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Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that liberal democracy is a system with a representative and limited government that operates within an accepted framework for political competition between different political parties. Regular elections are based on universal suffrage and are free and fair where individual rights are respected (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Based on this definition, this essay will argue that Russia has the potential to become a true democracy, but in recent years it has become an illiberal democracy or a competitive authoritarian regime. Levitsky and Way (2010) suggest competitive authoritarian regimes, or illiberal democracies, were competitive in the sense that they use competitive institutions to gain power. However, they use electoral manipulation and abuse state resources in favour of the incumbent regime (Levitsky and Way, 2010). This essay will explore how Russia has reached this stage from the formation of the 1993 constitution under Boris Yeltsin’s rule and how Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into an illiberal democracy.

Under Yeltsin’s rule (1991-99), Russia adopted a new constitution following a referendum in 1993 (Darlington, 1995). This is the constitution that Russia still uses to this day, though it has been amended since. Under this constitution, Russia has a bicameral legislature with a Federal Assembly, a Constitutional Court and a Duma, the latter being the lower chamber of their legislature (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The president is subject to impeachment to a great degree under the Russian constitution, as the president needs a two-thirds majority in both parliamentary chambers plus confirmation by the courts, to ensure laws are passed (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Donaldson (2004) suggests that this was a time when Russia was strengthening its parliamentary and legal system. This constitution ensures that laws take precedence over presidential decrees, and the Duma played a significant part during the 1990s of resisting Yeltsin’s reforms (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Hague and Harrop (2013) praise Yeltsin’s rule as a time when Russia achieved substantial decentralisation of power. Hague and Harrop (2013) suggest that even under the changes to the Russian constitution Putin has brought in since the end of Yeltsin’s rule, Russia still has a more effective system of rule of law when compared to authoritarian China. Smith (2010) praises the 1993 constitution for ensuring that substantial legal reforms and new laws were passed to improve the legal system in Russia. The 1990s seemed like a decade where Russia could achieve true democracy because they established a constitution that allows the government to operate within a framework of limited government like in a liberal democracy.

Following the election of Putin in 2000 to the present day, the situation in Russia has changed dramatically. Firstly, Putin successfully centralised power by acquiring the appointments of regional governments throughout Russia and he created, in 2000, seven extra-constitutional federal okrugs (districts) to oversee lower level units (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Though the 1993 Russian constitution has received praise for moving Russia towards a parliamentary and legal system, the constitution has an inherent flaw of allowing the president too much power as a guarantor of the constitution (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This flaw allows the president to be able to override legislation through decrees and dismiss ministers (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The purpose behind this centralisation was to ensure that these branches of the federal government remain loyal to Moscow and allowed the state to reduce dissent (Hague and Harrop, 2013). It seemed like Russia was now losing its potential to become a true democracy as Putin was beginning the process of strengthening the president’s power over Russia. This has led to Russia becoming a competitive authoritarian regime. This was only the beginning of things to come. Ross’ (2010) suggestion that Russia is a ‘unitary state masquerading as a federation’ (p.170) seems a more accurate way to describe Russia under Putin.

Despite the work that Yeltsin made in the 1990s to ensure that the Russian constitution remained decentralised, Sharlet (2005) argues that there is now a gap between individual rights on paper and their realisation in practice since Putin came to power. Respect for individual rights are fundamental for a true democracy to exist, and this lack of respect for individual rights shows how much further away from a true democracy Russia has become under Putin to become a competitive authoritarian state. Throughout Putin’s time, the public have increasingly lost faith in the legal system and legal adjustments against the state have become increasingly difficult to enforce, particularly in the case of Russia’s richest oil oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Sharlet, 2005). Khodorkovsky was arrested in 2003 for fraud, and again in 2010 for money laundering (Donaldosn, 2015). His trials received international condemnation for being politically motivated and for its lack of due process (Donaldson, 2015).

Yet another distinguishing factor that contributes towards the growth of a competitive authoritarian regime in Russia under Putin is the lack of separation between the public and private sphere. Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that it is quite common in Russia for gangsters to participate in ‘free-for-all deals with the state’ and that ‘individual financiers pull the strings to fill their own pockets’ (p. 167). Putin even stated himself that he wants to decrease the degree of pluralism in Russia and how he wants ‘civil society to be adjunct to a strong state’ (Evans, 2005: p.112). For this reason, few promotional groups in Russia possess a mass membership (Evans, 2005). Despite this, Russia still has the potential to become a true democracy in allowing the promotion of business interests to the state and increase the amount of pluralism in Russia. As Peregudov (2011) argues, a network of business organisations has been established, and it is up and running. Yet, as Peregudov (2011) also highlights, the problem with this system is that it has received very little interest from Putin. It is little wonder that promotional groups in Russia do not possess a mass membership as they feel they have little influence under Putin, which demonstrates a further lack of true democracy in Russia.

It is not just business interests that are penalised under Putin’s Russia. It is also opposition parties that receive barely any attention from the media and are put at a disadvantage by the state. As Hague and Harrop (2013) suggest, in a liberal democracy, there has to be a framework for competition between different political parties. Yet in recent years, this has not happened under Putin, which shows that true democracy is not prevailing. As McFaul (2005) argues, in Russia there is an absence of independence within the media as oligarchic ranks and regional elites reduced the freedom of manoeuvre for opposition parties and political candidates. A 2004 survey showed that eighty-two per cent of Russians watched television and twenty-two per cent read newspapers, which demonstrates the scope to which Putin can reach out to people (Oates, 2005). The significant problem with Russia’s media is that there are one-hundred laws governing media conduct and many journalists fear that whatever they publish, will ultimately lead to their deaths (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This proved to be the case when journalist Anna Piltkovskaya was murdered under suspicious circumstances in 2006 (Donaldson, 2015). The 2012 presidential elections, where Putin was re-elected, despite already serving two terms, demonstrated the fundamental weaknesses behind the Russian constitution (Donaldson, 2015). Putin received considerable protest after the count was manipulated to ensure Putin was re-elected (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This is what Levitsky and Way (2010) describe as ‘electoral manipulation in a competitive authoritarian regime’ (p. 3). This move has brought Russia closer to becoming a competitive authoritarian regime. Putin reacted to the growth in protest to his rule in 2012 from feminist punk band, the Pussy Riot, by imprisoning them and he restricted the amount of protests people are allowed to hold in Russia (Hague and Harrop, 2013).

It is little wonder that people have little faith in political parties in Russia. As Huggins (2002) argues, crucial to a true democracy is that there is no limit to political participation. Russia has the worst levels of political participation amongst European nations with only one per cent of people in Russia members of political parties (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The 2011 parliamentary elections and 2012 presidential elections saw higher numbers of young people voting than in previous elections (Hague and Harrop, 2013). As White (2007) suggests, political parties seem to ‘come and go’ in Russia and this creates ‘a lack of party identification’ when compared to most parliamentary democracies (p. 27). The United Russia Party, founded by Putin in 2001, has dominated the Duma and the Federation Council since and won forty-nine per cent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections (Donaldson, 2015). Levitsky and Way (2010) suggest that in competitive authoritarian regimes, the state abuses its power. The Kremlin used threats and bribes to ensure that this party was supported by Russia’s most powerful companies and regional governors (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This incident demonstrated that Russia possesses the characteristic features of a competitive authoritarian regime.

In 2008, Putin stood down as president so that Dimitry Medvedev could take over as president (Donaldson, 2015). In a cynical move, the constitution was extended so that the president could serve for six years and decided to become president again in March 2012 (Donaldson, 2015). Vladimir Rhyzkov, a Kremlin opponent and former Duma deputy who lost his seat in 2007, said of the extension terms of 2008: ‘This is very negative. Today, the president controls parliament, senate, the regions, and the bureaucracy’ (Donaldson, 2015). Hague and Harrop (2013) argue that Russia cannot achieve what is close to a liberal democracy because real change cannot occur until Putin resigns. As Donaldson (2015) argues, Russia has become ‘influenced by the power and personality of one man; Putin.’ As Levitsky and Way (2010) argue, rulers tend to make the results in a competitive authoritarian regime. Twigg (2005) praises the improvements in policy-making made by Putin in 2005 that replaced the era of Soviet privileges (free or subsidised housing, transportation, medicine for students and patients) with cash payments. Despite this, policy-making in post-communist Russia remains subject to the requirements of the political elite and industrialists who pose a threat to the president find regulations invoked against them (Hague and Harrop, 2013). For example, in 2006, Putin provided his allies from state-owned oil companies with a greater share of the Sakhalin-2 oil field by rewriting the contract with Royal Dutch Shell (Hague and Harrop, 2013: p. 359). Therefore, true democracy does not exist in Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, summed up his views of the current situation in Russia in 2011: ‘We have everything- a president, a prime minister, courts and a parliament- but it’s more of an imitation’ (Donaldson, 2015). The culmination of these events has inevitably led Putin to distract attention from home by trying to restore ‘prestige and glory’ to the Russian nation through occupying Ukraine and the Baltic states to expand Russia’s territory (Donaldson, 2015).

Therefore, true democracy will not exist under Russia whilst Putin is still in charge. Russia has moved towards a competitive authoritarian regime instead. The potential for Russia to become a true democracy certainly existed under Yeltsin with the construction of the 1993 constitution which laid out the powers of the Duma, the Constitutional Court, the Federal Council and the president. The Duma played a leading part in blocking many of Yeltsin’s reforms and Russia moved towards establishing an effective parliamentary and legal system at this time. However, since the arrival of Putin, the state has centralised power to a large extent. The problem with the 1993 constitution was that it allowed the president too much power as both head of state and guarantor of the constitution. Putin has abused this clause by acquiring appointments for regional governments. Putin has ensured that the media plays a significant part in guaranteeing his re-election through electoral manipulation and giving less air time to his opponents. It may not be until 2024 that the potential for true democracy to exist in Russia re-emerges.

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“No commentator has seriously doubted the central importance of the theory of class for [Marx’s] work…it is as essential for his theory of history as it is for his analysis of the dynamics of capitalist society.” (Dahrendorf, 1959, 8) This essay examines this assertion and looks at where and how class operates within Marx’s comprehensive socio-economic theory. It analyses class as both a description and concept, and as a motor of social change – as both a structural, static element and as a dynamic, transformational one.

“The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles” are the opening words of The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels, 1967, 79). The entire first section of the tract is devoted to a description of classes throughout the history of humankind and how, in his own age, the emergence of two dominant classes – bourgeoisie and proletariat – was simplifying the social structure and making it ripe for revolutionary, emancipatory social change. Although Marx’s motivation for his wish to see social transformation was morally driven in the first instance, all his works eschew arguments based upon morality (Wheen, 1999). Instead, the emphasis is upon political imperatives and economic determinism, attempting to make his arguments and theories scientific and rational rather than appealing to a more intangible sense of justice and fairness.

For Marx, historical progress itself was the driver of social change, while social classes were the agents of transformation. Class definition is determined not by income or status, but by property relations which, in turn, are the result of the production process structure (Parkin, 1979). By presenting his social theories and his view of history in terms of class, such an epistemological and methodological model supported not only his analysis of society, but also his assertion that the proletariat would be the ultimate agent of human liberation ushering in a better world. Friedrich Engels claimed that Marx’s exposition of Scientific Socialism or Historic Materialism revealed immutable laws similar to the contemporaneous theories of Charles Darwin in the field of evolutionary biology (Bullock & Stalybrass, 1983). However, in claiming to discern scientific laws governing the workings and development of human society, Marx’s analysis ran the risk of becoming a predeterminist philosophy, or a form of historicism (Honderich, 1995).

Engels argued that in order “to make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” (Engels, 1970, 43) The “realness” or authenticity elaborated by Marx and Engel placed the concept of class at the heart of subsequent Marxist philosophy. This centrality emerged from a conflict within the political left in the mid-19th century. Marx embarked upon a sustained campaign of argument and vilification against those he labelled “utopian socialists”, notably Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre Proudhon, Francois Fourier, Eugen Duhring and Robert Owen. Although he conceded that these individuals were well-meaning, genuine believers in the principles of socialism, and successful in demonstrating through their works the ethical essence of socialism, nonetheless their paternalistic ideas were insufficient to produce comprehensive human emancipation (Wheen, 1999). They gave too little heed to the importance of class antagonism as the fundamental driver of the struggle for liberation.

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx argued that the utopian socialists committed their mistakes because the urban working class had not yet developed sufficiently for the significance of class conflict to be recognised (1848). However, this mild rebuke was followed by much more acerbic criticism. He asserted that setting up idealistic experimental communities aimed at showing there was an alternative to the exploitative nature of the capitalist mode of production removed the participants from the wider society and made them irrelevant. Furthermore, the utopians’ writings, theories and actions demonstrated not just an ignorance of, but also a denial of, the central importance of class struggle. Consequently, in seeking reconciliation between bourgeoisie and worker, such collusion made them class traitors (Marx & Engels, 1967). By adopting such an uncompromising position, Marx had committed himself to an analysis that relied upon class and class conflict to explain the past and predict the future. Other social divisions, such as race, gender, ethnicity and religion were thereafter relegated to being largely the products of economic relations – part of the superstructure of society rather than the more powerful base comprising productive forces and the relations of production (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

Marx argued that throughout history successive waves of dominant classes, such as patricians, feudal lords and aristocrats, had merely replaced each other as exploiters of similarly successive underclasses, such as slaves, plebeians and serfs. The bourgeoisie were just the latest in a line of oppressors, but Marx asserted that they were both the apogee and the last of the exploiters (Muravchik, 2002). The emergence of the bourgeoisie superseding the aristocracy as the ruling elite was the result of the replacement of feudalism by capitalism and was characterised by industrialisation. Industrialisation was founded on the factory system which produced a new class – the proletariat. When this increasingly impoverished hired-hand sector with no part in the ownership of the means of production finally rose up in revolt against their masters, their subsequent rule would not, indeed could not, be oppressive because, consisting of almost everyone, they would have no one to exploit (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

While the proletariat would eventually usher in socialism and eventually communism, this would not happen until they were organised. Furthermore, such organisation could not occur before the working class became aware of the nature of their oppression – namely that it was one class dividing and exploiting another rather than the moral failures of powerful individuals. This would be difficult because, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” (Marx, 2014, 11-12) If their consciousness was rooted in their class position, how could this chicken-and-egg scenario be resolved?

This was where the concept of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat became such a useful tool for later actual parties of government which claimed to be Marxist, in particular the regime of Stalin. Asserting that the Bolshevik/Communist Party was the vanguard of the proletariat and imbued with a consciousness somehow not beholden to their social existence, this served the purposes of allowing an elite to claim to be part of the emancipationist class, provided a useful scapegoating catch-all category of “bourgeois” for condemning and liquidating opposition, and created a reservoir of willing, obedient lower-level-leadership acolytes from the actual working class who were dependent upon accepting the ideology and direction of that elite for their accession to, and continued holding of, their privileged positions (Daniels, 2007).

However, in Marxist theory this was not how it was supposed to develop. Class consciousness, or the self-awareness of a shared, unified and unifying experience, was to be the mechanism by which revolutionary consciousness developed as workers became properly aware of the locus of their grievances rather than merely experiencing untargeted, unfocused discontent. It was the very struggle against exploitation which would produce the conditions where workers were forced to organise collectively and behave as a class, a process which would create the awareness of class and distinct class interests (Callinicos, 2010). Marx argued that keeping workers separate from each other, part of a wider phenomenon of alienation experienced by wage labourers, was an essential component of the capitalist/bourgeois system of control (Hampsher-Monk, 1992). However, just as factory-based capitalism produced the industrial proletariat, so too did it produce shared ideas which inclined the working class towards socialist solutions to their unjust existence. “What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” (Marx & Engels, 1967, 94)

Marxism sees the bourgeoisie as naturally taking measures to defend their class interests as well as their individual interests. Their most potent weapon is the state, Marx claiming that “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” (Marx & Engels, 1967, 82) Marx viewed the state negatively and did not see it as a forum through which human emancipation and social justice could be achieved. The state was neither natural, neutral nor eternal, but simply a product of the era in which capitalism held sway. It was part of society’s superstructure, a view reinforced and elaborated upon by Lenin in 1917 in The State and Revolution: “The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable”. (Lenin, 1917, 9)

Analysis of the state as the servant of capitalist vested interests demonstrates further the central and fundamental role class plays in Marxist theory. It effectively argues that there is a cohesive ruling class running capitalist societies. Despite frequent conflicts of interest among themselves, its constituent parts are ultimately united in defence of an economic and social system which works to their benefit. This dominant class, in contemporary Marxist theory, comprises not just the owners of capital, property and land, but includes senior management in large corporations, the top layers of the civil service, the judiciary, the diplomatic corps, military leaders and most of the leading figures in right-wing political parties, particularly conservative ones, although increasingly also figuring within “centrist” parties which have accepted the current neoliberal orthodoxy. While the owners of the means of production rarely hold any of the reins of political power, they are part of the same elite which provides the political leadership. The state is almost permanently under the control of the ruling class of the age, while parliamentary politics and democratic elections are in large measure facades concealing the self-interest and ultimate control of this powerful class-based elite (Coxall & Roberts, 1990).

Among more recent strains of Marxian theory, Structuralist Marxists have contributed most substance to modern class analysis. Among their most salient arguments is the assertion that contemporary liberal-democratic states steer popular perceptions of political struggle away from class-conflict interpretations and towards discourses framed in terms of rights and justice. Although the state colludes in upholding and promoting a social and economic hierarchical class system, it successfully blinds the exploited to their exploitation (Resch, 1992). Furthermore, the contemporary ruling class prefers a state which does not overtly promote their material interests, but quietly upholds their political interests. Among other activities, it does this in democratic states by redefining workers, who are in reality a class of people, as political subjects and autonomous citizens, thus isolating them from each other under the guise of upholding the rights of the individual. The aim is to hide the fact of class relationships between and among classes, and to persuade people into accepting that their interests are part of a fictional “national interest” and that the state is the surest and most legitimate defender of their freedoms and material interests (Poulantzas, 1973).

This study agrees with the opening quotation’s assertion about the centrality of class to Marxist thought, and would add that it was also critical for the (overly) optimistic predictions of imminent proletarian revolution in The Communist Manifesto. The decision to use class as the epistemological prism through which to analyse socio-economic dynamics was essential for a theory which sought to explain almost all of human history’s trajectory towards the contemporary situation of the mid 19th century – then project it forward as a teleological theory with an endpoint in the fairly near future. Class was the unifier of the theory, the motor of change and the provider of agency. Originally embarked upon to explain how the European transition from feudalism to capitalism occurred, it gradually transmuted into a metahistory of humankind (Hampsher-Monk, 1992). However, Marx’s knowledge of history was selective and sketchy, and the further back in time that he went, the more speculative it became (Hobsbawm, 2011). Critically too, his analysis was Eurocentric, dismissed religion too easily, omitted gender relations, and was surprisingly dismissive of the power of ideas vis-a-vis economic developments (Hughes-Warrington, 2000).

As an explanatory tool, as a justification for revolution, as a motivator, and as a call to action – “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it”, (Marx, 1994, 98) – the concept of class has proved a vital, useful and enduring tool. Although global socio-economic structures have moved on immeasurably since Marx was writing a century-and-a-half ago, not only the concept of class, but also the very terminologies used by him (proletariat, bourgeoisie, relations of production) are still the coinage of discourse in much Marxist writing. Depending upon one one’s point of view, this is either an attestation of the enduring truths contained within his perceptive writings, or else a dogmatic adherence to semi-sacred texts akin to biblical fundamentalists refusing to accept that the Old Testament is anything other than literal truth.

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The phenomenon of globalisation has sparked debate in recent years that a ‘new world order’ is upon us; that the world – its nation-states, citizens, economies, cultures, and political systems, among many others – are under pressure to ‘evolve’ or perish (Evans and Mooney, 2007; Keohane, 2002; Waters, 2001). Some fears are likely justified; others are perhaps exaggerated. Further, the character, qualities, and elements of ‘globalisation’ itself continue to be highly contested among scholars from a wide variety of disciplines (Munck, 2006; Prakash and Hart, 1999; Drezner, 2008; Held, 2004; Martens, Gaston and Dreher, 2008).

Some of those observing the rapid and often dramatic changes in social, economic, and political arenas have concluded that “…both the world arena and the study of world politics have been transformed.” (Little and Smith, 2005:135). If true, the transformative processes we have been witnessing in recent years may suggest that our methods and abilities for observing and characterizing world politics are no longer useful as tools to make sense of this ‘new world order'(Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, 2003). Such concerns give rise to a question that is fundamental to the study of world politics in the future: “Has globalisation changed the basic character of world politics?”

While limitations of time and space here preclude us from considering a comprehensive definition of ‘globalisation’ or from discussing all the elements contributing to its existence and multivariate effects, this paper more modestly seeks to respond to the above question. By concentrating on the transforming challenges to nation-states, economic trade and interdependence, and the environment, the paper expects to conclude that while the basic character of world politics may not have yet been changed by globalisation in the present, the increasing effects of globalisation certainly do pose challenges for this and other disciplines in the near future.

Nation-States:

Nation-states, understood as the fundamental units of analysis in world politics for many years, have more recently been challenged by assertions that they ought not to be conceptualized as discrete ‘players’ in world affairs, but rather more porous and dependant entities which no longer act autonomously. Increasingly, arguments are forwarded that a focus on the nation-state itself is no longer useful or informative as a way of understanding politics on a global scale (Held, 2004; Brennan, T 2002; Patomaki, 2001; Crawford, 2002). Much recent literature has focused on what is perceived to be a decline in sovereignty of nation-states; owing to a significant increase in international interdependence, multinational governing bodies, and human and environmental migrations which, combined with a multitude of other factors, reduce nation-states’ autonomy in domestic affairs. (Lemert and Elliot, 2005; Hoffmann and Ba, 2005; Najam et al., 2007).

The sovereignty (i.e. the ability of individual nation-states to act autonomously in domestic affairs and assert themselves unilaterally in international affairs) of nation-states is eroded by globalisation, it is argued, due to the increasing interdependence between state actors on a global scale. The argument continues that this interdependence weakens the sovereignty of nation-states since international and particularly domestic policy decisions, can no longer be made without the consent and cooperation of other state or supra-state actors (Muppidi, 2004; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang, 2007). The necessity to consider other states, international agreements, and the influence of multinational institutions can often limit the domestic policy options of national and sub-national governments; thereby reducing the sovereignty policy- makers once more fully enjoyed.

Some of those critical to the continued focus on ‘the state’ as an independent, autonomous actor whose actions and interplay with other states shape and define world politics have suggested students of global politics consider the increasing relevance of multinational organizations as the key ‘players’ in the world today (Hoffmann and Ba, 2005; Laidi, 1998; Crawford, 2002). Some of these institutions and organizations would include the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, the International Court of Justice, and the various and sundry economic programmes and agreements that are administered internationally (Muppidi, 2004; Nye, 2004; Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler, 1999). All of these institutions and organizations, among many more, have the ability to influence the actions and policies of individual states and, in some cases, prevent certain public policies from being enacted or administered.

As the numbers of new trade agreements, treaties, and multinational conferences rise, so too does speculation that the individual nation-state has lost much of its power to singularly influence world politics or act autonomously and rather, is subject to the necessity of acting in compliance to and conformance with international partnerships (Keohane, 2002; Lentner, 2004; Held, 2004). Such arguments increase support for the notion that the nation-state is being supplanted by multi-level governance and international institutions. These views lead some to conclude that the nation-state will eventually become extinct; supplanted by multinational or even global governance (Keohane, 2002; Held, 2004).

However, others are less convinced that the nation-state is becoming unimportant or even obsolete. They remind us that it is still nation-states that forge alliances and agreements and that such relations are rarely, if ever, imposed from above by some international institution or organization (Rupert, 2000; Holden, 1999; Little and Smith, 2005). Nation-states, they argue, are still relatively sovereign in their ability to create and implement domestic policies while advancing their influence internationally through various exchanges and alliances. Moreover, they argue, the international agreements to which states become signatories are ones that they have carefully negotiated and view as net benefits for themselves. Similarly, the international organizations to which states belong have been voluntarily joined and in which they can assert influence in international affairs are generally viewed as beneficial to the states’ interests.

On the whole, it appears that individual nation-states are still useful entities of focus for students of world politics. They continue to be dominant actors on the global stage while maintaining relative sovereignty within their political borders. Never the less, those who study and observe world politics into the twenty-first century would be well-advised to note the increasing interdependence of nations-states to one another and to global institutions.

Economic Trade and Interdependence:

A related but further ‘threat’ to understanding world politics in terms of sovereign nation-states acting relatively autonomously is the rapidly increasing phenomenon of economic trade and interdependence between countries globally. Within the past two decades, a plethora of new trade agreements and various economic associations have been formed internationally between a large number of nation-states (Cameron and Zinn, 2006; Mittelman, 2000; Lachapelle and Paquin, 2005). These new economic relationships have often been experienced both as new ways of increasing economic prosperity and decreasing economic flexibility at home. As states agree to join these new economic associations, they increase their potential to ‘tap into new markets’ and increase trade; but they can also find that they are bound by certain restrictions within these agreements. GATT, NAFTA, European Union Monetary Policy, and even the most recent agreement, the PTT, to name but a few, all advance in various ways the amount and types of trade between nation-states and simultaneously restrict or eliminate such things as tariffs and domestic environmental policies (Brysk, 2002; Reitan, 2006; Kahler and Walter 2006).

State and business leaders commonly refer to the ‘pressure’ or ‘need’ to join ever-expanding and deepening international trade agreements in order to ‘remain competitive’ in global markets (Acocella, 2005). However, new trade and economic agreements can often cost jobs, economic security, and environmental degradation within the signatory countries (Labonte, et al, 2005; Brennan, 2002). For some, the inability of state leaders to protect domestic social, economic, and environmental concerns after entering international economic agreements is an indication that such arrangements erode sovereignty and threaten individuals and groups within the nation-state (Weiss, 2003). Conversely, those who are ‘pro-trade’ and value such agreements and treaties counter that domestic markets and economies tend to prosper from trade deals with other states through increased demand for products and services.

The Environment:

While globalisation is often understood to refer to the increased interconnectedness of nation-states and regions globally, and to the expansion of trade and markets throughout the world, a broader definition might also consider the existence and impact of environmental effects due – directly or indirectly – to the growth of neo-liberal economic activities in the world (Najam et al, 2007). Environmental scientists and activist groups have been warning global populations for a generation of the effects of large-scale, industrial operations and trade (Brennan, 2002; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang, 2007; Lemert and Elliot, 2005; Reitan, 2006). The consequences of such environmentally detrimental activities, they argue, may even threaten the continued existence of human and other life on the planet in the decades and centuries to come (Labonte, 2003; Mazlish, 2006).

Perhaps most alarming of all is the growing volume of evidence that environmental destruction and pollution is not limited to areas of heavy industrialization or large-scale commercial operations alone. Increasingly, scientists and others are observing how deforestation, toxic waste, air and water pollution, as well as human and animal transmitted diseases are impervious to the political boundaries of nation-states (Martens, Gaston, and Dreher, 2008; Munck, 2006; Rosenau, 2005). How does a consideration of the environmental impacts of globalised activities bear upon the question of whether or not globalisation has changed the basic character of world politics? Perhaps it is simply this: The future (and perhaps present) study of world politics will need to consider a more complex and elusive set of variables and elements than previously. The changing environment and its consequences for the health of the planet are highly likely to also impact not only how world politics is practiced in the future, but how it must be studied and understood (Meckling, 2001). Given the potentially catastrophic impacts of global warming, habitat destruction, environmental degradation, and loss of species, a wide variety of hazardous variables could foreseeably alter politics throughout the world in the near future. Taking account of these variables may be essential to understanding how nation-states manage (or not) the new challenges posed by environmental changes.

Conclusions:

By most accounts, it seems clear that globalisation – understood here as a sharp upshift in a wide variety of global interactions between nation-states, various institutions and organizations – is having an impact upon both how world politics will need to be studied and understood as well as how its primary unit, the nation-state, may be forced to ‘evolve’ or perish due to the transforming pressures of globalisation itself (Whitman, 2005). In brief, the answer to the question of whether globalisation will change the basic character of world politics, is a tentative “No” – for now. However, there appears to be little question that world politics will be severely challenged in the years ahead. It will be confronted by the need to observe and explain the complexities of globalisation and their impact on the nation-state itself as well as a need, perhaps, to reconsider this fundamental unit of analysis in light of an increasing propensity towards ‘global governance’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Held, 2004).

The modern nation-state has served the purpose of representing and asserting the interests of national groups for centuries. In this capacity, nation-states have created international and even global institutions and organizations in order, in part, to develop avenues of trade, mutual cooperation, and even international laws. In the twentieth century, the League of Nations and the United Nations were formed as vehicles for international negotiation and cooperative efforts towards security and economic trade (Cameron et al, 2006; Drezner, 2008). More recently, some observers have viewed such institutions as the genesis of a new global governance system which may make nation-states unnecessary or even obsolete. If these prediction are realized, world politics will require a reassessment of its methods and focus in order to more fully comprehend the new multivariate global realities.

While, at present, it seems unlikely that globalisation has changed the basic character of world politics, those critical of a state-centered approach to understanding politics on a global scale are making strong arguments in support of taking a much broader approach to the subject. It seems clear that a variety of factors present in the contemporary political world are now at play, and challenge students of world politics to consider their effects. As globalisation continues to develop and evolve, so too must world political studies. We ignore these challenges at our peril.

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Why has the concept of Sovereignty proved such a powerful political concept?
Introduction

That the concept of sovereignty still is a powerful concept can be seen with regard to European integration. The gradual transfer of core powers from EU member states to supranational institutions is a case in point, which consistently reveals the crucial importance of the concept of sovereignty: In the 2009 German Constitutional Court ruling on the Lisbon treaty, the court held that German state sovereignty cannot be transferred to a supranational level as it is ‘simply another name for German democracy’ (Koskenniemi 2010, 241, cf. Grimm 2009). Hence, the question emerges as to why the concept of sovereignty has been able to exert this long-lasting impact. I will argue that this is enabled by its becoming inextricably linked to notions of self-determination and democratic accountability. I will look at this argument from different perspectives, carving out a view on sovereignty as a concept which is fundamentally political, and which is powerful because it provides space for interpretation. My argument will operate against the backdrop of sovereignty conceived of as ‘supreme authority within a territory’ (Philpott 2014, n.p.). Throughout modernity sovereignty has been associated with the state, namely as a conditio sine qua non of the latter. This prevalence of the state is undergoing profound transformations since the second half of the twentieth century. Based on this observation I will explore how linking sovereignty to self-determination and democratic accountability is more relevant for explaining its success than to examine its link with the state. The first part thus analyses the historicity of the concept within the paradigm of state sovereignty, the second looks at its contemporary applicability beyond the state.

I. Sovereignty and modernity

According to Robert Jackson (2007), since the emergence of modernity in the early sixteenth century the concept of sovereignty became tied up to the notion of the supreme and independent state, which marks its connotation as a fundamentally ‘politicallegal term’ (Jackson 2007, 20). Sovereignty became a constitutive part of the state, closely related to its authority. Moreover, this association of sovereignty with the modern state enabled a shift in the ‘locus of sovereignty’ in the course of the following centuries up to the present day, ‘from rulers and dynasties to parliaments and estates or social classes, and then to the nation or people as a whole’ (Jackson 2007, 22). Jackson’s historical account asserts that while the locus of sovereignty changes over time, the basic tenets of political life remained stable:

[T]he land surface of the planet is partitioned into a number of separate bordered territories, … a certain determinate authority is supreme over all other authorities in each territory, and … those supreme authorities are independent of all foreign authorities. (Jackson 2007, 22)

For the present argument, however, what is crucial is the locus of sovereignty: the trajectory from absolutist rulers enthroned by the will of all, as stipulated in Hobbes or Bodin (cf. Hobbes 2008; Bodin 1962), to the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ (cf. Jackson 2007, 78ff.), in which “the people” hold sovereignty. It is evident in the answer given to the question for who is entitled to sovereignty: in the notion of popular sovereignty, ‘the authority of the final word resides in the political will or consent of the people of an independent state’ (Jackson 2007, 78). This shift in the understanding of self-determination – from a theoretical self-determination as can be found in Hobbes, where people surrender their sovereignty to the Leviathan voluntarily in order to overcome the primordial state of nature and war of all against all, to the factual self-determination of a nation – is of prime importance for the lasting influence of the concept of sovereignty. But how can this change in conceiving the locus of sovereignty be conceptualised?

The shift sheds light on the ‘polemical’ dimension of sovereignty, which surfaces in its its deployment not as a ‘marker of an entity’s sociological thickness but of the needs of present politics’ (Koskenniemi 2010, 232). From this follows a concept of sovereignty operating on two different levels, namely as a term which ‘simultaneously invokes the registers of both description and prescription’ (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 8). It can be employed both in order to analyse a certain status quo and to express a normative dimension, a desire for a certain outcome. It thus points to the present and the past as well as to the future. Therefore, it is invested with a fundamentally political dimension, which makes it subject to interpretation. The space opened up by this contestability can be seen as a crucial factor for the longevity of the concept: appealing to sovereignty can serve both to repress and justify absolutist rule and to demand emancipation. It is crucially related to the idea of agency, to the question of who de facto holds and exerts sovereignty, and who is seen to be actually entitled to it.

In the course of the twentieth century, for instance, the appeal to self-determination served colonised peoples to demand an end to European imperialism (cf. Jackson 2007, 76). While ‘[i]n the mid-twentieth century the “self” in self-determination was juridical and territory-focused more often that [sic] it was sociological and people-focused’ (Jackson 2007, 106), the national liberation movements of the second half of the century were built on the right to assert a certain, i.e. national, self-determination. At this juncture, another crucial aspect of sovereignty surfaces, namely the issue of accountability. It manifests itself in the notion of consent expressed by the governed towards those governing. In a representative democracy, consent is volatile and can be both confirmed and withdrawn in the course of elections. This process is to guarantee that the government consistently takes into account the public will – a relation which in the parts of the world colonised by European states was obviously not given (cf. Jackson 2007, 76). Accordingly, the appeal both to self-determination and to the requirement of consent by the governed – democratic accountability – form part of the discourse on sovereignty. This discursive dynamic with which the concept of sovereignty is invested provides a clear view on why it has proved to be as long-lasting.

II. Sovereignty beyond the state

From those considerations one can deduct a notion of sovereignty as a discursive instrument serving different causes in the hands of different actors. The profoundly political character of appealing to sovereignty can be considered a strong explanation of the powerful role the concept of sovereignty still plays. This can be further explored with reference to the approach developed by Cynthia Weber in Simulating Sovereignty (1995). The work is conceived against the backdrop of the perceived ignorance on behalf of most of International Relations scholars as regards the concept’s historicity (cf. Weber 1995, 2) – a critique in which resonates Rousseau’s dictum that ‘the Sovereign, by the mere fact that it is, is always everything it ought to be’ (Rousseau 1997, 52). I would argue that the critique launched by Weber emerges precisely from the political dimension of sovereignty, a dimension she sees obscured in the mainstream discourse which begs the question as to how a community is constituted (cf. Weber 1995, 8). This again touches on the problematic regarding the notion of “the people”: how is this abstract entity, which by no means corresponds to the empirical population (cf. Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 11), to be conceived? For Weber, who crucially draws on the work of Baudrillard, especially his Symbolic Exchange and Death (1988), considering this question must take into account the profound change from a ‘logic of representation’ to a ‘logic of simulation’ (Weber 1995, 127), which occurs during the second half of the twentieth century.

While the first logic implies the production of an original truth which sovereignty can refer to and which enables political representation (cf. Weber 1995, 123f.), the second logic prevails once the credibility of traditional referents such as “god” or “the people” has vanished. Truth is not produced anymore, but ’seduced’ (Weber 1995, 125). Weber examines the logic of representation for the relation between sovereignty and several twentieth century military interventions, that is, actual violations of sovereignty. Through the very violation of sovereignty in a specific case, however, the concept itself is reproduced. The conceptual pair sovereignty/intervention creates a boundary which ‘produces, represents, or writes the state’ (Weber 1995, 125).

In a logic of simulation, in contrast, the sovereignty/intervention boundary collapses and is replaced by an interchangeability of both, giving way to the emergence of a new term Weber calls “sovereigntyintervention” (Weber 1995, 127). This shift creates the need for the ‘simulation’ of this boundary, in order to keep up the concept of the state and sovereignty itself. Weber illuminates this with regard to the US intervention in Panama, which essentially obliterated the difference between sovereignty and intervention. With Baudrillard, Weber argues that an ‘abili [sic, read: alibi] function’ is deployed, a function which is based on self-referentiality and the closed circulation of interchangeable signifiers (Weber 1995, 128). In a vain ‘to rescue the “reality principle”’ (Weber 1995, 128, cf. Baudrillard 1988, 2), in this case, the reality of sovereignty, intervention is appealed to. Weber describes the resulting circular relation as follows:

For intervention to be meaningful, sovereignty must exist because intervention implies a violation of sovereignty. To speak of intervention, then, is to suggest that sovereignty does exist. In Baudrillard’s terms, intervention or transgression proves sovereignty or the law. (Weber 1995, 128f.)

From this Baudrillardian perspective the persistence of the concept of sovereignty can be explained as an attempt to perpetuate first referents in a time in which those referents have lost their foundation. Against the backdrop of the non-existence of “the people”, the appeal to sovereignty can only remain credible if it occurs within a network of other concepts. However, each of those other concepts in itself depends on being embedded in a network of signifiers, thus creating the above mentioned self-referentiality: there is nothing beyond the sign, it is pure simulation: a network of simulacra. From this Weber concludes that ‘[i]nvestigating state sovereignty … requires investigating how states are simulated’ (Weber 1995, 129).

Those displacements of the discursive use of the concept of sovereignty reflect its prolonged attraction. In other words, returning to the above mentioned ambiguity as regards its use (it can be employed to describe as well as to prescribe), sovereignty’s very texture has been characterised as ‘sponge-concept’ (Bartelson 1995, 237), from which derives an ‘uncertainty about what sovereignty is’ (Walker 1995, 27). Therefore, Kalmo and Skinner hold that if sovereignty is conceived of ‘as an argument, as a claim to authority, than there is no sense at all in which it can be “reduced” (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 7).

This brings us back to my argument as to the importance of the factors of self-determination and democratic accountability. First, precisely because self-determination has no empirical referent, but depends on invoking an abstract “people”, this people’s sovereignty can never be achieved, and therefore has to be appealed to persistently. In the hands of different actors it takes different shapes and refers to different aims, but it always has a prescriptive dimension. The same holds, second, for democratic accountability. Consent is never fixed, because “the people” who articulates this consent are not. Accordingly, democratic accountability is instable, too, as the governing have to take into account the possibility of the popular consent being withdrawn. The appeal to sovereignty by the multitude, Hardt and Negri (2000), for instance, hold, is floating, and per definition as ‘inconclusive [a] constitutive relation’ as the multitude itself (Hardt and Negri 2000, 103). One answer to the question for the ongoing impact of the concept of sovereignty therefore is that it is an ‘argumentative resource’ (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 24), while the credibility of its functioning as an analytical tool erodes.

Conclusion

The Baudrillardian theoretical construct is geared to devaluate all “traditional” ways of conceptualising sovereignty, as here it is subsumed under a theoretical framework in which simulation has substituted all “reality”. Yet it provides an enriching perspective on the discursive character of the concept of sovereignty, and therefore helps understanding the persistence of its use. The very intangibility of the concepts sovereignty refers to, be it “the people” or “consent”, leaves open a gap which contestation can pierce into. My argument showed that those referents of sovereignty, however, are mediated through the factors self-determination and democratic accountability, which therefore provide the essential link through which the discourse on sovereignty proceeds. Accordingly, while the Baudrillardian perspective developed by Weber mainly looks at the appeals to sovereignty by states themselves, it can also serve emancipatory movements for articulating political demands. What can be said in conclusion, then, is that the very ambiguity of the concept of sovereignty as expressed in the demand for self-determination, for instance, is what made and makes it successful.

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This essay assesses both the legitimacy and usefulness of the British House of Lords within a modern democratic state. It first turns to some broad theoretical background which should alert the reader to the deep-seated ideological biases that pervade this question. Next, this essay presents the case for opposing the House of Lords and produces a number of convincing rejoinders. Lastly, it outlines the critical contribution that this institution yields to the modern democratic state of Britain, both in offering expert insight and opinion but also in highlighting the need for policy to be air-tight and to cater to niche groups among the populous.

This question and analysis are permeated by more deep-seated ideological notions than meet the eye. It is tempting to overlook the historicity of this question whilst consumed in current noise and scandals. However, the common reaction and bias that many modern democratic citizens harbour against the House of Lords goes much deeper. The assertion that it is not elected and therefore not properly scrutinised by society is one that holds sway because of the way modern liberal states emerged.

Originally, dating back to the Enlightenment and the French revolution, democracy and gains in liberal thought were seen to exist in a zero-sum game against the authoritarian states that had up to that point supressed systematically (McLean, 2009). The philosophical notions that were birthed restored the importance of the individual agent (aka citizen) at the heart of collective decision-making and therefore prioritised her over the arbitrary and tyrannical nature of an unelected state. An example of the previous line of thought is that of Immanuel Kant, whose ideas seeped into democratic discourse Mouffe, C. and Holdengraeber, 1989). Namely, it is almost impossible to imagine a democracy that does not take individual claims of citizens as being of utmost importance; an agent has to be empowered to dictate his own fate and government should be merely a facilitator. Symmetrically, Rousseau (1920), another thinker of the era, maintained that the state should function as a reflection of collective will and thus the locus of collective decision-making. Equally, bolstering this idea, John Locke (1773), with his epoch-defining work ‘The two treatises of the government’, put forward the idea that democracy implies that people are governed by their voluntary consent and vest this power to the state. According to him, the individual is naturally free and becomes a political subject out of his own volition, something that every government should honour and adhere to.

These three prior notions that bring the individual back at the heart of the democratic future seem to be at play here. That is why a common stance towards the House of Lords is that I departs from these widely accepted social contracts; it is an institution that robs the individual of the ability to check it and does not therefore allow him to merge his personal destiny with that of the political community.

Going further, the UK is renowned for being the pinnacle of parliamentary supremacy (McLean, 2009). As has been seen by a multitude of examples, the UK has championed the idea that parliament should be put before other institutions and forces. Note that as a country it was very slow to adopt a supreme court (in 2009) and its reluctance to cede power to the European Union is also a testimony to the defence of parliamentary supremacy.

Having established these patterns of thought, it becomes intuitive to understand why the institution has indeed come under fire. Being the second largest legislative assembly and housing approximately 830 Lords, the institution has been widely criticised (The Week, 2015). A grand total of 781 eligible life peers are appointed by the Queen following the advice of the Prime Minister, while 87 of them are hereditary peers and 256 are bishops. To make matters worse, 75 per cent of them are men (ibid.).

Taking each objection in turn, it can firstly be seen that the second largest legislative assembly does not get elected while it claims momentous resources by its unconsented constituents and also a widely acknowledged and disseminated platform of discussion. Secondly, it is ironic that 781 of eligible life peers are single-handedly decided on by the Queen, who represents the monarchy, i.e. another unelected institution. Thirdly, people take issue with the fact that 87 peers gain their lordship at birth. It is natural that UK citizens foster resentment as that is seen as a profoundly unfair system that perpetuates filial privilege at the expense of everyone else. 256 Lords are bishops, embodying the church, which exists in an uneasy relationship with modern democracy, not least because it fails to keep pace with liberal reform. Lastly, three out of four members are men, highlighting a potentially sexist system that favours one sex over the other, augmenting the merit of the argument that marries the House of Lords with a bygone past.

These reasons appear quite damning for the institution as a whole, as they seem to suggest that it exists in its own bubble, detached from the demands and beliefs of citizens and reliant upon outdated notions. The House of Lords seems to be at variance with the ideas of fairness and justice, which are absolutely emblematic of democratic values. Specifically, hereditary privilege, lack of electoral accountability, appointment by the Queen, representative of the church and men, by and large, are all features that build the same narrative that runs counter to a democratic conception of fairness and equality. Building on the notions of his progenitors outlined above, John Rawls (2009) put this case perhaps more succinctly than anyone else. Before collective rules are set up, prospective citizens agree on them under the veil of ignorance. Blind to where they will end up in the society that they choose, citizens have an incentive, and one would argue a morally binding reason, to opt for a fair system, that allocates resources equitably and treats the most vulnerable with compassion. This thought experiment is relevant, as it means that modern citizens of Britain would a priori rule out the House of Lords, as it arbitrarily and haphazardly appoints and empowers individuals on grounds of factors that they had no control over (e.g. birth, sex, ties with the church, family). Therefore, it transpires that the House of Lords fails to meet these basic demands of fairness and renders itself the proper subject of censure.

What compounds these inherently anti-democratic practices is the House’s failure to represent the nation in all its diversity. That is to say, its constitutional make-up generates further socio-economic unfairness. This is because the House of Lords has approximately five times more members from the capital city compared to the North West of England, despite both regions having similar population sizes (Oborne, 2014). It is clear, therefore, that the House of Lords does not represent large parts of the UK. This is particularly problematic, as it creates the impression of a fragmented democracy with pockets of power, that should be in fact distributed evenly across the country. It is also deeply condescending towards regions outside of London, as they feel that their political participation comes to naught. It finally, as a result, encourages apathy and disengagement among the different regions outside of the capital. This exacerbates other national phenomena and legacies, including the North-South divide which is very unhelpful, as it prevents national unity and shared cultural identity.

More recently, arguments in opposition to the existence of the House of Lords have been animated by a series of scandals, which call into question the legitimacy and suitability of the peers as gatekeepers of the second largest legislative assembly worldwide (Stacey, 2015). As they are unelected and thus unaccountable, citizens make higher moral demands on the peers of the House of Lords. In this sense, peers should be cognizant of the duty they have to be responsive to public demands and proper in their demeanour, in an attempt to prove that what was potentially awarded to them unfairly is discharged in the most effective and respectful manner. Yet lately, these standards have been flaunted. One such example that garnered huge negative publicity and brought the House of Lords under renewed scrutiny was that of Lord Sewell, the former Chairmen of Committees charges with the responsibility to oversee moral conduct in the House of Lords (The Economist, 2015). The nature of sensationalist media as well as the readiness and deep suspicion in the public to criticise the House of Lords served merely as vindication to the argument that it is out of touch with reality, let alone modern democracy.

However, discussion should tread gently and use facts and analysis to make judgment rather than the vague appeal of history and the demands for absolute fairness. Granted, the institution falls short of adequately representing segments and groups in the UK, and also it fails to consider that hereditary privilege is arbitrary and embarrassing (though such cases are sharply declining). However, these largely emotional objections do not hold water when its real purpose weighs in.

It is widely and mistakenly assumed that legitimacy is purely down to elections. It is seen as something, as discussed earlier, sacrosanct and anything against that is anti-democratic. However, this is not the case. To dispel this simplistic yet appealing line of thought, this essay will now turn to the unique contribution that the House of Lords makes to democratic dialogue and representation.

Its main function, namely, is to scrutinise government bills and to force the government to think again when leaps of judgment occur or legislation fails to meet high standards (McLean, 2009). As such, the House of Lord performs a critical function and informs both the public and government as to the soundness of policy and whether everything has been deliberated upon properly before laws come into effect. Note that the House of Lords does not have the power to initiate its own bills, as this right is exclusive to the House of Commons. Nor does it have the power to block legislation, but it can merely delay bills or offer amendments that are to be considered anew by the House of Commons. This particular function that the House of Lords performs, in fact, is very different in nature from the criticisms that suggest that the House of Lords usurps power from the people and the House of Commons (ibid.). In fact, not only does it not ‘steal’ power and authority, it complements it with much needed expert insight and dialogue to be fed back to the House of Commons.

A number of examples illustrate the effectiveness and worth of the House of Lords. In the legislative session of 2014-15, the peers spent 507 hours examining legislation and considered and offered over 3449 amendments to bills (The Economist, 2015). In 2007, the Lords shot down plans for regional supercasinos, while in 2010 they amended a bill to ensure that children with special educational needs have better access to academies. In 2014 the Lords amended the Children and Families bill so that smoking would be prohibited in cars when children are present (ibid.). This is significant, as it highlights that in fact the House of Lords fills a very glaring gap in the way legislative initiative works. The fact that they are not elected makes the Lords more grounded in expertise and less swayed by public opinion and populism, and in fact may even prod them to lobby for marginalised and vulnerable segments of society.

In conclusion, this essay has exposed the pervasive fallacies running across common objections to the House of Lords’s legitimacy and existence. It has been shown by way of historical reference and positive arguments, that this case is weak and driven by idealistic and pseudo-historical emotional reasoning rather than one based on the real contribution that the House of Lords makes but is routinely overlooked and lost in the noise of a few isolated scandals. These in turn encourage an unhelpful and sweeping kind of thinking that dismisses this institution out of hand and does not do justice to the concrete offerings that they have for a modern and forward looking democracy.

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Locke, J., 1773. An essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. London: Edes and Gill Publishers.

McLean, I., 2009. What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mouffe, C. and Holdengraeber, P., 1989. Radical democracy: modern or postmodern?. Social Text 21, 31-45.

Oborne, P., 2014. Ed Miliband’s plan for an elected House of Lord’s would mean an upper house dominated by Ukip. Telegprah. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/11205797/Ed-Milibands-plan-for-an-elected-House-of-Lords-would-mean-an-upper-house-dominated-by-Ukip.html (accessed 10/17/15).

Rawls, J., 2009. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press.

Rousseau, J.-J., 1920. The Social Contract: & Discourses. London: JM Dent & Sons, Limited.

Russell, M., Sciara, M., 2008. The policy impact of defeats in the House of Lords. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10, 571–589.

Stacey, K., 2015. Sex scandal peer steps down from House of Lords. Financial Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec26be34-344d-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html#axzz3oqjyP3rj (accessed 10/17/15).

The Economist, 2015. Lord Sewel, upholder of standards in public life. The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21659910-indignant-letters-disgraced-peer-lord-sewel-upholder-standards-public-life (access 10/17/15).

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In this essay, I assess whether Machiavelli reduces politics to force. To construct a response to this, it is necessary to explore what “force” means, since “force” is a philosophically weak concept. In order to understand “force” as a philosophical concept, we need to separate the concepts of authority and power. With a clear concept of what we mean by power and how it differs from authority, it becomes possible to discuss whether Machiavelli reduces politics to force. Once the concepts of power and authority are clearly differentiated, the question becomes does Machiavelli reduce politics to force, where force is equated to power, or does Machiavelli rest politics on authority.

In this essay, I argue that, despite Skinner’s attempts to re-habilitate Machiavelli and re-construct Machiavelli as a defender of liberty, Machiavelli does not rest power and politics on authority. Instead, Machiavelli argues that power should be utilised for the purpose of “the common good”. For Machiavelli, political necessity allows for incursions on liberty and the use of power, rather than authority. Femia is alive to the implications of “the dark, authoritarian and militaristic element in Machiavelli’s writings” (Femia, 2004, p.15); and, in this essay, I argue that this should not be overlooked.

Goodwin argues that attempting to distinguish rigorously between power and authority “is ultimately doomed to failure” (Goodwin, 1997, p.314). However, she argues that “the distinction between power and authority has exercised many philosophers, who feel there should be a sharp demarcation between the two” (Goodwin, 1997, p.306). Whilst a “sharp demarcation” may not be possible, Goodwin does separate the two. She argues that power “is the ability to cause someone to act in a way which she would not choose, [if] left to herself” (Goodwin, 1997, p. 307). This can, obviously, occur in a number of ways, including threats and violence, but also through persuasion, propaganda and advertising. However, authority Goodwin argues, has a basis in law; a government has authority if it has legal validity (Goodwin, 1997). A sharp distinction between power and authority may not be possible, and it may be made to see the concepts on sliding scale, with illegitimate power on oneside, and legitimate authority on the other side, with much in-between.

This separation between power and authority is fundamental to this essay, as it is important to understand whether Machiavelli argues that politics ought to rest on authority or whether it can be reduced to maintaining power. Therefore, in an attempt to summarise the “demarcation” between power and authority, I once more return to Goodwin, who says the individual “defers to authority… [but] yields to power” (Goodwin, 1997, p.313). If Machiavelli reduces politics to force/power, his concern is that people must yield to the government; whereas, if Machiavelli argues that politics ought to rest on authority, his concern would be that the people deferred to the government, and recognised its legal legitimacy.

Machiavelli’s political philosophy is more complex than the often one-dimensional interpretation of Machiavelli as a self-serving manipulator, promoter of immorality and defender of tyranny. In contrast to the one-dimensional view of Machiavelli which implies that he reduces politics to the maintenance of power and a justification of tyranny, Machiavelli is a defender of a certain kind of liberty. However, Machiavelli’s concept of liberty is about the liberty of the state or the Government. He argues that in order for the people to be free, they must live a free state – a state free from external servitude. Machiavelli’s concept of liberty prioritises the state in the relationship between the individual and the state: “it is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). For Machiavelli, it is not the individual that is important, but the community or the state. Therefore, the individual must yield to the will of the state for the liberty and well-being of the “common good”.

In his interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought, Skinner emphasises the importance of the free state; and crucially, he stresses the seriousness of the metaphor of the body politic to neo-roman thought, which meant that Machiavelli could not conceive of a free individual without a free state. This is only one of many interpretations of Machiavelli, and is not objective as it is underpins Skinner’s thesis that liberty was an important concept to Machiavelli. Machiavelli defines the free state as one that is “removed from any kind of external servitude” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 2). Skinner expands this by relating it to the concept of the body politic, where, “just as individual human bodies are free… only if they are able to act or forbear from acting at will, so the bodies of nations and states are likewise free… only if they are similarly unconstrained from using their powers according to their own wills” (Skinner, 1998, p.25). Skinner’s elaboration means that a state is only free, when it follows the collective will of the people, and thereby, liberty is equated to self-government, so a free state is defined as a community “independent of any authority save that of the community itself” (Skinner, 1981, p.52). Machiavelli stridently defends the free state, arguing that “history reveals the harm that servitude has done to people and cities… [as they] have never increased either in dominion or wealth, unless they have been independent” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). This underpins Machiavelli’s perennial fear that freedom is fragile and liberty could succumb to external conquest or internal tyranny.

Skinner pursues this notion, and argues that overt coercion is not necessary for a state to be in a condition of slavery: if the maintenance of civil liberty is dependent upon the good will of arbitrary power, then the individual is already living as a slave (Skinner, 1998). This is a rational consequence of Machiavelli’s bleak interpretation of human nature, where men do not promote the common good i.e. the preservation of the state’s liberty. Machiavelli argues that humans are: self motivated – “men never do good unless necessity drives them” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 3); bellicose – “security for man is impossible unless it be conjoined with power” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book I, Discourse 1); fickle and untrustworthy – they “will not keep their promises” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter XVIII); pusillanimous – “when the state needs its citizens, few are to be found” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter IX). These attributes are a hindrance to a state that is trying to preserve its ability to enact the collective will without constraint. Therefore, liberty requires overcoming men’s selfish inclination, so they can be fit to govern themselves, and this involves engaging in activities which are conducive to “human flourishing” (Skinner, 1990). Given that it is contrary to mens’ natural inclinations to pursue the “common good”, it seems that this involves yielding to the power of the state. Skinner’s eloquent term “human flourishing” describes the need to imbue each citizen with a sense of civic virtu, which is essentially, a public-spirited ethos, whereby the individual commits a great deal of time and energy to participating in the affairs of the state, and maintaining a vigilance to safeguard its freedom. Skinner admits that civic virtu requires placing “the good of the community above all private interests and ordinary considerations of morality” (Skinner, 1981, p.54).

Machiavelli’s political philosophy rests on valuing the public sphere, with a resulting dismissive attitude toward the private sphere. Thus, the citizens of the state are required to yield to the power of the state, and to relinquish their individual liberty, if it is perceived to be in the “common good”. Machiavelli praises Rome where those who worked through the public sphere were honoured, but those working through private means were condemned and prosecuted (Machiavelli, The Discourses). Machiavelli argues that a sense of duty to the community, which entails sacrificing the legitimacy of the private sphere, does not curtail liberty but preserve it, as civic virtu is essential to ensuring the state is not constrained from acting upon its own will. He quotes, (possibly apocryphally) from ancient history: “they rebelled because when peace means servitude it is more intolerable to free men than war” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book III, Discourse 44), which appeals to Machiavelli’s doctrine of public-spiritedness, and his promotion of the well-being of the community.

Machiavelli promotes the ideals of republicanism, and republican liberty, which entails a need to safeguard the state against internal tyranny, through citizens that are active, vigilant, and participate in the daily running of the community to ensure that the state is not subjected to the caprices of a minority; and that, instead, the community seeks the public interest. Machiavelli criticises the consequences of internal tyranny with empirical reference to the greatness attained by Athens, once “liberated from the tyranny of Pisistratus…. [and] the greatness which Rome attained after freeing itself from its Kings” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). Thus, Machiavelli can be read as a defender of liberty by citing his belief that the conflict between the nobles and plebs was the primary reason Rome maintained her freedom (Machiavelli, The Discourses), and his assertion that a Monarch’s interests are usually harmful to the city (Machiavelli, The Discourses). This interpretation of Machiavelli shows that he does not unambiguously reduce politics to the use of force and power. Instead, he argues that politics rests on the order of a well-structured government. However, for Machiavelli, a well-structured government and political authority are not necessarily synonymous, since he argues that political order may require the use of force and the wielding of power by a powerful leader.

Machiavelli’s writings are littered with references to his love for strong leadership e.g. “dictatorship was always useful” in Rome (Machiavelli, The Discourses), or his defence of a Prince’s cruelty to keep his subjects united and loyal, as men are wretched and will pursue their own interest, unless they fear punishment (Machiavelli, The Prince). There are clearly elements of Machiavelli’s writings that support the idea of the free state and a certain concept of liberty; for instance, he argues that “experience shows that cities have never increased in dominion or riches except while they have been at liberty” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). This allows Skinner to construct Machiavelli as a defender of liberty, by arguing that “what Machiavelli primarily has in mind in laying so much emphasis on liberty is that a city bent on greatness must remain free from all forms of political servitude” (Skinner, 1981, p.58). Skinner’s reading of Machiavelli suggests that Machiavelli did not reduce politics to force and power; and that, instead, Machiavelli rested politics on political authority. However, this re-habilitating of Machiavelli by Skinner overlooks a number of passages in Machiavelli’s writing that show he clearly was prepared to allow force and power to be used without linking it to authority.

Femia takes the view that Machiavelli was not a defender of liberty, and did not place authority at the heart of politics. Femia concludes that Machiavelli’s political thought can be characterised by the belief that “we cannot draw a sharp line between moral virtue and moral vice: the two things often change place. Fair is foul and foul is fair” (Femia, 2004, p.11). For Machiavelli, it is the state that is important, and the individual’s liberty can be subjected to power and force in order for the good of the city to prevail. Machiavelli eradicates the private sphere, which allows Femia to draw a parallel between Machiavelli’s concept of freedom and fascists who also argue that “freedom comes through participating in a great whole… [and] nothing to do with limiting the state’s autonomy” (Femia, 2004, p.8). Machiavelli primary concern is maintaining political order, and his advice in The Prince often seems to be more about maintaining power, than establishing authority. In places, Machiavelli’s advice is brutal, and seems unambiguously to promote the exercise of force for the purposes of maintaining power.

Machiavelli shows no regard for individual liberties, and allows The State to trample over its citizens when force and power are necessary, arguing that “it should be noted that one must either pamper or do away with men, because they will avenge themselves for minor offences while for more serious ones they cannot” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter III). This brutal, cynical observation is an instance of Machiavelli’s realism. Such cynical realistic observations do not, in themselves, prove that Machiavelli reduces politics to force and power. It is possible to argue that Machiavelli’s observation accurately observes politics, and he is simply drawing the reader to an important piece of wisdom about human nature. However, this does not seem to be Machiavelli’s motivation. He is not merely observing brutal realism, but appears to be advocating its application. He argues that those the ruler “hurts, being dispersed and poor, can never be a threat to him, and all others remain on the one hand unharmed… and on the other afraid of making a mistake, for fear that what happened to those who were dispossessed might happen to them” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter III). The important word here is “fear”. The people fear the ruler, and so obey. This does not imply that the ruler that governs by authority. Instead, the implication is that the ruler holds power through force.

Despite the ruthless, brutal and cynical methods that Machiavelli appears to advocate, it is important not to misread Machiavelli as someone who advocates force and violence merely for the sake of power. Machiavelli is concerned with “The Common Good”, and thus he argues that the exercise of force – raw power – is only justified if it is exercised in pursuit of “The Common Good”. Or, more simply, the “ends justify the means”. Machiavelli does not advocate raw power, per se; instead, he argues that if the ends are “good”, then the use of force is justified. This blurring of the common good and the use of power to promote it is evident when he argues that “a prince must not worry about the reproach of cruelty when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal; for with a very few examples of cruelty he will be more compassionate than those who, out of excessive mercy, permit disorders to continue… for these usually harm the community at large” (Machiavelli, The Prince: Chapter XVII). This, however, exposes the paradox in Machiavelli’s thought, where cruelty is justified by the ends. The problem is that Machiavelli’s initial concern is about holding power to prevent disobedience and disorder. It is possible that this exercising of power may shift, and become authority; but, in its first instance, politics is about maintaining power.

Machiavelli was a Renaissance writer; and, therefore, the differentiation between power and authority that Goodwin discussed had not become a part of political philosophy. Therefore, to argue that Machiavelli did not seek political authority, but power, would be a mis-representation, as these concepts were not available to him. However, for Machiavelli, political necessity dominates, and in a realist vein, he allows for incursions on liberty and the use of force and even cruelty to hold power. Ultimately, he seeks authority in the common good, and this justifies whatever methods are used to hold on to power.

Machiavelli doesn’t simply reduce politics to force, since force is used to pursue the common good. However, Machiavelli is not concerned with the individual citizen, since he does not differentiate between the public and private realms. Thus, Machiavelli is not concerned with individual liberty and individuals’ rights: when the “private person may be the loser… there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence” (Machiavelli, The Discourses: Book II, Discourse 2). Without a clear separation of public and private, and between legitimate authority and illegitimate power, the common good can become the arbitrary will of the ruler. The arbitrary will of a ruler – even one that is seeking to promote the common good – leaves politics very open to the use of force to maintain power, in the name of common good. This notion of the use of force to maintain power is quite different from the use of force by a Government that governs through authority, under the rule of law.

Bibliography

Femia, J (2004) “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism”, History of Political Thought, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp. 1-15

Goodwin, B (1997) Using Political Ideas (4th edition), John Wiley & Sons, Chichester

Machiavelli, N (1984) The Prince (Edited, Introduced and Translated by P Bondanella and M Musa) Oxford University Press, Oxford

Machiavelli, N (1998) The Discourses (Edited, Introduced, Revised and Translated by B Crick, L Walker and B Richardson) Penguin Classics, London

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Skinner, Q (1990) “The republican ideal of political liberty” in Bock, G & Skinner, Q & Viroli, M (editors) Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 293-310

Skinner, Q (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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Famously, in the last of his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx declared that ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (1974, p.123). This was intended as part of a contribution to a contemporary debate within German philosophy – in this case, over the exact character of existing materialism. However, Marx’s challenge could be said to encapsulate the key question at the heart of the discussion about the role of the ‘philosopher’, or intellectual – what impact do his or her ideas have in the wider world? More plainly, what is the relationship between thought and action? In terms of the communist or socialist left, with which, of course, Marx was most concerned, this question has worked itself out in a number of ways, but perhaps the main focus has been on the issue of the political or social commitment of the intellectual – especially, his or her commitment to a specific ideology and political formation such as the Party. At times in the history of the Leftist intellectual since the 19th century, this has led to a high degree of tension between those who see a specific ideological commitment as the sine qua non of an intellectual position, and those who argue for a more creative, if not more complex conception of the relationship between intellectuals and the practical political sphere.

Thus, for the Left the idea of the intellectual as a figure who stands in some way apart from and above the political fray and offers universally applicable insights into the state of things as they are is problematic. In his book on the intellectual, Legislators and Interpreters (1987), the social theorist Zygmunt Bauman identifies two general conceptions of the intellectual and of intellectual work – modern and postmodern. For the first of these, he writes, the ‘typically modern strategy of intellectual work is one best characterised by the metaphor of the “legislator” role’. This role ‘consists of making authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding’ (1987, p.4). In this conception, the intellectual has, through his or her ‘superior, objective knowledge’ (1987, p.5), access to an impartial, universal ‘Truth’ which enables him or her to make the right decisions on the part of society or humanity as a whole.

The modern intellectual of whom Bauman is writing has its origins largely in the rationalist philosophes of 18th century France, who sought to establish modern society on the basis of Reason and rationalist principles. Such a ‘legislative’ intellectual would seem to be anathema to those on the Left, especially the revolutionary Left, who required the intellectual to be aligned with and committed to their particular cause. However, for Bauman, and for other theorists such as Michel Foucault, whose conception of the ‘universal’ intellectual as ‘the master of truth and justice’ (1980, p.126) shares much in common with Bauman’s, the Leftist intellectual in fact operates in much the same way as the figure he describes. Thus, Lenin in What is to be Done? (1902) wrote of the revolutionary intellectual as one who brings theoretical-consciousness to the masses, or proletariat, from ‘outside’ (1988, pp.143-4). Lenin argued that the proletariat was incapable of developing such a consciousness spontaneously, on its own, and needed the vanguard intellectual, standing at the head of the class and organised within the tightly disciplined revolutionary party, to supply its shortfall. Although eventually he became persona non grata, as far as the Soviet state was concerned, and was assassinated by agents of that state, Trotsky also argued with Lenin for the supremacy of the party. In his speech given to mark the founding of the Fourth International in1938, he signalled the need for complete commitment on the part of revolutionary intellectuals to the party: ‘Our party demands each of us, totally and completely…For a revolutionary to give himself entirely to the party signifies finding himself’ (1974, p.86).

For Trotsky, the experience of persecution at the hands of Stalin did not lead to his disillusionment with the idea of the revolutionary party as the ‘lever of history’ (1974, p.86), the means by which intellectuals such as himself would raise the ‘revolutionary level’ of the masses (1974, p.86). It was in this context, and only in this context, that the intellectual of the Left (specifically, the revolutionary left) had validity, because he or she had political agency. However, for many on the Left the victory of Stalin and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union led them to re-think the relationship between the intellectual and the working class, seeking to address the problem of how to produce intellectuals from and develop revolutionary consciousness more widely and authentically in the working class itself. Perhaps the most convincingly elaborated effort to do so was that of Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci is best known for his development of the concept of the ‘organic intellectual’. Such an intellectual is distinct from the ‘traditional’ type by dint of the fact that it arises out of the ranks of the working class itself, instead of being of the bourgeoisie, or ruling class. The ‘traditional intellectuals’, although they thought of themselves as autonomous and ‘endowed with a character of their own’ (Gramsci, 1971, p.8), were rather a stratum which legitimised the rule of the bourgeoisie, which had arisen with that class and functioned to serve its ends in the spheres of culture and ethics. In fact, according to Gramsci, the ‘traditional intellectual’ had been itself the ‘organic intellectual’ of the now ruling class when it was expanding and elaborating its hegemony over all other classes.

The elaboration of its own ‘organic intellectuals’, therefore, becomes a key task for the working class in its struggle for hegemony, or cultural and political domination, over all other classes. The process whereby such intellectuals are created was not marginal to the achievement of that domination but constituted the very movement of that process. As the working class ‘distinguishes’ (1971, p.334) itself through the production of such intellectuals, it raises its general level of consciousness and culture and is able to produce more, and more accomplished, intellectuals, which will enable it to challenge its competitors across the whole field of culture and society. With the widening and deepening of this process, the working class is able to generate and develop a culture of its own sufficient to the tasks of the revolutionary transformation of society, rather than having to rely upon intellectuals from ‘outside’ to perform those tasks for it.

Such a conception as Gramsci’s would seem to place the intellectual at the very heart of the political and cultural practice of the Left, opening up the possibilities of participation in intellectual action to many members of the working class itself. However, the party was still a centralised and hierarchical structure. Gramsci still had to try and balance the often conflicting demands of party organisation and discipline with the centrifugal forces of popular participation and autonomy. Gramsci borrowed the idea of the Centaur from Machiavelli, which brought together the two sides of ‘force and consent…the individual moment and the universal moment’ (1971, p.170), party and mass. It was his conception that the ‘organic intellectual’ would articulate these two sides, as an intermediate stratum which would ensure the unification of the spontaneous consciousness of the working class, rooted in its experience of oppression and exploitation, and the revolutionary-theoretical consciousness of its ‘leaders’ in the party. However, Gramsci was to die after his long imprisonment and in the end his project to re-energise the revolutionary party from below was defeated by the bureaucratism of Stalinism, which became more entrenched with the movement towards World War in the 1930s. For Gramsci, the intellectual was not only a valid category but a crucial agent in the victory of socialism over capitalism, although one which still was to be seen within the context of the party.

The last of the incarnations of the intellectual of the Left I am going to discuss is one which arose within the context of the post-war period and the rise of what came to be known as the ‘New Left’. With the coming of the Cold War and the increasing disillusionment with the Soviet Union of many of those on the Left in the West, many of the latter began to look around for alternatives to the ‘statist’ politics of the Communist Party. This process was hastened by events in Hungary in 1956, where the Soviet Union crushed a rebellion against its client regime, which saw a mass-scale withdrawal by intellectuals and others from the Communist Parties of the West. During this period, immediately after the Second World War, many intellectuals – or those in what might be called the ‘intellectual professions’ – became deeply suspicious of state-level political organisations and sought to found a New Left which connected with the everyday lives and experiences and struggles of ordinary people on the ground.

One may say that this effort had much in common with what Gramsci hoped to do, as discussed above. However, the intellectual of the New Left was concerned with re-founding politics on the basis of ethical commitment rather than with achieving state power through the elaboration and strengthening of the party as an organisation. One figure who was influential both as a model and as an advocate of this altered conception of the Left intellectual was the British historian E.P. Thompson. Thompson argued for an emphasis upon moral responsibility and ethical commitment in the practice of politics. He was less concerned with seizing state power than enabling ordinary people to resist its worst effects.

It is possible here only to touch upon the ideas Thompson developed with regard to the intellectual and his or her commitment to a more ethical politics in the post-war world. Thompson had been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain as well as being a tutor in workers’ and adult education, and each of these experiences could be said to have shaped his particular thinking about the necessary responsibilities of the intellectual. As a former Communist Party member, he believed that such events as those in Hungary demonstrated the bankruptcy of its politics and the failure of the party to connect itself to the wider working class. However, as a tutor Thompson saw education (especially that extramural education that took place outside of the formal context of schools and academies) as a key alternative context to that of the party in which the intellectual could play a vital role in politicising and connecting with ordinary members of the working class. Indeed, when Thompson joined Leeds University as an adult education tutor in 1948, he declared his aim to be ‘to create revolutionaries’ (Searsby et al, 1993, p.3). At the same time, Thompson saw his involvement in adult and workers’ education as a two-way process, insofar as it enabled him to tap into a longstanding tradition within that sphere of independent thought and participation from below.

At this time, then, Thompson was committed both to the party and to workers’ education. However, this dual commitment eventually became impossible. In the wake of the 1956 events a journal he had co-founded, The Reasoner, was suppressed by the Communist Party which Thompson then left. From then on he was fully committed to ‘socialist humanism’ (see 1957), and with the struggle ‘between competing moralities within the working class’ (Thompson, 1959, p.52). A key site for that struggle was education, where the intellectual of the Left could foster the humanist values necessary to enable his or her students to defend themselves against the corruption of state ideologies and politics, and the intellectual him- or herself could learn from the lived experience of the working class.

Thompson became one of the most influential figures of the British New Left, and wrote one of the most influential texts of social history ‘from below’ in 1963, The Making of the English Working Class, as well as becoming a key figure in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. For Thompson, as for other New Left figures such as C. Wright Mills, the radical American sociologist, the Leftist intellectual had the most validity and social significance outside of the party and when relating to the struggles of people at the level of their everyday lives. What mattered for them was not ideology and dogma but moral values and experience.

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SEARSBY, P., RULE, J. MALCOLMSON, R. (1993) Edward Thompson as a Teacher: Yorkshire and Warwick. In RULE, J. and MALCOLMSON, R. (eds.) Protest and Survival: Essays for E.P. Thompson. London: The Merlin Press.

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TROTSKY, L. (1974) Writings of Leon Trotsky 1938/9. New York: Pathfinder Press.

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Introduction

Democracy usually refers to a political system that advocates the kratos (meaning the rule) or the demos (meaning, the collectivity) of ‘the people’ in Greek (Castoriadis 2007, p.122). The demos, that also stands for the political body of the active ‘people’ who mutually contract with each other, is bound to the decisions of the majority (Hobbes 1994, p.119; 1998, p.94 & p.117; 2006, p.103). However, democracy has seen a variety of different definitions and interpretations. For the ancients, democracy was almost synonymous with direct participation in the decision making, rejecting tout court any form of expertism and delegation of powers to third parties (Castoriadis 1997). Modern democracies, however, function based on the principle of representation in parliaments and councils, whose operation abide to legislations of national Constitutions (Zakaria 1997, p.41; Leach & Coxall 2011, p.4) and jurisdictions that allow a body politic to exercise active surveillance over its representatives, discarding them if they betray their trust, or revoking the powers which they might have abused (Constant 1998, p.326). This essay aims to explore these two diametrically opposite definitions, in order to provide a clear understanding regarding democracy and democratic politics. In addition, by examining up to what extent a state like the United Kingdom may be classified as democratic (taking into account the two different interpretations of democracy), it will expose the theoretical deficiencies of the modern conception. It will finally stress that democracy should be better understood as a system of open public consultation and participation (according to the ancient model), acknowledging the modern Swiss paradigm of direct democracy through referendums and public initiatives as a vital alternative.

The democracy of the ancients compared to that of the moderns

Benjamin Constant in his speech at the Athenee Royal addresses two types of liberty, one in the Greek and Roman antiquity and the other after the consolidation of the French Revolution. In this speech Constant (1998) champions modern democracy as a system that respects individual rights and personal freedoms, which, in his view, appear absent from both the ancient Athenian and the Roman model. Respect to individual rights is a fundamental principle of a modern democratic state. But at the same time, such a state bases its institutioning upon a complex of liberal-republican values that were born during the French Revolution, such as the state of justice, the rule of law, the right of the masses to elect freely their own leaders and representatives, freedom of speech, free trade and private property; ideals considered among the highest, able to ensure social peace, stability and prosperity for every human society, ideals that “have remained with us ever since” (Graeber 2012).

Another important feature of modern democracies, however, is the principle of (majoritarian) consent, exercised through the process of electing a government. According to the modern democratic theory, “elections give sovereignty or ultimate power to the citizens. It is through elections that the citizen participates in the political process and ultimately determines the personnel and policies of governments. Only a government which is elected by the people is a legitimate government” (Denver & Carman 2012, p.5). The elected governors and statesmen are also accountable to ‘the people’, and their power is limited to their demands according to John Locke (Laslett 2008, p.109). In case this public consent is neglected, the government should be immediately dissolved. Thus, “it is for the people only to decide whether or when their government trustees have acted contrary to their trust, or their legislative has been changed, and for the people as a whole to act as umpire in any dispute between the governors and a part of their body” (Laslett 2008, p.109). Democracy, therefore, is to protect people from arbitrary powers, since as Locke (2008, p.281) stated, “force without Right, upon Man’s Person, makes a State of War”.

Individual rights, consent and protection from arbitrary powers in modern democracies are safeguarded by national constitutions, which are “designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done “not by simply writing up a list of rights, but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights” (Zakaria 1997, p.41). In other words, “the people who in order to enjoy the liberty which suits them resort to the representative system, must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives, the right to discard them if they betray their trust, and to revoke the powers which they might have abused” (Constant 1998, p.326). Constitutionalism also “seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source – state, church or society” (Zakaria 1997, p.25-26).

The concept of democracy, however, according to the standards of the pre-modern, or even the ancient, world, differs significantly in many aspects. In ancient Greece where one initially identifies the first emergence of democracy according to Castoriadis (1997, p.87) the idea of representation was unknown, and the idea of elections was considered an aristocratic principle, whereas among the moderns it is at the basis of their political systems (Castoriadis 1997, p.89-90). As Rousseau (2014, p.114) stressed, “the idea of representatives is modern: it comes to us from feudal Government that iniquitous and absurd Government in which the human species is degraded, and the name of man dishonored”. Further, for the ancients, politics was synonymous with the public sphere, characterized by openness and voluntary participation in the common world of public life, in the making of decisions that determine the function and course of a community (Arendt 1961, p.149). According to the Athenian experience “freedom itself needed a place where people could come together – the agora, the market-place, or the polis, the political space proper” (Arendt 1990, p.31). The polis, for both Castoriadis and Arendt was also the self-governed body of active citizens who through open discussions could take upon themselves the creation of institutions “that regulate their own active participation in the running of society” (Straume 2012, p.3).

Summarizing: there is, on one hand, the modern approach on democracy that is based on the principle of consent and representation (id est the acting and deciding on behalf of the demos), focusing at the same time on the institutions that regulate governments from abuse of office, protecting minorities and civil freedoms. On the other, the definition provided by Castoriadis and Arendt who have thoroughly elucidated on the Greek and Roman antiquity, focuses on direct participation (rather than elections), on common appearance and, above all, on the ability of questioning laws, norms and institutions (Castoriadis 1997, p.87). Which among the two definitions, however, could be considered as more accurate, is about to be discussed in the next section, which also aims to examine whether a modern state, such as the United Kingdom, can be classified as democratic. This process will reveal major deficiencies in the modern understanding of democracy.

Which democracy? The UK as a case study

“Britain, along with most states in the modern world, and many others elsewhere, claims to be a democracy” (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.4). At prima facie one could argue that this statement is valid up to an extent. In fact, a brief study on the political institutions of modern Britain shows that all the perquisites that must be met in order for a state to be classified as democratic are perfectly followed by the British political establishment. There is equality before the law, respect for individual rights and restrictions of the powers of the royal families, free elections and freedom of speech, which are also guaranteed by British legal documents, court judgments, treaties and constitutional conventions (Kavanagh 2000; Norton 2013; Wright 2013). However, “do elected politicians make the real decisions that affect the British people?” ask Leach and Coxall (2011, p.5-6). In other words, does the majoritarian consent and the voice of the demos predominate or is it exercised only formally?

“More real power and influence may be exercised by individuals who are not part of the formal political process at all” say Leach and Coxall (2011, p.5-6). Such individuals are “businessmen aˆ¦ bankers, or owners of newspapers, television companies and other media, some of whom may not even be British” (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.5-6). As also Roy Greenslade (2011) has argued, newspapers, despite their steady decline during the past few years, still have the capacity to influence the political process. Thus, on one hand the mass media (owned by powerful entrepreneurs) obstruct independent public commentary by shaping certain opinions (Leach & Coxall 2011, p.5) while on the other “the civil service, the City of London, or multi-national corporations exercise far more effective power and influence in the British political process than any single personality” claim Leach and Coxall (2011, p.6).

At this point it would be important to acknowledge the following well known quote by Rousseau: “the English people think it is free; it is greatly mistaken, it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing” (Rousseau2014, p.114). This quote comes from his book The Social Contract (1762) where he exposes the impossibility of the representative system, claiming that only through an ancient model of democracy, popular sovereignty and, therefore, freedom could be achieved. Hence, since the English representative system cannot safeguard popular sovereignty it cannot also sustain freedom, except from the day of the elections, where the public can exercise its vote. After the end of this process the English citizen becomes again a subject to the decisions taken by their representatives. Further, since public consciousness in Britain is shaped by powerful media (whose role, as stated above, is contradictory), and most of the decisions of elected politicians is not as influential as those coming from non-accountable institutions according to Leach and Coxall (2015), then it could arguably be said that the British people are not free even during parliamentary elections, since legislations and laws are influenced by non-political individuals.

Consequently, only formally Britain might be considered as a democratic state. It would be more accurate to classify it as a liberal constitutional regime, since freedom of speech and respect for individual rights alone do not entail democracy. But Britain is not an isolated example of a representative democracy that appears to be insufficient in implementing the will of the people and safeguarding the consent of the majority. Castoriadis who has thoroughly observed the modern occidental world, came to the following conclusion: no western society, including Britain, should be called democratic. Instead they are liberal oligarchies (Castoriadis 2007, p.122). In his words, modern western societies are “oligarchies since they are dominated by a specific stratum of people [and] liberal because that stratum consents a number of negative or defensive liberties to citizens” (Castoriadis 2007, p.126).

Since, however, direct democracy, as Castoriadis and Arendt visualized it (according to the ancient model) could not be easily implemented under the current circumstances, a study on the Swiss paradigm would inspire alternative ideas. The political system of Switzerland allows its citizens to broadly participate in the decision making (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008; Huber 1968). This is happening through referendums and open assemblies in many cantons (creating, thus, a public sphere). More precisely, over 30 referendums held every year by popular initiative, thus limiting the power of the parliament whilst parties and governments have often been forced to abandon their policies under the pressure of the popular vote (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008, p.34; Huber 1968, p.24-25). Through such procedures power partly remains in the hands of the citizens (as it is seen in the ancient types of democratic participation), and this power cannot be bypassed by representatives or by non-political institutions which may hijack the role of the elected representatives. The Swiss paradigm, therefore, being closer to the ancient model of democracy seems preferable in order to safeguard the majoritarian consent. It appears closer to the initial definition of democracy that is “the power of the people”.

Conclusion

This essay has highlighted the significant differences between the modern and ancient definitions of democracy. By examining the United Kingdom and the way political representation becomes easily taken over by strong powerful centers that invade the domain of politics, influencing important decisions and legislations, one understands the fragility of the modern model. Nonetheless, it could not be argued that Britain is an isolated case. In other words, the UK should not be understood as a unique example of ineffective representation. Although individual rights, freedom of speech and protection from abuse of power are important perquisites for a democratic state, the same state, in order to be classified as truly democratic has to fulfill also an area of other demands, such as effective participation and public consent, which appears marginalized not only in the UK but almost everywhere in the occidental world, with Switzerland being a notable example. The theoretical observations conducted above, relying both the work of Castoriadis as well as on the Swiss paradigm, not only confirm this reasoning, but at the same time provide vital alternatives of how open participation (close to the ancient model) can safeguard the majoritarian consent, preventing officials and political personnel to bypass the will of the citizens.

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Discuss to what extent attack ads are effective within presidential election campaigns in the U.S, with a focus on the 2012 election

In the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election

Attack ads were a major part of the 2012 presidential election campaign in the U.S. In fact, the Washington Post reports that of the $404 million that was spent on TV ads in favour of Barack Obama, 85% ($343.4 million) was spent on negative ads, while of the $492 million spent on TV ads in favour of Mitt Romney, 91% ($447.72 million) was spent on negative ads (Andrews, Keating, & Yourish, 2012). The attack ad strategies of both candidates were very similar. In fact, the top ten U.S. states in which the candidates spent campaign funds on negative TV ads were exactly the same, with Florida, Virginia, and Ohio being the top three respectively (Andrews, Keating, & Yourish, 2012). Given that the vast majority of money spent on TV ads was spent on negative ads, it is reasonable to believe that there must be some efficacy to such ads. In this project, scholarly research on the effectiveness of attack ads in the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign is reviewed in order to answer the question when and in what circumstances were the attack ads effective during this election?

Interests Group Involvement and Attack Ads

Recent trends in media and campaign ad funding may contribute to the high number of attack ads in the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign, as well as the campaign’s high ratio of negative-to-positive ads. While the percentage of negative ads coming directly from the campaigns of the candidates increased significantly from 2008 to 2012, the majority of the increase in negative ads is attributable to the rise in campaign ads that were not funded by the candidates’ campaigns (Fowler, 2012). In fact, 60% of presidential campaign ads in 2012 were funded by groups other than presidential campaign groups (Fowler, 2012). This is a huge increase from 2008 in which 97% of ads were funded by presidential candidate campaigns (Fowler, 2012). The number of ads from interest groups increased by 1,100% from 2008 to 2012, while the number of TV ads from political parties increased from zero in 2008 to almost 10,000 in 2012 (Fowler, 2012).A Moreover, in 2008, ads from presidential candidates were only 9% negative, while those from interest groups were 25% negative (Fowler, 2012). These numbers quickly changed by 2012, in which 53% of ads from the presidential candidates themselves were negative and 86% from interest groups were negative (Fowler, 2012). The increase in the involvement of special interest groups in advertisement campaigns only partially explains the increase in attack ads in 2012. The change in media and the rise of social media may be able to explain partially both the increase in special interest group participation and the increase in attack ads.

Polarized Parties and Polarized Media

Several recent changes in news media may have affected not only the number of political attack ads, but also the efficacy of such ads. One major change in news media is that it now covers political ad campaigns much more than in the past. In fact, from 1960 to 2008, the percentage of political news articles and segments that covered political ads rose by over 500% (Geer, 2012). On one hand, the increased coverage of political ads may be because of the increase in attack ads. After all, attack ads tend to be more controversial and ‘news-worthy’ than positive ads. On the other hand, however, the increase in attack ads may be, in part, the result of an increase in media coverage of negative ads. Geer (2012) argues that “news media now cover negative ads so extensively that they have given candidates and their consultants extra incentive to produce and air them” (p. 423). There may or may not be a mutualistic relationship between attack ads and media coverage of political ads. Nevertheless, the clear increase in both may help to increase the efficacy of attack ads, given that such ads may receive more media coverage.

If it is the case that the media’s willingness to cover negative political ads more than positive ads does, in fact, encourage more attack ads, there is not a necessary increase in the efficacy of such ads. Geer (2012) holds that the increase in media coverage on attack ads does not mean that such coverage is in any way influential to voters; that is, it is not typically the goal of news organizations to influence voters. Thus, while an attack ad may receive more public attention because of the media, the increase in attention may not be necessarily favourable or unfavourable to any candidate.

Another recent change in news media is its partisanship. Now, many U.S. news outlets are partisan or are considered to be partisan by viewers. For example, just as Fox News is considered to be a conservative news organization that promotes Republican politicians over Democratic politicians, MSNBC is considered to be a liberal news organization (Jacobson, 2013). The polarization of the media may actually be the result of the polarization of the current two-party federal political system in the U.S. (Sides & Vavreck, 2014). In the last decade, the democratic and republican political parties in the U.S. have moved further away ideologically, resulting in substantial gridlock in Congress (Sides & Vavreck, 2014). Such disagreement and polarization may, on one hand, lead to an increase in attack ads. Attack ads may seem more effective when there is such a large ideological divide between the parties. On the other hand, such political polarization has likely contributed to the polarization of news outlets (Sides & Vavreck, 2014), which, in turn, further encourages attack ads. Even with the increase in polarized parties and media outlets, attack ads may not be an effective means to sway voters towards or away from particular candidates.

Attack Ad Rationale and Efficacy

A meta-analysis of research studies on the effects of political attack ads reveals that attack ads tends to be more memorable and stimulate more knowledge about political campaigns than positive campaign ads (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007). Despite these effects, campaign attack ads were not found to be effective at convincing individuals to either change their votes or to vote in an election (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007). Moreover, the results of the meta-analysis revealed that attack ads have significant negative effects on individual perceptions of the political system, trust in government, and public mood (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007).

A more recent meta-analysis conducted by Fridkin and Kenney (2011) found that in some cases campaign attack ads can be effective at lower voter evaluations of targeted candidates. However, Fridkin and Kenney (2011) also found that in certain circumstances, attack ads lower voter evaluations of the attacking candidates. For an attack ad to be effective, the researchers found that the attack ad must bring up a relevant issue that is reinforced with fact or must present the opposing candidate as being uncivil in some significant way. Otherwise, the attack ad may have no effect or even a negative effect on voters. Additionally, Fridkin and Kenney (2011) found that effects from attack ads on voter evaluations of candidates tend to be very small.

Social Media and Attack Ads

The rise of social media has dramatically changed the political advertising landscape. The 2012 presidential campaign features another strong social media showing by President Obama, who outspent every other candidate in social media advertising in his successful 2008 presidential run (West, 2013). Social media allowed Obama to reach key demographics much more effectively than general television commercials allowed (West, 2013). Social media allows candidates to contrast a higher number of messages and aim specific messages at target audiences effectively (West, 2013). This is extremely important during a time in which there are so many issues of disagreement between the two major U.S. political parties and in which transparency is highly valued (West, 2013). Social media outlets serve as a significant platform for all political ads and their content, altering the ways in which we tend to think about politics and the media.

Another important aspect of social media and attack ads is that social media acts as a platform for social discussions on attack ads. Just as the news media tends to cover attack ads more than positive political ads, members of social media sites tend to openly discuss attack ads more than positive political ads (Hong & Nadler, 2012). Thus, the rise of social media may have further encouraged the use of attack ads during the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Even so, as with news media, there is no significant evidence that the increase in news media coverage generated from attack ads alters voter behaviour or attitudes (Hong & Nadler, 2012). As a result, the effectiveness of attack ads cannot be confirmed.

A Deeper Look into the 2012 Election and its Attack Ads

The 2012 presidential election featured Mitt Romney, who spent significantly more on attack ads than Barack Obama (Andrews, Keating, & Yourish, 2012). Moreover, a greater ratio of Romney’s television ads were attack ads (Andrews, Keating, & Yourish, 2012). Nevertheless, Obama was the victor in the election, as well as the popular vote. The results of the 2012 presidential election, however, do not suggest that attack ads are ineffective. Incumbent candidates are more likely to win elections, including presidential elections, in the U.S. than non-incumbents (Sides & Vavreck, 2014). Thus, the efficacy of the attack ads used by either candidate cannot be determined based on the outcome of the election alone.

Of the six most memorable attack ads of the 2012 U.S. presidential election, West (2013) argues, five were attack ads. The first is an attack ad from Obama about Romney’s Swiss Bank account. This attack ad may have been effective with moderate voters because it singled Romney out as having a major interest in big business, as opposed to improving the middle-class (West, 2013). Additionally, the ad had high relevance to a real issue, which meets the Fridkin and Kenney (2011) criteria for an ad that may be effective at reducing favourability with a particular candidate. The second ad is from Romney and targeted Obama’s failure to bring unemployment levels to acceptable levels (West, 2013). This ad targeted a real issue, while providing a positive aspect, which is that Romney has the business experience to create jobs as President. The third attack ad is also from Romney and claimed that Obama’s recent tax plan would raise taxes on the middle class (2013). This can be viewed as a direct rebuttal to Obama’s attack ad and consequently addresses a real and relevant topic.

The fourth memorable attack ad in this campaign is the attack from the American Crossroads, which is a Super Political Action Committee (PAC). The attack targets Obama’s celebrity status (West, 2013). This attack fails to address any real issue and, thus, should not be viewed under the Fridkin and Kenney (2011) criteria as being able to influence voter favourability toward Obama. Finally, the Priorities USA Super PAC targeted Romney’s capitalization on Bain Capital, again indicating that Romney does not have the interests of the middle-class in mind, but instead has the interests of the upper-class in mind. This attack ad addresses a highly relevant issue.

For the most part, the attack ads of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election were likely to be somewhat effective in decreasing voter favourability. While there is no strong evidence that attack ads actually sway voter decisions or voter turnout (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007), there is evidence that voter favourability of a candidate can be decreased through political attack ads when such ads address a relevant issue (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). Moreover, attack ads tend to generate considerably more media attention than positive political ads. While this may seem, prima facie, to benefit candidates who put out attack ads, there is no evidence that such media coverage influences voter behaviour. Thus, the logic behind one of the primary reasons for attack ads may be flawed. Nevertheless, the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election featured a number of attack ads, many of which were on-topic and relevant, others were off-topic and irrelevant. The actual effectiveness of these attack ads is not currently known, though they likely, at the very least, increased media coverage for the targeted candidates.

References

Andrews, W., Keating, D., & Yourish, K. (2012) Mad Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign. The Washington Post. Accessed on 15 October 2015 from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidential-campaign-ads-2012/

Fridkin, K. L., & Kenney, P. (2011) Variability in Citizens’ Reactions to Different Types of Negative Campaigns. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), pp.307-325.

Fowler, E. F. (2012) Presidential Ads 70 Percent Negative in 2012, Up from 9 Percent in 2008. Wesleyan Media Project, May, 2, pp.119-136.

Geer, J. G. (2012) The News Media and the Rise of Negativity in Presidential Campaigns. PS: Political Science & Politics, 45(03), pp.422-427.

Hong, S., & Nadler, D. (2012) Which candidates do the public discuss online in an election campaign?: The use of social media by 2012 presidential candidates and its impact on candidate salience. Government Information Quarterly, 29(4), pp.455-461.

Jacobson, G. C. (2013) How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 Presidential and Congressional Elections. Political Science Quarterly, 128(1), pp.1-38.

Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007) The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: a Metaaˆ?analytic Reassessment. Journal of Politics, 69(4), pp.1176-1209.

Sides, J., & Vavreck, L. (2014) The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential Election. Princeton University Press.

West, D. M. (2013) Air Wars: Television Advertising and Social Media in Election Campaigns, 1952-2012. Sage.

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The human brain is the main source of nerve function in the body. It is the epicentre of the nervous system and controls all of the main neural functions of the human body (Lewiset al, 1998, 479-483). When assessing brain function, there are many different areas that are addressed, but one main area of concern is the actual aging of the brain. As the brain ages, the functions that it performs are broken down and degraded. The nerves become slower and the motor functions are less precise. Short term and long term memory is negatively affected and the overall brain function is broken down.

Many people attribute all of these detrimental effects to old age and poor health, when in reality oxidative stress and free radicals are the main causes of loss of brain function. Throughout this paper, actual brain function patterns will be examined, followed by some common reasons for brain function degradation. Then oxidative stress and its effects on the human brain will be looked at, along with a few of the common diseases and health problems that are associated with brain aging and loss of brain function.

The Brain: an Overview

The human brain is a mass of nerve tissue, synaptic gaps, and nerves (Lewis et al, 1998, 479-483). All of these parts work together to form what is known as the human brain. The brain is the main centre of nerve function in the body. The nervous system is controlled solely by the brain itself, which works as a kind of packaging centre for the messages that are delivered to each nerve cell by the body. However, the brain would not function properly if it were not for the job performed by each cell and its consequent parts. A cell is made up of the nerve cell itself, the synapse, and dendrite. Each dendrite is connected to the next dendrite by a small opening that allows the passage of chemicals such as Potassium and in order for proper neural functioning. The chemicals move along the dendritic pathway and form a gradient at the synaptic gap. The gradient then allows the chemical to trickle across the gap, which then causes the nerve to deliver its message (usually a message for a muscle to contract). If a gradient does not exist, then the message is not sent and the function is not performed properly. If a problem arises in the nervous system then it is usually due to the fact that the chemical gradient is incorrect at a particular synaptic gap, creating either a muscle seizure or some other undesirable reaction.

The main nerve cord of the body, known as the spinal column, is made up of layer upon layer of nerve cells. This mass of nerves serves as the pathway for all of the major neural messages of the body. It allows the chemical messages packaged by the brain to be transported to various parts of the body, and vice versa. All of the neural messages of the human body are delivered in a matter of seconds, that is why it does not seem as if there is along delay in between a particular stimuli and the consequent reaction. Branching out from the spinal cord itself are the various nervous pathways of the body. There are nerves that stretch all of the way to the fingertips and toes, but they all return to the spinal cord to deliver various stimulus messages. Each of the various nervous pathways is also made up of layers of nerve cells. All of the nerve cells of the body work together to form messages that are interpreted by the brain. The brain is able to decide what priority is needed to be appropriately assigned to each task and then takes action to perform those actions.

Brain Function

There are basically three main functions of the brain: memory, interpretation of data, and motor function control. Not only is the brain a packaging and interpretation centre for the neural messages of the human body, but it is also a storage bank for information. The brain stores information from everyday life using chemical reactions in the cerebrum to create memories. This information is then available for the rest of the brain’s life, regardless of whether a person can actually pull the information up to examine it.

The brain serves its main purpose of data interpretation by deciphering the messages and stimulus information that the human body encounters every day. Each and every piece of information that the body comes into contact with is sent through the brain to either store the information, cause a reaction to a stimulus, or to disregard it. This interpretation process is very exact, yet extremely fast. The entire process seems instantaneous, from the introduction of the information all the way to the interpretation results/stimuli reaction.

Finally, the brain controls all of the muscles of the body and consequently all motor control of the human body. Every movement, be it voluntary or involuntary is controlled by the brain. Each function of the muscles is perfectly coordinated and timed so that the abducting muscles work perfectly with the adducting muscles to produce useful movement. The brain coordinates each twitch of any muscle in the entire musculature system so that no energy is wasted in useless movement. Because the body is constantly in a delicate balance, it is necessary for the brain to be even more precise than the world’s most sophisticated computer when dealing with the body’s homeostasis. The body has many involuntary muscle movements that are necessary for life, but need not be thought about to be performed each time. A couple of these movements are such things as the contraction and expansion of the diaphragm in the stomach to allow respiration and the beating of the heart. However, other muscles and functions are also controlled by the brain, such as the movement in walking, swimming, or running. The contraction of the bladder and other voluntary, yet unthought of muscle contractions are also controlled by the brain.

Stressors of the Brain

In every cell of the body, there are what are known as redox reactions (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). Basically, a redox reaction is an oxidation-reduction chemical reaction in which one compound is oxidized (loses electrons) and another compound is reduced (gains electrons) (Zumdahl, 1991,216-220). Redox reactions are essential for survival and for the proper function of various organ systems in the body.

While redox reactions may be essential for survival, they can produce what are known as free radicals (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). A free radical is defined as any type of chemical existence that can stand alone and survive on its own without the need for any other chemicals to continue the life of the chemical (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). Free radicals contain unpaired electrons, which make the chemical very unstable (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). The unpaired electrons tend to try to pair with any other free electrons to achieve a stable outer electron ring (usually eight electrons). Therefore, the unstable free radicals are always trying to pair up with any and all organic chemicals that they come into contact with. Free radicals can be increased in the body by exercise and environmental stresses. They tend to be stored in the fat cells of the body and are released when fat is burned. The free radicals are then spread all throughout the body where they can then react with other organic substrates (OXIS Research, 2003, 1). These organic substrates include DNA and various proteins as well (OXIS Research, 2003, 1). The oxidation of these molecules can damage them and cause a great number of diseases (OXIS Research, 2003, 1).

There are several different organ systems that are predisposed to free radical damage. These organ systems include the circulatory system, the pulmonary system, the eye, the reproductive system, and the brain (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). While it is true that every organ system could be examined and an oxidative stress Achilles heel could be found, the brain is especially susceptible to free radical damage (OXIS Research, 2003,2). Oxidative stress is a term that is used when dealing with a build up of ROS chemicals (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). ROS stands for Reactive Oxygen Species and refers to many chemical oxygen derivatives (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). The build up of these chemicals can cause an imbalance of oxidant activity in the system (i.e. the brain) and can lead to several negative health effects including premature aging of the system and any number of diseases (OXIS Research, 2003, 2).

The oxidative reactions that take place in the body and especially the brain are regulated by a system known as the Antioxidant Defence System, or ADS for short (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). This system is a conglomerate of many different approaches to keeping free radical production and collection to a minimum in the body. The ADS contains antioxidant chemicals as well as a number of enzymes that can not only limit and control the overall production of oxidative reactions, but actually target damaged molecules for the purpose of replacement or repair (OXIS Research, 2003, 2).The actual antioxidants are either internally synthesized or are ingested by the organism via various fruits, vegetables, and grains (OXIS Research, 2003,2). Antioxidants are categorized into two different categories: Scavenger oxidants and prevention antioxidants (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). Scavenger antioxidants remove the ROS molecules from the body and include both small antioxidants (Vitamin C and glutamine) and large antioxidants that need to be synthesized by cells in the body before they can be used to protect the organ systems (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). Prevention antioxidants such as ferritin and myoglobin are designed to prevent the formation of new oxidants and free radicals (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). They work by binding to the various free radicals to protect the proteins that are essential in the organ system (OXIS Research, 2003, 2). This group includes such chemicals as metallothionine, albumin, and transferrin (OXIS Research, 2003, 2).

It is obvious that free radicals are at least a necessary evil in the body when it comes to the completion of certain processes. In order for proper functioning of the various life systems of the human body, it is necessary to have the by products of the processes (generally free radicals)present in the system. However, this does not mean that free radicals are safe or needed. Most of the time the body’s systems of removal (ADS, etc.) will take care of the overabundance of free radicals, however at times it is possible for even the ADS system to be overpowered by a great influx of free radicals. This phenomenon can be due to the production of energy by mitochondria or some other natural process, but in most cases this large influx of free radicals is caused either by environmental stresses or from being near various industrial processes. It is a great concern of researchers today that there are more free radicals being released into the environment by industrialactivities and other forms of pollution. These free radicals are easily bound to various food products that are produced by humans and have a detrimental health effect on both animals and humans. If more free radicals are present in the environment than in past historical records, there is a high risk of ingesting enough oxidants to produce an imbalance of free radicals that could lead to the ADS system not being able to handle the extra oxidant load. This would then result in a large epidemic of environmentally caused free radical damage and disease.

Degradation and the Effects on Brain Function

Due to the importance of the brain function to the body, it can be seen why it is imperative that the brain be kept in good working order so to speak. If the brain is allowed to degrade to the point that motor functions and memory is affected, then there could be long term health effects that can cause more problems than just brain functioning. If the brain is allowed to degrade to a point at which everyday muscular functions and other physiological functions begin to become harder to perform then there is a possibility that other more serious side effects could be on the horizon. Certain diseases are caused by brain degradation or are causation factors in brain aging and degradation itself. One such disease is Alzheimer’s Disease.

Alzheimer’s disease is a brain disorder that has many symptoms and causes the loss of memory, the ability to learn, and the ability to carry out everyday activities. Towards the end of the disease progression, Alzheimer’s can cause personality changes and even cause hallucinations and paranoia (Alzheimer’s Association, 2005, 2). Alzheimer’s is a form of dementia: a category of diseases that cause the systematic destruction of brain cells and lead to a decline in brain function and quality (Alzheimer’s Association, 2005, 2). It has many stages and eventually leads to the complete breakdown of the brain to the point of death (Alzheimer’s Association, 2005,2). A person who has a dementia disease will eventually need full-time care because of the loss of a large portion of the brain function (Alzheimer’s Association, 2005, 2). While Alzheimer’s and dementia are not the only neural disorders that have a progressive effect on brain function, they are two of the main problems that are faced in countries such as the United States and England. Researchers have not yet identified a known cause of Alzheimer’s disease, however the field has progressed great strides in the past few years. As of right now, the disease is linked to a genetic predisposition to the disease and generally bad aging habits (Alzheimer’s Association, 2005, 2). But there is still some value to the school of thought adopted by a few doctors that believe that diseases like Alzheimer’s, dementia, and Parkinson’s disease are all due to not only genetic factors but also to environmental stresses which would include the introduction of free radicals into the body. Free radicals can cause great disruption in the brain function mainly because the neurotransmitters and neurons that are present in the brain are very delicate and can be destroyed easily. The free radicals can bind to the various proteins that are used to transmit messages and perform repairs in the brain tissues, preventing them from performing their duties and causing a weakened brain state. Proteins are themselves very specific concerning binding properties and will only function correctly if they bind with the correct substrate (Staines et al, 1993, 130). Therefore, if the active site of the protein is disrupted by a free radical, then that protein is completely changed and will not perform as it was intended.

Brain Aging: An uphill battle

Many diseases are linked to free radicals and other types of oxidants, however another factor of brain function needs to be examined to get the entire picture concerning brain functions and memory. This factor is, of course, brain aging. It is what some call an unfortunate fact of life, but we all grow older. From the time of our birth all the way to our death, our body is in a constant state of degradation and repair (Ebbing and Gammon, 2002, 809). This is true for every part of the body including the brain and carries great consequences for overall brain function and health. The brain is a delicate organ that stores the information that runs the rest of the body’s functions. If it is allowed to age past a certain point and it is not in good health, then it is possible for bodily functions and memory to be detrimentally affected. As the brain ages, it becomes slightly more sluggish and tends to lose its edge so to speak. Because of the complexity of the brain itself, aging tends to have a harsh effect on its ability to function correctly. A major factor in the development of diseases such as dementia and other neural system diseases is often the aging of the brain. The older the brain is, the less it functions correctly. As of now, there is not a particular treatment or cure for dementia. The best that we can do is to simply make the patient comfortable and to try to make their lives as easy as possible when dealing with everyday life functions. It is the hope of researchers of brain aging that by forging new paths in the field of neural aging, that a cure will be found for such diseases as dementia and Alzheimer’s.

For years it has been common practice to believe that brain and neural diseases were caused either by environmental stresses or from brain aging. Today, however the tide is swaying more towards the middle than to either extreme. Researchers are starting to realize that the environment as well as brain aging could be factors in the development of certain diseases and disorders. Not only can both environmental factors and the age of the brain itself work together to cause stress on the brain, but some environmental factors can actually cause the brain to age prematurely as well. This premature aging is actually a worse form of aging than the actual aging process of the human body itself. Premature aging means that the brain is aging faster than it would naturally; in other words a brain that is supposed to only be five years old would look and function as if it were ten years old or older. The implications of this type of aging process are obvious. As the brain ages, neurons and neurotransmitters die and do not function as well as when the brain was younger, leading to memory loss and slower reaction time.

Brain aging is caused by many factors including environmental factors, industrial processes, and of course the passage of time. Two of these factors can be regulated: environmental factors and industrial processes. By regulating certain chemicals and industrial processes, it is possible to cut down on the amount of premature aging that occurs in the brain (Sharon, 1998,167). Certain industrial processes such as the metallurgic processes used in alloy formation as well as welding are known causes of brain degradation and causation factors in such diseases as Parkinson’s and manganism (Landis and Yu,1999, 213-217). Certain chemicals that are present in these various processes are able to penetrate through the blood brain barrier and contact the brain tissue directly. This can lead to tumours and neuron death that then causes cognitive problems as well as body function problems. The only good way to prevent such contamination is to completely negate contact with these chemicals at all. Researchers know this and that is why environmental laws are being put into place that allow for the prevention of release of these chemicals.

Aging of the brain occurs whether or not there are external environmental stressors present in the person’s surroundings. It occurs throughout the entire lifespan of the organism. Earlier in history it was believed that the aging of the brain caused the degradation of neurons no matter the circumstances, however it is the common belief today that as long as a few guidelines concerning lifestyle choices are followed, it is possible for the neurons of the brain to stay completely healthy and fully functional all the way until death. Brain aging is defined as the breakdown of the brain itself. The grooves in the brain tissue will grow wider and the actual weight of the brain material will decrease dramatically. New studies are showing that the plaques and neural tangles that were previously believed to have been the culprits of Alzheimer’s disease may actually not be the main disease causing factors after all (Brady et al, 2000, 864). It is a growing school of thought that the actual cause of dementia type diseases is actually result of complex chemical reactions in the brain (Brady et al, 2000, 864). This information is very important to neural researchers because it can completely change the focus of their research and hopefully eventually lead to a cure for dementia and other diseases of this type.

Conclusions

It is apparent that the aging of the brain is a major concern, especially to researchers studying the effects of specific kinds of neural diseases. It is believed that these diseases could have a myriad of causes, but brain aging may be a contributing factor in several or all of them. The overall aging of the brain is coming to the forefront of modern medicine because not much is known about it. It is becoming evident that what was thought to be facts concerning brain aging before was little more than just educated guesses. Now however, the technology is available that will allow the actual study of the brain and its functions to try to give a better picture of the breakdown of the organ. Once a specific timeline is established that shows the breakdown of a healthy brain, it will be possible to quantitatively measure the degradation of a diseased brain. While this may not seem very important, it is actually very useful information. This information can be used to explain to patients what they should expect to experience at specific time periods of their disease and could help prepare them for what is to come.

Brain aging information can also be of use to the doctors that are administering treatment, in as much that it would allow the doctor to determine at what stage the aging was in, and therefore what type of treatment to administer.

Oxidative brain stress is a completely different matter than brain aging as far as research is concerned. While it is true that more is known about free radicals and their effects on the brain than the aging process, it is important to understand why research of this kind needs to be continued. The world is constantly changing and the chemicals and different kinds of pollutants that are released are in a continuous state of advancement. Because of this it is necessary to continually be studying the physiological and biological effects of each new chemical that is developed and put onto the market. By performing this kind of research early on in the development process, it is possible to determine if there are any harmful effects of using the new chemicals. The early research performed as a preliminary study could lead to less disease and fewer health problems later on.

Overall, oxidative stress along with brain aging is newly emerging field that has the job of trying to answer age old questions that are concerned with brain and neural health. It is important to continue research in both of these areas so that advancements in modern medicine can be pursued. Society owes a great debt to the researchers who have and will spend their entire lives studying the effects of brain aging and oxidative stress on the functioning of the brain. Hopefully in the near future there will be great advancements made in the field of neural medicine to allow for better and more effective treatment of certain nervous system diseases.