realized, world politics will require a reassessment of its methods and focus in order to more fully comprehend the new multivariate global realities.

While, at present, it seems unlikely that globalisation has changed the basic character of world politics, those critical of a state-centered approach to understanding politics on a global scale are making strong arguments in support of taking a much broader approach to the subject. It seems clear that a variety of factors present in the contemporary political world are now at play, and challenge students of world politics to consider their effects. As globalisation continues to develop and evolve, so too must world political studies. We ignore these challenges at our peril.

References

Acocella, N 2005, Economic Policy in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, GBR. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10284358=globalisation+and+politics)

Brennan, T 2002, Globalisation and Its Terrors, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 8, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10099695=Globalisation+and+Its+Terrors)

Brysk, A (ed.) 2002, Globalization and Human Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, USA. Accessed online (Proquest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10057114=Globalization+and+Human+Rights)

Cameron, DR, Ranis, G, & Zinn, A 2006, Globalization and Self Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege?, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (Proquest eLibrary) October 13, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10163830=Globalization+and+Self+Determination%3A)

Crawford, N 2002, Argument and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Port Chester, NY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 11, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10023560=Argument+and+Change+in+World+Politics)

Drezner, DW 2008, All Politics Is Global, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 5, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10312508=Politics+of+the+Global)

Drori, GS, Meyer, JW, & Hwang, H (eds) 2007, Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change, Oxford University Press, Cary, NC, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/search.action?p00=Globalization+and+Organization%3A+World+Society++and+Organizational+Change=fromSearch

Evans, B, & Mooney, A (eds) 2007, Globalisation: The Key Concepts, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 5, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10160278=Globalisation%3A+The+Key+Concepts)

Hart, JA, & Prakash, A 2000, Responding to Globalization, Routledge, London, GBR. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 5, 2015.

Held, D (ed.) 2004, Globalizing World?: Culture, Economics, Politics, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 6, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10273161=David+Held )

Higgott, RA, Underhill, GR, & Bieler, A 1999, Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System, Routledge, London, GBR.

Hoffmann, MJ, & Ba, AD (eds) 2005, Contending Perspectives on Global Governance : Coherence and Contestation, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 9, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10163709=Contending+Perspectives+on+Global+Governance+%3A++Coherence+and+Contestation)

Holden, B 1999, Global Democracy: Key Debates, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 10, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=5001331=Global+Democracy%3A+Key+Debates)

Jaguaribe, H, & Vasconcelos, AD (eds) 2003, European Union, Mercosul and a New World Order, Frank Cass Publishers, London, GBR.

Kahler, M, & Walter, B (eds) 2006, Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization, Cambridge University Press, West Nyack, NY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10129196=Territoriality+and+Conflict+in+an+Era+of+Globalization)

Keohane, RO 2002, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 5, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10100309=Power+and+Governance+in+a+Partially+Globalized+World)

Labonte, R 2003, Dying For Trade: Why Globalization Can Be Bad for Our Health, Centre for Social Justice, Toronto, Canada. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 9, 2015.(http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10213541=Dying+For+Trade%3A+Why+Globalization+Can+Be+Bad+for+Our+Health)

Labonte, Ronald, Schrecker, Ted, and Gupta, Amit Sen, 2005, Health for Some: Death, Disease and Disparity in a Globalizing Era, Centre for Social Justice, Toronto, Canada. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 9, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10213324=Health+for+Some%3A+Death%2C+Disease++and+Disparity+in+a+Globalizing+Era)

Lachapelle, G, & Paquin, S (eds) 2005, Mastering Globalization: New Sub-States’ Governance and Strategies, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 10, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10162453=Mastering+Globalization%3A+New+Sub-States%E2%80%99+Governance++and+Strategies)

Laidi, Z 1998, World Without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 9, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10165286=World+Without+Meaning%3A+The+Crisis+of+Meaning+in+International+Politics)

Lentner, HH 2004, Power and Politics in Globalization, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 10, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10162947=Power+and+Politics+in+Globalization)

Lemert, C, & Elliot, A 2005, New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 8, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10163503=New+Individualism%3A+The+Emotional+Costs+of+Globalization)

Little, R, & Smith, M 2005, Perspectives on World Politics (3rd Edition), Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 8, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10163472=Perspectives+on+World+Politics+%283rd+Edition%29)

Martens, P, Gaston, N, & Dreher, A 2008, Measuring Globalisation: Gauging Its Consequences, Springer, New York, NY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 7, 2015. http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/search.action?p00=globalisation+and+world+politics=fromSearch

Mazlish, B 2006, New Global History, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 13, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10152293=New+Global+History)

Meckling, J 2001, Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate Politics, and the Rise of Emissions Trading, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10504736=Carbon+Coalitions%3A+Business%2C+Climate+Politics%2C+and+the+Rise+of+Emissions++Trading)

Mittelman, JH 2000, Globalization Syndrome: Transformation & Resistance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 13, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10031954=Globalization+Syndrome%3A+Transformation+%26+Resistance)

Munck, R 2006, Globalisation and Contestation: The New Great Counter-Movement, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 6, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10155739=Globalisation+and+Contestation%3A+The+New+Great+Counter-Movement)

Muppidi, H 2004, Politics of the Global, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 9, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10151226=Politics+of+the+Global)

Najam, A, Runnalls, D, & Halle, M 2007, Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, MB, CAN. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 09, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10157574=Environment+and+Globalization%3A+Five+Propositions)

Nye, JS 2004, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 11, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10098890=Power+in+the+Global+Information+Age%3A+From+Realism+to+Globalization)

Patomaki, H 2001, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics, Routledge, London, GBR.

Rosenau, JN 2005, Study of World Politics, Volume 2: Globalization and Governance (2nd Edition), Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 11, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10163494=Study+of+World+Politics%2C+Volume+2%3A+Globalization+and+Governance+%282nd++Edition%29)

Reitan, R 2006, Global Activism, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10155662=Global+Activism)

Rupert, M 2000, Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 12, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10017826=Ideologies+of+Globalization%3A+Contending+Visions+of+a+New+World+Order)

Waters, M 2001, Globalization, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 6, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=5001342=Globalization)

Weiss, L (ed.) 2003, States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In, Cambridge University Press, West Nyack, NY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 8, 2015. http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docID=10064286=globalisation+and+politics

Whitman, J 2005, Limits of Global Governance, Routledge, Florence, KY, USA. Accessed online (ProQuest eLibrary) October 8, 2015. (http://site.ebrary.com.myaccess.libra

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

Why has the concept of Sovereignty proved such a powerful political concept?
Introduction

That the concept of sovereignty still is a powerful concept can be seen with regard to European integration. The gradual transfer of core powers from EU member states to supranational institutions is a case in point, which consistently reveals the crucial importance of the concept of sovereignty: In the 2009 German Constitutional Court ruling on the Lisbon treaty, the court held that German state sovereignty cannot be transferred to a supranational level as it is ‘simply another name for German democracy’ (Koskenniemi 2010, 241, cf. Grimm 2009). Hence, the question emerges as to why the concept of sovereignty has been able to exert this long-lasting impact. I will argue that this is enabled by its becoming inextricably linked to notions of self-determination and democratic accountability. I will look at this argument from different perspectives, carving out a view on sovereignty as a concept which is fundamentally political, and which is powerful because it provides space for interpretation. My argument will operate against the backdrop of sovereignty conceived of as ‘supreme authority within a territory’ (Philpott 2014, n.p.). Throughout modernity sovereignty has been associated with the state, namely as a conditio sine qua non of the latter. This prevalence of the state is undergoing profound transformations since the second half of the twentieth century. Based on this observation I will explore how linking sovereignty to self-determination and democratic accountability is more relevant for explaining its success than to examine its link with the state. The first part thus analyses the historicity of the concept within the paradigm of state sovereignty, the second looks at its contemporary applicability beyond the state.

I. Sovereignty and modernity

According to Robert Jackson (2007), since the emergence of modernity in the early sixteenth century the concept of sovereignty became tied up to the notion of the supreme and independent state, which marks its connotation as a fundamentally ‘politicallegal term’ (Jackson 2007, 20). Sovereignty became a constitutive part of the state, closely related to its authority. Moreover, this association of sovereignty with the modern state enabled a shift in the ‘locus of sovereignty’ in the course of the following centuries up to the present day, ‘from rulers and dynasties to parliaments and estates or social classes, and then to the nation or people as a whole’ (Jackson 2007, 22). Jackson’s historical account asserts that while the locus of sovereignty changes over time, the basic tenets of political life remained stable:

[T]he land surface of the planet is partitioned into a number of separate bordered territories, … a certain determinate authority is supreme over all other authorities in each territory, and … those supreme authorities are independent of all foreign authorities. (Jackson 2007, 22)

For the present argument, however, what is crucial is the locus of sovereignty: the trajectory from absolutist rulers enthroned by the will of all, as stipulated in Hobbes or Bodin (cf. Hobbes 2008; Bodin 1962), to the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ (cf. Jackson 2007, 78ff.), in which “the people” hold sovereignty. It is evident in the answer given to the question for who is entitled to sovereignty: in the notion of popular sovereignty, ‘the authority of the final word resides in the political will or consent of the people of an independent state’ (Jackson 2007, 78). This shift in the understanding of self-determination – from a theoretical self-determination as can be found in Hobbes, where people surrender their sovereignty to the Leviathan voluntarily in order to overcome the primordial state of nature and war of all against all, to the factual self-determination of a nation – is of prime importance for the lasting influence of the concept of sovereignty. But how can this change in conceiving the locus of sovereignty be conceptualised?

The shift sheds light on the ‘polemical’ dimension of sovereignty, which surfaces in its its deployment not as a ‘marker of an entity’s sociological thickness but of the needs of present politics’ (Koskenniemi 2010, 232). From this follows a concept of sovereignty operating on two different levels, namely as a term which ‘simultaneously invokes the registers of both description and prescription’ (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 8). It can be employed both in order to analyse a certain status quo and to express a normative dimension, a desire for a certain outcome. It thus points to the present and the past as well as to the future. Therefore, it is invested with a fundamentally political dimension, which makes it subject to interpretation. The space opened up by this contestability can be seen as a crucial factor for the longevity of the concept: appealing to sovereignty can serve both to repress and justify absolutist rule and to demand emancipation. It is crucially related to the idea of agency, to the question of who de facto holds and exerts sovereignty, and who is seen to be actually entitled to it.

In the course of the twentieth century, for instance, the appeal to self-determination served colonised peoples to demand an end to European imperialism (cf. Jackson 2007, 76). While ‘[i]n the mid-twentieth century the “self” in self-determination was juridical and territory-focused more often that [sic] it was sociological and people-focused’ (Jackson 2007, 106), the national liberation movements of the second half of the century were built on the right to assert a certain, i.e. national, self-determination. At this juncture, another crucial aspect of sovereignty surfaces, namely the issue of accountability. It manifests itself in the notion of consent expressed by the governed towards those governing. In a representative democracy, consent is volatile and can be both confirmed and withdrawn in the course of elections. This process is to guarantee that the government consistently takes into account the public will – a relation which in the parts of the world colonised by European states was obviously not given (cf. Jackson 2007, 76). Accordingly, the appeal both to self-determination and to the requirement of consent by the governed – democratic accountability – form part of the discourse on sovereignty. This discursive dynamic with which the concept of sovereignty is invested provides a clear view on why it has proved to be as long-lasting.

II. Sovereignty beyond the state

From those considerations one can deduct a notion of sovereignty as a discursive instrument serving different causes in the hands of different actors. The profoundly political character of appealing to sovereignty can be considered a strong explanation of the powerful role the concept of sovereignty still plays. This can be further explored with reference to the approach developed by Cynthia Weber in Simulating Sovereignty (1995). The work is conceived against the backdrop of the perceived ignorance on behalf of most of International Relations scholars as regards the concept’s historicity (cf. Weber 1995, 2) – a critique in which resonates Rousseau’s dictum that ‘the Sovereign, by the mere fact that it is, is always everything it ought to be’ (Rousseau 1997, 52). I would argue that the critique launched by Weber emerges precisely from the political dimension of sovereignty, a dimension she sees obscured in the mainstream discourse which begs the question as to how a community is constituted (cf. Weber 1995, 8). This again touches on the problematic regarding the notion of “the people”: how is this abstract entity, which by no means corresponds to the empirical population (cf. Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 11), to be conceived? For Weber, who crucially draws on the work of Baudrillard, especially his Symbolic Exchange and Death (1988), considering this question must take into account the profound change from a ‘logic of representation’ to a ‘logic of simulation’ (Weber 1995, 127), which occurs during the second half of the twentieth century.

While the first logic implies the production of an original truth which sovereignty can refer to and which enables political representation (cf. Weber 1995, 123f.), the second logic prevails once the credibility of traditional referents such as “god” or “the people” has vanished. Truth is not produced anymore, but ’seduced’ (Weber 1995, 125). Weber examines the logic of representation for the relation between sovereignty and several twentieth century military interventions, that is, actual violations of sovereignty. Through the very violation of sovereignty in a specific case, however, the concept itself is reproduced. The conceptual pair sovereignty/intervention creates a boundary which ‘produces, represents, or writes the state’ (Weber 1995, 125).

In a logic of simulation, in contrast, the sovereignty/intervention boundary collapses and is replaced by an interchangeability of both, giving way to the emergence of a new term Weber calls “sovereigntyintervention” (Weber 1995, 127). This shift creates the need for the ‘simulation’ of this boundary, in order to keep up the concept of the state and sovereignty itself. Weber illuminates this with regard to the US intervention in Panama, which essentially obliterated the difference between sovereignty and intervention. With Baudrillard, Weber argues that an ‘abili [sic, read: alibi] function’ is deployed, a function which is based on self-referentiality and the closed circulation of interchangeable signifiers (Weber 1995, 128). In a vain ‘to rescue the “reality principle”’ (Weber 1995, 128, cf. Baudrillard 1988, 2), in this case, the reality of sovereignty, intervention is appealed to. Weber describes the resulting circular relation as follows:

For intervention to be meaningful, sovereignty must exist because intervention implies a violation of sovereignty. To speak of intervention, then, is to suggest that sovereignty does exist. In Baudrillard’s terms, intervention or transgression proves sovereignty or the law. (Weber 1995, 128f.)

From this Baudrillardian perspective the persistence of the concept of sovereignty can be explained as an attempt to perpetuate first referents in a time in which those referents have lost their foundation. Against the backdrop of the non-existence of “the people”, the appeal to sovereignty can only remain credible if it occurs within a network of other concepts. However, each of those other concepts in itself depends on being embedded in a network of signifiers, thus creating the above mentioned self-referentiality: there is nothing beyond the sign, it is pure simulation: a network of simulacra. From this Weber concludes that ‘[i]nvestigating state sovereignty … requires investigating how states are simulated’ (Weber 1995, 129).

Those displacements of the discursive use of the concept of sovereignty reflect its prolonged attraction. In other words, returning to the above mentioned ambiguity as regards its use (it can be employed to describe as well as to prescribe), sovereignty’s very texture has been characterised as ‘sponge-concept’ (Bartelson 1995, 237), from which derives an ‘uncertainty about what sovereignty is’ (Walker 1995, 27). Therefore, Kalmo and Skinner hold that if sovereignty is conceived of ‘as an argument, as a claim to authority, than there is no sense at all in which it can be “reduced” (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 7).

This brings us back to my argument as to the importance of the factors of self-determination and democratic accountability. First, precisely because self-determination has no empirical referent, but depends on invoking an abstract “people”, this people’s sovereignty can never be achieved, and therefore has to be appealed to persistently. In the hands of different actors it takes different shapes and refers to different aims, but it always has a prescriptive dimension. The same holds, second, for democratic accountability. Consent is never fixed, because “the people” who articulates this consent are not. Accordingly, democratic accountability is instable, too, as the governing have to take into account the possibility of the popular consent being withdrawn. The appeal to sovereignty by the multitude, Hardt and Negri (2000), for instance, hold, is floating, and per definition as ‘inconclusive [a] constitutive relation’ as the multitude itself (Hardt and Negri 2000, 103). One answer to the question for the ongoing impact of the concept of sovereignty therefore is that it is an ‘argumentative resource’ (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 24), while the credibility of its functioning as an analytical tool erodes.

Conclusion

The Baudrillardian theoretical construct is geared to devaluate all “traditional” ways of conceptualising sovereignty, as here it is subsumed under a theoretical framework in which simulation has substituted all “reality”. Yet it provides an enriching perspective on the discursive character of the concept of sovereignty, and therefore helps understanding the persistence of its use. The very intangibility of the concepts sovereignty refers to, be it “the people” or “consent”, leaves open a gap which contestation can pierce into. My argument showed that those referents of sovereignty, however, are mediated through the factors self-determination and democratic accountability, which therefore provide the essential link through which the discourse on sovereignty proceeds. Accordingly, while the Baudrillardian perspective developed by Weber mainly looks at the appeals to sovereignty by states themselves, it can also serve emancipatory movements for articulating political demands. What can be said in conclusion, then, is that the very ambiguity of the concept of sovereignty as expressed in the demand for self-determination, for instance, is what made and makes it successful.

Bibliography

Bartelson J 1995, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP.

Baudrillard J 1988, ‘Symbolic Exchange and Death’, in: idem., Poster M (ed. and intr.), Selected Writings, pp. 119-148, Stanford: Stanford UP.

Bodin J 1962, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale ,McRae K D (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.

Grimm , D 2009, Souveranitat. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlusselbegriffs , Berlin: Berlin UP.Hobbes T 2008, Leviathan, Gaskin J C A (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UP.

Hardt M and Negri A 2000, Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.

Jackson R 2007, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea, Cambridge, Malden, Mass.: Polity.

Kalmo H and Skinner Q 2010, ‘Introduction: a concept in fragments’, in: idem., Sovereignty in fragments: the past, present and future of a contested concept, pp. 1-25, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP.

Koskenniemi M 2010, ‘Conclusion. vocabularies of sovereignty – powers of a paradox’, in: Kalmo H and Skinner Q (eds.), Sovereignty in fragments: the past, present and future of a contested concept, pp. 222-242, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP.

Philpott D 2014, ‘Sovereignty’, in: Zalta E N (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/sovereignty, accessed 08 Feb. 15.

Rousseau J J 1997, The social contract and other later political writings, Gourevitch V (ed.), Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP.

Walker R B J 1995, ‘From International Relations to World Politics’ in: Camilleri J A, Jarvis A P and Pasolini A J (eds.), The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space, pp. 21–38, Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.

Weber, C 1995, Simulating Sovereignty, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP.

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

This essay assesses both the legitimacy and usefulness of the British House of Lords within a modern democratic state. It first turns to some broad theoretical background which should alert the reader to the deep-seated ideological biases that pervade this question. Next, this essay presents the case for opposing the House of Lords and produces a number of convincing rejoinders. Lastly, it outlines the critical contribution that this institution yields to the modern democratic state of Britain, both in offering expert insight and opinion but also in highlighting the need for policy to be air-tight and to cater to niche groups among the populous.

This question and analysis are permeated by more deep-seated ideological notions than meet the eye. It is tempting to overlook the historicity of this question whilst consumed in current noise and scandals. However, the common reaction and bias that many modern democratic citizens harbour against the House of Lords goes much deeper. The assertion that it is not elected and therefore not properly scrutinised by society is one that holds sway because of the way modern liberal states emerged.

Originally, dating back to the Enlightenment and the French revolution, democracy and gains in liberal thought were seen to exist in a zero-sum game against the authoritarian states that had up to that point supressed systematically (McLean, 2009). The philosophical notions that were birthed restored the importance of the individual agent (aka citizen) at the heart of collective decision-making and therefore prioritised her over the arbitrary and tyrannical nature of an unelected state. An example of the previous line of thought is that of Immanuel Kant, whose ideas seeped into democratic discourse Mouffe, C. and Holdengraeber, 1989). Namely, it is almost impossible to imagine a democracy that does not take individual claims of citizens as being of utmost importance; an agent has to be empowered to dictate his own fate and government should be merely a facilitator. Symmetrically, Rousseau (1920), another thinker of the era, maintained that the state should function as a reflection of collective will and thus the locus of collective decision-making. Equally, bolstering this idea, John Locke (1773), with his epoch-defining work ‘The two treatises of the government’, put forward the idea that democracy implies that people are governed by their voluntary consent and vest this power to the state. According to him, the individual is naturally free and becomes a political subject out of his own volition, something that every government should honour and adhere to.

These three prior notions that bring the individual back at the heart of the democratic future seem to be at play here. That is why a common stance towards the House of Lords is that I departs from these widely accepted social contracts; it is an institution that robs the individual of the ability to check it and does not therefore allow him to merge his personal destiny with that of the political community.

Going further, the UK is renowned for being the pinnacle of parliamentary supremacy (McLean, 2009). As has been seen by a multitude of examples, the UK has championed the idea that parliament should be put before other institutions and forces. Note that as a country it was very slow to adopt a supreme court (in 2009) and its reluctance to cede power to the European Union is also a testimony to the defence of parliamentary supremacy.

Having established these patterns of thought, it becomes intuitive to understand why the institution has indeed come under fire. Being the second largest legislative assembly and housing approximately 830 Lords, the institution has been widely criticised (The Week, 2015). A grand total of 781 eligible life peers are appointed by the Queen following the advice of the Prime Minister, while 87 of them are hereditary peers and 256 are bishops. To make matters worse, 75 per cent of them are men (ibid.).

Taking each objection in turn, it can firstly be seen that the second largest legislative assembly does not get elected while it claims momentous resources by its unconsented constituents and also a widely acknowledged and disseminated platform of discussion. Secondly, it is ironic that 781 of eligible life peers are single-handedly decided on by the Queen, who represents the monarchy, i.e. another unelected institution. Thirdly, people take issue with the fact that 87 peers gain their lordship at birth. It is natural that UK citizens foster resentment as that is seen as a profoundly unfair system that perpetuates filial privilege at the expense of everyone else. 256 Lords are bishops, embodying the church, which exists in an uneasy relationship with modern democracy, not least because it fails to keep pace with liberal reform. Lastly, three out of four members are men, highlighting a potentially sexist system that favours one sex over the other, augmenting the merit of the argument that marries the House of Lords with a bygone past.

These reasons appear quite damning for the institution as a whole, as they seem to suggest that it exists in its own bubble, detached from the demands and beliefs of citizens and reliant upon outdated notions. The House of Lords seems to be at variance with the ideas of fairness and justice, which are absolutely emblematic of democratic values. Specifically, hereditary privilege, lack of electoral accountability, appointment by the Queen, representative of the church and men, by and large, are all features that build the same narrative that runs counter to a democratic conception of fairness and equality. Building on the notions of his progenitors outlined above, John Rawls (2009) put this case perhaps more succinctly than anyone else. Before collective rules are set up, prospective citizens agree on them under the veil of ignorance. Blind to where they will end up in the society that they choose, citizens have an incentive, and one would argue a morally binding reason, to opt for a fair system, that allocates resources equitably and treats the most vulnerable with compassion. This thought experiment is relevant, as it means that modern citizens of Britain would a priori rule out the House of Lords, as it arbitrarily and haphazardly appoints and empowers individuals on grounds of factors that they had no control over (e.g. birth, sex, ties with the church, family). Therefore, it transpires that the House of Lords fails to meet these basic demands of fairness and renders itself the proper subject of censure.

What compounds these inherently anti-democratic practices is the House’s failure to represent the nation in all its diversity. That is to say, its constitutional make-up generates further socio-economic unfairness. This is because the House of Lords has approximately five times more members from the capital city compared to the North West of England, despite both regions having similar population sizes (Oborne, 2014). It is clear, therefore, that the House of Lords does not represent large parts of the UK. This is particularly problematic, as it creates the impression of a fragmented democracy with pockets of power, that should be in fact distributed evenly across the country. It is also deeply condescending towards regions outside of London, as they feel that their political participation comes to naught. It finally, as a result, encourages apathy and disengagement among the different regions outside of the capital. This exacerbates other national phenomena and legacies, including the North-South divide which is very unhelpful, as it prevents national unity and shared cultural identity.

More recently, arguments in opposition to the existence of the House of Lords have been animated by a series of scandals, which call into question the legitimacy and suitability of the peers as gatekeepers of the second largest legislative assembly worldwide (Stacey, 2015). As they are unelected and thus unaccountable, citizens make higher moral demands on the peers of the House of Lords. In this sense, peers should be cognizant of the duty they have to be responsive to public demands and proper in their demeanour, in an attempt to prove that what was potentially awarded to them unfairly is discharged in the most effective and respectful manner. Yet lately, these standards have been flaunted. One such example that garnered huge negative publicity and brought the House of Lords under renewed scrutiny was that of Lord Sewell, the former Chairmen of Committees charges with the responsibility to oversee moral conduct in the House of Lords (The Economist, 2015). The nature of sensationalist media as well as the readiness and deep suspicion in the public to criticise the House of Lords served merely as vindication to the argument that it is out of touch with reality, let alone modern democracy.

However, discussion should tread gently and use facts and analysis to make judgment rather than the vague appeal of history and the demands for absolute fairness. Granted, the institution falls short of adequately representing segments and groups in the UK, and also it fails to consider that hereditary privilege is arbitrary and embarrassing (though such cases are sharply declining). However, these largely emotional objections do not hold water when its real purpose weighs in.

It is widely and mistakenly assumed that legitimacy is purely down to elections. It is seen as something, as discussed earlier, sacrosanct and anything against that is anti-democratic. However, this is not the case. To dispel this simplistic yet appealing line of thought, this essay will now turn to the unique contribution that the House of Lords makes to democratic dialogue and representation.

Its main function, namely, is to scrutinise government bills and to force the government to think again when leaps of judgment occur or legislation fails to meet high standards (McLean, 2009). As such, the House of Lord performs a critical function and informs both the public and government as to the soundness of policy and whether everything has been deliberated upon properly before laws come into effect. Note that the House of Lords does not have the power to initiate its own bills, as this right is exclusive to the House of Commons. Nor does it have the power to block legislation, but it can merely delay bills or offer amendments that are to be considered anew by the House of Commons. This particular function that the House of Lords performs, in fact, is very different in nature from the criticisms that suggest that the House of Lords usurps power from the people and the House of Commons (ibid.). In fact, not only does it not ‘steal’ power and authority, it complements it with much needed expert insight and dialogue to be fed back to the House of Commons.

A number of examples illustrate the effectiveness and worth of the House of Lords. In the legislative session of 2014-15, the peers spent 507 hours examining legislation and considered and offered over 3449 amendments to bills (The Economist, 2015). In 2007, the Lords shot down plans for regional supercasinos, while in 2010 they amended a bill to ensure that children with special educational needs have better access to academies. In 2014 the Lords amended the Children and Families bill so that smoking would be prohibited in cars when children are present (ibid.). This is significant, as it highlights that in fact the House of Lords fills a very glaring gap in the way legislative initiative works. The fact that they are not elected makes the Lords more grounded in expertise and less swayed by public opinion and populism, and in fact may even prod them to lobby for marginalised and vulnerable segments of society.

In conclusion, this essay has exposed the pervasive fallacies running across common objections to the House of Lords’s legitimacy and existence. It has been shown by way of historical reference and positive arguments, that this case is weak and driven by idealistic and pseudo-historical emotional reasoning rather than one based on the real contribution that the House of Lords makes but is routinely overlooked and lost in the noise of a few isolated scandals. These in turn encourage an unhelpful and sweeping kind of thinking that dismisses this institution out of hand and does not do justice to the concrete offerings that they have for a modern and forward looking democracy.

Bibliography

The Week, 2015. House of Lords: the pros and cons of an unelected upper chamber. The Week UK. Accessed at: http://www.theweek.co.uk/61210/house-of-lords-the-pros-and-cons-of-an-unelected-upper-chamber (accessed 10/17/15).

Locke, J., 1773. An essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. London: Edes and Gill Publishers.

McLean, I., 2009. What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mouffe, C. and Holdengraeber, P., 1989. Radical democracy: modern or postmodern?. Social Text 21, 31-45.

Oborne, P., 2014. Ed Miliband’s plan for an elected House of Lord’s would mean an upper house dominated by Ukip. Telegprah. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/11205797/Ed-Milibands-plan-for-an-elected-House-of-Lords-would-mean-an-upper-house-dominated-by-Ukip.html (accessed 10/17/15).

Rawls, J., 2009. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press.

Rousseau, J.-J., 1920. The Social Contract: & Discourses. London: JM Dent & Sons, Limited.

Russell, M., Sciara, M., 2008. The policy impact of defeats in the House of Lords. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10, 571–589.

Stacey, K., 2015. Sex scandal peer steps down from House of Lords. Financial Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec26be34-344d-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html#axzz3oqjyP3rj (accessed 10/17/15).

The Economist, 2015. Lord Sewel, upholder of standards in public life. The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21659910-indignant-letters-disgraced-peer-lord-sewel-upholder-standards-public-life (access 10/17/15).

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

In this essay, I assess whether Machiavelli reduces politics to force. To construct a response to this, it is necessary to explore what “force” means, since “force” is a philosophically weak concept. In order to understand “force” as a philosophical concept, we need to separate the concepts of authority and power. With a clear concept of what we mean by power and how it differs from authority, it becomes possible to discuss whether Machiavelli reduces politics to force. Once the concepts of power and authority are clearly differentiated, the question becomes does Machiavelli reduce politics to force, where force is equated to power, or does Machiavelli rest politics on authority.

In this essay, I argue that, despite Skinner’s attempts to re-habilitate Machiavelli and re-construct Machiavelli as a defender of liberty, Machiavelli does not rest power and politics on authority. Instead, Machiavelli argues that power should be utilised for the purpose of “the common good”. For Machiavelli, political necessity allows for incursions on liberty and the use of power, rather than authority. Femia is alive to the implications of “the dark, authoritarian and militaristic element in Machiavelli’s writings” (Femia, 2004, p.15); and, in this essay, I argue that this should not be overlooked.

Goodwin argues that attempting to distinguish rigorously between power and authority “is ultimately doomed to failure” (Goodwin, 1997, p.314). However, she argues that “the distinction between power and authority has exercised many philosophers, who feel there should be a sharp demarcation between the two” (Goodwin, 1997, p.306). Whilst a “sharp demarcation” may not be possible, Goodwin does separate the two. She argues that power “is the ability to cause someone to act in a way which she would not choose, [if] left to herself” (Goodwin, 1997, p. 307). This can, obviously, occur in a number of ways, including threats and violence, but also through persuasion, propaganda and advertising. However, authority Goodwin argues, has a basis in law; a government has authority if it has legal validity (Goodwin, 1997). A sharp distinction between power and authority may not be possible, and it may be made to see the concepts on sliding scale, with illegitimate power on oneside, and legitimate authority on the other side, with much in-between.

This separation between power and authority is fundamental to this essay, as it is important to understand whether Machiavelli argues that politics ought to rest on authority or whether it can be reduced to maintaining power. Therefore, in an attempt to summarise the “demarcation” between power and authority, I once more return to Goodwin, who says the individual “defers to authority… [but] yields to power” (Goodwin, 1997, p.313). If Machiavelli reduces politics to force/power, his concern is that people must yield to the government; whereas, if Machiavelli argues that politics ought to rest on authority, his concern would be that the people deferred to the government, and recognised its legal legitimacy.

Machiavelli’s political philosophy is more complex than the often one-dimensional interpretation of Machiavelli as a self-serving manipulator, promoter of immorality and defender of tyranny. In contrast to the one-dimensional view of Machiavelli which implies that he reduces politics to the maintenance of power and a justification of tyranny, Machiavelli is a defender of a certain kind of liberty. However, Machiavelli’s concept of liberty is about the liberty of the state or the Government. He argues that in order for the people to be free, they must live a free state – a state free from external servitude. Machiavelli’s concept of liberty prioritises the state in the relationship between the individual and the state: “it is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). For Machiavelli, it is not the individual that is important, but the community or the state. Therefore, the individual must yield to the will of the state for the liberty and well-being of the “common good”.

In his interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought, Skinner emphasises the importance of the free state; and crucially, he stresses the seriousness of the metaphor of the body politic to neo-roman thought, which meant that Machiavelli could not conceive of a free individual without a free state. This is only one of many interpretations of Machiavelli, and is not objective as it is underpins Skinner’s thesis that liberty was an important concept to Machiavelli. Machiavelli defines the free state as one that is “removed from any kind of external servitude” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 2). Skinner expands this by relating it to the concept of the body politic, where, “just as individual human bodies are free… only if they are able to act or forbear from acting at will, so the bodies of nations and states are likewise free… only if they are similarly unconstrained from using their powers according to their own wills” (Skinner, 1998, p.25). Skinner’s elaboration means that a state is only free, when it follows the collective will of the people, and thereby, liberty is equated to self-government, so a free state is defined as a community “independent of any authority save that of the community itself” (Skinner, 1981, p.52). Machiavelli stridently defends the free state, arguing that “history reveals the harm that servitude has done to people and cities… [as they] have never increased either in dominion or wealth, unless they have been independent” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). This underpins Machiavelli’s perennial fear that freedom is fragile and liberty could succumb to external conquest or internal tyranny.

Skinner pursues this notion, and argues that overt coercion is not necessary for a state to be in a condition of slavery: if the maintenance of civil liberty is dependent upon the good will of arbitrary power, then the individual is already living as a slave (Skinner, 1998). This is a rational consequence of Machiavelli’s bleak interpretation of human nature, where men do not promote the common good i.e. the preservation of the state’s liberty. Machiavelli argues that humans are: self motivated – “men never do good unless necessity drives them” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 3); bellicose – “security for man is impossible unless it be conjoined with power” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 1); fickle and untrustworthy – they “will not keep their promises” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter XVIII); pusillanimous – “when the state needs its citizens, few are to be found” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter IX). These attributes are a hindrance to a state that is trying to preserve its ability to enact the collective will without constraint. Therefore, liberty requires overcoming men’s selfish inclination, so they can be fit to govern themselves, and this involves engaging in activities which are conducive to “human flourishing” (Skinner, 1990). Given that it is contrary to mens’ natural inclinations to pursue the “common good”, it seems that this involves yielding to the power of the state. Skinner’s eloquent term “human flourishing” describes the need to imbue each citizen with a sense of civic virtu, which is essentially, a public-spirited ethos, whereby the individual commits a great deal of time and energy to participating in the affairs of the state, and maintaining a vigilance to safeguard its freedom. Skinner admits that civic virtu requires placing “the good of the community above all private interests and ordinary considerations of morality” (Skinner, 1981, p.54).

Machiavelli’s political philosophy rests on valuing the public sphere, with a resulting dismissive attitude toward the private sphere. Thus, the citizens of the state are required to yield to the power of the state, and to relinquish their individual liberty, if it is perceived to be in the “common good”. Machiavelli praises Rome where those who worked through the public sphere were honoured, but those working through private means were condemned and prosecuted (Machiavelli, The Discourses). Machiavelli argues that a sense of duty to the community, which entails sacrificing the legitimacy of the private sphere, does not curtail liberty but preserve it, as civic virtu is essential to ensuring the state is not constrained from acting upon its own will. He quotes, (possibly apocryphally) from ancient history: “they rebelled because when peace means servitude it is more intolerable to free men than war” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book III, Discourse 44), which appeals to Machiavelli’s doctrine of public-spiritedness, and his promotion of the well-being of the community.

Machiavelli promotes the ideals of republicanism, and republican liberty, which entails a need to safeguard the state against internal tyranny, through citizens that are active, vigilant, and participate in the daily running of the community to ensure that the state is not subjected to the caprices of a minority; and that, instead, the community seeks the public interest. Machiavelli criticises the consequences of internal tyranny with empirical reference to the greatness attained by Athens, once “liberated from the tyranny of Pisistratus…. [and] the greatness which Rome attained after freeing itself from its Kings” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). Thus, Machiavelli can be read as a defender of liberty by citing his belief that the conflict between the nobles and plebs was the primary reason Rome maintained her freedom (Machiavelli, The Discourses), and his assertion that a Monarch’s interests are usually harmful to the city (Machiavelli, The Discourses). This interpretation of Machiavelli shows that he does not unambiguously reduce politics to the use of force and power. Instead, he argues that politics rests on the order of a well-structured government. However, for Machiavelli, a well-structured government and political authority are not necessarily synonymous, since he argues that political order may require the use of force and the wielding of power by a powerful leader.

Machiavelli’s writings are littered with references to his love for strong leadership e.g. “dictatorship was always useful” in Rome (Machiavelli, The Discourses), or his defence of a Prince’s cruelty to keep his subjects united and loyal, as men are wretched and will pursue their own interest, unless they fear punishment (Machiavelli, The Prince). There are clearly elements of Machiavelli’s writings that support the idea of the free state and a certain concept of liberty; for instance, he argues that “experience shows that cities have never increased in dominion or riches except while they have been at liberty” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). This allows Skinner to construct Machiavelli as a defender of liberty, by arguing that “what Machiavelli primarily has in mind in laying so much emphasis on liberty is that a city bent on greatness must remain free from all forms of political servitude” (Skinner, 1981, p.58). Skinner’s reading of Machiavelli suggests that Machiavelli did not reduce politics to force and power; and that, instead, Machiavelli rested politics on political authority. However, this re-habilitating of Machiavelli by Skinner overlooks a number of passages in Machiavelli’s writing that show he clearly was prepared to allow force and power to be used without linking it to authority.

Femia takes the view that Machiavelli was not a defender of liberty, and did not place authority at the heart of politics. Femia concludes that Machiavelli’s political thought can be characterised by the belief that “we cannot draw a sharp line between moral virtue and moral vice: the two things often change place. Fair is foul and foul is fair” (Femia, 2004, p.11). For Machiavelli, it is the state that is important, and the individual’s liberty can be subjected to power and force in order for the good of the city to prevail. Machiavelli eradicates the private sphere, which allows Femia to draw a parallel between Machiavelli’s concept of freedom and fascists who also argue that “freedom comes through participating in a great whole… [and] nothing to do with limiting the state’s autonomy” (Femia, 2004, p.8). Machiavelli primary concern is maintaining political order, and his advice in The Prince often seems to be more about maintaining power, than establishing authority. In places, Machiavelli’s advice is brutal, and seems unambiguously to promote the exercise of force for the purposes of maintaining power.

Machiavelli shows no regard for individual liberties, and allows The State to trample over its citizens when force and power are necessary, arguing that “it should be noted that one must either pamper or do away with men, because they will avenge themselves for minor offences while for more serious ones they cannot” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter III). This brutal, cynical observation is an instance of Machiavelli’s realism. Such cynical realistic observations do not, in themselves, prove that Machiavelli reduces politics to force and power. It is possible to argue that Machiavelli’s observation accurately observes politics, and he is simply drawing the reader to an important piece of wisdom about human nature. However, this does not seem to be Machiavelli’s motivation. He is not merely observing brutal realism, but appears to be advocating its application. He argues that those the ruler “hurts, being dispersed and poor, can never be a threat to him, and all others remain on the one hand unharmed… and on the other afraid of making a mistake, for fear that what happened to those who were dispossessed might happen to them” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter III). The important word here is “fear”. The people fear the ruler, and so obey. This does not imply that the ruler that governs by authority. Instead, the implication is that the ruler holds power through force.

Despite the ruthless, brutal and cynical methods that Machiavelli appears to advocate, it is important not to misread Machiavelli as someone who advocates force and violence merely for the sake of power. Machiavelli is concerned with “The Common Good”, and thus he argues that the exercise of force – raw power – is only justified if it is exercised in pursuit of “The Common Good”. Or, more simply, the “ends justify the means”. Machiavelli does not advocate raw power, per se; instead, he argues that if the ends are “good”, then the use of force is justified. This blurring of the common good and the use of power to promote it is evident when he argues that “a prince must not worry about the reproach of cruelty when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal; for with a very few examples of cruelty he will be more compassionate than those who, out of excessive mercy, permit disorders to continue… for these usually harm the community at large” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter XVII). This, however, exposes the paradox in Machiavelli’s thought, where cruelty is justified by the ends. The problem is that Machiavelli’s initial concern is about holding power to prevent disobedience and disorder. It is possible that this exercising of power may shift, and become authority; but, in its first instance, politics is about maintaining power.

Machiavelli was a Renaissance writer; and, therefore, the differentiation between power and authority that Goodwin discussed had not become a part of political philosophy. Therefore, to argue that Machiavelli did not seek political authority, but power, would be a mis-representation, as these concepts were not available to him. However, for Machiavelli, political necessity dominates, and in a realist vein, he allows for incursions on liberty and the use of force and even cruelty to hold power. Ultimately, he seeks authority in the common good, and this justifies whatever methods are used to hold on to power.

Machiavelli doesn’t simply reduce politics to force, since force is used to pursue the common good. However, Machiavelli is not concerned with the individual citizen, since he does not differentiate between the public and private realms. Thus, Machiavelli is not concerned with individual liberty and individuals’ rights: when the “private person may be the loser… there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). Without a clear separation of public and private, and between legitimate authority and illegitimate power, the common good can become the arbitrary will of the ruler. The arbitrary will of a ruler – even one that is seeking to promote the common good – leaves politics very open to the use of force to maintain power, in the name of common good. This notion of the use of force to maintain power is quite different from the use of force by a Government that governs through authority, under the rule of law.

Bibliography

Femia, J (2004) “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism”, History of Political Thought, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp. 1-15

Goodwin, B (1997) Using Political Ideas (4th edition), John Wiley & Sons, Chichester

Machiavelli, N (1984) The Prince (Edited, Introduced and Translated by P Bondanella and M Musa) Oxford University Press, Oxford

Machiavelli, N (1998) The Discourses (Edited, Introduced, Revised and Translated by B Crick, L Walker and B Richardson) Penguin Classics, London

Skinner, Q (1981) Machiavelli, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Skinner, Q (1990) “The republican ideal of political liberty” in Bock, G & Skinner, Q & Viroli, M (editors) Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 293-310

Skinner, Q (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

Famously, in the last of his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx declared that ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (1974, p.123). This was intended as part of a contribution to a contemporary debate within German philosophy – in this case, over the exact character of existing materialism. However, Marx’s challenge could be said to encapsulate the key question at the heart of the discussion about the role of the ‘philosopher’, or intellectual – what impact do his or her ideas have in the wider world? More plainly, what is the relationship between thought and action? In terms of the communist or socialist left, with which, of course, Marx was most concerned, this question has worked itself out in a number of ways, but perhaps the main focus has been on the issue of the political or social commitment of the intellectual – especially, his or her commitment to a specific ideology and political formation such as the Party. At times in the history of the Leftist intellectual since the 19th century, this has led to a high degree of tension between those who see a specific ideological commitment as the sine qua non of an intellectual position, and those who argue for a more creative, if not more complex conception of the relationship between intellectuals and the practical political sphere.

Thus, for the Left the idea of the intellectual as a figure who stands in some way apart from and above the political fray and offers universally applicable insights into the state of things as they are is problematic. In his book on the intellectual, Legislators and Interpreters (1987), the social theorist Zygmunt Bauman identifies two general conceptions of the intellectual and of intellectual work – modern and postmodern. For the first of these, he writes, the ‘typically modern strategy of intellectual work is one best characterised by the metaphor of the “legislator” role’. This role ‘consists of making authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding’ (1987, p.4). In this conception, the intellectual has, through his or her ‘superior, objective knowledge’ (1987, p.5), access to an impartial, universal ‘Truth’ which enables him or her to make the right decisions on the part of society or humanity as a whole.

The modern intellectual of whom Bauman is writing has its origins largely in the rationalist philosophes of 18th century France, who sought to establish modern society on the basis of Reason and rationalist principles. Such a ‘legislative’ intellectual would seem to be anathema to those on the Left, especially the revolutionary Left, who required the intellectual to be aligned with and committed to their particular cause. However, for Bauman, and for other theorists such as Michel Foucault, whose conception of the ‘universal’ intellectual as ‘the master of truth and justice’ (1980, p.126) shares much in common with Bauman’s, the Leftist intellectual in fact operates in much the same way as the figure he describes. Thus, Lenin in What is to be Done? (1902) wrote of the revolutionary intellectual as one who brings theoretical-consciousness to the masses, or proletariat, from ‘outside’ (1988, pp.143-4). Lenin argued that the proletariat was incapable of developing such a consciousness spontaneously, on its own, and needed the vanguard intellectual, standing at the head of the class and organised within the tightly disciplined revolutionary party, to supply its shortfall. Although eventually he became persona non grata, as far as the Soviet state was concerned, and was assassinated by agents of that state, Trotsky also argued with Lenin for the supremacy of the party. In his speech given to mark the founding of the Fourth International in1938, he signalled the need for complete commitment on the part of revolutionary intellectuals to the party: ‘Our party demands each of us, totally and completely…For a revolutionary to give himself entirely to the party signifies finding himself’ (1974, p.86).

For Trotsky, the experience of persecution at the hands of Stalin did not lead to his disillusionment with the idea of the revolutionary party as the ‘lever of history’ (1974, p.86), the means by which intellectuals such as himself would raise the ‘revolutionary level’ of the masses (1974, p.86). It was in this context, and only in this context, that the intellectual of the Left (specifically, the revolutionary left) had validity, because he or she had political agency. However, for many on the Left the victory of Stalin and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union led them to re-think the relationship between the intellectual and the working class, seeking to address the problem of how to produce intellectuals from and develop revolutionary consciousness more widely and authentically in the working class itself. Perhaps the most convincingly elaborated effort to do so was that of Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci is best known for his development of the concept of the ‘organic intellectual’. Such an intellectual is distinct from the ‘traditional’ type by dint of the fact that it arises out of the ranks of the working class itself, instead of being of the bourgeoisie, or ruling class. The ‘traditional intellectuals’, although they thought of themselves as autonomous and ‘endowed with a character of their own’ (Gramsci, 1971, p.8), were rather a stratum which legitimised the rule of the bourgeoisie, which had arisen with that class and functioned to serve its ends in the spheres of culture and ethics. In fact, according to Gramsci, the ‘traditional intellectual’ had been itself the ‘organic intellectual’ of the now ruling class when it was expanding and elaborating its hegemony over all other classes.

The elaboration of its own ‘organic intellectuals’, therefore, becomes a key task for the working class in its struggle for hegemony, or cultural and political domination, over all other classes. The process whereby such intellectuals are created was not marginal to the achievement of that domination but constituted the very movement of that process. As the working class ‘distinguishes’ (1971, p.334) itself through the production of such intellectuals, it raises its general level of consciousness and culture and is able to produce more, and more accomplished, intellectuals, which will enable it to challenge its competitors across the whole field of culture and society. With the widening and deepening of this process, the working class is able to generate and develop a culture of its own sufficient to the tasks of the revolutionary transformation of society, rather than having to rely upon intellectuals from ‘outside’ to perform those tasks for it.

Such a conception as Gramsci’s would seem to place the intellectual at the very heart of the political and cultural practice of the Left, opening up the possibilities of participation in intellectual action to many members of the working class itself. However, the party was still a centralised and hierarchical structure. Gramsci still had to try and balance the often conflicting demands of party organisation and discipline with the centrifugal forces of popular participation and autonomy. Gramsci borrowed the idea of the Centaur from Machiavelli, which brought together the two sides of ‘force and consent…the individual moment and the universal moment’ (1971, p.170), party and mass. It was his conception that the ‘organic intellectual’ would articulate these two sides, as an intermediate stratum which would ensure the unification of the spontaneous consciousness of the working class, rooted in its experience of oppression and exploitation, and the revolutionary-theoretical consciousness of its ‘leaders’ in the party. However, Gramsci was to die after his long imprisonment and in the end his project to re-energise the revolutionary party from below was defeated by the bureaucratism of Stalinism, which became more entrenched with the movement towards World War in the 1930s. For Gramsci, the intellectual was not only a valid category but a crucial agent in the victory of socialism over capitalism, although one which still was to be seen within the context of the party.

The last of the incarnations of the intellectual of the Left I am going to discuss is one which arose within the context of the post-war period and the rise of what came to be known as the ‘New Left’. With the coming of the Cold War and the increasing disillusionment with the Soviet Union of many of those on the Left in the West, many of the latter began to look around for alternatives to the ‘statist’ politics of the Communist Party. This process was hastened by events in Hungary in 1956, where the Soviet Union crushed a rebellion against its client regime, which saw a mass-scale withdrawal by intellectuals and others from the Communist Parties of the West. During this period, immediately after the Second World War, many intellectuals – or those in what might be called the ‘intellectual professions’ – became deeply suspicious of state-level political organisations and sought to found a New Left which connected with the everyday lives and experiences and struggles of ordinary people on the ground.

One may say that this effort had much in common with what Gramsci hoped to do, as discussed above. However, the intellectual of the New Left was concerned with re-founding politics on the basis of ethical commitment rather than with achieving state power through the elaboration and strengthening of the party as an organisation. One figure who was influential both as a model and as an advocate of this altered conception of the Left intellectual was the British historian E.P. Thompson. Thompson argued for an emphasis upon moral responsibility and ethical commitment in the practice of politics. He was less concerned with seizing state power than enabling ordinary people to resist its worst effects.

It is possible here only to touch upon the ideas Thompson developed with regard to the intellectual and his or her commitment to a more ethical politics in the post-war world. Thompson had been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain as well as being a tutor in workers’ and adult education, and each of these experiences could be said to have shaped his particular thinking about the necessary responsibilities of the intellectual. As a former Communist Party member, he believed that such events as those in Hungary demonstrated the bankruptcy of its politics and the failure of the party to connect itself to the wider working class. However, as a tutor Thompson saw education (especially that extramural education that took place outside of the formal context of schools and academies) as a key alternative context to that of the party in which the intellectual could play a vital role in politicising and connecting with ordinary members of the working class. Indeed, when Thompson joined Leeds University as an adult education tutor in 1948, he declared his aim to be ‘to create revolutionaries’ (Searsby et al, 1993, p.3). At the same time, Thompson saw his involvement in adult and workers’ education as a two-way process, insofar as it enabled him to tap into a longstanding tradition within that sphere of independent thought and participation from below.

At this time, then, Thompson was committed both to the party and to workers’ education. However, this dual commitment eventually became impossible. In the wake of the 1956 events a journal he had co-founded, The Reasoner, was suppressed by the Communist Party which Thompson then left. From then on he was fully committed to ‘socialist humanism’ (see 1957), and with the struggle ‘between competing moralities within the working class’ (Thompson, 1959, p.52). A key site for that struggle was education, where the intellectual of the Left could foster the humanist values necessary to enable his or her students to defend themselves against the corruption of state ideologies and politics, and the intellectual him- or herself could learn from the lived experience of the working class.

Thompson became one of the most influential figures of the British New Left, and wrote one of the most influential texts of social history ‘from below’ in 1963, The Making of the English Working Class, as well as becoming a key figure in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. For Thompson, as for other New Left figures such as C. Wright Mills, the radical American sociologist, the Leftist intellectual had the most validity and social significance outside of the party and when relating to the struggles of people at the level of their everyday lives. What mattered for them was not ideology and dogma but moral values and experience.

2078 words

Bibliography

BAUMAN, Z. (1987) Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals. Cambridge: Polity Press.

FOUCAULT, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge. GORDON, C. (ed.). Brighton: Harvester Press.

GRAMSCI, A. (1971) Selections from Prison Notebooks. HOARE, Q. and NOWELL-SMITH, G. (ed. and trans.). London: Lawrence and Wishart.

LENIN, V. I. (1988) What is to be Done? Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

MARX, K. AND ENGELS, F. (1974) The German Ideology: Students Edition. ARTHUR, C.J. (ed.). London: Lawrence and Wishart.

SEARSBY, P., RULE, J. MALCOLMSON, R. (1993) Edward Thompson as a Teacher: Yorkshire and Warwick. In RULE, J. and MALCOLMSON, R. (eds.) Protest and Survival: Essays for E.P. Thompson. London: The Merlin Press.

THOMPSON, E.P. (1957) “Socialist Humanism”: An Epistle to the Philistines. The New Reasoner 1, pp.105-43.

THOMPSON, E.P. (1959) Commitment in Politics. Universities and Left Review 6, pp.50-55.

TROTSKY, L. (1974) Writings of Leon Trotsky 1938/9. New York: Pathfinder Press.

This work was produced by one of our professional writers as a learning aid to help you with your studies

Introduction

Democracy usually refers to a political system that advocates the kratos (meaning the rule) or the demos (meaning, the collectivity) of ‘the people’ in Greek (Castoriadis 2007, p.122). The demos, that also stands for the political body of the active ‘people’ who mutually contract with each other, is bound to the decisions of the majority (Hobbes 1994, p.119; 1998, p.94 & p.117; 2006, p.103). However, democracy has seen a variety of different definitions and interpretations. For the ancients, democracy was almost synonymous with direct participation in the decision making, rejecting tout court any form of expertism and delegation of powers to third parties (Castoriadis 1997). Modern democracies, however, function based on the principle of representation in parliaments and councils, whose operation abide to legislations of national Constitutions (Zakaria 1997, p.41; Leach & Coxall 2011, p.4) and jurisdictions that allow a body politic to exercise active surveillance over its representatives, discarding them if they betray their trust, or revoking the powers which they might have abused (Constant 1998, p.326). This essay aims to explore these two diametrically opposite definitions, in order to provide a clear understanding regarding democracy and democratic politics. In addition, by examining up to what extent a state like the United Kingdom may be classified as democratic (taking into account the two different interpretations of democracy), it will expose the theoretical deficiencies of the modern conception. It will finally stress that democracy should be better understood as a system of open public consultation and participation (according to the ancient model), acknowledging the modern Swiss paradigm of direct democracy through referendums and public initiatives as a vital alternative.

The democracy of the ancients compared to that of the moderns

Benjamin Constant in his speech at the Athenee Royal addresses two types of liberty, one in the Greek and Roman antiquity and the other after the consolidation of the French Revolution. In this speech Constant (1998) champions modern democracy as a system that respects individual rights and personal freedoms, which, in his view, appear absent from both the ancient Athenian and the Roman model. Respect to individual rights is a fundamental principle of a modern democratic state. But at the same time, such a state bases its institutioning upon a complex of liberal-republican values that were born during the French Revolution, such as the state of justice, the rule of law, the right of the masses to elect freely their own leaders and representatives, freedom of speech, free trade and private property; ideals considered among the highest, able to ensure social peace, stability and prosperity for every human society, ideals that “have remained with us ever since” (Graeber 2012).

Another important feature of modern democracies, however, is the principle of (majoritarian) consent, exercised through the process of electing a government. According to the modern democratic theory, “elections give sovereignty or ultimate power to the citizens. It is through elections that the citizen participates in the political process and ultimately determines the personnel and policies of governments. Only a government which is elected by the people is a legitimate government” (Denver & Carman 2012, p.5). The elected governors and statesmen are also accountable to ‘the people’, and their power is limited to their demands according to John Locke (Laslett 2008, p.109). In case this public consent is neglected, the government should be immediately dissolved. Thus, “it is for the people only to decide whether or when their government trustees have acted contrary to their trust, or their legislative has been changed, and for the people as a whole to act as umpire in any dispute between the governors and a part of their body” (Laslett 2008, p.109). Democracy, therefore, is to protect people from arbitrary powers, since as Locke (2008, p.281) stated, “force without Right, upon Man’s Person, makes a State of War”.

Individual rights, consent and protection from arbitrary powers in modern democracies are safeguarded by national constitutions, which are “designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done “not by simply writing up a list of rights, but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights” (Zakaria 1997, p.41). In other words, “the people who in order to enjoy the liberty which suits them resort to the representative system, must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives, the right to discard them if they betray their trust, and to revoke the powers which they might have abused” (Constant 1998, p.326). Constitutionalism also “seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source – state, church or society” (Zakaria 1997, p.25-26).

The concept of democracy, however, according to the standards of the pre-modern, or even the ancient, world, differs significantly in many aspects. In ancient Greece where one initially identifies the first emergence of democracy according to Castoriadis (1997, p.87) the idea of representation was unknown, and the idea of elections was considered an aristocratic principle, whereas among the moderns it is at the basis of their political systems (Castoriadis 1997, p.89-90). As Rousseau (2014, p.114) stressed, “the idea of representatives is modern: it comes to us from feudal Government that iniquitous and absurd Government in which the human species is degraded, and the name of man dishonored”. Further, for the ancients, politics was synonymous with the public sphere, characterized by openness and voluntary participation in the common world of public life, in the making of decisions that determine the function and course of a community (Arendt 1961, p.149). According to the Athenian experience “freedom itself needed a place where people could come together – the agora, the market-place, or the polis, the political space proper” (Arendt 1990, p.31). The polis, for both Castoriadis and Arendt was also the self-governed body of active citizens who through open discussions could take upon themselves the creation of institutions “that regulate their own active participation in the running of society” (Straume 2012, p.3).

Summarizing: there is, on one hand, the modern approach on democracy that is based on the principle of consent and representation (id est the acting and deciding on behalf of the demos), focusing at the same time on the institutions that regulate governments from abuse of office, protecting minorities and civil freedoms. On the other, the definition provided by Castoriadis and Arendt who have thoroughly elucidated on the Greek and Roman antiquity, focuses on direct participation (rather than elections), on common appearance and, above all, on the ability of questioning laws, norms and institutions (Castoriadis 1997, p.87). Which among the two definitions, however, could be considered as more accurate, is about to be discussed in the next section, which also aims to examine whether a modern state, such as the United Kingdom, can be classified as democratic. This process will reveal major deficiencies in the modern understanding of democracy.

Which democracy? The UK as a case study

“Britain, along with most states in the modern world, and many others elsewhere, claims to be a democracy” (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.4). At prima facie one could argue that this statement is valid up to an extent. In fact, a brief study on the political institutions of modern Britain shows that all the perquisites that must be met in order for a state to be classified as democratic are perfectly followed by the British political establishment. There is equality before the law, respect for individual rights and restrictions of the powers of the royal families, free elections and freedom of speech, which are also guaranteed by British legal documents, court judgments, treaties and constitutional conventions (Kavanagh 2000; Norton 2013; Wright 2013). However, “do elected politicians make the real decisions that affect the British people?” ask Leach and Coxall (2011, p.5-6). In other words, does the majoritarian consent and the voice of the demos predominate or is it exercised only formally?

“More real power and influence may be exercised by individuals who are not part of the formal political process at all” say Leach and Coxall (2011, p.5-6). Such individuals are “businessmen aˆ¦ bankers, or owners of newspapers, television companies and other media, some of whom may not even be British” (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.5-6). As also Roy Greenslade (2011) has argued, newspapers, despite their steady decline during the past few years, still have the capacity to influence the political process. Thus, on one hand the mass media (owned by powerful entrepreneurs) obstruct independent public commentary by shaping certain opinions (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.5) while on the other “the civil service, the City of London, or multi-national corporations exercise far more effective power and influence in the British political process than any single personality” claim Leach and Coxall (2011, p.6).

At this point it would be important to acknowledge the following well known quote by Rousseau: “the English people think it is free; it is greatly mistaken, it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing” (Rousseau2014, p.114). This quote comes from his book The Social Contract (1762) where he exposes the impossibility of the representative system, claiming that only through an ancient model of democracy, popular sovereignty and, therefore, freedom could be achieved. Hence, since the English representative system cannot safeguard popular sovereignty it cannot also sustain freedom, except from the day of the elections, where the public can exercise its vote. After the end of this process the English citizen becomes again a subject to the decisions taken by their representatives. Further, since public consciousness in Britain is shaped by powerful media (whose role, as stated above, is contradictory), and most of the decisions of elected politicians is not as influential as those coming from non-accountable institutions according to Leach and Coxall (2015), then it could arguably be said that the British people are not free even during parliamentary elections, since legislations and laws are influenced by non-political individuals.

Consequently, only formally Britain might be considered as a democratic state. It would be more accurate to classify it as a liberal constitutional regime, since freedom of speech and respect for individual rights alone do not entail democracy. But Britain is not an isolated example of a representative democracy that appears to be insufficient in implementing the will of the people and safeguarding the consent of the majority. Castoriadis who has thoroughly observed the modern occidental world, came to the following conclusion: no western society, including Britain, should be called democratic. Instead they are liberal oligarchies (Castoriadis 2007, p.122). In his words, modern western societies are “oligarchies since they are dominated by a specific stratum of people [and] liberal because that stratum consents a number of negative or defensive liberties to citizens” (Castoriadis 2007, p.126).

Since, however, direct democracy, as Castoriadis and Arendt visualized it (according to the ancient model) could not be easily implemented under the current circumstances, a study on the Swiss paradigm would inspire alternative ideas. The political system of Switzerland allows its citizens to broadly participate in the decision making (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008; Huber 1968). This is happening through referendums and open assemblies in many cantons (creating, thus, a public sphere). More precisely, over 30 referendums held every year by popular initiative, thus limiting the power of the parliament whilst parties and governments have often been forced to abandon their policies under the pressure of the popular vote (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008, p.34; Huber 1968, p.24-25). Through such procedures power partly remains in the hands of the citizens (as it is seen in the ancient types of democratic participation), and this power cannot be bypassed by representatives or by non-political institutions which may hijack the role of the elected representatives. The Swiss paradigm, therefore, being closer to the ancient model of democracy seems preferable in order to safeguard the majoritarian consent. It appears closer to the initial definition of democracy that is “the power of the people”.

Conclusion

This essay has highlighted the significant differences between the modern and ancient definitions of democracy. By examining the United Kingdom and the way political representation becomes easily taken over by strong powerful centers that invade the domain of politics, influencing important decisions and legislations, one understands the fragility of the modern model. Nonetheless, it could not be argued that Britain is an isolated case. In other words, the UK should not be understood as a unique example of ineffective representation. Although individual rights, freedom of speech and protection from abuse of power are important perquisites for a democratic state, the same state, in order to be classified as truly democratic has to fulfill also an area of other demands, such as effective participation and public consent, which appears marginalized not only in the UK but almost everywhere in the occidental world, with Switzerland being a notable example. The theoretical observations conducted above, relying both the work of Castoriadis as well as on the Swiss paradigm, not only confirm this reasoning, but at the same time provide vital alternatives of how open participation (close to the ancient model) can safeguard the majoritarian consent, preventing officials and political personnel to bypass the will of the citizens.

Bibliography

Arendt, H., 1961. Between past and future: six exercises in political thought. London: Faber and Faber.

Arendt, H., 1990. On Revolution. 6Th ed. London: Penguin Books.

Castoriadis, C., & Curtis, D. A. 1997. World in fragments: Writings on politics, society, psychoanalysis, and the imagination. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Castoriadis, C., 2007. Figures of the Thinkable. Stranford: Stranford University Press.

Constant, B., 1988. Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Denver, D., & Carman, C., 2012. Elections and Voters in Britain. 3Rd Ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Garnett, M., & Lynch, P., 2014. Exploring British Politics. London: Routledge.

Graeber, D., 2012. The movement as an end-in-itself? Platipus in New York, [online] 31st of January 2012, Available at: http://platypus1917.org/2012/01/31/interview-with-david-graeber/ [Accessed 17 September 2015].

Greenslade, R., 2011. How newspapers, despite decline, still influence the political process. The Guardian, [online] 21st of June 2011, Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2011/jun/21/national-newspapers-newspapers [Accessed 18 September 2015].

Hobbes, T., & Gaskin, J., C., A., 1994. The elements of law, natural and politic: Part I, Human nature, part II, De corpore politico; with Three lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hobbes, T., Tuck, R., & Silverthorne, M. 1998. On the citizen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobbes, Th., 2006. Leviathan. New York: Dover Philosophical Classics.

Huber, H., 1968. How Switzerland is Governed. Switzerland: Schweizer Spiegel Vergal.

Kavanagh, D., 2000. British Politics: Continuities and Change. 4Th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kriesi, H., & Trechsel, I‘., 2008. The Politics of Switzerland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leach, R., Coxall, B., & Robins, L., 2011. British Politics. 2Nd ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Locke, J., and Laslett, P., 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Student ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norton, P., 2013. Parliament in British Politics. 2Nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rousseau, J., J., & Gourevitch, V., 2014. Rousseau: The Social Contract and other later Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Straume, S. I., 2012. A common world? Arendt, Castoriadis and political creation. [e-journal] 16(2). Available through: European Journal of Social Theory – Sage Articles http://est.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/03/26/1368431012440870 [Accessed 17 September 2015].

Wright, T., 2013. British Politics: a very short Introduction. 2Nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zakaria, F., 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. US: Foreign Affairs.